Adolescent fertility programs: taking the first few steps

Adolescent fertility programs in Asia and the Pacific have a long way to go to check the problems associated with adolescent fertility, but a start has been made. Delegates from 8 countries met in 1982 to share their problems and experiences in their own countries. The conference participants drew up plans to deal with a high rate of adolescent fertility, sexually active adolescents, out-of-wedlock births, unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, prostitution, rape, abortion, and drug addiction. The delegates felt that for adolescent fertility programs to be effective the program workers must first be equipped with the needed skills through proper training. Inadequate knowledge of the subject matter, inability to communicate with adolescents, personal bias, and lack of counseling skills were among the worker-related problems that conference participants identified. A few months after the conference, participant countries conducted a training program on the effective delivery of adolescent fertility-related information and counseling services. The training program, held in Manila from January 23 to February 2, 1984, was conducted by the Population Center Foundation and sponsored by the Family Planning International Assistance. Training program objectives included: in crease the participants' knowledge of sexuality-related matters; help them to communicate better with adolescents on matters related to sexuality and fertility; make them aware of other ways of responding to fertility-related information needs of adolescents; and improve their skills in counseling adolescents. Lectures, structured learning activities, discussions, role playing, and other methods were used to maximize learning. The training program was divided into 6 modules: group dynamics; human sexuality; information dissemination; counseling techniques; management; and action planning. The plans of Fiji, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Philippines are reviewed. Organizers of the training program are confident that the action plans of the individual countries will take shape soon and clear the path toward more effective adolescent fertility programs.     

Adolescent fertility: worldwide concerns

There is growing concern over the adverse health, social, economic, and demographic effects of adolescent fertility. Morbidity and mortality rates ar significantly higher for teenage mothers and their infants, and early initiation of childbearing generally means truncated education, lower future family income, and larger completed family size. Adolescent fertility rates, which largely reflect marriage patterns, range from 4/1000 in Mauritania; in sub-Saharan Africa, virtually all rates are over 100. In most countries, adolescent fertility rates are declining due to rising age at marriage, increased educational and economic opportunities for young women, changes in social customs, increased use of contraception, and access to abortion. However, even if fertility rates were to decline dramatically among adolescent women in developing countries, their sheer numbers imply that their fertility will have a major impact on world population growth in the years ahead. The number of women in the world ages 15-19 years is expected to increase from 245 million in 1985 to over 320 million in the years 2020; 82% of these women live in developing countries. As a result of more and earlier premarital sexual activity, fostered by the lengthening gap between puberty and marriage, diminished parental and social controls, and increasing peer and media pressure to be sexually active, abortion and out-of-wedlock childbearing are increasing among teenagers in many developed and rapidly urbanizing developing countries. Laws and policies regarding sex education in the schools and access to family planning services by adolescents can either inhibit or support efforts to reduce adolescent fertility. Since contraceptive use is often sporadic and ineffective among adolescents, family planning services are crucial. Such programs should aim to reduce adolescents' dependence on abortion through preventive measures and increase awareness of the benefits of delayed sexual activity. Similarly, sex education should seek to provide a basis for intelligent, informed decision making. Programs tailored to reach teenagers in schools, recreational centers, and the workplace have particular potential.     

Pop-ed programs for the out-of-school youth

39% of the Philippines youth are not in school and these youths receive no training for responsible parenthood and community life. A number of agencies try to reach these members of society, including the Bureau of Youth Welfare (BYW), the Family Planning Organization of the Philippines (FPOP), the Foundation for Youth Development in the Philippines (FYDP), the Rizal Youth Development Foundation (RYDF), the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), and the Philippine Youth Welfare Coordinating Committee. BYW conducts informal group sessions including discussions among 13-24 year old members who have started self-employment projects. FPOP's youth program, SIGLA, aims at developing out-of-school youths social y and having them disseminate information to other out of school youths. This information includes family development, family planning, and population-related information, and is disseminated through activities and workshops. FYDP aims at functional literacy but also disseminates family planning information to out-of-school youths. RYDF conducts week-long seminars in topics such as birth processes, family relations, and care of babies. PRRM integrates population and family planning into its nonformal education program for out-of-school youth and adults in Nueva Ecija Province. Problems encountered in these programs are 1) suspicion of parents, and 2) feelings of inadequacy on the part of teachers. While emphasis has been on unemployed youth, efforts should be made to reach those youth who are employed.     

How development programs can affect fertility: the case of Bangladesh

Improving living standards and increasing productivity in developing countries may result in fertility reduction. In Bangladesh, government policy stresses rural development and fertility reduction. Programs that raise women's status reduce fertility. Educational level is inversely correlated to childbearing. Women aged 25-29 with a Secondary School Certificate have 2.4 children, versus 4.0 for those with no education. Employment also decreases fertility. Thus, improving the educational and employment status of women could have major effects on fertility. Studying the Bangladesh Rural Social Services program revealed that community organization efforts and self-help programs for economic and social improvement also decrease fertility. Rural electrification programs, which have been emphasized in development planning, contribute to changing attitudes and behavior of residents of these regions. In addition to electrification, improved transportation and communications should enhance the spread of information to rural areas. Agricultural development programs, such as the Comilla development program, have not affected fertility. This is attributed to the concentration of benefits to a few farms, with the majority becoming poorer. Unless agricultural development benefits are widely distributed, there will probably be little effect on fertility. Thus, the development programs most likely to affect fertility are those which emphasize female education and employment, open rural areas to information and ideas, and are open to a whole community.     

How economic development and family planning programs combined to reduce indonesian fertility

This paper examines the contributions of family planning programs, economic development, and women’s status to Indonesian fertility decline from 1982 to 1987. Methodologically we unify seemingly conflicting demographic and economic frameworks into a single “structural” proximate-cause model as well as controlling statistically for the targeted (nonrandom) placement of family planning program inputs. The results are consistent with both frameworks: 75% of the fertility decline resulted from increased contraceptive use, but was induced primarily through economic development and improved education and economic opportunities for females. Even so, the dramatic impact of the changes in demand-side factors (education and economic development) on contraceptive use was possible only because there already existed a highly responsive contraceptive supply delivery system.     

Breastfeeding women and family planning programs: special needs and opportunities

Although breastfeeding makes a major contribution to fertility control and child spacing in many developing countries, the implications of this are not widely recognized. Terminology may be part of the reason. Contraception may imply something modern, whereas the contraceptive effect of breastfeeding is a natural biological mechanism. Also, many family planning program managers are educated in the West, where breastfeeding is of little contraceptive importance. Regardless of where they were educated, they may consider the pregnancy-postponing effects of breastfeeding as mythology, or may consider breastfeeding as sufficiently effective at the individual level. Breastfeeding as a family planning method cannot be "delivered" to women by family planning methods, and requires an educational approach rather than a clinical or medical approach. A women might use breastfeeding more confidently in avoiding an unplanned pregnancy if she begins using a contraceptive method as soon as she resumes menses, when she begins giving her baby food supplements, or by 6 months post partum--whichever comes first. She can achieve high effectiveness in avoiding pregnancy by keeping the baby nearby and feeding on demand, feeding frequently, sleeping near the baby and maintaining nightfeedings, not giving the baby bottles or pacifiers, and giving the baby only breastmilk for at least 4 months. Breastfeeding can only be used by new mothers and cannot be used to postpone the 1st birth. Nor is it appropriate for women who have attained their desired family size, or who wish to avoid or postpone pregnancy at any cost.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the year 2000: the role of Protestantism

Social transformations in Brazil in recent years have included a substantial increase in adolescent fertility, a dramatic rise in membership of Protestant religious denominations, and an accompanying decline in the number of Catholics. We used the 2000 Brazil Census to examine differentials in fertility and family formation among adolescents living in Rio de Janeiro by the following religious denominations: Catholic; Baptist; other mainline Protestant; Assembly of God Church; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; other Pentecostal Protestant; and no religion. Results from logistic regression models show that the majority of the Protestants are at a lower risk of adolescent fertility than Catholics, and that among adolescents who have had a child, most Protestants are more likely than Catholics to be in a committed union. Our findings offer some support for the hypothesis that Protestant churches are more effective than the Catholic Church in discouraging premarital sexual relations and childbearing among adolescents.     

A note on measuring the independent impact of family planning programs on fertility Declines

This note critically evaluates recent cross-national studies that estimate the independent effect of family planning programs on the fertility of the developing world. The evaluation demonstrates that past research is biased to produce overestimates of net program impact. A new estimate is derived to account more completely for the effects of the social context and socioeconomic development on fertility. This estimate indicates that 5 percent of the variation in crude birth rate decline for 89 developing countries is due to family planning programs. This is substantially less than past estimates.     

Pensions and fertility: back to the roots

Fertility has long been declining in industrialised countries and the existence of public pension systems is considered as one of the causes. This paper provides detailed evidence on the mechanism by which a public pension system depresses fertility, based on historical data. Our theoretical framework highlights that the effect of a public pension system on fertility is ex ante ambiguous while its size is determined by the internal rate of return of the pension system. We identify an overall negative effect of the introduction of pension insurance on fertility using regional variation across 23 provinces of Imperial Germany in key variables of Bismarck’s pension system, which was introduced in Imperial Germany in 1891. The negative effect on fertility is robust to controlling for the traditional determinants of the first demographic transition as well as to other policy changes.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro,Brazil in the year 2000: The role of Protestantism

We use survey data from Bulgaria and Hungary to investigate the determinants of whether women intend to have a first or a second child and, if so, whether they intend to have the child within the ensuing 2 years or later. These determinants differ significantly by the order and timing of the intended birth. The variables used include measures of anomie and social capital and these appear to be among the factors that determine both whether to have a child and when. There is some evidence that these measures and economic factors are relatively more important in Bulgaria than in Hungary, and that ideational factors are more important in Hungary, particularly in the case of voluntary childlessness.     

From low to high fertility in Sulawesi (Indonesia) during the colonial period: explaining the 'first fertility transition'

This paper examines the past transition from low to high fertility which, in Indonesia as elsewhere, preceded the return to lower birth rates. Data from two parts of the island of Sulawesi where fertility rose during the colonial period are used to explain both why it rose, and why it was originally low. Economic conditions, it is argued, were the most important factors, affecting fertility via the supply of income and the demand for labour. Two schematic models of the 'first fertility transition' are proposed. In areas with low population densities and area-extensive forms of agriculture responsive to commercial stimuli, birth rates rose as the growth of commerce raised levels of prosperity, facilitated marriage, and undermined institutions such as debt-slavery which had previously acted to restrict marital fertility. In densely populated areas with labour-intensive agriculture and heavy state taxation in labour, fertility rose in response to demands for women's (and possibly child) labour that did not necessarily lead to gains in income.     

Evaluating the impact of conditional cash transfer programs on fertility: the case of the Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua

Evaluating the impact of poverty-reduction programs on fertility is complicated given that changes in incentives to have children take time to be incorporated into decision making and evaluation periods are usually quite brief. We explore the use of birth spacing as a short-run indicator of the impact of poverty-reduction programs on fertility. The data come from a Nicaraguan conditional cash transfer program that offers incentives for poor households to invest in children’s health, nutrition, and education. We estimate a stratified Cox proportional hazard model and find that the program decreased the hazard of a birth, indicating an increase in birth spacing.     

Evolutionary contributions to the study of human fertility

Demography, lacking an overarching theoretical framework of its own, has drawn on theories in many other social sciences to inform its analyses. The aim of this paper is to bring to the demographic community’s attention research in the evolutionary sciences on fertility, and to demonstrate that evolutionary theory can be another useful tool in the demographer’s toolkit. I first dispel some myths which impede the incorporation of evolutionary theory into demography: I make it clear that evolutionary explanations do not assume that all human behaviour is hardwired and functions to maximize genetic fitness; that they are able to explain variation in human behaviour; and that they are not necessarily alternatives to social science explanations. I then describe the diversity of work on fertility by evolutionary researchers, particularly human evolutionary ecologists and cultural evolutionists, and illustrate the usefulness of the evolutionary approach with examples of its application to age at first birth and the fertility transition.     

Adolescent alienation: Evaluating the hypotheses

Statistics reveal the steady, long-term, increase of self-and-other-destructive conduct among American youths. The conduct involved includes suicide, homicide, out-of-wedlock births, drug abuse and recorded crimes. A variety of hypotheses have been proposed to interpret this conduct — and to indicate possible remedies. Some of these hypotheses are briefly characterized, generally evaluated, and rejected. One hypothesis, the so-called youth bulge theory, suggests that the conduct is due to a disproportinate relationship between the youth population and the adult population; this disproportion — the so-called youth bulge — ultimately led to various modes of youth alienation. The youth bulge hypothesis was tested through a regression analysis which estimated the contemporaneous relationship between a measure of adolescent disorder (the youth suicide rate over time) and the proportion of youths to adults. A statistically significant but small relationship was found between the two variables. The implications of this conclusion are briefly sketched.     

From natural fertility to family limitation: The onset of fertility transition in a sample of German villages

Utilizing data from a sample of German village genealogies, it is possible to document the changes in reproductive patterns on the family level that started to take place in Germany during the nineteenth century and formed the basis for the secular decline in fertility which eventually encompassed the entire country. One striking finding from this study was the substantial diversity among the small sample of villages in terms of the timing of the emergence of family limitation. While couples in all villages who married during the last half of the eighteenth century appeared to be characterized predominantly by natural fertility the emergence of family limitation began as early as the turn of the nineteenth century in some places and as late as the end of the nineteenth century in others. Occupational differentials with respect to family limitation were also examined. There is little evidence that changes in birth spacing played an important part in the initial phase of the fertility trnsition. Rather, the underlying process appears to involve a change from fertility patterns that were characterized by the absence of parity-dependent control to one in which attempts to terminate childbearing in response to the number of children already born becomes widespread.