RISK, TRANSACTIONS CHARGES, AND THE MARKET FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE SERVICES

This paper suggests that transactions charges in foreign exchange markets, rather than being solely brokerage fees, represent exchange rate uncertainty in periods of great fluctuations by including remuneration for the assumption of risk by foreign exchange dealers. Since most of the cost of exchange rate uncertainty may be largely endogenously included in the foreign exchange markets, attempts to examine the efficient market hypothesis in these markets should most appropriately include specific consideration of transactions costs. There appears to be empirical support for the premise that transactions charges are positively related to exchange rate risk, and, as well, inclusion of contemporaneous bid-ask spreads into the interest parity schedule leaves few unexplained profits from dollar-pound covered interest arbitrage during the 1970's and underscores the notion of classifying periods by degree of turbulence in analyzing covered interest arbitrage.     

EMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS AND THE MITIGATION OF RISK

The main ideas discussed in this paper can be briefly summarized as follows: First, although risk-mitigating arrangements — specifically, risk shifting in labor markets and risk pooling in product markets — suggest an explanation for certain specified features of macroeconomic fluctuations, risk-mitigating contractual arrangements are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause any particular disturbance to produce output and employment fluctuations. Second, given that a stochastic disturbance is going to affect output and employment, risk-mitigating arrangements can affect the amplitude of these fluctuations. Specifically, risk-mitigating arrangements reduce and reallocate the risks associated with stochastic disturbances. This process produces at least three effects on the variation in aggregate employment. These effects are changes in worker tolerance of employment fluctuations, increased variation in spot product prices, and relatively greater income variation for agents who probably have relatively high marginal spending propensities. In addition to these effects the existence of contractual markets has a potential effect on the form of the inference problem that agents face in determining the nature of disturbances in a context of incomplete information. Third, despite some similarities, a macroeconomic model that encompasses risk-mitigating arrangements differs in important ways from models that utilize the non-market-clearing approach to analysis of the determination of income and employment.     

THE TERMS OF TRADE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICY

This paper develops an example of a noncooperative game between fiscal authorities in two countries. The key strategic link between countries is the terms of trade. An equilibrium without cooperation is characterized by excessive tax rates and public spending levels in each country. The outcome is analogous to the Nash equilibrium of the static optimal tarif game in trade theory. But in this model there is also a dynamic distortion caused by noncooperative behaviour. This dynamic distortion depresses capital accumulation and reduces the equilibrium capital stock in each country. Numerical examples suggest a significant welfare benefit of cooperation.     

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND THE VOLATILITY OF TRADE

Were the large import fluctuations around the 2007–2009 recession because of increasing trade volatility? I show that import volatility relative to gross domestic product (GDP) increased in the 2000s and examine whether vertical specialization (VS) trade can explain this increase. I develop and calibrate a model of VS trade that generates most of the observed increase in relative import volatility from the 1960s to the 2000s. The increase is because of GDP's shift to less volatile services production. VS trade has a negligible impact. VS causes trade to fall more in recession but also increases the share of output that is traded, leaving volatility unaffected. It increases volatility by shifting trade to more volatile sectors, but this effect is quantitatively small. (JEL E3, F1)     

FLUCTUATING EXCHANGE RATES AND THE PRICING OF EXPORTS

The purpose of this paper is to examine the invoicing decision of an exporter under a system of pegged exchange rates and a system of freely fluctuating rates. With pegged exchange rates, the exporter may equivalently invoice in its home currency or in the currency of its foreign clients, since the two prices are related by the pegged rate. With fluctuating rates, however, the choice of an invoicing strategy is important and will affect the level of trade. The optimal prices with each strategy are compared, and the exporter's responses to governmental policy instruments are characterized.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE COMPOSITION OF LABOR MARKET TURNOVER

The composition of labor market turnover is shown to influence patterns of international trade. Job and worker turnover have opposing marginal effects on industry export intensity, highlighting the importance of relative turnover shares on either side of the labor market, as opposed to total volumes of labor mobility, in shaping economic outcomes. Industries with relatively greater shares of worker turnover export more of total production, and those with higher job turnover export less. Furthermore, relatively high job turnover hinders industry adjustment following trade liberalization. These predictions receive support for U.S. manufacturing industries using turnover data in the Quarterly Workforce Indicators available from the U.S. Census Bureau. (JEL F16)     

FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES

This article provides a quantitative assessment of the role of financial frictions in the choice of exchange rate regimes. I use a two‐country model with sticky prices to compare different exchange rate arrangements. I simulate the model without and with borrowing constraints on investment, under monetary policy and technology shocks. I find that the stabilization properties of floating exchange rate regimes in face of foreign shocks are enhanced relative to fixed exchange rate in presence of credit frictions. In presence of symmetric and correlated shock, fixed exchange rates regimes can perform better than floating. This analysis can have important policy implications for accession countries joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II system and with high degrees of credit frictions. (JEL E3, E42, E44, E52, F41)     

RISK TAKING IN CONTESTS AND THE ROLE OF CARROTS AND STICKS

We study contests in which contestants choose both work effort and the variance of output (risk). Winner-take-all contests generate incentives for contestants to engage in costly risk taking, which is inefficient if the contest organizer values the aggregate output of all contestants. The addition of a penalty for ranking last (retaining a prize for ranking first) enables the organizer to independently control contestants' incentives to exert productive effort and to increase output variance. In this way, the organizer can eliminate risk-seeking behavior in settings where it is wasteful, but also control risk seeking when it is desirable, such as in research tournaments. ( JEL J33, C72)     

EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: THE ROLE OF REAL SHOCKS AND THE VELOCITY OF MONEY

The effects of stochastic output shocks on the behavior of ex-change rates and nominal price levels is studied within the context of a two-country, cash-in-advance model. The analysis of this model, in contrast to the existing cash-in-advance literature, demonstrates that exchange rates can be more volatile than price levels even though agents' elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods is greater than one-half. This possibility arises when output shocks are autocorrelated and are due to revisions in expectations that affect the terms of trade and/or the velocity of money.     

PIERRE BOURDIEU AND THE PERILS OF ALLODOXIA : NATIONALISM,GLOBALISM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL EXCHANGE

Working outward from the issues raised by Bourdieu in his essay ‘Passport to Duke’, the tension is explored between, on the one hand, the participation of intellectuals in a putatively public sphere of mutually respectful, transnational exchange and, on the other hand, the pull of those territorialized, nationalistic contexts in which intellectuals find themselves compelled to give concrete articulation to their professional desires for autonomy and solidarity. In the process, the paper touches on some of the ways in which Bourdieu's work - and Bourdieu's legacy - can help us cope more effectively with the confusions of a period in which, in an often overwhelming fashion, we are confronted with cultural challenges that arise out of the asymmetrical relations that inform the global interactions of nation-states. Crucial to my argument is Bourdieu's tendency, at various points in his final years, to speak of allodoxia where he might previously have spoken of misrecognition. By thus shifting attention toward the categorical mistakes that arise in the course of the movement from one national field to another - from one territorially-bounded framework of opinion and custom to another - Bourdieu, it is argued, elevates the problematic of misrecognition to a global level.     

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THE TIMING OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT FORMATIONS AND ENLARGEMENTS

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have proliferated over the past 60 years. While a small number of recent studies have examined empirically the economic determinants of the likelihood of a pair of countries having a PTA, this study explains empirically the timing of all PTA formations and enlargements from 1950 through 2006 using duration analysis. Our main and novel goal is to predict (in‐ and out‐of‐sample) a substantive share of these 1,560 PTA events using a parsimonious model with mainly economic variables, taking selection dynamics into account. Our analysis reveals that we can predict correctly in‐sample the actual year of entry into force for 26% of the 1,560 bilateral PTA formations/enlargements in the period 1950–2006 among 10,518 pairings of 146 countries using only a few economic and political variables. Moreover, we can predict correctly in‐sample 57% of these PTA events within a 10‐year window leading up to the event using this model. The model also performs well out‐of‐sample for the near term (82%), but not if the out‐of‐sample period is very long. We conclude with an evaluation of the model's ability to predict the timing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union's formation and enlargements, and the model's ten most likely post‐2006 PTA events. (JEL F14, F15)     

THE THEORY OF INTERSTELLAR TRADE

This article extends interplanetary trade theory to an interstellar setting. It is chiefly concerned with the following question: how should interest charges on goods in transit be computed when the goods travel at close to the speed of light? This is a problem because the time taken in transit will appear less to an observer traveling with the goods than to a stationary observer. A solution is derived from economic theory, and two useless but true theorems are proved. (JEL F10, F30)     

EXCHANGE RATE RISK and THE BID-ASK SPREAD: A SEVEN COUNTRY COMPARISON

This paper studies the determination of exchange market transaction costs. Using a large data set including seven currencies, it provides empirical support for the theoretical prediction of a positive relationship between the level of uncertainty regarding future prices and current transaction costs. In contrast to most previous work, it considers explicitly the problem of omitted transactions volume, showing that while estimators are less efficient and potentially inconsistent in the absence of the unavailable variable, the direction of potential coefficient bias is such that hypothesis tests regarding the importance of uncertainty are rendered more conservative.     

THE CHANGING INFLUENCE OF MONEY AND MONETARY POLICY ON EXCHANGE RATES

This paper focuses on an old issue—the linkage between money announcements and the exchange rate. It shows that the magnitude of the time-varying response of the spot exchange rate to an unanticipated money announcement is mainly driven by agents' expectations of the Federal Reserve's time-varying response to the deviation of the actual money supply from a prespecified target. The inference is, the magnitude of the exchange rate's response to economic announcements depends on market participants' expectations about the announcements and the Fed's probable monetary policy response.     

A CHOICE THEORETIC MODEL OF THE OPTIMAL USE AND ISSUANCE OF TRADE CREDIT

This paper develops an extended inventory theoretic model for the purpose of analyzing the optimal use and issuance of trade credit. One significant result is that the incentives payments costs associated with commodity transactions and from the existence of positive per unit cost associated with storing commodities. A further important result is that the cost charged by the firm in return for its issuance of credit consists in firm earning asset holdings, and a risk premium reflecting the possibility of default on the part of the household.