Subnational Non-Hispanic White Natural Decrease in the United States

This research is the first to examine the prevalence and dynamics of non-Hispanic white natural decrease in fine scale subregional units of the United States. In 2015, more non-Hispanic Whites died than were born in 65 percent of the US counties. This is the highest incidence of non-Hispanic white natural decrease ever reported. It results from a complex interaction among fertility, mortality, and migration over a protracted period. Spatial regression is used to identify three critical variables (over-65 population, child–women ratio, and women of childbearing age) that are the immediate demographic causes of this natural decrease. The timely, factual information in this paper provides a demographic context for analysis of the social, political, and policy implications of this emergent demographic phenomenon.     

Natural Increase: A New Source of Population Growth in Emerging Hispanic Destinations in the United States

Updated US Census Bureau estimates and race/ethnic‐specific birth and death data for the post‐2000 period are used to highlight the increasing role of natural increase as an engine of population growth in emerging Hispanic destinations. Newly emerging Hispanic growth areas are distinguished from established and high‐growth areas from the 1990s. The findings document that recent Hispanic population gains have been generated increasingly by natural increase—the excess of Hispanic births over deaths. Hispanics accounted for 46 percent of the population gain and 53 percent of the natural increase in nonmetro America in 2000–2005. Yet, Hispanics represented only 5.4 percent of the nonmetro population in 2000. In metro areas, they accounted for 50 percent of the population gain and 47 percent of the natural increase, although they comprised only 14 percent of the metro population. Current trends suggest that the ascendancy of the US Hispanic population is likely to continue unabated, whether restrictive immigration legislation is enacted or not. The growth of the Hispanic population, caused increasingly by natural increase, has taken on a demographic momentum of its own.     

Is There a Stabilizing Selection Around Average Fertility in Modern Human Populations?

Possibly the greatest challenge for an evolutionary explanation of demographic transition is the fact that fertility levels universally start to fall first among the well‐to‐do, well‐educated, healthy classes, which can be explained only by some voluntary or at least adaptive action. The problem of how restraints on fertility could have evolved by natural selection has been tackled with group selection models as well as with stabilizing selection models. The latter model, which is critically discussed in this article, posits that some intermediate (rather than maximal) level of fertility is optimal for long‐term reproductive success. Tests of stabilizing selection in human populations are rare, their results inconclusive. Here four sets of data are analyzed: they are samples drawn from the 'class of 1950 of the US Military Academy at West Point (cohorts 1923–29), retired US noncommissioned officers (cohorts 1913–37), and western German and eastern German physicians (cohorts 1930–35), all containing fertility data over two generations, and from European royalty (cohorts 1790–1939) containing fertility data over four generations. Deterministic as well as stochastic fitness measures are used. It is found that maximal, not average, fertility in the first generation leads to maximal long‐term reproductive success. Also against prediction, no decreasing marginal fitness gains by increasing fertility can be observed. The findings leave little space for considering stabilizing selection as a plausible mechanism explaining the course of demographic transition but indicate instead that biological evolution today is as fast and vigorous as ever in human history. Even in large populations, all people living today may be the descendants of just some few percents—a much smaller proportion than generally believed— of the people living some generations ago.     

Growing Diversity among America's Children and Youth: Spatial and Temporal Dimensions

This study documents the changing racial and ethnic mix of America's children. Specifically, we focus on the unusually rapid shifts in the composition and changing spatial distribution of America's young people between 2000 and 2008. Minorities grew to 43 percent of all children and youth, up from 38.5 percent only eight years earlier. In 1990, this figure stood at 33 percent. Among 0–4‐year‐olds, 47 percent of all children were minority in 2008. Changes in racial and ethnic composition are driven by two powerful demographic forces. The first is the rapid increase since 2000 in the number of minority children—with Hispanics accounting for 80 percent of the growth. The second is the absolute decline in the number of non‐Hispanic white children and youth. The growth of minority children and racial diversity is distributed unevenly over geographical space. Over 500 (or roughly 1 in 6) counties now have majority‐minority youth populations. Broad geographic areas of America nevertheless remain mono‐racial, where only small shares of minorities live.     

Natural population decrease in Iowa counties

As a follow-up on the studies by Dorn and Beale, this paper examines differences between Iowa counties with natural decrease and those with natural increase and analyzes the part that migration and fertility played in bringing about an excess of deaths over births in Iowa counties. The county groups are distinctly different in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Out-migration as a mode of response adopted by the rural population in Iowa is by far the most dominant factor leading to natural decrease. Sustained net out-migration is more likely to touch off natural decrease in counties of comparatively low fertility than in those with higher fertility. Low fertility is, therefore, a contributing factor to the imbalance between births and deaths, but the amount of influence of fertility adjustment over the fertility differentials among county groups cannot be ascertained in this study because of the correlation between fertility and Catholic Church membership in counties. The data of this study were obtained from the population censuses and vital statistics.     

The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995

Marital status life tables were calculated using 1995 US rates of marriage, divorce, and mortality. Compared to figures for 1988, the proportion of persons surviving to age 15 who ever marry remained fairly steady at about five‐sixths of all men and seven‐eighths of all women. The average age at first marriage rose substantially: to 28.6 years for men and 26.6 years for women. The probability of a marriage ending in divorce changed little and was .437 for men and .425 for women. It is likely that no US period or cohort will ever have half of all marriages end in legal divorce, though the highest cohort may reach 47 percent. Patterns of marriage and divorce observed since 1970 show the effect that cohabitation continues to have on the American family, where it is delaying, but not replacing, marriage.     

A Closer Look at the Second Demographic Transition in the US: Evidence of Bidirectionality from a Cohort Perspective (1982–2006)

Second demographic transition (SDT) theory posits that increased individualism and secularization have contributed to low fertility in Europe, but very little work has directly tested the salience of SDT theory to fertility trends in the US. Using longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women who were followed throughout their reproductive years (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort, NLSY79), this study examines the role of several key indicators of the SDT (secularization, egalitarianism, religious affiliation, and female participation in the labor market) on fertility behavior over time (1982–2006). Analyses employ Poisson estimation, logistic regression, and cross-lagged structural equation models to observe unidirectional and bidirectional relationships over the reproductive life course. Findings lend support to the relevance of SDT theory in the US but also provide evidence of “American bipolarity” which distinguishes the US from the European case. Furthermore, analyses document the reciprocal nature of these relationships over time which has implications for how we understand these associations at the individual-level.     

Mortality of American Troops in the Iraq War

We estimate the death rate of United States troops deployed to Iraq from the beginning of the US invasion through 30 September 2006. Eighty percent of the deaths in Iraq were combat‐related. The death rate in Iraq is lower than that of the civilian population of the United States but substantially higher than that of young adults. It is much lower than the death rate of US troops in Vietnam, in part because a much smaller fraction die among those wounded in Iraq. We also estimate relative mortality levels for US troops according to numerous demographic variables through 30 November 2006. The risk of death in Iraq per deployment is shown to be highest for Marines; Naval and Air Force personnel in Iraq have lower death rates than the civilian population of comparable age. Other categories with above‐average mortality in Iraq are enlisted troops, males, younger persons, and Hispanics.     

The construction of the fertility model of variable parity from family planning practice]

Understanding the changing patterns of age specific fertility under the planning system is essential for building a fertility model which reflects birth control policy implementation in China. In building a Parity Variable Fertility Model, 4 basic elements are to be considered: 1) psychosocial, and physiological variables, 2) patterns of the total fertility rate and age-specific fertility rate, 3) socioeconomic development, and 4) distribution of parity-specific fertility. THe natural fertility of women is 17, calculated from a 309-years childbearing period, with 17% of non-susceptible time. In China, about 86% of natural fertility is suppressed by various factors. In this model, the following variables are included: 1) The first marriage ratio, which is the proportion of women in each age group which enters into a first marriage. The range and spread of this ratio is closely associated with the first birth. 2) The first birth ratio, which is the proportion of a marriage cohort to have a first birth each year. 3) the birth interval, which determines the distribution of second births. 4) Regulation coefficient B, which represents birth control regulations which approximately determine the number of second-parity or higher order births. The difference between the fertility level generated from the Parity Variable Fertility Model and reality depends on the implementation of birth control program, the assumptions on regulation coefficients, and changes in social and cultural factors. The model is easy to use, especially for areas where the marriage and fertility records of women of child-bearing are well kept.     

Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan

Between 1975 and 1995, the singulate mean age at marriage in Japan increased from 24.5 to 27.7 years for women and from 27.6 to 30.7 years for men, making Japan one of the latest‐marrying populations in the world. Over the same period, the proportion of women who will never marry, calculated from age‐specific first‐marriage probabilities pertaining to a particular calendar year, increased from 5 to 15 percent for women and from 6 to 22 percent for men—behaviors sharply different from those characterizing the universal‐marriage society of earlier years. This article investigates how and why these changes have come about. The reasons are bound up with rapid educational gains by women, massive increases in the proportion of women who work for pay outside the home, major changes in the structure and functioning of the marriage market, extraordinary increases in the prevalence of premarital sex, and far‐reaching changes in values relating to marriage and family life.     

Emptying the Nest: Older Men in the United States, 1880–2000

Between 1880 and 2000, the percentage of married men 60 and older living only with their wives in empty nest households rose from 19 percent to 78 percent. Data drawn from the US census show that more than half of this transformation occurred in the 30‐year period from 1940 to 1970, bookended by moderate increases between 1880 and 1940 and very modest increases after 1970. Two literatures have presented demographic, cultural, and economic explanations for the decline in elderly co‐residence with their children, but none adequately accounts for a sharp change in the mid‐twentieth century. Both aggregate comparisons and multivariate analysis of factors influencing the living arrangements of elderly men suggest that economic advances for all age groups in the critical 30‐year period, along with trends in fertility and immigration, best explain the three‐stage shift that made the empty nest the dominant household form for older men by the beginning of the twenty‐first century.     

The distribution of pollution and environmental justice in Puerto Rico: a quantitative analysis

This research quantifies the distribution of toxic releases in Puerto Rico to determine whether environmental inequality exists. We calculate an environmental Gini coefficient using Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data from 2000 to 2008. Our findings suggest Puerto Rico has a relatively constant and unequal distribution of releases over this time period. Based on this result, we investigate linkages between toxic releases and several socioeconomic and demographic indicators. We apply a quantile regression model using TRI data and American Community Survey data from 2005 to 2008 to identify important indicators across the distribution of releases. We find municipios (legal division equivalent to US counties) that have a higher percent of non-Puerto Rican Hispanic origin or high school educated population experience higher releases to all media. This also is true for unemployment, but only for municipios with the largest releases (i.e., highest quintile). The results also reveal municipios that are more densely populated or that have a higher percent of college degrees experience lower releases to all media. Higher proportions of certain age groups also suggest lower releases. These results are not constant across the distribution of releases; they are most significant in those municipios with the largest releases. This is even more obvious when we only examine releases to air.     

Gentrification and Segregated Wealth in Rural America: Home Value Sorting in Destination Counties

The term “gentrification” carries conflicting popular connotations, conjuring images of both revitalization and displacement. Despite a rich critical literature from urban social scientists, gentrification as it relates to rural housing and rural development is a similarly conflicted term. With the frequent conflation of rural gentrification and economic improvement, researchers and policy-makers alike need more nuanced techniques for identifying how the process distributes costs and benefits across households. This paper operationalizes rural gentrification as a specific demographic pattern of household migration, termed the “Rural Gentrification Score,” and maps its footprint between 1980 and 2000 in 25 US states. It then uses census data to better understand the impacts of rural gentrification on home values in rural counties, interrogating the popular notion that homeowners benefit from gentrification. Using comparative analyses, two related hypotheses about rural gentrification and inequality are explored: (1) that gentrified rural counties were susceptible to greater home value segregation and (2) that over time gentrification’s spread culminated in greater homogeneity of home values. Results support each of these hypotheses and point to nuances in the relationship between population turnover, inequality, and socioeconomic context. Most notably the findings highlight a spatial and temporal pattern of widening wealth inequality in gentrifying rural counties.     

Two Is Best? The Persistence of a Two‐Child Family Ideal in Europe

How persistent and universal has the two child family ideal been in Europe during the last three decades? We analyze responses of women of reproductive age from 168 surveys conducted in 37 countries in 1979–2012. A two‐child ideal has become nearly universal among women in all parts of Europe. Countries that used to display higher ideal family size have converged over time toward a two‐child model. Six out of ten women in Europe consider two children as ideal, and this proportion is very similar in different regions. The mean ideal family size has become closely clustered around 2.2 in most countries. Gradual shifts can be documented toward more women expressing an ideal of having one child (and, quite rarely, having no children) and a parallel decline in an ideal of three or more children. An increasing number of European countries saw their mean ideal family size falling to relatively low levels around 1.95–2.15. However, with the exception of one survey for eastern Germany and two of the surveys not included in our study owing to high nonresponse or low sample size, none of the analyzed surveys suggests a decline in mean ideal family size to levels considerably below replacement, i.e., below 1.9 children per woman.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Black-White Disparities in Life Expectancy: How Much Can the Standard SES Variables Explain?

This article quantifies the extent to which socioeconomic and demographic characteristics can account for black-white disparities in life expectancy in the United States. Although many studies have investigated the linkages between race, socioeconomic status, and mortality, this article is the first to measure how much of the life expectancy gap remains after differences in mortality are purged of the compositional differences in socioeconomic characteristics between blacks and whites. The decomposition is facilitated by a reweighting technique that creates counterfactual estimation samples in which the distribution of income, education, employment and occupation, marital status, and other theoretically relevant variables among blacks is made to match the distribution of these variables among whites. For males, 80% of the black-white gap in life expectancy at age 1 can be accounted for by differences in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. For females, 70% percent of the gap is accounted for. Labor force participation, occupation, and (among women only) marital status have almost no additional power to explain the black-white disparity in life expectancy after precise measures for income and education are controlled for.     

Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty‐First Century

The article discusses issues raised by persistent below‐replacement fertility in Europe. The continent's demographic predicament is highlighted by comparing age structures and relative population sizes between populations in and outside Europe—such as those of Russia and Yemen and those of an enlarged 25‐country European Union and a 25‐country hinterland to the EU in North Africa and West Asia—during the past 50 years and prospectively up to 2050, based on United Nations estimates and projections. Potential geopolitical aspects of the population shifts are considered. European policy responses to them are found largely wanting. With respect to the key demographic variable, fertility, explicit pronatalism is rejected by most European governments. A set of policy measures that commands wide support, with the hoped‐for side effect of raising birth rates, seeks to make women's participation in the formal labor force compatible with childrearing. The effectiveness of such measures, however, is likely to be limited. Continued below‐replacement fertility, higher immigration from outside Europe, negative population growth, and loss of demographic weight within the global population are safe predictions for the Europe of the twenty‐first century.     

The Contribution of Assisted Reproduction to Completed Fertility: An Analysis of Danish Data

Assisted reproduction has a minor but increasing influence on childbearing trends in advanced societies. In Denmark, the use of assisted reproduction technology (ART) has become particularly widespread. At the same time, Danish women born in the late 1950s and the 1960s experienced stabilization or even a slight increase in their mean number of children. Broad availability and widespread use of assisted reproduction may become important factors contributing to maintaining relatively high completed fertility among the younger cohorts of Danish women. To explore this idea, we analyze and project cohort trends in fertility rates among native Danish women born in 1960‐78 and examine the likely contribution of assisted reproduction to these trends. The projected proportion of children born after ART treatment shows a substantial increase from 2.1 percent among women born in 1965 to 4‐5 percent among women born in 1978, with an estimated net impact of ART (as compared with the hypothetical situation where no ART treatment was available) on the order of 3‐4 percent. When intrauterine inseminations are included, this implies that up to 7 percent of children of those native Danish women born in 1975 and later will likely be conceived by infertility treatment.     

Importance of fatalism in understanding mammography screening in rural elderly women

This study examined the relationship between demographic factors and other correlates of fatalism, and assessed the impact of fatalistic beliefs on the participation in breast cancer screening in rural women. The subjects were 220 women aged 50 and over recruited from 6 large rural counties in South Carolina. Data were collected using a demographic questionnaire and the revised Powe Fatalism Inventory. Results show significant associations between fatalism and increased age (p = 0.005), race (p = 0.0001), doctor recommendation (p = .0034) and decreased educational level (p = 0.001). Fatalism was associated with noncompliance with mammography screening in univariate analysis among African-American women (OR = .362; 95% CI: 1.11, 11.8). After adjusting for possible confounders (age, education, and doctor recommendation), fatalism was not significantly associated with noncompliance with screening. These results illustrate age, race, and education may be important predictors of fatalism and that fatalism may be one barrier that has previously gone unmeasured and unchallenged in understanding screening behavior in older women.     

Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia's Birth Rate

The total fertility rate in what is now the Russian Federation has been below replacement level during much of the last 40 years. By the late 1990s it was barely above 1.2 children per woman. There may have been some recovery since: the United Nations estimate for 2000–05 is 1.33. Other reports set the 2004 rate at 1.17. Countries elsewhere in Europe have fertility levels that are equally low or even lower, but the Russian demographic predicament is aggravated by mortality that is exceptionally high by modern standards. Thus, despite large‐scale net immigration (mostly due to return of ethnic Russians from other republics of the former Soviet Union), the population in the last decade‐and‐a‐half has been shrinking: of late by some 700,000 persons per year. The United Nations medium estimate assumes a steady recovery of the total fertility rate to reach a level of 1.85 by 2050 and a considerable improvement in survival rates during that period—notably an increase in male life expectancy at birth of more than ten years. It also assumes further modest net immigration at a steady rate, amounting to a total of somewhat over 2 million by midcentury. Under these stipulations the projected population of Russia in 2050 would be 112 million—some 31 million below its present size. By that time, 23 percent of the population would be aged 65 and older. The government's concern with the demographic situation of the country and its intent to improve it have been manifest in various official statements, notably in the annual State of the Nation Address given by the president to the Federal Assembly (or State Duma). Formerly a subordinate theme (see the Documents item in the June 2005 issue of PDR), the issue constituted the centerpiece of the 2006 Address, delivered on 10 May in the Kremlin by President Vladimir Putin. Policies regarding health and mortality were given short shrift in the speech—road safety, bootleg alcohol, and cardiovascular diseases being singled out as areas of special concern. The president's remarks on immigration are of greater interest: immigration of skilled persons is to be encouraged. They must be educated and law‐abiding and must treat the country's culture and national tradition with respect. The main focus of the address, however, was on the birth rate and policies to be introduced to raise it. (The need for an “effective demographic policy” as seen from the Kremlin was of course also voiced in the later stages of the Soviet era. See, for example, the excerpts from the addresses delivered by then Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Nikolai Tikhonov to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981 that appear in the Documents item in the June 1981 issue of PDR.) In detail and specificity, and also in terms of the economic cost of the measures envisaged, Putin's speech is without parallel in addressing population policy matters by a head of state in Europe. The demo graphically relevant portion of the address is reproduced below in the English translation provided by the website of the president's office « http://www.kremlin.ru/eng ». Calling Russia's demographic situation “the most acute problem facing our country today,” Putin terms its causes as “well known,” but lists only economic factors, presumably because these, at least in principle, lend themselves to remedial measures that the Russian government, its coffers now swollen with petrodollars, should be able to provide. His starkly economic interpretation of the problem of low fertility (in Russia apparently taking the form of convergence to a single‐child pattern) may be overly optimistic. Causes of electing to have only one child may lie deeper than those Putin names: low incomes, inadequate housing, poor‐quality health care and inadequate educational opportunities for children, and even lack of food. Putin's proposed policies to attack these problems in part consist of a major upgrading of existing child care benefits: to 1,500 roubles a month for the first child and 3,000 roubles for the second. The latter amount is roughly equivalent to US$113, a significant sum given Russian income levels. Maternity leave for 18 months at 40 percent of the mother's previous wage (subject to a ceiling) and compensation for the cost of preschool childcare round out the basic package proposed. Benefits are to be parity‐dependent, highlighting the pronatalist intent of the measures. Thus the child benefit for the second child is to be twice as large as for the first, and payment for preschool childcare is to cover 20 percent of parental costs for the first, 50 percent for the second, and 70 percent for the third child. Putin mentions “young families” as recipients, but the payments are clearly directed to mothers. (Even the usually obligatory reference to western European–style paternity leave is missing.) The most innovative element of the proposed measures, however, is support for women who have a second birth. The state should provide such women (not the child, as called for in some European precedents) “with an initial maternity capital that will raise their social status and help resolve future problems.” Citing expert opinion, Putin says that such support “should total at least 250,000 roubles [about $9,300] indexed to annual inflation.” Evidently assuming, optimistically, that there will be many takers, Putin says that carrying out all these plans will require not only a lot of work but also “an immense amount of money.” The measures are to be launched starting January 2007.