Advance Selling in the Presence of Speculators and Forward‐Looking Consumers

This article examines the pricing policy of a monopolist seller who may sell in advance of consumption in a market that comprises of myopic consumers, forward‐looking consumers, and speculators. The latter group has no consumption value for the goods and is in the market with the sole objective of making a profit by reselling the purchased goods shortly after. Consumers, although homogeneous in terms of their valuations, are different with respect to their perspectives. We show that in an “upward” market where the expected valuation increases over time, the optimal pricing policy is an ex ante “static” one where the seller “prices into the future” and prices the myopic consumers out of the advance market. However, in a “downward” market where the expected valuation decreases over time, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy except for the case when higher initial sales can trigger more demand subsequently and when the downward trend is not too high. In this case, the seller prefers an ex ante “static” pricing strategy and deliberately prices lower initially to sell to speculators. We identify the conditions under which the seller benefits from the existence of speculators in the market. Moreover, although the presence of entry costs is ineffective as an entry deterrence, we determine the conditions under which exit costs can rein in speculative purchase.     

Mitigating Inventory Overstocking: Optimal Order‐up‐to Level to Achieve a Target Fill Rate over a Finite Horizon

Service level agreements (SLAs) are widely adopted performance‐based contracts in operations management practice, and fill rate is the most common performance metric among all the measurements in SLAs. Traditional procedures characterizing the order‐up‐to level satisfying a specified fill rate implicitly assume an infinite performance review horizon. However, in practice, inventory managers are liable to maintain and report fill rates over a finite performance review horizon. This horizon discrepancy leads to deviation between the target fill rate and actual achieved fill rate. In this study, we first examine the behavior of the fill rate distribution over a finite horizon with positive lead time. We analytically prove that the expected fill rate assuming an infinite performance review horizon exceeds the expected fill rate assuming a finite performance review horizon, implying that there exists some inventory “waste” (i.e., overstocking) when the traditional procedure is used. Based on this observation and the complexity of the problem, we propose a simulation‐based algorithm to reduce excess inventory while maintaining the contractual target fill rate. When the lead time is significant relative to the length of the contract horizon, we show that the improvement in the inventory system can be over 5%. Further, we extend our basic setting to incorporate the penalty for failing to meet a target, and show how one can solve large‐scale problems via stochastic approximation. The primary managerial implication of our study is that ignoring the performance review horizon in an SLA will cause overstocking, especially when the lead time is large.     

A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort

We study a newsvendor who can acquire the services of a forecaster, or, more generally, an information gatherer (IG) to improve his information about demand. When the IG's effort increases, does the average ex ante order quantity rise or fall? Do average ex post sales rise or fall? Improvements in information technology and in the services offered by forecasters provide motivation for the study of these questions. Much depends on our model of the IG and his efforts. We study an IG who sends a signal to a classic single‐period newsvendor. The signal defines the newsvendor's posterior probability distribution on the possible demands and the newsvendor uses that posterior to calculate the optimal order. Each of the possible posteriors is a scale/location transform of the same base distribution. When the IG works harder, the average scale parameter drops. Higher IG effort is always useful to the newsvendor. We show that there is a critical value of order cost. For costs on one side of this value more IG effort leads to a higher average ex ante order and for costs on the other side to a lower average order. But for all costs, more IG effort leads to higher average ex post sales. We obtain analogous results for a “regret‐averse” newsvendor who suffers a penalty that is a nonlinear function of the discrepancy between quantity ordered and true demand.     

Greening the electricity industry: The dynamic logic of the Green-e certification program

With the advent of retail completion in the supply of electricity to end-use customers, individuals and businesses will be given the opportunity to purchase electricity from “green power” sources. Some customers are clearly willing to pay a premium for environmentally preferable sources of electricity supply. Yet, there have been concerns that customer confusion, vague marketing claims, and “apples and oranges” comparisons will limit the potential market penetration of green power products.Environmental certification programs are increasingly seen as important tools for achieving environmental objectives and are intended to alleviate some of the concerns listed above, as well as to increased product and marketer credibility. The Green-e Renewable Electricity Branding Program is the first U.S.-based effort to certify green power products that meet certain environmental standards. The voluntary Green-e program also helps create consumer confidence in these certified products through a marketer code of conduct, disclosure provisions, and a public education campaign. This article details the development, design and results of the Green-e program to date.     

Browse‐and‐Switch: Retail‐Online Competition under Value Uncertainty

Although online shopping is becoming popular, consumers who are unsure about whether to buy a product may find it advantageous to visit a brick‐and‐mortar retail store to first examine the product before purchasing it. But, after browsing at the store, consumers have the option of switching to an e‐tailer to purchase the item at a cheaper price rather than buying at the store. Recent business press refers to this browse‐and‐switch behavior as “showrooming,” and attributes to it the declining profits of brick‐and‐mortar retailers. To study the effect of the browse‐and‐switch option on retail and online pricing strategies and profits, we analyze a stylized economic model that incorporates uncertainty in consumers' valuation of the product, captures the heterogeneity among consumers in their inclination to purchase online, and permits product returns. We consider various equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer shopping behaviors, characterize the parameter ranges for each scenario, and demonstrate that browse‐and‐switch behavior can indeed occur under equilibrium. Our analysis further shows that the option for consumers to browse‐and‐switch intensifies competition, reducing the profits for both firms.     

Managing the Performance Trade‐Offs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects

Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms' govern partnering relationships through fixed‐price contracts, whereas in others, firms' use more flexible time and materials or performance‐based contracts. How do these choices affect the costs and benefits that arise from greater levels of partner integration? Furthermore, how are these relationships affected when the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship? Our study addresses these questions using data from 172 R&D projects that involve partners. We find that, (i) greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs for all contract types; (ii) greater partner integration is associated with higher product quality only in projects that adopt more flexible time and materials or performance‐based contracts; and (iii) in projects where the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship, greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs, but not with higher product quality. Our results shed light on the subtle interplay between formal and relational contracting. They have important implications for practice, with respect to designing optimal governance structures in partnered R&D projects.     

Estimating Health Risks from Natural Hazards Using Risk Assessment and Epidemiology

Risk assessment is the process of estimating the likelihood that an adverse effect may result from exposure to a specific health hazard. The process traditionally involves hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization to answer “How many excess cases of disease A will occur in a population of size B due to exposure to agent C at dose level D?” For natural hazards, however, we modify the risk assessment paradigm to answer “How many excess cases of outcome Y will occur in a population of size B due to natural hazard event E of severity D?” Using a modified version involving hazard identification, risk factor characterization, exposure characterization, and risk characterization, we demonstrate that epidemiologic modeling and measures of risk can quantify the risks from natural hazard events. We further extend the paradigm to address mitigation, the equivalent of risk management, to answer “What is the risk for outcome Y in the presence of prevention intervention X relative to the risk for Y in the absence of X?” We use the preventable fraction to estimate the efficacy of mitigation, or reduction in adverse health outcomes as a result of a prevention strategy under ideal circumstances, and further estimate the effectiveness of mitigation, or reduction in adverse health outcomes under typical community-based settings. By relating socioeconomic costs of mitigation to measures of risk, we illustrate that prevention effectiveness is useful for developing cost-effective risk management options.     

Incentive Contracts in Projects with Unforeseeable Uncertainty

Designing incentive contracts that constructively guide employee efforts is a particularly difficult challenge in novel innovation initiatives, where unforeseen events may occur. Empirical studies have observed a variety of incentive structures in innovation settings: “time and material contracts” (compensation for executing orders), “downside protection” (target‐driven incentives with protection from unexpected risks), and “upside rewards” (additional remuneration for pursuing opportunities). This paper develops a model of incentives in presence of unforeseen events and offers a theoretical prediction of which of the empirically observed incentive structures should be used under which circumstances. The combination of three key influences drives the shape of the best incentive contract. First, the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty, or the occurrence of events that cannot possibly be foreseen at the outset. These may force a change in the project's plan, making pure target setting insufficient. Second, fairness concerns dictate that the employee's expected compensation cannot be shifted downward by unforeseen events, because it would cause demotivation, hostility, and defection. Third, management may not be able to observe the detailed actions of the employee (moral hazard) nor whether a positive or negative unforeseen event has occurred (asymmetric information).     

Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents' beliefs. This bound yields, for example, competitive convergence as N →∞ in environments in which an appropriately‐defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists. We also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games: the “offer game” in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents, and the “bidding game” in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal.     

Fractional Price Matching Policies Arising from the Ocean Freight Service Industry

We consider a situation in which shippers (customers) can purchase ocean freight services either directly from a carrier (service provider)in advance or from the spot market just before the departure of an ocean liner. The price is known in the former case, while the spot price is uncertain ex‐ante in the latter case. Consequently, some shippers are reluctant to book directly from the carrier in advance unless the carrier is willing to “partially match” the realized spot price when it is lower than the regular price. This study is an initial attempt to examine if the carrier should bear some of the “price risk” by offering a “fractional” price matching contract that can be described as follows. The shipper pays the regular freight price in advance; however, the shipper will get a refund if the realized spot price is below the regular price, where the refund is a “fraction” of the difference between the regular price and the realized spot price. By modeling the dynamics between the carrier and the shippers as a sequential game, we show that the carrier can use the fractional price matching contract to generate a higher demand from the shippers compared to no price matching contract by increasing the “fraction” in equilibrium. However, as the carrier increases the “fraction,” the carrier should increase the regular price to compensate for bearing additional risk. By selecting the fractional price matching contract optimally, we show that the carrier can afford to offer this price matching mechanism without incurring revenue loss: the optimal fractional price matching contract is “revenue neutral.”     

On the Use of Buy Up as a Model of Customer Choice in Revenue Management

We consider settings in which a revenue manager controls bookings over a sequence of flights. The revenue manager uses a buy‐up model to select booking limits and updates estimates of the model parameters as data are accumulated. The buy‐up model we consider is based upon a simple model of customer choice, wherein each low‐fare customer who is not able to purchase a low‐fare ticket will, with a fixed probability, “buy up” to the high fare, independent of everything else. We analyze the evolution of the parameter estimates (e.g., the buy‐up probability) and chosen booking limits in situations where the buy‐up model is misspecified, that is, in situations where there is no setting of its parameters for which its objective function gives an accurate representation of expected revenue as a function of the booking limit. The analysis is motivated by the common situation in which a revenue manager does not know precisely how customers behave but nevertheless uses a parametric model to make decisions. Under some assumptions, we prove that the booking limits and parameter estimates converge and we compare the actual expected revenue at the limiting values with that associated with the booking limits that would be chosen if the revenue manager knew the actual behavior of customers. The analysis shows that the buy‐up model often works reasonably well even when it is misspecified, and also reveals the importance of understanding how parameter estimates of misspecified models vary as functions of decisions.     

DETECTION OF TURNING POINTS IN A TIME SERIES

Consider a time series for which, over a finite interval, there is a model that provides an adequate forecast of the series. Without loss of genality one can take the series over this period of time to have mean O and variance s̀². At some time the underlying process changes to some other model. The previous model no longer produces errors with mean zero. It is assumed, however, that the variance remains s̀². The problem considered here is to detect the change in the process as quickly as possible after it happens. The technique is a computationally feasible extension of Wald's [14] sequential analysis, to develop a parabolic mask centered over the most recent cumulative sum (“cusum”) of the forecast errors. Detection occurs when any previous point in the series of cusums lies outside the parabola. The technique is illustrated by an APL program applied to the logarithms of weekly changes in closing prices for IBM common stock on the New York Stock Exchange over the period 1968–1970.     

Optimizing Customer Forecasts for Forecast‐Commitment Contracts

We study a “Forecast‐Commitment” contract motivated by a manufacturer's desire to provide good service in the form of delivery commitments in exchange for reasonable forecasts and a purchase commitment from the customer. The customer provides a forecast for a future order and a guarantee to purchase a portion of it. In return, the supplier commits to satisfy some or all of the forecast. The supplier pays penalties for shortfalls of the commitment quantity from the forecast, and for shortfalls of the delivered quantity from the customer's final order (not exceeding the commitment quantity). These penalties allow differential service among customers. In Durango‐Cohen and Yano (2006), we analyzed the supplier's problem for a given customer forecast. In this paper, we analyze the customer's problem under symmetric information, both when the customer is honest and when he strategically orders more than his demand when doing so is advantageous. We show that the customer gains little from lying, so the supplier can use his control over the contract parameters to encourage honesty. When the customer is honest, the contract achieves (near‐)coordination of the supply chain in a great majority of instances, and thus provides both excellent performance and flexibility in structuring contracts.     

A LOWER BOUND FOR THE SINGLE-LEVEL DYNAMIC HORIZON LOT-SIZING PROBLEM

Conventional production planning methods assume the existence of a medium- or longrange demand horizon. However, demand usually is known over a much shorter range; scheduling decisions must be made within this “decision window,” which rolls forward in time. This paper presents a new lower bound for lot-sizing heuristics in a rolling-horizon framework and compares it to the well-known Wagner-Whitin bound. The new bound indicates heuristic schedules that have costs close to the optimum. Rolling-horizon schedule costs are compared to corresponding static-horizon schedule costs (assuming the whole horizon is known in advance), using the ratio of decision-window size to the natural order cycle as a parameter. For values below unity, the rolling-horizon policy is significantly more costly. For values above one, the two policies have similar costs and actually converge as the parameter value increases.     

Market Microstructure Invariance: Empirical Hypotheses

Using the intuition that financial markets transfer risks in business time, “market microstructure invariance” is defined as the hypotheses that the distributions of risk transfers (“bets”) and transaction costs are constant across assets when measured per unit of business time. The invariance hypotheses imply that bet size and transaction costs have specific, empirically testable relationships to observable dollar volume and volatility. Portfolio transitions can be viewed as natural experiments for measuring transaction costs, and individual orders can be treated as proxies for bets. Empirical tests based on a data set of 400,000+ portfolio transition orders support the invariance hypotheses. The constants calibrated from structural estimation imply specific predictions for the arrival rate of bets (“market velocity”), the distribution of bet sizes, and transaction costs.     

Monopolistic Competition,Expected Inflation and Contract Length

Abstract. This paper shows that the explicit consideration of the “expected inflation effect” makes it more likely that increases in wage and price flexibility reduce employment variability. This result, obtained in a monopolistic competition model with synchronized contracts, casts doubts on some existing consensus in the literature pointing towards the opposite view. Wage and price flexibility, although ceteris paribus desirable, is however shown to be an inferior substitute for optimally designed demand management.     

Will More Purchasing Options Benefit Customers?

This paper considers the sale of a seasonal product in the face of strategic customers. At the beginning of the selling season, the retailer announces both the price p_h at which the product will be sold during the selling season and the post‐season clearance price p<p_h for unsold items. We analyze two operating regimes: The “no reservation regime” allows a buyer either to purchase the product at price p_h when he arrives or to enter a lottery to purchase at price p if the product remains unsold. The “reservation regime” offers each buyer one extra option than the no reservation regime: reserve the product for purchase at the clearance price p. If the buyer reserves the product under the reservation regime and if it remains unsold at the end of the selling season, then he is obligated to purchase it at price p. We consider a situation in which heterogeneous customers with probabilistic valuation arrive in accord with a Poisson process. We characterize the rational purchasing behavior wherein each arriving customer is strategic; each customer takes other customers' purchasing behavior into consideration. By considering the Nash equilibrium of this game, we show that strategic customer behavior can render the customer to be worse off and the retailer to be better off under the reservation regime, despite the fact that this regime offers one extra option (reservation) to a customer. Hence, more purchasing options do not necessarily benefit customers.     

不确定需求下考虑资金约束的生鲜农产品政府补贴策略

针对需求不确定环境下政府如何对生鲜农产品供应链进行补贴的问题,在考虑财政资金的约束下,分别构建了无政府补贴、采购补贴和销售补贴三种情形下的博弈模型。通过对比分析得出了政府的最优补贴策略,并分析了补贴策略对生鲜供应链最优决策的影响,最后用数值算例进一步说明了不同补贴策略对不同类型生鲜农产品的影响。研究发现,补贴策略的选择与财政预算密切相关。在财政预算充裕时,两种补贴策略都有效且可行,都能平抑物价、增加供给、拉动需求;从改善社会整体福利的角度,采购补贴为最优策略;从补贴资金效率的角度,销售补贴为最优策略。在销售补贴预算充裕而采购补贴预算存在缺口时,销售补贴为最优策略。在财政预算不足时,政府的最优策略就是不干涉市场的运营。     

Alliance governance choices: Disentangling the effects of uncertainty and alliance experience

This article analyses the interaction between alliance experience and behavioural uncertainty to improve our understanding of alliance governance. We investigate the extent to which the effect of alliance experience on governance choices is explained by a reduction in “mundane” transaction costs or by a reduction in “opportunistic” transaction costs. Based on more than 12,000 firm experiences with equity and non-equity alliances, we demonstrate a reduction in mundane transaction costs over time by firms reusing the same governance structure in successive alliances. We also find that in high behavioural uncertainty alliances, firms rely on their experience as a substitute for equity governance to reduce opportunistic transaction costs.     

Contracting in a Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand and Substitute Products

Retailers often stock competing products from multiple manufacturers. When the retailer stocks out of a particular item, customers who prefer the item are likely, with some probability, to switch to a substitute product from another manufacturer at the same store. In such an event, a “lost sale” for the manufacturer is not a “lost sale” for the retailer. This exacerbates differences in manufacturer's and retailer's stockout costs for the item. Such differences in stockout cost influence the optimal contract between the manufacturer and the retailer and also impose agency costs on the channel. Such contracts, in turn, determine equilibrium inventory levels and fill rates. We study these issues in a single‐period supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, under three different scenarios (when the two firms are integrated into a single entity, when the retailer makes stocking decisions, and when the manufacturer makes stocking decisions). We compare, and present a methodology for comparing, stocking quantities, manufacturer efforts, and supply chain profits across different scenarios. We find that VMI performs better when manufacturer effort is a substantial driver of consumer demand and when consumers are unlikely to substitute to another brand in case of a stockout. On the other hand, if non‐contractible manufacturer effort is unimportant, or when substitution is significant, VMI can exacerbate, rather than mitigate, channel inefficiencies, and can perform worse than traditional Retailer Managed Inventory.