Testing Multiple Forecasters

We consider a cross‐calibration test of predictions by multiple potential experts in a stochastic environment. This test checks whether each expert is calibrated conditional on the predictions made by other experts. We show that this test is good in the sense that a true expert—one informed of the true distribution of the process—is guaranteed to pass the test no matter what the other potential experts do, and false experts will fail the test on all but a small (category I) set of true distributions. Furthermore, even when there is no true expert present, a test similar to cross‐calibration cannot be simultaneously manipulated by multiple false experts, but at the cost of failing some true experts.     

Why Frequency is Not Well Defined for Engineering Systems with Nonexponential Failure Times

Dr. Yellman proposes to define frequency as “a time‐rate of events of a specified type over a particular time interval.” We review why no definition of frequency, including this one, can satisfy both of two conditions: (1) the definition should agree with the ordinary meaning of frequency, such as that less frequent events are less likely to occur than more frequent events, over any particular time interval for which the frequencies of both are defined; and (2) the definition should be applicable not only to exponentially distributed times between (or until) events, but also to some nonexponential (e.g., uniformly distributed) times. We make the simple point that no definition can satisfy (1) and (2) by showing that any definition that determines which of any two uniformly distributed times has the higher “frequency” (or that determines that they have the same “frequency,” if neither is higher) must assign a higher frequency number to the distribution with the lower probability of occurrence over some time intervals. Dr. Yellman's proposed phrase, “time‐rate of events … over a particular time interval” is profoundly ambiguous in such cases, as the instantaneous failure rates vary over an infinitely wide range (e.g., from one to infinity), making it unclear which value is denoted by the phrase “time‐rate of events.”     

A Mechanism‐Design Approach to Speculative Trade

When two parties have different prior beliefs about some future event, they can realize gains through speculative trade. Can these gains be realized when the parties' prior beliefs are not common knowledge? We examine a simple example in which two parties having heterogeneous prior beliefs, independently drawn from some distribution, bet on what future action one of them will choose. We define a notion of “constrained interim‐efficient” best and ask whether they can be implemented in Bayesian equilibrium by some mechanism. Our main result establishes that as the costs of unilaterally manipulating the bet's outcome become more symmetric across states, implementation becomes easier. In particular, when these costs are equal in both states, implementation is possible for any distribution.     

Technical Note – Pricing Below Cost Under Exchange‐Rate Risk

Pricing below cost is often classified as “dumping” in international trade and as “predatory pricing” in local markets. It is legally prohibited from practice because of earlier findings that it leads to predatory behavior by either eliminating competition or stealing market share. This study shows that a stochastic exchange rate can create incentives for a profit‐minded monopoly firm to set price below marginal cost. Our result departs from earlier findings because the optimal pricing decision is based on a rational behavior that does not exhibit any malicious intent against the competition to be considered as violating anti‐trust laws. The finding is a robust result, because our analysis demonstrates that this behavior occurs under various settings such as when the firm (i) is risk‐averse, (ii) can postpone prices until after exchange rates are realized, (iii) is capable of manufacturing in multiple countries, and (iv) operates under demand uncertainty in addition to the random exchange rate.     

9 Validity,Validation and Values

Abstract

Tests and assessments are used in organizations for a wide range of purposes, and it is the uses of tests, not the tests themselves, that are validated. As a result, the critical question is often not “Is this test valid?”, but rather “Valid for what?”. Tests normally have multiple uses and purposes in organizations, which may be defined and understood differently by different stakeholders, and tests might have as many validities as they have uses. The strengths and weaknesses of existing validation strategies are examined and compared in the light of the ways tests are used in organizations. Content validation often seems unconnected with the ways tests are used and interpreted in organizations, and is not always useful a strategy for validating tests. Criterion‐oriented validation methods (including sophisiticated variants, such as the validity generalization model) are often deficient because they apply a univariate strategy for evaluating what is clearly a multivariate phenomenon—i.e., use of test scores to make high‐stakes decisions in organization. Multivariate models of validation provide an opportunity to integrate qualitatively different criteria (e.g., efficiency and equity) in evaluating the validity of a test as it is used in an organization.     

Instrumental Variable Treatment of Nonclassical Measurement Error Models

While the literature on nonclassical measurement error traditionally relies on the availability of an auxiliary data set containing correctly measured observations, we establish that the availability of instruments enables the identification of a large class of nonclassical nonlinear errors‐in‐variables models with continuously distributed variables. Our main identifying assumption is that, conditional on the value of the true regressors, some “measure of location” of the distribution of the measurement error (e.g., its mean, mode, or median) is equal to zero. The proposed approach relies on the eigenvalue–eigenfunction decomposition of an integral operator associated with specific joint probability densities. The main identifying assumption is used to “index” the eigenfunctions so that the decomposition is unique. We propose a convenient sieve‐based estimator, derive its asymptotic properties, and investigate its finite‐sample behavior through Monte Carlo simulations.     

A Maximum Entropy Joint Demand Estimation and Capacity Control Policy

We propose a tractable, data‐driven demand estimation procedure based on the use of maximum entropy (ME) distributions, and apply it to a stochastic capacity control problem motivated from airline revenue management. Specifically, we study the two fare class “Littlewood” problem in a setting where the firm has access to only potentially censored sales observations; this is also known as the repeated newsvendor problem. We propose a heuristic that iteratively fits an ME distribution to all observed sales data, and in each iteration selects a protection level based on the estimated distribution. When the underlying demand distribution is discrete, we show that the sequence of protection levels converges to the optimal one almost surely, and that the ME demand forecast converges to the true demand distribution for all values below the optimal protection level. That is, the proposed heuristic avoids the “spiral down” effect, making it attractive for problems of joint forecasting and revenue optimization problems in the presence of censored observations.     

Philosophical speculations on systems design

Belief in the value of the scientific method as a means of implementing improvement in social systems (here called “systems design”—SD) raises important philosophical questions concerning, inter alia, the meaning of “scientific method”, of “improvement”, and of social reality. One underlying problem is that of the “self reflecting paradox”; e.g. the content and validity of the scientific method can only be discovered by the application of the scientific method. Similarly, SD has its own “social reality” through which it perceives that of its client. “Improvement” is bound up with ethics but ethics does not admit the limitation of obligation to one sub-system, therefore improvement requires the recognition of sub-system linkages. Paradoxically, again, the “improver” is himself part of the total system and bears its impress. Implementation (of improvement) meets the paradox that SD on SD is needed to judge the worth of the SD proposal. The pragmatic escape from the paradox identifies SD with a heuristic role in social progress but presupposes the possibility of progress. “Implementation” secures the possibility of such progress. The second major problem is that SD requires a social reality in which individuals have visible goals; but the “inner world” of individual goals is unknown and cannot be tracked from observable responses. In any case, Kant's moral precept requires that individuals be valued as ends rather than means. Much of SD uses them as means. Though SD is and must be practised, such philosophical speculation raises SD's self knowledge and points the neat paradox of its technical precision won at the price of its fundamental woolliness.     

MANUFACTURING STRATEGY ON THE “S” CURVE

The concept and techniques of “manufacturing strategy” offer managers the opportunity to use their production function as a strategic weapon in competition, an apparently attractive objective. Yet after about 25 years, the use of manufacturing in corporate strategy (MCS) as a management practice is not widespread. In contrast, however, in academic literature it appears to be flourishing and rapidly growing in popularity. This paper seeks to answer this apparent paradox, beginning with the history of MCS as it was developed as a theory of design to enable a manufacturing system to be focused on a key competitive task. Common criticisms of MCS, such as “tradeoffs,” “focus” and “undynamic,” are examined and refuted as valid reasons for its only modest usage. Instead, three “new” problems in the MCS concept and its techniques are suggested as genuine needs for the completion of the theory and for its becoming more universally understood and used by industrial managers.     

Supply Chain Management of Fresh Products with Producer Transportation*

This article considers a class of fresh‐product supply chains in which products need to be transported by the upstream producer from a production base to a distant retail market. Due to high perishablility a portion of the products being shipped may decay during transportation, and therefore, become unsaleable. We consider a supply chain consisting of a single producer and a single distributor, and investigate two commonly adopted business models: (i) In the “pull” model, the distributor places an order, then the producer determines the shipping quantity, taking into account potential product decay during transportation, and transports the products to the destination market of the distributor; (ii) In the “push” model, the producer ships a batch of products to a distant wholesale market, and then the distributor purchases and resells to end customers. By considering a price‐sensitive end‐customer demand, we investigate the optimal decisions for supply chain members, including order quantity, shipping quantity, and retail price. Our research shows that both the producer and distributor (and thus the supply chain) will perform better if the pull model is adopted. To improve the supply chain performance, we propose a fixed inventory‐plus factor (FIPF) strategy, in which the producer announces a pre‐determined inventory‐plus factor and the distributor compensates the producer for any surplus inventory that would otherwise be wasted. We show that this strategy is a Pareto improvement over the pull and push models for both parties. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted, which reveal some interesting managerial insights on the comparison between different business models.     

Temptation and Taxation

We study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self‐control problems. Embedding the class of preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting, we first prove, in a two‐period model, that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by “excessive” impatience. The savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive. We then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests, as a special case, the Phelps–Pollak–Laibson multiple‐selves model (thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model). We prove that when period utility is logarithmic, the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon. Moreover, as the horizon grows large, the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy, in contrast to the well known Chamley–Judd result.     

Shareholders' Wealth‐Maximizing Operating Decisions and Risk Management Practices in a Mixed Contracts Economy

This paper establishes a critically important positive role for operations management practices and financial hedging. We show that operations management decisions and financial hedging are intertwined, and we advance a framework that can identify their combined effects on investors' wealth. We show that: (a) firms (publicly traded corporations) will optimally hold adequate riskless working capital (e.g., cash) to minimize the cost of obtaining non‐financial inputs, and the magnitude of this cash holding depends on operating details, and (b) operations management and financial hedging can lower firms' cash requirements, and boost productivity, defined as the wealth created in the firm per dollar of invested capital. Productivity‐enhancing practices—by “freeing up” some of the firm's cash—can maximize the investors' wealth. We show that these results obtain because firms' contracts with many of the providers of non‐financial inputs are not traded, and because investors can invest not just in public corporations but also in businesses “outside the markets” (e.g., proprietorships, partnerships, and private equity).     

MANAGING CREDIT BUBBLES

We study a dynamic economy where credit is limited by insufficient collateral and, as a result, investment and output are too low. In this environment, changes in investor sentiment or market expectations can give rise to credit bubbles, that is, expansions in credit that are backed not by expectations of future profits (i.e., fundamental collateral), but instead by expectations of future credit (i.e., bubbly collateral). Credit bubbles raise the availability of credit for entrepreneurs: this is the crowding‐in effect. However, entrepreneurs must also use some of this credit to cancel past credit: this is the crowding‐out effect. There is an “optimal” bubble size that trades off these two effects and maximizes long‐run output and consumption. The equilibrium bubble size depends on investor sentiment, however, and it typically does not coincide with the “optimal” bubble size. This provides a new rationale for macroprudential policy. A credit management agency (CMA) can replicate the “optimal” bubble by taxing credit when the equilibrium bubble is too high and subsidizing credit when the equilibrium bubble is too low. This leaning‐against‐the‐wind policy maximizes output and consumption. Moreover, the same conditions that make this policy desirable guarantee that a CMA has the resources to implement it.     

Channel Conflict and Coordination in the E‐Commerce Age

A number of factors, including developments in Internet‐based commerce and third‐party logistics, have led many companies to consider engaging in direct sales. Such a company may at once be both a supplier to and a direct competitor of any existing reseller partners (e.g., land‐based retailers), which can result in “channel conflict.” This can have momentous implications for distribution strategy. To generate managerial insights into this important issue, we develop a model that captures key attributes of such a setting, including various sources of inefficiency. We examine these in detail and identify a number of counterintuitive structural properties. For instance, the addition of a direct channel alongside a reseller channel is not necessarily detrimental to the reseller, given the associated adjustment in the manufacturer's pricing. In fact, both parties can benefit. Finally, we examine ways to adjust the manufacturer‐reseller relationship that have been observed in industry. These include changes in wholesale pricing, paying the reseller a commission for diverting customers toward the direct channel, or conceding the demand fulfillment function entirely to the reseller. The latter two schemes could be mutually beneficial in that they achieve a division of labor according to each channel's competitive advantage.     

Outsourcing Manufacturing: Secure Price‐Masking Mechanisms for Purchasing Component Parts

This paper develops and tests a privacy‐preserving business process that supports the selection of a contract manufacturer by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), and the determination of whether the OEM or the chosen contract manufacturer will procure each of the components to be used in the manufacture of the OEM's branded product. Our “secure price‐masking (SPM)” technology contributes to procurement theory and practice in four significant ways: First, it preserves the privacy of every party's individual component prices. Second, SPM assures that the contract manufacturers will bid their own private purchase cost (i.e., not add a margin to their cost). Third, SPM is not invertible; i.e., none of the participants can “solve” for the private inputs of any other participant based on its own inputs and the outputs provided to it by SPM. Fourth, the posterior distribution of any other participant's private inputs is practically indistinguishable from its prior distribution. We also describe the results of a proof‐of‐concept implementation.     

Specters,Inc.: The Elusive Basis of the Corporation

In this article we discuss the political and economic consequences of the contemporary legal theory of incorporation. We argue that incorporation has developed historically in a way that makes it internally inconsistent, but that this inconsistency is useful for the powerful because of its legal and economic effects. The corporation can “shape shift,” which is very helpful for claiming some rights and disavowing certain responsibilities. Of course this flexibility comes at the expense of consistent concepts and this leads to the creation of what we term an “ideal‐type reified singular representation.” We go on to show the far‐reaching effects of this representation for legal studies, economics, and political theory, and show it worked in the pro‐corporate decision in the recent Citizens United case. We conclude by providing several alternative ways to think about the nature of corporate organization.     

Invisible Whispering: Restructuring Collaborative Decision Making with Instant Messaging

Organizational decision making is dominated by teams. When an important decision is required, a team is often formed to make it or to advise the individual decision maker, because a team has more resources, knowledge, and political insight than any one individual working alone. As teams have become geographically distributed, collaboration technology has come to play an important role in such collective decision making efforts. Instant messaging (IM) is an increasingly prevalent workplace collaboration technology that enables near‐synchronous text exchanges on a variety of devices. We examined the use of IM during face‐to‐face, telephone, and computer‐mediated team meetings, a practice we call “invisible whispering.” We introduce Goffman's characterization of social interaction as dramatic performance, differentiable into “front stage” and “backstage” exchanges, to analyze how invisible whispering alters the socio‐spatial and temporal boundaries of team decision making. Using IM, workers were able to influence front stage decision making through backstage conversations, often participating in multiple backstage conversations simultaneously. This type of interaction would be either physically impossible or socially constrained without the use of IM. We examine how invisible whispering changes the processes of collaborative decision making and how these new processes may affect the efficiency and effectiveness of collaborative decision making, as well as participation, satisfaction, relationships among team members, and individual attention.     

Optimal Pricing Strategies for Capacity Leasing Based on Time and Volume Usage in Telecommunication Networks

In this study, we examined optimal pricing strategies for “pay‐per‐time,” “pay‐per‐volume,” and “pay‐per‐both‐time‐and‐volume” based leasing of data networks in a monopoly environment. Conventionally, network capacity distribution includes short‐/long‐term bandwidth and/or usage time leasing. When customers choose connection‐time–based pricing, their rational behavior is to fully utilize the bandwidth capacity within a fixed time period, which may cause the network to burst (or overload). Conversely, when customers choose volume‐based strategies their rational behavior is to send only the minimum bytes necessary (even for time‐fixed tasks for real time applications), causing the quality of the task to decrease, which in turn creates an opportunity cost for the provider. Choosing a pay‐per time and volume hybridized pricing scheme allows customers to take advantage of both pricing strategies while lessening the disadvantages of each, because consumers generally have both time‐ and size‐fixed tasks such as batch data transactions. One of the key contributions of this study is to show that pay‐per both time and volume pricing is a viable and often preferable alternative to the offerings based on only time or volume, and that judicious use of such a pricing policy is profitable to the network provider.     

Managing Retail Shelf and Backroom Inventories When Demand Depends on the Shelf‐Stock Level

Inventory displayed on the retail sales floor not only performs the classical supply function but also plays a role in affecting consumers’ buying behavior and hence the total demand. Empirical evidence from the retail industry shows that for some types of products, higher levels of on‐shelf inventory have a demand‐increasing effect (“billboard effect”) while for some other types of products, higher levels of on‐shelf inventory have a demand‐decreasing effect (“scarcity effect”). This suggests that retailers may use the amount of shelf stock on display as a tool to influence demand and operate a store backroom to hold the inventory of items not displayed on the shelves, introducing the need for efficient management of the backroom and on‐shelf inventories. The purpose of this study is to address such an issue by considering a periodic‐review inventory system in which demand in each period is stochastic and depends on the amount of inventory displayed on the shelf. We first analyze the problem in a finite‐horizon setting and show under a general demand model that the system inventory is optimally replenished by a base‐stock policy and the shelf stock is controlled by two critical points representing the target levels to raise up/drop down the on‐shelf inventory level. In the infinite‐horizon setting, we find that the optimal policies simplify to stationary base‐stock type policies. Under the billboard effect, we further show that the optimal policy is monotone in the system states. Numerical experiments illustrate the value of smart backroom management strategy and show that significant profit gains can be obtained by jointly managing the backroom and on‐shelf inventories.