Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly, even when there are equilibria in which an agreement is reached, we find that the model always has an equilibrium in which agreement is never reached, as well as equilibria in which agreement is delayed for an arbitrary length of time. Finally, the only way in which the parties can reach an agreement in equilibrium is by using inefficient punishments for (some of) the opponent's deviations. We argue that this implies that, when the parties are given the opportunity to renegotiate out of these inefficiencies, the only equilibrium outcome that survives is the one in which agreement is never reached, regardless of the value of the transaction costs.     

Portfolio rebalancing with an investment horizon and transaction costs

In this paper we consider the problem of rebalancing an existing financial portfolio, where transaction costs have to be paid if we change the amount held of any asset. These transaction costs can be fixed (so paid irrespective of the amount traded provided a trade occurs) and/or variable (related to the amount traded). We indicate the importance of the investment horizon when rebalancing such a portfolio and illustrate the nature of the efficient frontier that results when we have transaction costs. We model the problem as a mixed-integer quadratic programme with an explicit constraint on the amount that can be paid in transaction cost. Our model incorporates the interplay between optimal portfolio allocation, transaction costs and investment horizon. We indicate how to extend our model to include cardinality constraints and present a number of enhancements to the model to improve computational performance. Results are presented for the solution of publicly available test problems involving up to 1317 assets.     

具有资本结构因子和交易成本的证券组合投资模型

在介绍经典的Harry Markowitz均值-方差投资组合模型的基础上,建立了含有资本结构因子和交易成本的证券组合最优化模型,在组合中不含有无风险证券和含有无风险证券的条件下,分别给出最优投资比例及有效边界,并讨论了资本结构因子与交易成本对有效边界的影响.     

基于参照点的产学研知识产权冲突协调契约设计

产学研合作中，企业方和学研方由于主体异质性，容易引发知识产权冲突，从而导致效率损失或合作破裂。对此，本文采用不完全契约理论下的参照点契约理论框架，选择实践中知识产权交易价格和知识产权成果价值两个矛盾集中点入手，基于契约参照点偏差，引入企业方和学研方在议价能力、价值认知及折减行为上的不对称假定，从事前知识产权的最优分配、事后自我履约价格区间求解以及事后最优知识产权交易价格的选取三个方面，建立了参照点契约模型，对产学研研发合作契约进行优化设计。研究表明，创新知识产权份额的分配将对产学研合作整体效率产生影响，签订弹性价格契约有助于事后价格位于自我履约区间内，从而在一定程度上提高事后效率，但仍不能完全避免折减行为，需优化选取事后价格以实现产学研合作整体效率的最优。     

Shutdown contests in multi-plant firms

When multi-plant firms face a declining demand, they typically have to close one or more locations. In that case, the firm can organize a shutdown contest among the plants to generate extra incentives. Within a two-plant model, I discuss the impact of plant size, workers’ outside options and bargaining power on the profitability of such contest. Whereas the influence of plant size is ambiguous, the firm prefers a shutdown contest to an immediate closure of the less productive location if the more productive plant’s bargaining power is large relative to that of the less productive one. In that case, the more productive workforce spends much effort and has a high probability to survive. If the multi-plant firm is an international corporation, auctioning off the decision right which plant to close can be profitable for the firm, since each country is interested in protecting its domestic plant. From the firm’s perspective, such bidding dominates a shutdown contest if national costs from plant closure are sufficiently large relative to extra profits generated by the contest.     

A new two-party bargaining mechanism

If resources and facilities from different partners need to be engaged for a large-scale project with a huge number of tasks, any of which is indivisible, decision on the number of tasks assigned to any collaborating partner often requires a certain amount of coordination and bargaining among these partners so that the ultimate task allocation can be accepted by any partner in a business union for the project. In the current global financial crisis, such cases may appear frequently. In this paper, we first investigate the behavior of such a discrete bargaining model often faced by service-based organizations. In particular, we address the general situation of two partners, where the finite Pareto efficient (profit allocation) set does not possess any convenient assumption for deriving a bargaining solution, namely a final profit allocation (corresponding to a task assignment) acceptable to both partners. We show that it is not appropriate for our discrete bargaining model to offer the union only one profit allocation. Modifying the original optimization problem used to derive the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), we develop a bargaining mechanism and define a related bargaining solution set to fulfil one type of needs on balance between profit-earning efficiency and profit-earning fairness. We then show that our mechanism can also suit both Nash’s original concave bargaining model and its continuous extension without the concavity of Pareto efficient frontier on profit allocation.     

On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties

The presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes. This paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining. When parties have access to stationary outside options, we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party, there is a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible. A similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option.     

Wage Determination in Post-War Italy

ABSTRACT: A bargaining model is proposed and tested in order to explain the irrelevance of the general labour market conditions to wage settlements in the post-war Italian economy. The model is a “right to manage model”, but the solution cannot be improved, being both on the labour demand curve and on the contract curve. The reason for such an outcome is that both firms and unions have priorities, and distinguish the labour force between insiders and outsiders. Different definitions of insiders are used, but in the postwar Italian economy the employees and ex-employees of the industrial sector appear to be the share of the labour force which have been better protected by both contractual parties.     

Negotiating control and achieving performance in international joint ventures: A conceptual model

Adapting well-established organization theories to international joint ventures (IJVs), this paper develops an overarching theoretical model of the determinants and effects of parent control of IJVs from an interpartner bargaining power perspective. Drawing upon power dependence, transaction costs, and agency theories, we argue that the relative bargaining power between IJV partners serves as the key determinant of control structure, and that control exerts a direct effect on the venture's performance. In addition, government influence and interpartner working relationship are critical factors that complicate the linkage between control and performance but may help to explain past conflicting results. Propositions regarding these relationships are formed for future empirical test, and implications and directions for future research are provided.     

基于F2F的生鲜农产品C2B众筹预售定价

合理的产品定价是生鲜类农业众筹项目成功的关键。本文运用交易成本理论、供应链管理理论及互联网思维构建了生产者组织化联合和消费者社群化聚合、O2O场景产销对接模型和产品阶梯定价策略。研究表明,与传统开放式多级分销模式相比,生鲜农产品通过农场直达家庭的众筹预售在促进产销衔接、降低物流成本、保障质量安全方面优势明显,可让消费者获得更多顾客让渡价值并在阶梯价格吸引下“滚雪球”式地为生产者聚集批量订单进行定制化按需生产,进而实现生产者与消费者的帕累托改进。     

A Mechanism‐Design Approach to Speculative Trade

When two parties have different prior beliefs about some future event, they can realize gains through speculative trade. Can these gains be realized when the parties' prior beliefs are not common knowledge? We examine a simple example in which two parties having heterogeneous prior beliefs, independently drawn from some distribution, bet on what future action one of them will choose. We define a notion of “constrained interim‐efficient” best and ask whether they can be implemented in Bayesian equilibrium by some mechanism. Our main result establishes that as the costs of unilaterally manipulating the bet's outcome become more symmetric across states, implementation becomes easier. In particular, when these costs are equal in both states, implementation is possible for any distribution.     

A JOINT ECONOMIC-LOT-SIZE MODEL FOR PURCHASER AND VENDOR

In a typical purchasing situation, the issues of price, lot sizing, etc., usually are settled through negotiations between the purchaser and the vendor. Depending on the existing balance of power, the end result of such a bargaining process may be a near-optimal or optimal ordering policy for one of the parties (placing the other in a position of significant disadvantage) or, sometimes, inoptimal policies for both parties. This paper develops a joint economic-lot-size model for a special case where a vendor produces to order for a purchaser on a lot-for-lot basis under deterministic conditions. The focus of this model is the joint total relevant cost. It is shown that a jointly optimal ordering policy, together with an appropriate price adjustment, can be beneficial economically for both parties or, at the least, does not place either at a disadvantage.     

Market Microstructure Invariance: Empirical Hypotheses

Using the intuition that financial markets transfer risks in business time, “market microstructure invariance” is defined as the hypotheses that the distributions of risk transfers (“bets”) and transaction costs are constant across assets when measured per unit of business time. The invariance hypotheses imply that bet size and transaction costs have specific, empirically testable relationships to observable dollar volume and volatility. Portfolio transitions can be viewed as natural experiments for measuring transaction costs, and individual orders can be treated as proxies for bets. Empirical tests based on a data set of 400,000+ portfolio transition orders support the invariance hypotheses. The constants calibrated from structural estimation imply specific predictions for the arrival rate of bets (“market velocity”), the distribution of bet sizes, and transaction costs.     

合并商誉的本质及会计处理:企业资源基础理论和交易费用视角

合并商誉一直是会计界争论较多的问题之一,本文试图以企业资源基础论对合并商誉的本质进行解释,先从无交易费用的理想情况着手建立模型并逐渐放松假设,考虑各种情况下合并商誉的含义以及出现合并负商誉的条件,最后对合并商誉的会计处理提出一些建议。本文认为,合并正商誉的实质是被并购企业的异质性资源加入并购企业为其带来的商誉增值,合并负商誉产生的根本原因是被并企业本身的价值因素而非交易费用。当被并企业的持续经营价值大于清算价值时,合并负商誉与企业本身的价值因素更相关;反之则与交易费用、清算成本更相关。     

A Transaction‐Efficiency Analysis of an Internet Retailing Supply Chain in the Music CD Industry*

The emergence of the Internet may have fundamentally altered the mechanisms underlying information exchanges between sellers and end consumers. However, little attention has been given to the impact these mechanisms have on the efficiency of supply chain operations. This paper begins to address this deficiency in the literature by evaluating supply chain transaction efficiency effects from Internet purchases by consumers. It develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework examining the role Internet purchases have in establishing transaction‐efficiency levels in product exchanges involving sellers, placed at different supply chain echelons, and consumers. The theoretical framework integrates the transaction‐cost and internet economics, inter‐organizational information systems, and supply chain management literatures. Empirical testing, via structural equation modeling, is based on archival data in the Internet music CD market. The results show that Internet‐mediated purchases by consumers allow for greater transaction efficiencies when inventory ownership is postponed farther upstream in the supply chain and supply chain echelons are disintermediated. The results also indicate that channel structure configuration, defined by the supply chains' Internet retailing echelon, moderates these transaction efficiency effects.     

Institutional antecedents of subsidiary external embeddedness: Coping with regulatory competitive constraints

We investigate institutional antecedents to subsidiary external embeddedness and relate regulation constraining competition in local service sectors to subsidiary embeddedness with local partners in complementary sectors. Combining research on business networks with arguments derived from transaction cost economics, we argue that subsidiary external embeddedness depends on the extent of transaction costs originating from small numbers bargaining, which regulatory competitive constraints in local service sectors are a source of. Based on this logic, we suggest that low and high levels of regulatory competitive constraints are associated with greater subsidiary external embeddedness. We also suggest that this U-shaped relationship is more pronounced for subsidiaries that are centers of excellence within the multinational enterprise because these subsidiaries heavily depend on the local context as a source of their competitive advantage over their sister subsidiaries.     

Union Density and Relative Wages: What is the Relationship?

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of union density on relative wages under decentralised bargaining settings. Whilst, traditionally, empirical studies have focused on the impact of union status on wages (either at the individual or at the plant level), here it is argued that local trade union density can have an independent (positive) effect on wages. This occurs through the threat of collective action and the ability of the union to impose costs onto employers. First, a Nash bargaining model is presented under efficient-bargaining settings, and a wage-membership equation is derived. Wages are shown to be an increasing and convex function of union membership. Second, an empirical specification of the wage-membership equation, suitable for estimation, is obtained and fitted to establishment-level data for the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. A positive monotonic relationship between wages and union density is detected. Furthermore, wages are shown to be increasing with union density even where no formal local bargaining agreement is in force, thus suggesting that “union-threat” effects might be relevant.     

基于在线算法的改进指数梯度投资组合策略

弱集成算法是对专家意见进行动态加权平均的在线学习算法。近年来,机器学习和人工智能等方法被用来研究在线投资组合问题。该文从弱集成算法的在线学习及其序列决策性角度出发,设计改进的指数梯度在线投资组合策略,以弥补指数梯度在线投资组合策略不能结合交易费用进行分析的缺陷。首先根据指数梯度在线投资组合策略的更新方法构建代表投资策略的专家意见池,并以此为基础应用弱集成算法加权集成专家意见得到改进的指数梯度在线投资组合策略,证明了该策略可与最优专家策略(基准策略)相媲美。其次将交易费用引入到改进的指数梯度在线投资组合策略中,进一步给出对应的投资策略,重要的是理论上证明了该策略实现的平均累积收益与最优专家策略实现的平均累积收益之间的差值存在渐进式下界,从而提高了指数梯度在线投资组合策略的实用性。最后利用国内外股票市场的历史数据进行实证分析,说明了改进的指数梯度在线投资组合策略的可行性和有效性。     

Temporary Contracts,Employment Protection,and Collective Bargaining

This paper examines the effect of employment protection in a matching model with endogenous job destruction, collective bargaining, and two types of employment contracts. Using this framework, we show that (i) the impact on job creation and job destruction caused by reducing the firing costs associated with temporary jobs depends on the labour unions' bargaining strength and the gap in firing costs between contracts; (ii) reducing the firing costs associated with permanent jobs unambiguously decreases equilibrium unemployment if labour unions have strong bargaining power; and (iii) the impact caused by the firing costs differs between collective and individual bargaining.     

食品供应链中企业与农户短期合作交易契约设计

依据食品供应链中企业与农户间的交易特性,在不完全契约理论框架下,建立了双方承诺不再进行协商的短期合作交易契约设计理论模型。研究结论表明,企业的试验代理人地位是保证农户在第一阶段诚实宣告其类型,从而保证双方专用性投资为最优水平的关键,子博弈精炼纳什均衡的主要限制为,企业支付函数必须为单调函数条件才不会说谎。