Protective service unions’ political activities and department expenditures

This paper examines how police and firefighter unions’ political activities influence departmental expenditures. Unlike prior research, we measure unions’ political activity independently of union bargaining power. Results indicate that a protective service union’s electoral activities positively affect departmental expenditures, and these effects are attributable to union political power rather than multilateral collective bargaining power. The authors thank Steve Blumenfeld, Wally Hendricks, Asghar Zardkoohi, and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments and suggestions.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

The power and pay of international union officials

Secondary data are used to examine the relationship between the power of international union presidents and their pay. The analysis supported the hypotheses that (1) power and pay were positively related and (2) the relationship is more pronounced in unions that are larger and are less effective in bargaining as well as during periods characterized by conflict over the president’s role. While highlighting the political dimensions of union organizations, the data also support previous studies that found international union officers’ salaries to have a “rational” basis in the union’s bargaining effectiveness. I am indebted to Gabriella Belli for help with a number of statistical issues.     

Union legislative records during president reagan’s first term

It has been assumed that organized labor’s political record has declined markedly since President Reagan was elected in 1980. This study shows this contention to be only partly true. While organized labor’s political influence has declined somewhat, particularly in the executive branch, there is considerable variation in the legislative agendas, objectives, and successes across a sample of eight major unions studied. This suggests that union legislative activity should be studied on a union-by-union basis. The authors are indebted to the many union lobbyists who agreed to be interviewed as a part of this study, and to Jack Fiorito, Donna Sockell, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This study was partially funded by a Columbia University Graduate School of Business Faculty Research Fellowship.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

Union membership,economic rents,and migration behavior

This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.     

Japanese labor relations: A view from organized labor

Donald F. Ephlin retired in June 1988 as vice-president and director of the General Motors Division of the UAW. He has also directed the UAW’s Ford Division, where he led the union’s bargaining team in negotiations over job security, profit sharing, and worker participation in management. Mr. Ephlin has served as a regional director of the UAW in New England, as an administrative assistant to former UAW president Leonard Woodcock, and as a member of the Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness and the U.S. Department of Labor Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation. He is now a lecturer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.     

Union commitment and membership support for political action: An exploratory analysis

Union political activity has always been controversial, even among union members. Research has shown that a sizable minority of union members question the propriety of union political involvement and disagree with union leaders on public policy issues. It has also shown, however, that union members’ commitment to the union may be positively associated with members’ political support. This study extends this research by statistically estimating the relationship between union commitment and members’ support for their national union’s political involvement. Based on the questionnaire responses of several hundred local union members, the findings support a positive relationship between union commitment and political support. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Cynthia Fisher and an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. They also wish to thank the numerous union participants in the study.     

A Review of Kyoto Protocol Adoption in Russia: Joint Implementation in Focus

Russia’s role in ‘animation’ of the Kyoto Protocol was crucial. Its initial vacillation on ratification was predominantly due to political bargaining with the EU. Domestic economic rationales [i.e. impacts of emission trading and Joint Implementation (JI) projects] were important to a much lesser extent and environmental motives did not seem to play any role in the decision. Since the Protocol entered into force, there have been significant delays in complete establishment of policy implementation frameworks, which are necessary for Russia to start benefiting from JI and emission trading. Only recently, in 2007, have GHG inventories and a national registry been established and the responsibilities for implementation of the Protocol and JI among the government departments have been distributed only to a certain extent. Some constraints hindering JI projects, such as vague legislation, an unfavourable economic climate, lack of commitment to JI projects, corruption, xenophobia, state and agency ‘capture’ still remain.      

Unions,politics, and protectionism

Conventional models of labor relations emphasize “business unionism,” that is, collective bargaining activities and outcomes. We argue that a more realistic model of behavior incorporates the union’s role as an agent of redistribution that seeks to benefit some members and union leaders primarily at the expense of other members, nonunion employees, and consumers. Union power to redistribute wealth is obtained from the special privileges that labor organizations obtain from government. This paper demonstrates how, as political entities, unions and their employers attempt to secure government-sanctioned wealth transfers through protectionism. The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Earhart Foundation.     

Congressional support for unions’ positions across diverse legislation

Organized labor has become increasingly active in national politics. This development has encouraged research into union political activities, particularly in the area of legislative politics. But little research has been published on the basis of congressional support for union positions on diverse public policy items. This paper has examined the correlates of congressional support for unions’ positions across 33 roll-call votes taken in the first session of the 98th Congress. Empirical analyses suggest that certain factors, such as legislators’ party affiliation and constituents’ ideology, are consistent correlates of such support across diverse legislation. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Jack Fiorito for their generous comments on a previous version of the paper. They also wish to thank the union lobbyists who granted interviews. A Faculty Research Grant from the Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, provided partial support.     

Wage and nonwage outcomes in collective bargaining: Determinants and tradeoffs

Using unskilled labor wage rates and union contract scores derived from a sample of 500 U.S. manufacturing contracts, this study finds that in 1975 there was considerable variation in unions’ abilities to deliver higher wages and desirable nonwage contractual provisions to their members (though it is clear that the stronger unions have bargained high levels of both wages and nonwage items). There are a variety of union power, employee quality, union preference, and employer cost variables which impact upon the bargaining choices made between wages and nonwage provisions, and it appears that union strength tilts the compensation package toward wages. The authors, associate professors at the University of Illinois, are very grateful to Christopher Pawlowicz, Ronald Seeber, and Roger Wolters for their help in gathering data. They also are grateful to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and Research of the U.S. Department of Labor and to the Research Board of the University of Illinois for financially supporting this research. Such support in no way implies, however, that the Department or the University endorses the methods or conclusions in this study.     

The use of information technology in a strike

Conclusion Exhausted by almost eight months of striking, the CEP members urged their union officers to take a radical proposal to the Herald: forget the seniority clause, which the company had maintained was the main stumbling block. Many union members believed that the Herald and Conrad Black didn’t care about seniority and had picked it as an issue in full confidence that it was the one item no union would drop. But since nothing else was working, despite evidence the Herald was suffering severe circulation and corporate-image losses, it was time to call the employer’s bluff. The company seemed to be taken by surprice at the CEP’s abandoning of the cherished principle when union and compeny representatives met in front of an official of the Alberta government. But within a few days, Gaynor was saying publicly there were other issues in the way, not just seniority. Despite the innovative use of electronic communications during the strike, there was no hope of obtaining a settlement if the Herald wasn’t forced to negotiate with the union. The provincial government, however, failed to enforce provisions of its weak labor laws that required “bargaining in good faith.”     

Union democracy in the international typographical union: Thirty years later

The International Typographical Union, long cited as the one deviant case to Michel’s “iron law of oligarchy,” is examined thirty years afterUnion Democracy to determine whether or not democracy can survive in the face of today’s hostile environment. An analysis of events occurring within the union as well as the results of a case study of a large ITU local indicate that an unfavorable environment poses unavoidable challenges to democracy. The author thanks Ed Gross, Phil Kienast, Dennis Quinn, Terry Mitchell, Bob Aulerich, and Northwest Typographical Union #99 for assistance at various stages of this research.     

The political effects of grievance handling by stewards in a local union

This study develops and tests three long-standing propositions about the relationship between grievance-handling behavior and political outcomes in a local union: (1) more favorable grievance handling enhances the steward’s likelihood of re-election; (2) the more the political support obtained in an election, the greater the steward’s ability to affect grievance outcomes favorably; and (3) as the relationship between management and the union evolves, grievance handling becomes more efficient and effective. Data on grievances and election results of Ford-UAW Local 400 from the 1950s were used to test hypotheses derived from these propositions; most received substantial, significant support.     

Part of the welfare mix: The third sector as an intermediate area

This article presents a conceptional framework which analyses the third sector as a part of a mixed welfare system, otherwise made up of the market, the state and the informal private household spheres. From this perspective, the third sector appears as a dimension of the public space in civil societies: an intermediate area rather than a clear-cut sector. Third sector organisations are understood as polyvalent organisations whose social and political roles can be as important as their economic ones; they are portrayed as hybrids, intermeshing resources and rationales from different sectors. In present policies of ‘welfare pluralism’ the emphasis is consequently more on ‘synergetic’ mixes of resources and rationales than on mere issues of substitution processes between different sectors of provision. The last section discusses the potential distinguishing features of such policies with respect to ‘pluralist’ approaches which try to safeguard the conventional hierarchies in a mixed economy of welfare. This paper draws in part on the author's introduction to Evers and Svetlik (1993).     

Mandatory agency shop laws as an explanation of Canada-U.S. union density divergence

X. Conclusion During a period of strength the Canadian labor movement was able to secure enduring legislation providing for their institutional protection. In the 1940s Justice Rand justified his decision by invoking the spirit underlying the operationalization of a collective bargaining regime. In the 1990s the Canadian Supreme Court continued this tradition by refusing to hollow out unions’ rights to a secure financial base and autonomy in decision making. Between the 1940s and the 1990s, the unions' voice was heard in legislatures throughout the country through the NDP. Canadian unions now benefit from, among other things, first-contract arbitration, job protection for striking workers, and a card process of union certification. Thus, although current Canadian attitudes towards unions show considerable detachment, the embeddedness of legal protections helps hold such challenges as RTW in Alberta at bay. During the same years, American labor was unable to translate its strength of numbers into gains in public policy: in fact, as union density peaked, legislation such as the Taft-Hartley Act and Landrum-Griffin Act eroded union institutional protections. An earlier version of this article appears as “Union Security in Canada,” in The Internal Governance and Organizational Effectiveness of Labor Unions, edited by S. Estreicher, H. C. Katz, and B. E. Kaufman, Kluwer Press. We are grateful for their permission to reproduce portions of the chapter. Comments from Dennis Nolan (University of South Carolina) and John Godard (University of Manitoba) are greatly appre-ciated. The article benefited from their excellent suggestions. Research assistance from Fred Jacques is acknowledged. We follow the Canadian spelling of “labour” for accuracy when it is used in citations, quotes, and titles.     

The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Twilight for organized labor

Conclusion The Old Unionism, organized labor in the private economy, is in irreversible decline. Economic and market factors beyond its control are principally responsible. The absence of effective leadership and its emphasis on political, instead of trade union, goals do not help. The substitution has diverted much of organized labor’s large financial resources to advancing a political agenda which has brought no material gains in membership and market share, but stigmatizes the union movement as a “special interest” group and as the Luddites of the new century: “American labor organizations ... are shaped much more basically by events of the past century than by forces of the past fifteen years” (Dunlop, 1978, p. 79). I am indebted to Ka-Neng Au, librarian at the Dana Library of Rutgers University, Newark, for his accurate and timely assistance with research information and citations of various references.