Cost of Equity in Homeland Security Resource Allocation in the Face of a Strategic Attacker

Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent in homeland security since September 11, 2001. Many mathematical models have been developed to study strategic interactions between governments (defenders) and terrorists (attackers). However, few studies have considered the tradeoff between equity and efficiency in homeland security resource allocation. In this article, we fill this gap by developing a novel model in which a government allocates defensive resources among multiple potential targets, while reserving a portion of defensive resources (represented by the equity coefficient) for equal distribution (according to geographical areas, population, density, etc.). Such a way to model equity is one of many alternatives, but was directly inspired by homeland security resource allocation practice. The government is faced with a strategic terrorist (adaptive adversary) whose attack probabilities are endogenously determined in the model. We study the effect of the equity coefficient on the optimal defensive resource allocations and the corresponding expected loss. We find that the cost of equity (in terms of increased expected loss) increases convexly in the equity coefficient. Furthermore, such cost is lower when: (a) government uses per‐valuation equity; (b) the cost‐effectiveness coefficient of defense increases; and (c) the total defense budget increases. Our model, results, and insights could be used to assist policy making.     

Counterterrorism resource allocation during a pandemic: The effects of dynamic target valuations when facing a strategic terrorist

The outbreak of pandemics such as COVID-19 can result in cascading effects for global systemic risk. To combat an ongoing pandemic, governmental resources are largely allocated toward supporting the health of the public and economy. This shift in attention can lead to security vulnerabilities which are exploited by terrorists. In view of this, counterterrorism during a pandemic is of critical interest to the safety and well-being of the global society. Most notably, the population flows among potential targets are likely to change in conjunction with the trend of the health crisis, which leads to fluctuations in target valuations. In this situation, a new challenge for the defender is to optimally allocate his/her resources among targets that have changing valuations, where his/her intention is to minimize the expected losses from potential terrorist attacks. In order to deal with this challenge, in this paper, we first develop a defender–attacker game in sequential form, where the target valuations can change as a result of the pandemic. Then we analyze the effects of a pandemic on counterterrorism resource allocation from the perspective of dynamic target valuations. Finally, we provide some examples to display the theoretical results, and present a case study to illustrate the usability of our proposed model during a pandemic.     

Choosing What to Protect

We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations, and an attacker must choose a location to attack. The defender does not know the attacker's preferences, while the attacker observes the defender's resource allocation. The defender's problem gives rise to negative externalities, in the sense that increasing the resources allocated to one location increases the likelihood of an attack at other locations. In equilibrium, the defender exploits these externalities to manipulate the attacker's behavior, sometimes optimally leaving a location undefended, and sometimes preferring a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. Key results of our model are as follows: (1) the defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) manner; (2) as the number of locations to be defended grows, the defender can cost effectively reduce the probability of a successful attack only if the number of valuable targets is bounded; (3) the optimal allocation of resources can be nonmonotonic in the relative value of the attacker's outside option; and (4) the defender prefers his or her defensive allocation to be public rather than secret.     

An Attacker–defender Resource Allocation Game with Substitution and Complementary Effects

The United States is funding homeland security programs with a large budget (e.g., 74.4 billion for FY 2019). A number of game-theoretic defender–attacker models have been developed to study the optimal defense resource allocation strategies for the government (defender) against the strategic adversary (attacker). However, to the best of our knowledge, the substitution or complementary effects between different types of defensive resources (e.g., human resource, land resource, and capital resource) have not been taken into consideration even though they exist in practice. The article fills this gap by studying a sequential game-theoretical resource allocation model and then exploring how the joint effectiveness of multiple security investments influences the defensive budget allocation among multiple potential targets. Three false belief models have been developed in which only the defender, only the attacker, and both the defender and attacker hold false beliefs about the joint effectiveness of resources. Regression analysis shows that there are significant substitution effects between human and capital resources. The results show that the defender will suffer a higher loss if he fails to consider the substitution or complementary effects. Interestingly, if the attacker holds a false belief while the defender does not, the defender will suffer an even higher loss, especially when the resources are substitutes. However, if both the attacker and defender hold false beliefs, there will be lower loss when resources are complementary. The results also show that the defender should allocate the highly effective resource when the resources substitute each other. This article provides some new insights to the homeland security resource allocation.     

Robust allocation of a defensive budget considering an attacker's private information

Attackers' private information is one of the main issues in defensive resource allocation games in homeland security. The outcome of a defense resource allocation decision critically depends on the accuracy of estimations about the attacker's attributes. However, terrorists' goals may be unknown to the defender, necessitating robust decisions by the defender. This article develops a robust-optimization game-theoretical model for identifying optimal defense resource allocation strategies for a rational defender facing a strategic attacker while the attacker's valuation of targets, being the most critical attribute of the attacker, is unknown but belongs to bounded distribution-free intervals. To our best knowledge, no previous research has applied robust optimization in homeland security resource allocation when uncertainty is defined in bounded distribution-free intervals. The key features of our model include (1) modeling uncertainty in attackers' attributes, where uncertainty is characterized by bounded intervals; (2) finding the robust-optimization equilibrium for the defender using concepts dealing with budget of uncertainty and price of robustness; and (3) applying the proposed model to real data.     

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

We evaluate, for the U.S. case, the costs and benefits of three security measures designed to reduce the likelihood of a direct replication of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To do so, we assess risk reduction, losses, and security costs in the context of the full set of security layers. The three measures evaluated are installed physical secondary barriers (IPSB) to restrict access to the hardened cockpit door during door transitions, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program. In the process, we examine an alternate policy measure: doubling the budget of the FFDO program to $44 million per year, installing IPSBs in all U.S. aircraft at a cost of $13.5 million per year, and reducing funding for FAMS by 75% to $300 million per year. A break‐even cost‐benefit analysis then finds the minimum probability of an otherwise successful attack required for the benefit of each security measures to equal its cost. We find that the IPSB is costeffective if the annual attack probability of an otherwise successful attack exceeds 0.5% or one attack every 200 years. The FFDO program is costeffective if the annual attack probability exceeds 2%. On the other hand, more than two otherwise successful attacks per year are required for FAMS to be costeffective. A policy that includes IPSBs, an increased budget for FFDOs, and a reduced budget for FAMS may be a viable policy alternative, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year with consequences for security that are, at most, negligible.     

Cost‐Benefit Analysis for Optimization of Risk Protection Under Budget Constraints

Cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) is commonly applied as a tool for deciding on risk protection. With CBA, one can identify risk mitigation strategies that lead to an optimal tradeoff between the costs of the mitigation measures and the achieved risk reduction. In practical applications of CBA, the strategies are typically evaluated through efficiency indicators such as the benefit‐cost ratio (BCR) and the marginal cost (MC) criterion. In many of these applications, the BCR is not consistently defined, which, as we demonstrate in this article, can lead to the identification of suboptimal solutions. This is of particular relevance when the overall budget for risk reduction measures is limited and an optimal allocation of resources among different subsystems is necessary. We show that this problem can be formulated as a hierarchical decision problem, where the general rules and decisions on the available budget are made at a central level (e.g., central government agency, top management), whereas the decisions on the specific measures are made at the subsystem level (e.g., local communities, company division). It is shown that the MC criterion provides optimal solutions in such hierarchical optimization. Since most practical applications only include a discrete set of possible risk protection measures, the MC criterion is extended to this situation. The findings are illustrated through a hypothetical numerical example. This study was prepared as part of our work on the optimal management of natural hazard risks, but its conclusions also apply to other fields of risk management.     

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Alternative Device Configurations for Aviation-Checked Baggage Security Screening

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in dramatic changes in aviation security. As of early 2003, an estimated 1,100 explosive detection systems (EDS) and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines (ETD) have been deployed to ensure 100% checked baggage screening at all commercial airports throughout the United States. The prohibitive costs associated with deploying and operating such devices is a serious issue for the Transportation Security Administration. This article evaluates the cost effectiveness of the explosive detection technologies currently deployed to screen checked baggage as well as new technologies that could be used in the future. Both single-device and two-device systems are considered. In particular, the expected annual direct cost of using these devices for 100% checked baggage screening under various scenarios is obtained and the tradeoffs between using single- and two-device strategies are studied. The expected number of successful threats under the different checked baggage screening scenarios with 100% checked baggage screening is also obtained. Lastly, a risk-based screening strategy proposed in the literature is analyzed. The results reported suggest that for the existing security setup, with current device costs and probability parameters, single-device systems are less costly and have fewer expected number of successful threats than two-device systems due to the way the second device affects the alarm or clear decision. The risk-based approach is found to have the potential to significantly improve security. The cost model introduced provides an effective tool for the execution of cost-benefit analyses of alternative device configurations for aviation-checked baggage security screening.     

基于双层规划的反恐应急设施选址模型及算法

恐怖袭击常以人流密集地区的平民作为袭击目标，并存在突发性和随机性等特点，极易造成严重的袭击后果。通过反恐应急设施的合理布局可以缩短救援人员和物资的到达时间，从而减轻袭击后果。首先，对反恐应急设施选址问题进行描述，并将其构造为一类离散双层规划模型。其中，上层规划是关于政府选址的0-1规划问题，下层规划则是关于恐怖分子袭击目标选择的0-1规划问题。其次，结合模型和问题的特征设计算法，利用分支定界算法实现上层选址变量的隐枚举，同时通过下层问题的求解来确定上下界并判断是否满足分枝或剪枝的条件。最后，结合南疆地区的交通拓扑网络进行算例分析，结果证明有效的选址方案可以大大降低袭击损失。     

Optimal Stopping Analysis of a Radiation Detection System to Protect Cities from a Nuclear Terrorist Attack

We formulate and analyze an optimal stopping problem concerning a terrorist who is attempting to drive a nuclear or radiological weapon toward a target in a city center. In our model, the terrorist needs to travel through a two-dimensional lattice containing imperfect radiation sensors at some of the nodes, and decides at each node whether to detonate the bomb or proceed. We consider five different scenarios containing various informational structures and two different sensor array topologies: the sensors are placed randomly or they form an outer wall around the periphery of the city. We find that sensors can act as a deterrent in some cases, and that the government prefers the outer wall topology unless the sensors have a very low detection probability and the budget is tight (so that they are sparsely deployed).     

策略延迟下众筹项目的定价和激励决策

本文研究了投资者的策略延迟行为对众筹项目的定价以及激励决策的影响。策略延迟是指投资者在投资过程中自动按照估值在相应阶段投资,并且部分投资者会刻意延迟投资来搭便车的行为。本文采用了一个两阶段模型来刻画投资者的投资行为,并进一步对比序列到来模式（投资者没有策略延迟）与同时到来模式（投资者有策略延迟）中的贝叶斯均衡。研究结果表明,当发起人采用价格激励的方式提高成功率时,投资者的策略延迟行为可能会影响最优的激励策略。当存在固定目标约束时,如果投资者没有策略延迟行为,发起人应该激励前期投资者,通过弥补他们等待成本的方式提高成功率;反之如果投资者出现策略延迟行为,对项目估值较高的投资者会自动在前期投资并且愿意承受更高的价格,此时发起人应该反过来激励后期投资者。当不存在目标约束时,不论投资者是否有策略延迟行为,发起人都应该始终激励前期投资者以获得更高的成功率以及期望收益。     

不对称信息下反恐阻止网络设计

当前，我国面临的恐怖主义威胁日益严峻。为防止境外恐怖分子潜入，政府可设计反恐阻止网络，通过在交通网络中有效地分配例如安检仪器、传感设备等阻断资源，来提前识别和拦截正在潜入的恐怖分子。特别地，考虑信息不对称情形，把阻断资源分为"公开"和"隐蔽"两种类型，并假设恐怖分子观察不到"隐蔽"阻断。主要研究政府应如何同时优化两类阻断方案，才能发挥信息优势，设置"陷阱"并降低袭击分析。首先，将该问题构造为双层规划模型，上层规划是关于政府的阻止网络设计问题，下层规划则是关于恐怖分子的袭击节点选择和入侵路径优化问题。随后，设计一类用改进遗传算法处理上层规划，并结合下层规划直接求解的混合算法。其中，改进体现于杂交算子和变异算子的设计。最后，结合喀什地区进行算例分析，并分析"隐蔽"阻断的作用机理。     

Modeling Arbitrary Layers of Continuous‐Level Defenses in Facing with Strategic Attackers

We propose a novel class of game‐theoretic models for the optimal assignment of defensive resources in a game between a defender and an attacker. Compared to the other game‐theoretic models in the literature of defense allocation problems, the novelty of our model is that we allow the defender to assign her continuous‐level defensive resources to any subset (or arbitrary layers) of targets due to functional similarity or geographical proximity. We develop methods to solve for equilibrium, and illustrate our model using numerical examples. Compared to traditional models that only allow for individual target hardening, our results show that our model could significantly increase the defender's payoff, especially when the unit cost of defense is high.     

企业年金积累期的最优动态资产配置策略

替代率是评价企业年金基金投资效果的重要指标之一.本文构建了与替代率挂钩的目标基金,建立了基于目标的企业年金基金最优资产配置模型,利用随机动态规划方法获得了年金基金最优投资策略的解析解,并通过蒙特卡洛模拟技术对所得结果进行数值模拟,考察了不同市场环境及不同群体的最优配置策略和最优策略对可控制参数的敏感性.结果表明:模型中参数对年金基金的最优配置策略各有不同影响,不同群体和不同金融市场中的最优策略也有差异,但总体而言最优资产配置策略具有高风险资产权重随着时间推移而降低的动态特征.     

Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes

The problem of designing a trade mechanism (for an indivisible good) between a seller and a buyer is studied in the setting of discrete valuations of both parties using tools of finite-dimensional optimization. A robust trade design is defined as one which allows both traders a dominant strategy implementation independent of other traders’ valuations with participation incentive and no intermediary (i.e., under budget balance). The design problem which is initially formulated as a mixed-integer non-linear non-convex feasibility problem is transformed into a linear integer feasibility problem by duality arguments, and its explicit solution corresponding to posted price optimal mechanisms is derived along with full characterization of the convex hull of integer solutions. A further robustness concept is then introduced for a central planner unsure about the buyer or seller valuation distribution, a corresponding worst-case design problem over a set of possible distributions is formulated as an integer linear programming problem, and a polynomial solution procedure is given. When budget balance requirement is relaxed to feasibility only, i.e., when one allows an intermediary maximizing the expected surplus from trade, a characterization of the optimal robust trade as the solution of a simple linear program is given. A modified VCG mechanism turns out to be optimal.     

Incentive Schemes for Semiconductor Capacity Allocation: A Game Theoretic Analysis

We study incentive issues that arise in semiconductor capacity planning and allocation. Motivated by our experience at a major U. S. semiconductor manufacturer, we model the capacity‐allocation problem in a game‐theoretic setting as follows: each product manager (PM) is responsible for a certain product line, while privately owning demand information through regular interaction with the customers. Capacity‐allocation is carried out by the corporate headquarters (HQ), which allocates manufacturing capacity to product lines based on demand information reported by the PMs. We show that PMs have an incentive to manipulate demand information to increase their expected allocation, and that a carefully designed coordination mechanism is essential for HQ to implement the optimal allocation. To this end, we design an incentive scheme through bonus payments and participation charges that elicits private demand information from the PMs. We show that the mechanism achieves budget‐balance and voluntary‐participation requirements simultaneously. The results provide important insights into the treatment of misaligned incentives in the context of semiconductor capacity‐allocation.     

Duality Approaches to Economic Lot‐Sizing Games

Sharing common production, resources, and services to reduce cost are important for not for profit operations due to limited and mission‐oriented budget and effective cost allocation mechanisms are essential for encouraging effective collaborations. In this study, we illustrate how rigorous methodologies can be developed to derive effective cost allocations to facilitate sustainable collaborations in not for profit operations by modeling the cost allocation problem arising from an economic lot‐sizing (ELS) setting as a cooperative game. Specifically, we consider the economic lot‐sizing (ELS) game with general concave ordering cost. In this cooperative game, multiple retailers form a coalition by placing joint orders to a single supplier in order to reduce ordering cost. When both the inventory holding cost and backlogging cost are linear functions, it can be shown that the core of this game is non‐empty. The main contribution of this study is to show that a core allocation can be computed in polynomial time under the assumption that all retailers have the same cost parameters. Our approach is based on linear programming (LP) duality. More specifically, we study an integer programming formulation for the ELS problem and show that its LP relaxation admits zero integrality gap, which makes it possible to analyze the ELS game by using LP duality. We show that there exists an optimal dual solution that defines an allocation in the core. An interesting feature of our approach is that it is not necessarily true that every optimal dual solution defines a core allocation. This is in contrast to the duality approach for other known cooperative games in the literature.     

Using Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Modeling for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis: Application to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in the Land Environment

This article presents a framework for using probabilistic terrorism risk modeling in regulatory analysis. We demonstrate the framework with an example application involving a regulation under consideration, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for the Land Environment, (WHTI‐L). First, we estimate annualized loss from terrorist attacks with the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) Probabilistic Terrorism Model. We then estimate the critical risk reduction, which is the risk‐reducing effectiveness of WHTI‐L needed for its benefit, in terms of reduced terrorism loss in the United States, to exceed its cost. Our analysis indicates that the critical risk reduction depends strongly not only on uncertainties in the terrorism risk level, but also on uncertainty in the cost of regulation and how casualties are monetized. For a terrorism risk level based on the RMS standard risk estimate, the baseline regulatory cost estimate for WHTI‐L, and a range of casualty cost estimates based on the willingness‐to‐pay approach, our estimate for the expected annualized loss from terrorism ranges from $2.7 billion to $5.2 billion. For this range in annualized loss, the critical risk reduction for WHTI‐L ranges from 7% to 13%. Basing results on a lower risk level that results in halving the annualized terrorism loss would double the critical risk reduction (14–26%), and basing the results on a higher risk level that results in a doubling of the annualized terrorism loss would cut the critical risk reduction in half (3.5–6.6%). Ideally, decisions about terrorism security regulations and policies would be informed by true benefit‐cost analyses in which the estimated benefits are compared to costs. Such analyses for terrorism security efforts face substantial impediments stemming from the great uncertainty in the terrorist threat and the very low recurrence interval for large attacks. Several approaches can be used to estimate how a terrorism security program or regulation reduces the distribution of risks it is intended to manage. But, continued research to develop additional tools and data is necessary to support application of these approaches. These include refinement of models and simulations, engagement of subject matter experts, implementation of program evaluation, and estimating the costs of casualties from terrorism events.     

An Approach for Optimal Allocation of Safety Resources: Using the Knapsack Problem to Take Aggregated Cost‐Efficient Preventive Measures

On the basis of the combination of the well‐known knapsack problem and a widely used risk management technique in organizations (that is, the risk matrix), an approach was developed to carry out a cost‐benefits analysis to efficiently take prevention investment decisions. Using the knapsack problem as a model and combining it with a well‐known technique to solve this problem, bundles of prevention measures are prioritized based on their costs and benefits within a predefined prevention budget. Those bundles showing the highest efficiencies, and within a given budget, are identified from a wide variety of possible alternatives. Hence, the approach allows for an optimal allocation of safety resources, does not require any highly specialized information, and can therefore easily be applied by any organization using the risk matrix as a risk ranking tool.     

The allocation of promotion budget to maximize customer equity

Since the early 1980s, the concept of relationship marketing has gained increased acceptance in the field of general marketing, and particularly that of direct and interactive marketing. One of the major benefits of relationship marketing is the ability to make decisions based on their impact on customer equity. In this paper, we offer a general approach to the organization of promotion budget allocation, where the objective function is to maximize customer equity. A cornerstone in our study is the use of decision calculus in which managers’ judgments and/or estimates serve as some of the inputs to formal modeling. A series of applications of our approach to promotion budget allocation are offered under different market conditions. These applications focus on promotional expenditure allocation decisions between acquisition and retention, as well as among different promotional options for each category of expenditure. The paper also treats potential cases of synergy, or interaction, between promotional vehicles when applied to the same market segment.