STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF QUALITY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

This paper investigates the relationship between aspects of quality and long run profitability and growth of a firm. The paper first determines whether a stable relationship among price, aspects of quality, and the sales rate exists, by examining the equilibrium properties of a dynamic model. Then, we use the derived equilibrium expressions to develop insights into the strategic nature of “quality reputation” and, how to integrate marketing (i.e., pricing) and quality related decisions. The paper shows under certain conditions it might be more advantageous to manipulate “quality reputation” through advertising and product innovations than to increase product quality. We comment on quality based strategic options a firm must consider to ensure long run growth and profitability.     

ECONOMIC PROCESS CONTROL UNDER UNCERTAINTY

The future of the global industry lies in the continuous improvement of both products and processes, a renewed commitment to competition, and an aggressive approach to satisfying customers needs in quality, quantity, and timing. In quality management, the degree of customer satisfaction for a given product may be measured in the form of the loss to society. This loss is formulated as a function of the deviation from the target for each of the product's quality characteristics. The greater the variability of uncontrolled factors during manufacturing or production the larger will be that loss. In this paper, we develop a form of the loss function that takes into account the variability of a production process, the decision loss, and the costs of sampling and inspection. Specifically, we consider monitoring a production process, which may undergo continuous mean shift and variance deterioration during a production run. We then examine decision rules for continuing production or stopping and adjusting the production process.     

工艺设计质量信息不对称环境下质量激励合同设计

工艺设计质量决定了产品可制造性，从而对产品质量产生重要影响。在生产外包环境下，不仅供应商的质量努力难以合同化，而且工艺设计质量可能是设计者的私人信息，因此在供应商和制造商之间往往是不对称的，从而为质量激励合同设计带来挑战。本文考虑一个制造商和一个供应商构成的两级供应链。制造商可能自己设计产品，然后将生产外包给供应商，也可能将设计和生产都外包给供应商。本文分析了在这两种外包策略下，制造商的质量激励合同设计。研究发现：1）当工艺设计质量是对称信息时，制造商可以通过质量合同设计实现全局最优质量和利润；2）当工艺设计质量是制造商的私人信息时，工艺设计质量高的制造商可以通过降低对供应商的质量惩罚强度以及增加采购价格来传递工艺设计质量的信号；3）当工艺设计质量是供应商的私人信息时，制造商可以通过质量合同菜单来甄别工艺设计质量信息。与工艺设计质量是对称信息时的均衡合同相比，在针对低工艺设计水平供应商的合同中，制造商降低质量惩罚强度和采购价格；在针对高工艺设计水平供应商的合同中，质量惩罚强度不变，但采购价格提高。     

ON-LINE QUALITY MANAGEMENT: INTEGRATION OF PRODUCT INSPECTION AND PROCESS CONTROL

A growing recognition that quality management is an important factor in defining a firm's competitive position has led to renewed attention to this function and has resulted in implementation of elaborate systems for on-line quality control comprising product inspection and process control. Traditionally, these functions have been treated independently, with very little interaction. In this paper we examine, in detail, a scheme that integrates the two functions, and we demonstrate that such an approach can result in significant cost savings. The motivation for this work comes from our experience in a wafer fabrication facility that suggested that exchange of quality information between different stages of production could result in significant performance improvements. To illustrate this approach, we consider a specific environment characterized by a single-stage continuous production process whose status is monitored by an X̄ control chart. We assume that quality-related costs may be described as a function of the process output. This is analogous to Taguchi's quality loss function and may be interpreted as a generalization of conventional classification of process output as either acceptable or defective units. The integrative scheme essentially relies on utilization of the process status information (based on process control) in making product inspection decisions. For this system we derive a cost model and develop a solution procedure to determine optimal decision parameters. Limited computational results indicate that the scheme has significant potential for reducing quality-related costs.     

PRODUCT AND SERVICE QUALITY: THE ANTECEDENTS OF CUSTOMER LOYALTY IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

Prior literature has examined product quality and service quality separately as antecedents of customer loyalty. In the context of the automotive industry, we present a framework that examines the simultaneous impact of product and service quality on consumers' purchase intentions. The framework is operationalized as several hypotheses that posit relationships between service quality, service satisfaction, product quality, and customer loyalty. The hypotheses are tested using three sources of data: (i) archival data on product quality and customer purchases, (ii) consumersíresponses to a survey instrument, and (iii) Consumer Reports. Results indicate general support for main hypotheses proposed.     

MANUFACTURING QUALITY,RELIABILITY AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

We consider an important topic from the traditional quality literature-the impact of conformance quality of a manufactured product on the preventive maintenance costs to downstream users of this product. Folk wisdom supports the notion that higher conformance quality translates into lower maintenance costs (as well as other components of life-cycle costs) for these users. We examine this proposition in some detail on the basis of a failure-time model that relates conformance quality to reliability. We consider both repairable and nonrepairable items that are maintained by a block-replacement or a minimal-repair strategy. In addition to maintenance cycles and costs, we discuss the value of information to the user as to the actual production quality, and the value of inspection.     

两级供应链产品质量控制契约模型分析

基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究在两级供应链中如何进行质量控制契约设计的问题。建立生产商和购买商的期望收益函数模型,生产商对其生产过程投资水平进行决策并确定其产品质量预防水平;购买商进行质量评价决策并确定其产品质量检验水平。生产商存在降低其生产过程投资水平的道德风险问题,在生产过程中将"削减投资",购买商为激励生产商提高其生产过程投资水平将支付"信息租金"的成本。购买商在进行产品质量检验决策时,存在夸大产品质量缺陷率的道德风险问题,在产品质量检验过程中将"过度检验"。运用最优化原理,求解生产商的最优生产过程投资水平、产品质量预防水平和价格折扣额与购买商的最优质量检验水平和外部损失分摊比例,并进行了算例分析,结果表明:当生产商提高其生产过程投资水平时,其质量预防水平将显著增加,购买商的质量检验水平将显著下降;随着购买商质量检验水平的提高,生产商所提供的价格折扣额先增大后减少,生产商所承担的外部损失分摊比例将会下降,其期望收益增加,购买商的期望收益将会减少,供应链联合期望收益将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的质量控制契约模型是可行的。     

两种激励条件下三级供应链产品质量控制策略研究

本文基于四阶段Stackelberg博弈分析,研究了在三级供应链中如何进行产品质量控制策略问题。构建了由制造商、零售商与最终顾客组成的三级供应链博弈模型,制造商进行产品质量决策,即生产高质量产品或者低质量产品,零售商进行产品采购决策和零售定价决策,最终顾客根据两种产品质量水平和零售价格的差异,决定产品的购买数量;当零售商采购高质量产品时,制造商将会向其提供价格折扣策略;当零售商采购低质量产品时,制造商将会向其提供延迟付款策略。运用最优化原理,求解了制造商的产品质量水平、价格折扣、延迟付款期限和零售商的零售价格、最终顾客的购买数量,及期望收益函数。进行了算例分析,结果表明:高质量产品零售价格关于价格折扣下降幅度更大,而低质量产品零售价格关于延迟付款期限下降幅度更大;制造商提供的价格折扣越大、延迟付款期限越长,其期望收益将会减少,此时零售商的期望收益将会增加,最终顾客产品需求量将会增加;制造商的总期望收益函数将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的产品质量控制策略是可行的。     

A high-quality-supplier selection model for supply chain management and ISO 9001 system

Supplier selection process for supply chain management (SCM) and ISO 9001 quality management system environments is considered. Determining suitable suppliers in the supply chain has become a key strategic consideration. However, the nature of these decisions is usually complex and unstructured. This paper proposes a high-quality-supplier selection (HQSS) model to deal with supplier selection problems in supply chain management. In selecting a supplier, quality management factors are considered first, and then price, delivery, etc. Quality management factors include a quality management audit, product testing, engineering work force, capability index, training time, etc., based on a five-interval scale. Next, the HQSS model determines the final solution by considering factors such as price, production lead-time, and delivery time.     

On the product selection and plant dimensioning problem under uncertainty

We present a two-stage full recourse model for strategic production planning under uncertainty, whose aim consists of determining product selection and plant dimensioning. The main uncertain parameters are the product price, demand and production cost. The benefit is given by the product net profit over the time horizon minus the investment depreciation and operation costs. The Value-at-Risk and the reaching probability are considered as risk measures in the objective function to be optimized as alternatives to the maximization of the expected benefit over the scenarios. The uncertainty is represented by a set of scenarios. The problem is formulated as a mixed 0–1 Deterministic Equivalent Model. The strategic decisions to be made in the first stage are represented by 0–1 variables. The tactical decisions to be made in the second stage are represented by continuous variables. An approach for problem solving based on a splitting variable mathematical representation via scenario is considered. The problem uses the Twin Node Family concept within the algorithmic framework known as Branch-and-Fix Coordination for satisfying the nonanticipativity constraints. Some computational experience is reported.     

A Dynamic Model of Product Quality and Pricing Decisions on Sales Response

This paper presents a dynamic model that examines the influence of price and customer perception of product quality on the sales rate of a firm producing durable goods. The sales rate of the firm is modeled as a function of its price, average product life, perceived quality, and market potential. Specifically, the model considers: (1) the process by which perceived quality is determined by including the effects of the average life of a product and quality weighted units in the market; (2) the time delay in the influence of actual quality on perceived quality; (3) the process by which demand (i.e., potential sales) is converted to realized sales due to the effects of price and perceived quality; and (4) the saturation effect and associated non-linearity in the demand function. The model presented is a reformulation and extension of the model originally proposed by Bass [2]. The validity of the model is tested using historical data on For Mustang.     

How Should a Firm Manage Deteriorating Inventory?

Firms selling goods whose quality level deteriorates over time often face difficult decisions when unsold inventory remains. Since the leftover product is often perceived to be of lower quality than the new product, carrying it over offers the firm a second selling opportunity, a product line extension to new and unsold units, and the ability to price discriminate. By doing so, however, the firm subjects sales of its new product to competition from the leftover product. We present a two period model that captures the effect of this competition on the firm's production and pricing decisions. We characterize the firm's optimal strategy and find conditions under which the firm is better off carrying all, some, or none of its leftover inventory. We also show that, compared to a firm that acts myopically in the first period, a firm that takes into account the effect of first period decisions on second period profits will price its new product higher and stock more of it in the first period. Thus, the benefit of having a second selling opportunity dominates the detrimental effect of cannibalizing sales of the second period new product.     

A TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT-BASED INCENTIVE SYSTEM SUPPORTING TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION

Although there have been many cases of total quality management (TQM) success, embracing TQM does not always lead to performance improvements. Many companies resist the changes in organizational processes such as compensation and performance appraisal systems that are required to link TQM efforts to bottom-line performance. We present the basic structure of a TQM-based compensation system that can provide incentives based on a variety of performance measures, including an explicit incentive for the reduction of variability in product variables. As a result, this approach encourages the continuous improvement central to the TQM philosophy, rather than serving as a disincentive for such improvement as do many traditional compensation systems. The set of performance measures can be adjusted periodically to focus on those measures deemed most likely to yield significant increases in customer satisfaction, further supporting the core elements of TQM. The approach is described using examples from the paper manufacturing operation where it has been successfully implemented. A longitudinal analysis of several performance measures is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new compensation system.     

Simultaneous determination of production lot size and process parameters under process deterioration and process breakdown

The purpose of this study is to combine production-inventory management with process-quality design for determining production lot size and process parameters under the possibility of process deterioration and breakdown. The total cost of such an integrated model includes: the combined setup cost (production setup and process resetting), the costs of quality loss, tolerance and mean costs for processes established, a penalty cost for process breakdown and carrying costs for cumulated inventory. The quadratic quality loss function is introduced to assess quality loss within the system. Decision variables include the initial setting (process mean) and process tolerance for process parameters determination, and production lot size for production-inventory management. The cycle time for production-inventory management is assumed to be the same as the resetting cycle for the new process-quality system. The contribution of this study lies in its development of an integrated model that enables process parameters, production lot size, and cycle time to be determined concurrently for quality and economic considerations, and at an earlier time in the process design and production management stage. An example is presented to demonstrate the proposed model.     

动态竞争环境下的产品保证管理最优控制策略研究

产品保证与产品质量和价格密切相关,在动态变化的市场环境中,如何通过产品保证优化管理实现保证政策与产品质量和价格三者的均衡,对扩大产品市场占有率、提高企业利润有重要作用.对国内外关于产品保证优化管理的研究进行总结,着重分析当前研究存在的问题,在此基础上提出动态市场竞争环境下企业保证管理的最优控制模型,通过引入市场竞争变量构建产品销售率函数,综合考虑市场竞争环境下产品保证与产品质量和价格的动态变化关系;采用极大值原理对该模型进行求解,并对最优解的参数和变化规律进行详细的分析讨论;应用灵敏度分析验证相关的分析结论,评估时间、市场变量和成本结构等参数对最优解的影响,并有针对性地提出具有指导性的管理建议.     

竞争市场上保修期与价格的联合质量信号传递作用

虽然顾客重视产品的质量（可靠性），但其在做出购买决策时往往不能完全掌握产品的质量信息。不同质量的产品可能具有不同生产和保修成本，因此保修期和销售价格可以成为传递产品质量的有效信号。考虑市场上存在相互竞争的两个生产商：在位者和新进者，顾客了解在位者的产品质量信息但不了解新进者的质量状况。研究并比较了仅保修期作为单质量信号、保修期和价格同时作为质量信号时，市场实现分离均衡的条件，以及新进者的保修期设计与定价决策。研究表明：在保修期作为单质量信号时，只要高质量新进者的单位时间保修成本小于低质量新进者，即可实现分离均衡；在保修期和价格同时作为质量信号时，当满足某些条件时也可实现分离均衡。相对于保修期作单质量信号的情形，当保修期和价格同作质量信号时，高质量新进者实现分离均衡所需提供的保修期更短、价格更低（信息租金更少），且能获得更高的市场份额和利润。最后，数值分析表明保修期和价格同作质量信号时所需满足的条件是比较宽松的，比保修期单独作质量信号时更容易实现分离均衡。     

基于上游成员的机会成本和消费者偏好的供应链产品策略

基于对上游成员的机会成本和消费者在质量偏好上的异质性的考虑,本文研究中心化和由一零售商与一制造商（供应商）组成的分散化供应链在质量和数量上的最优产品策略。通过构建问题的理论模型及分析,分别获得最优解和博弈均衡解。进而利用灵敏度分析和算例讨论了消费者对质量偏好的异质性和上游成员的机会成本对供应链的产品策略、供应链的利润和消费者剩余的影响。研究发现：当边际质量成本较低时,供应链产品策略应主要考虑满足大众需求;而当边际质量成本和消费者对质量偏好的异质性程度都较高时,供应链只需考虑部分高质量敏感的消费者;当消费者对质量的平均偏好水平较低,边际质量成本较高和顾客需求趋于同质时,产品应考虑退出市场;此外,成员的权利均衡有助于完善供应链利润和社会福利,而零售商的强势帮助消费者培育和提高产品质量。最后,占据先动优势的一方在利润分配时基本上占上风。     

PIECING TOGETHER SERVICE QUALITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ROBUST SERVICE*

This paper addresses the issue of service design, specifically that of designing the service encounter for improved quality. We introduce a framework based on the three T's of task, treatment, and tangibles as a means of organizing the application of the diverse and growing body of service quality literature to encounter design. The framework is consistent with how successful service managers disaggregate the design problem. More importantly, we show that mutually supportive interrelationships between the three T's produce an opportunity for designing in a robustness to service failure. The framework is supported by case based evidence.     

WHY FIRMS SEEK ISO 9000 CERTIFICATION: REGULATORY COMPLIANCE OR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE?

Proponents of iso 9000 certification claim that it is a low-cost signal of a firm's commitment to quality and a meaningful component of total quality management (TQM). Critics claim that it has little relation to TQM and is a tariff on international trade. We test the hypothesis that firms obtain ISO 9000 certification to comply with government and customer demands by estimating a probit model of the certification decision. The results support the view of proponents of ISO 9000. After controlling for regulatory and customer pressures to obtain ISO 9000, other factors related to quality management and quality-based competition explain the adoption decision.