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1.
The article discusses issues raised by persistent below‐replacement fertility in Europe. The continent's demographic predicament is highlighted by comparing age structures and relative population sizes between populations in and outside Europe—such as those of Russia and Yemen and those of an enlarged 25‐country European Union and a 25‐country hinterland to the EU in North Africa and West Asia—during the past 50 years and prospectively up to 2050, based on United Nations estimates and projections. Potential geopolitical aspects of the population shifts are considered. European policy responses to them are found largely wanting. With respect to the key demographic variable, fertility, explicit pronatalism is rejected by most European governments. A set of policy measures that commands wide support, with the hoped‐for side effect of raising birth rates, seeks to make women's participation in the formal labor force compatible with childrearing. The effectiveness of such measures, however, is likely to be limited. Continued below‐replacement fertility, higher immigration from outside Europe, negative population growth, and loss of demographic weight within the global population are safe predictions for the Europe of the twenty‐first century.  相似文献   

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Over the second half of the twentieth century rapid population growth in the less developed countries has redrawn the global demographic map. Many once‐poor countries have also experienced strong economic growth, which in combination with the demographic change has yielded marked shifts in the world's economic balance, with far‐reaching geopolitical implications. At the same time, low fertility in much of the developed world presages a future of population shrinkage, accompanied by pronounced population aging. In per capita terms, the economic advantages of the developed countries will likely persist for many years, but their actual and potential falls in population may accentuate their loss of relative economic power and eventually lead to marginalization of their international standing and influence. Preventing population shrinkage will be an urgent task for them, requiring either large‐scale immigration (likely to be ruled out) or raising the birth rate. Existing pro‐family policies have had at best modest effects on fertility levels. Two novel approaches are described that would plausibly have greater impact. One would counteract the disproportionate influence of older voters in the electorate by granting voting rights to all citizens, allowing custodial parents to vote on behalf of their children. The second would reform the public pension system to reestablish the link between the financial security of retired persons and the number of children they have raised to productive adulthood.  相似文献   

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Past interest in long‐range global population projections has been almost exclusively centered on future population size and, to some extent, on changes in the age structure. Uncertainties concerning future demographic dynamics are typically dealt with by preparing multiple projections, distinguished by differing fertility trajectories ranging from high to low. The usual assumption, that the constituting units of the global population— countries and regions—all follow the same variant projection (such as high or low), masks another potential uncertainty of future population dynamics: uncertainty in the composition of the global total by the relative sizes of its constituting units. Using a set of long‐range population projections covering the period 2000–2100, this note explores plausible ranges of this uncertainty with reference to six constituting units of the global population.  相似文献   

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The U.S. Census Bureau periodically releases projections of the US resident population, detailed by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. The most recent of these, issued 13 January 2000, for the first time extend to the year 2100 and also include information on the foreign‐bom population. (Earlier projections were carried up to 2080.) The extensive tabulations presenting the new set, and detailed explanation of the methodology and the assumptions underlying the projections, are accessible at the Census Bureau's web site: http://www.census.gov . A brief summary of some of the main results of these projections is reproduced below from United States Department of Commerce News, Washington, DC 20230. (The Census Bureau is an agency of the Department of Commerce.) Uncertainties as to future trends in fertility, mortality, and net migration over a period of some 100 years are very great, as is illustrated by the massive difference in the projected size of the population for 2100 in the three variants produced. The “middle” projected population figure of 571 million (which represents a growth of some 109 percent over its current level) is bracketed by “lowest” and “highest” alternative projections of 283 million and 1.18 billion, respectively. With somewhat lesser force, the point also applies to the 50‐year time span considered in the well‐known country‐by‐country projections of the United Nations. These projections are also detailed in three variants: low, middle, and high. The UN projections (last revised in 1998) envisage less rapid growth in the United States during the first part of the twenty‐first century than do the Census Bureau's. The projected population figures for 2050 in the three variants (low, middle, and high) are as follows (in millions):
U.S. Census Bureau 313.5 403.7 552.8
United Nations 292.8 349.3 419.0
Since the initial age and sex distributions from which the two sets of population projections start are essentially identical, these differences reflect assumptions by the Census Bureau with respect to the three factors affecting population dynamics in the next 50 years. In the middle series, each of these assumptions is more growth‐producing in the Census Bureau's set than in that of the United Nations. Thus, in the middle of the twenty‐first century the Census Bureau anticipates male and female life expectancies of 81.2 and 86.7 years; the corresponding figures according to the UN are 78.8 and 84.4 years. Net immigration to the United States per 1000 population at midcentury is assumed to be 2.2 by the United Nations and somewhat above 2.4 according to the Census Bureau. The factor most affecting the difference between the projected population sizes, however, is the differing assumptions with respect to fertility. The middle UN series anticipates a midcentury US total fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman; the Census Bureau's assumption is slightly above 2.2. A notable feature of the Census Bureau's projection methodology in comparison to that of the UN is the recognition of differences in mortality and fertility, and also in immigration, with respect to race and Hispanic origin. Thus, at midcentury the white non‐Hispanic population is assumed to have a total fertility rate of 2.03; the corresponding figure for the population of Hispanic origin is 2.56. (Fertility in other population subgroups is expected to lie between these values, although closer to the fertility of non‐Hispanic whites.) And Hispanic immigration, currently the major component within total immigration, is assumed to remain significant throughout the next five decades (although by midcentury it is expected to be far exceeded by immigration of non‐Hispanic Asians). As a result, the structure of the US population by race and Hispanic origin is expected to shift markedly. To the extent that fertility and mortality differentials persist, such a shift also affects the mean fertility and mortality figures of the total population.  相似文献   

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Singapore has achieved one of the highest levels of per capita income in the world, through sound economic planning and a stress on building its human capital. Yet its enviable living conditions are at risk of being enjoyed by fewer citizens, and indeed themselves placed in jeopardy, by the continued very low fertility levels. Ultra‐low fertility and growing reluctance by citizens to accept an increasing share of foreign‐born pose difficult dilemmas for population policy, given the planning scenario of reaching a resident population of 6.5 million. A range of pro‐marriage and pronatalist policies has failed to raise fertility substantially, while past success in modifying population trends and structure through migration has now encountered the twin problems of political constraints on the volume of immigration that is acceptable and a possible increase in emigration of Singapore citizens.  相似文献   

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The authors examine the global diffusion of international population policy, which they consider a cultural item. The process of cultural diffusion is often seen as spontaneous: items of Western culture are in demand because they are universally attractive. Yet cultural flows may also be directed, they may be unattractive to their intended recipients, and their acceptance may depend on persuasion and material incentives. The authors consider the range of responses of national elites to the new population policy adopted by the United Nations at Cairo in 1994. Strongly influenced by feminists, the Cairo Program of Action promotes gender equity and reproductive health and demotes previous concerns with population growth. The data are interviews with representatives of governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved in population and health in five developing countries. To interpret the interviews, the authors draw on two theoretical frameworks. The first emphasizes the attractiveness of new cultural items and the creation of a normative consensus about their value. The second emphasizes differentials in power and resources among global actors and argues that the diffusion of cultural items can be directed by powerful donor states. Interviews in Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, Malawi, and Senegal portray a mixed reception to Cairo: enthusiastic embrace of certain aspects of the Cairo policy by some members of the national elite and a realistic assessment of donor power by virtually all. Strategies of rhetoric and action appear to be aimed at maintaining and directing the flows of donor funds.  相似文献   

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For the past several decades those engaged in shaping the Program of Action documents at international conferences on population have muted their voices when the topic of abortion has been raised. In a desire to side‐step entanglement in a bitter debate over the morality of abortion, great care has been taken to define “family planning” in ways that explicitly exclude abortion. The “common‐ground” approach to treating abortion can be summarized in two directives found in all contemporary international population documents: “in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning”; and all governments should work “to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved family‐planning services.” This article has three goals: first, to examine the appropriateness of these directives with respect to what is currently known about the relationship between abortion, family planning, and population policy; second, to trace how this “contraception‐only” definition of family planning became de rigueur at international population conferences; and third, to discuss the prospects for the emergence of a more appropriate “common‐ground” approach to abortion and population policy.  相似文献   

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Diffusion Processes and Fertility Transition: Selected Perspectives. 2001. Edited by John B. Caster‐Line. National Research Council, Committee on Population. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Pp. xi + 271. N.p.g. ISBN: 0‐309‐07610‐2. Available online at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076102/html/Rl.html

The Explanatory Power of Models. 2002. Edited by Robert Franck. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. x + 310. £74.00. ISBN: 1‐4020‐0867‐8.

Communism, Health and Lifestyle. The Paradox of Mortality Transition in Albania, 1950‐1990. 2001. By Arjan Gjonça. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Pp. ix + 227. US$69.95. ISBN: 0‐313‐31586‐8.

Historical Studies in Mortality Decline. 2002. By William H. Hubbard, Kari Pitkänen, Jürgen Schlumbohm, Sølvi Sogner, Gunnar Thorvaldsen, and Frans van Poppel. Oslo: Novus Forlag. Pp. 134. ISBN: 82‐7099‐360‐3.

Population and Society in Western European Port‐Cities. 2002. Edited by Richard Lawton and Robert Lee. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Pp. xx + 385. £18.95. ISBN: 0‐85323‐907‐X.

The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation. 2003. Edited by Peggy Levitt and Mary C. Waters. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp. xi + 408. US$39.95. ISBN: 0‐87154‐517‐9.

The Demography of Victorian England and Wales. 2000. By Robert Woods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxv + 447. £50.00. ISBN: 0‐521‐78254‐6.

The Life Table: Modelling Survival and Death. 2002. Edited by Guillaume Wunsch, Michel Mouchart, and Josianne Duchêne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (European Studies of Population, Volume 11). Pp. x + 306. £89.00. ISBN: 1‐4020‐0638‐1.  相似文献   

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印度人口政策述评   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
20世纪印度人口的高速增长令人注目.作为世界第二人口大国的印度来说,人口政策不仅决定其人口类型、人口增长模式,还决定着整个民族的命运.本文对半个世纪以来印度人口政策的发展、转变作了简要概述,并着重对2000年印度新出台的人口政策进行了详细的分析和评述.  相似文献   

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展望21世纪上半叶世界与中国人口发展趋势   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
本文展望了 2 1世纪上半叶世界人口与中国人口在增长速度、数量规模、素质和构成等各方面的发展变动趋势 ,指出了与此相应的各种人口问题 ,并对 2 1世纪人口科学研究和发展的方向提出了自己的看法  相似文献   

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