Equilibrium Wage‐Tenure Contracts

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage‐tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage‐tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job‐to‐job movements as well as wage‐tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.     

A Note on Air‐Cargo Capacity Contracts

Carriers (airlines) use medium‐term contracts to allot bulk cargo capacity to forwarders who deliver consolidated loads for each flight in the contractual period (season). Carriers also sell capacity to direct‐ship customers on each flight. We study capacity contracts between a carrier and a forwarder when certain parameters such as the forwarder's demand, operating cost to the carrier, margin, and reservation profit are its private information. We propose contracts in which the forwarder pays a lump sum in exchange for a guaranteed capacity allotment and receives a refund for each unit of unused capacity according to a pre‐announced refund rate. We obtain an upper bound on the informational rent paid by the carrier for a menu of arbitrary allotments and identify conditions under which it can eliminate the informational rent and induce the forwarder to choose the overall optimal capacity allotment (i.e., one that maximizes the combined profits of the carrier and the forwarder).     

Job Tenure,Labour Mobility and Wage Profiles

Abstract. The features and the length of the attachment of workers to firms represent a central aspect of the labour relationship. The length of service is an important determinant of wages and of non-pecuniary benefits; it affects internal mobility in the firm, and insulates workers with long job tenure from unemployment. In this paper it is argued that the traditional “spot” labour market Characterization is difficult to reconcile with the existence of long term employment relationships. A number of alternative theories which predict the existence of an employer-worker attachment proposed, and their implications discussed. The relevance of long term employment relationships is then tested using micro-data for the Italian manufacturing industry. An appropriate methodology for the analysis of the duration of employment is developed. and separate “job tenure” equations for white and blue collar workers are estimated. A higher educational attainment - ceteris paribus- appears to increase the probability of a job separation; conversely, a higher working experience, previous to the current job, tends to reduce it. The effect of firm size is negative, as larger organizations seem to favour longer employment spells. Outside opportunities show a strong positive effect on the probability of separation. Finally, conditional on the current wage, the probability of leaving the job increases with the length of time worked. However, when the unconditional outcome is considered, separation decline with tenure; in this case. it is argued, the wage effect more than outweighs the conditional effect. This result is consistent with the predictions of both “specific” human capital and job matching theories.     

Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts.     

Temporary Contracts,Employment Protection,and Collective Bargaining

This paper examines the effect of employment protection in a matching model with endogenous job destruction, collective bargaining, and two types of employment contracts. Using this framework, we show that (i) the impact on job creation and job destruction caused by reducing the firing costs associated with temporary jobs depends on the labour unions' bargaining strength and the gap in firing costs between contracts; (ii) reducing the firing costs associated with permanent jobs unambiguously decreases equilibrium unemployment if labour unions have strong bargaining power; and (iii) the impact caused by the firing costs differs between collective and individual bargaining.     

公仆型领导、员工集体和个人的工作态度对服务质量的影响

作者在13家宾馆和餐馆进行了一次实证研究,探讨饭店管理人员的公仆型领导风格、员工集体和个人的工作态度对员工的服务质量的影响。多层次线性模型分析结果表明,部门的公仆型领导氛围会直接影响员工集体的工作满意感,并通过集体情感性归属感,间接影响员工的服务质量。部门的公仆型领导氛围会调节员工感知的部门负责人的公仆型领导风格对他们的服务质量的影响;员工集体的情感性归属感会调节员工个人的工作满意感和情感性归属感对服务质量的影响。     

合同线性化与线性化合同

本文讨论了不对称信息下委托代理关系中合同的线性化与线性化的合同。我们的出发点是代理人之间的能力差异,由此诱发了同时存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题,为处理这一问题我们得到一个产出呈凹性的支付合同,并对其线性化,考虑到这一参数线性合同系的不稳定性,我们最终以无参数的线性合同来替代,从而更为接近现实中使用的合同。     

审计师任期、事务所任期与审计质量

利用审计师对财务危机的公司是否出具持续经营的查核意见,以及企业的异常营运资本,作为研究衡量审计质量良莠的代理变量,分析了中国审计师任期与会计师事务所任期对审计质量的影响。如果以查核意见作为被解释变量,没有发现审计师任期或事务所任期与审计质量有关联性的证据。然而,一旦以异常营运资本作为分析对象时,则发现较长的审计师任期有助于提高审计质量的证据。此外,当企业有增加盈余的动机时,还发现会计师事务所内的审计师之间有审计经验传承的效果。进一步的分析则显示,前述的发现主要来自于非四大会计师事务所。换言之,审计师任期的经验效果对于非四大会计师事务所更为重要。     

A Note on Compounded Conservatism

Compounded conservatism (or "creeping safety") describes the impact of using conservative, upper-bound estimates of the values of multiple input variates to obtain a conservative estimate of risk modeled as an increasing function of those variates. In a simple multiplicative model of risk, for example, if upper p -fractile (100 p th percentile) values are used for each of several statistically independent input variates, the resulting risk estimate will be the upper p' -fractile of risk predicted according to that multiplicative model, where p' > p . The amount of compounded conservativism reflected by the difference between p' and p may be substantial, depending on the number of inputs, their relative uncertainties, and the value of p selected. Particular numerical examples of compounded conservatism are often cited, but an analytic approach may better serve to conceptualize and communicate its potential quantitative impact. This note briefly outlines such an approach and illustrates its application to the case of risk modeled as a product of lognormally distributed inputs.     

Distributions of Total Job Tenure for Men and Women in Selected Industries and Occupations in the United States, February 1996

This article develops and fits probability distributions for the variability in projected (total) job tenure for adult men and women in 31 industries and 22 occupations based on data reported by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. It extends previously published results and updates those results from January 1987 to February 1996. The model provides probability distributions for the variability in projected (total) job tenures within the time range of the data, and it extrapolates the distributions beyond the time range of the data, i.e., beyond 25 years.     

A Portfolio Approach to Procurement Contracts

The purpose of this paper is to develop a general framework for supply contracts in which portfolios of contracts can be analyzed and optimized. We focus on a multi‐period environment with convex contract, spot market, and inventory holding costs. We specialize the model to the case of a portfolio consisting of option contracts. We characterize the optimal replenishment policy and show that it has a simple structure. Namely, the use of every different option contract and the spot market is dictated by a modified base‐stock policy. In addition, we derive conditions to determine when an option is relatively attractive compared to other options or the spot market. Finally, we present our computational study, where we report the sensitivity of the results to the parameters of the model. Our experiments indicate that portfolio contracts not only increase the manufacturer's expected profit, but can also reduce its financial risk.     

集体智慧的内涵及研究综述

基于对集体智慧的内涵、组成及形成过程的探讨,综述了国内外关于集体智慧的优越性、影响因素及应用研究,构建了集体智慧的理论研究框架。该框架从个体智慧贡献、集体智慧形成及集体智慧平台发展3个方面梳理了集体智慧发展的影响因素,并整合了集体智慧的主要应用领域。     

A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability

We consider a decision maker who ranks actions according to the smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). An action is justifiable if it is a best reply to some belief over probabilistic models. We show that higher ambiguity aversion expands the set of justifiable actions. A similar result holds for risk aversion. Our results follow from a generalization of the duality lemma of Wald (1949) and Pearce (1984).     

经理任期风险和公司治理的实证分析

对公司经理任期的约束应该是公司治理的一个重要方面.本文通过多元线性回归和生存分析的方法检验了内外部治理因素对经理职位变动的影响.这两种方法得出的结果大同小异,相互补充.从结果可以看出,董事长和总经理因为同样处于代理人的位置,所以他们的任期风险影响因素中有几个是共同的:市场业绩、年龄、学历、股权变更.市场业绩的影响作用和理论相反.由于董事长和总经理存在权力的分别,所以领导独立性、内部监事比例和企业规模三个变量对两个职位任期风险的影响作用不同.另外,在检验的变量中,企业的利润率和国有股权比例都没有对经理任期风险产生显著影响,说明经理任期风险并不受企业会计业绩和企业股权性质的影响.     

在有效前沿上集中投资回报的分配

基于均值-方差模型对在有效前沿上集中投资回报提出一个既能增加单个投资者的期望回报,又能减少风险的分配方式,而且此种分配使得投资经理可获得正的期望回报。     

基于挣值的项目管理多业绩指标激励合同研究

应用EVM中两个基本业绩测度(计划差异和成本差异)建立一个多任务委托代理项目管理模型,并给出确定合同参数的计算方法。进一步,给出了最优激励强度之间的关系:当代理人两种努力相互替代(互补,独立)时,相应的激励强度之间也存在着替代(互补,独立)关系。最后,分析了外生参数的变化对这种替代(互补)关系中的替代(互补)程度的影响。结果表明,最优激励强度之间的替代(互补)程度随着代理人努力之间的替代(互补)程度、代理人风险规避程度和代理人用于降低实际成本努力的边际相对风险的增加而增加,但随着代理人用于提高挣值的努力的边际相对风险的增加而减小。     

A Note on the Inoperability Input-Output Model

In this note, we propose some comments and some extensions of the inoperability input-output model (IIOM), as recently proposed by Santos and Haimes (2004). In particular, we propose the use of some analytic tools capable of providing information on the reaction of sectors subsequent to a terrorist attack on infrastructure service sectors. These tools, namely, the field of influence and the multiplier product matrix, provide information on the way sectors react to a shock on the aggregate demand and/or to a (temporary or permanent) change of production function coefficients. Finally, using the 2003 65 sectors input-output matrix for the U.S. economy, a simple empirical example is presented.     

Definable and Contractible Contracts

This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions of the Godel code of every other player's contract. We provide a complete characterization of the set of allocations supportable as pure‐strategy Bayesian equilibria of this contracting game. When information is complete, this characterization provides a folk theorem. In general, the set of supportable allocations is smaller than the set supportable by a centralized mechanism designer.