我国证券市场逆向选择与道德风险的探讨

逆向选择与道德风险是市场经济本身产生的两大“体制缺陷”,是导致市场失灵的重要原因,本文运用信息经济学的委托代理理论中的逆向选择与道德风险的理论,通过深沪股市大量的数据与实例分析了我国证券市场存在的逆向选择与道德风险的种种表现及问题,并提出相应的治理对策。     

跟单服务与溢短交易驱动下产能分享供应链均衡策略选择

考虑由于信息不对称等原因导致的产能分享双方订单与实际交付不一致的情形,本文构建了由产能买方,产能卖方和第三方跟单服务商组成的产能分享供应链系统,并研究“溢短交易”和“跟单服务”对产能交付率提升发挥的作用。考虑产能卖方决策是否选择溢短交易模式,产能买方决策是否接受跟单服务,本文采用博弈论分析了产能买卖双方的占优策略以及双方的均衡策略组合。研究发现,溢短交易和跟单服务都可以降低产能分享的加入门槛,使得更多企业加入到产能分享中。当次品率相对较高,或跟单服务效果相对较好时,买卖双方倾向于接受跟单服务,采取普通交易模式;相反,当次品率相对较低,或跟单服务效果相对较差时,买卖双方倾向于采取溢短交易模式,不接受跟单服务。本文进一步给出了溢短交易和跟单服务的均衡策略及其条件,为产能买卖双方对合作对象的选择及相关决策提供了依据。     

电子市场价格分散、信息价值与效率:多视角的分析框架

电子市场是集合买卖双方交换价格和产品信息的跨组织信息系统,已成为撮合交易的重要虚拟场所,其对有形市场的影响力日益彰显,引起理论界和实务界的密切关注.本文将电子市场价格分散、信息价值与效率问题放在同一分析框架下研究,从不同的视角审视电子市场现存文献的解释力度;指出电子市场价格分散现象是多种因素综合作用的结果,消费者的搜寻异质、买方偏好(品牌、信任与忠诚度等因素)、服务质量、市场结构特征等多变量共同决定了电子市场的价格分散度、信息价值及效率大小;最后,提出了未来电子市场的研究方向,即通过价格比较购物技术扩散模型的引入,建立集影响电子市场价格的多变量于一体的理论分析框架,探讨电子市场价格分散及与其相关联的信息价值测度和市场效率等基础理论问题.     

The Dark Side of Information and Market Efficiency in E‐Markets*

Price dispersion reflects the differences in prices for identical products. While in physical markets such dispersion is prevalent due to high search costs, many researchers argue that search costs and price dispersion will be much lower in electronic markets (e‐markets). Empirical evidence does not support this contention, and researchers have studied search costs, market factors, and service‐quality factors to explain this dispersion. Previous research has largely assumed that more information is better. By ignoring the dark side of information, we argue that only a partial understanding of price dispersion is possible. In this article, information overload and equivocality are studied as two dark attributes of information that lead sellers to different pricing decisions in e‐markets. Hypotheses relating these attributes to price dispersion are supported through analysis of 161 product markets. This work opens up new avenues in the study of e‐markets and discusses the implications of these findings for research and practice on consumer and seller decisions.     

Reconsidering the Effect of Market Experience on the “Endowment Effect”

Simple exchange experiments have revealed that participants trade their endowment less frequently than standard demand theory would predict. List (2003a) found that the most experienced dealers acting in a well functioning market are not subject to this exchange asymmetry, suggesting that a significant amount of market experience is required to overcome it. To understand this market‐experience effect, we introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty—choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty—both of which could lead to exchange asymmetry. We conjecture that trade uncertainty is most important for exchange asymmetry. To test this conjecture, we design an experiment where the two treatments impact differently on trade uncertainty, while controlling for choice uncertainty. Supporting our conjecture, we find that “forcing” subjects to give away their endowment in a series of exchanges eliminates exchange asymmetry in a subsequent test. We discuss why markets might not provide sufficient incentives for learning to overcome exchange asymmetry.     

A Supply Chain with a Service Requirement for Each Market Signal

We study a single‐period two‐stage service‐constrained supply chain with an information update. The buyer has two procurement opportunities with the second one after observing a market signal, which updates the demand forecast. He also commits to a service level after observing the market signal. We derive his optimal ordering decisions and show that the critical market signal, the optimal first‐stage order quantity, and the optimal expected profit are monotone with respect to the target service level. We also discuss the impact of the forecast quality on the optimal decisions. We show that the optimal first‐stage order quantity may not be monotone with respect to information accuracy, as is in the case without the service constraint. In addition, we extend our analysis to the situation when an order cancellation is allowed upon the observation of the market signal. We also compare the results obtained for the problems with and without an order cancelation. Finally, we discuss the supply chain coordination issue and find that a buyback contract can also coordinate the supply chain in the presence of the service constraint.     

灰色市场环境下的服务策略研究

考虑零售商可能参与灰色市场投机,我们构建一个由制造商和零售商组成的两阶段博弈模型,并分别研究制造商是否提供服务以及零售商是否参与灰色市场投机组成的四种情景。研究结果表明：首先,不管制造商在高价市场中是否提供差异化服务,在替代系数和低价市场需求弹性都适宜的条件下零售商都参与灰色市场投机以获取额外的利润,并且双方在一定条件下实现共赢。其次,制造商提供服务能缩小零售商参与灰市投机的空间和减少利润受损的空间。再次,消费者对产品服务敏感性越高,服务策略应对灰色市场的效果越好。最后,服务水平与敏感系数和替代系数两个因素相关。     

信息失称下的创业资本运营分析

信息不对称是创业资本存在和发展于新兴高科技企业融资市场的关键原因。本文把信息不对称和它导致的道德风险问题、逆向选择问题统一于一个模型之中,并且系统分析了创业资本在应对这些问题中所体现的核心能力和竞争优势。文章还简单讨论了信息不对称对创业资本退出方式的影响。     

B2B电子中介买方用户忠诚形成机理实证研究——基于转移成本的调节作用

以提供买卖双方支持服务的B2B电子中介为研究对象,探索了买方用户忠诚的形成机理以及转移成本的关键维度,建立了基于转移成本调节作用的买方用户忠诚概念模型,然后采集数据,运用结构方程建模技术对买方用户忠诚的形成机理以及转移成本对买方用户忠诚形成机理的调节作用进行了检验,得出了买方用户忠诚的影响因素、影响程度以及转移成本的具体调节范围等。     

非对称信息对高新技术企业融资的影响

在技术成果转化的过程中,高新技术企业与投资者之间存在着非对称信息,非对称信息导致的逆向选择和道德风险使高新技术企业面临着融资障碍.本文详细分析了高新技术企业技术成果转化过程中的非对称信息对高新技术企业融资的影响,论证了私人权益资本市场中的机构投资者能够克服技术成果转化过程中非对称信息,满足其资金需求.     

Dynamic Matching,Two‐Sided Incomplete Information,and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady‐state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs.     

Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard problem

In the past two decades many organizations have turned to other organizations to satisfy their information systems needs. Information systems outsourcing arrangements cover the spectrum from agreements involving the delivery of all information services to those providing specific services such as systems development, communications management, desktop computing provision and maintenance, and so on.In this paper we model information systems outsourcing arrangements as a non-cooperative game with two players: a company and an outsourcing vendor. The game between the two players has an inherent double moral hazard problem as the success of the information system outsourcing project depends on the actions of both players, which are costly for them and are not directly contractible. Both parties make their decisions taking into account the effects that these decisions have on the other player's actions. In our analysis, we compare the solution obtained without a moral hazard problem (the first-best solution) to the one obtained under a double moral hazard setting (the second-best solution). We demonstrate some results based on the assumption that increases in the productivity of the vendor lead to increases in the productivity of the company. Further we establish that outsourcing contracts should provide no separate payment for failure to the outsourcing vendor although effectively many of them do. We also provide a sharing rule for providing appropriate incentives for the vendor and examine the dynamics associated with this sharing rule. Finally, we further provide for the characterization of response functions and the ensuing Nash solution including the optimal outsourcing fee. This allows for the nuanced consideration of the degree of interaction between the effort of one party and the productivity of the effort of the other party. This particular interaction has not been explored formally in the extant research literature.     

两级供应链产品质量控制契约模型分析

基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究在两级供应链中如何进行质量控制契约设计的问题。建立生产商和购买商的期望收益函数模型,生产商对其生产过程投资水平进行决策并确定其产品质量预防水平;购买商进行质量评价决策并确定其产品质量检验水平。生产商存在降低其生产过程投资水平的道德风险问题,在生产过程中将"削减投资",购买商为激励生产商提高其生产过程投资水平将支付"信息租金"的成本。购买商在进行产品质量检验决策时,存在夸大产品质量缺陷率的道德风险问题,在产品质量检验过程中将"过度检验"。运用最优化原理,求解生产商的最优生产过程投资水平、产品质量预防水平和价格折扣额与购买商的最优质量检验水平和外部损失分摊比例,并进行了算例分析,结果表明:当生产商提高其生产过程投资水平时,其质量预防水平将显著增加,购买商的质量检验水平将显著下降;随着购买商质量检验水平的提高,生产商所提供的价格折扣额先增大后减少,生产商所承担的外部损失分摊比例将会下降,其期望收益增加,购买商的期望收益将会减少,供应链联合期望收益将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的质量控制契约模型是可行的。     

基于“柠檬”理论的在线信誉反馈系统有效性研究

信任问题是困扰在线拍卖市场发展的瓶颈之一.在线信誉反馈系统在消除信息不对称性,解决在线拍卖市场逆向选择问题中发挥着重要的作用.首先分析在线拍卖市场中逆向选择问题产生的原因,而后基于"柠檬"理论,从更换交易对手的重复博弈角度分析在线信誉反馈系统中信誉运行模型,对在线拍卖市场的信誉运行机理进行分析.研究指出在线信誉反馈系统能激励卖家诚信交易,一定程度上降低逆向选择问题,为我国在线拍卖网站和网络卖家更好地实施网络声誉战略提供一个思路.     

供应链质量管理中的最优合同设计

本文研究在供应链质量管理过程中合同设计问题对供应商质量预防决策和制造商质量检测决策的影响.在合同设计过程中分析了各种行动隐匿情况下的道德风险问题,以及如何通过限定合同参数的取值来激励制造商和供应商的行动,在实现供应商和制造商利益最大化的同时,保证供应链整体质量收益(质量成本)的优化.     

Gray Markets and Supply Chain Incentives

“Gray markets” are unauthorized channels that distribute a branded product without the manufacturer's permission. Since gray markets are not officially sanctioned by the manufacturer, their existence is assumed to hurt the manufacturer. Yet manufacturers sometimes tolerate or even encourage gray market activities. We investigate the incentives of a manufacturer and its authorized retailer to engage in (or tolerate) gray markets. The firms need to consider the trade‐off between the positive effects of a gray market (price discrimination and cost savings) and the negative effects (cannibalization of sales and a loss in consumer valuation). Generally, gray markets can be categorized into two types: (i) a “local gray market,” where a retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers operating in the same region as the retailer; and, (ii) “bootlegging,” where the retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers in another market where the manufacturer sells through a direct channel. We characterize the equilibrium in each type of gray market and identify conditions under which the retailer will divert products to the gray market. Incentive problems are more complicated when the retailer bootlegs and, in this case, we show that conflicting incentives may lead to the emergence of a gray market where both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits decrease.     

信息技术对价格信息不对称的影响研究

信息技术降低了企业和客户获取信息的成本,从而对价格信息不对称产生影响。本文从客户搜索产品价格信息的角度,分别对四种市场进行分析,得出了在短期市场中,考虑IT影响时信息不对称降低、客户获得较低价格的结论;长期市场中,考虑IT影响时,信息不对称消失、市场演变为完全竞争市场的结论。最后,给出企业制定价格策略的建议。     

拍卖采购合同及议价谈判机制设计

考虑采购商在多个潜在供应商中选择1名获胜者来提供单物品或服务,并且供应商存在不可见努力的情况,设计了两阶段采购机制.该机制先实施关于合同的拍卖阶段,再执行可能的议价谈判阶段.分析的基本结论是,在对称信息情况下,存在系统最优的质量标准和努力水平;不对称信息下,投标者将在拍卖阶段报价自己的真实成本.在不对称信息的谈判阶段,存在包含重新确定的价格、质量和努力水平的惟一议价均衡,此均衡将实现对称信息下的分配效率——系统最优.从采购商的利益出发,给出了采购商选择采取谈判策略或者采用拍卖阶段合同的条件.     

中国股票市场IPO折价实证研究

IPO折价普遍存在于世界股票市场,有关IPO折价的研究是一个热点问题.中国股市的特殊性使IPO上市股票的折价不但符合IPO的普遍规律,而且具有很多独特的规律.结合有关折价原因的几种理论和假说(包括信息不对称、股权分配、投资者非理性等),对中国股市IPO折价的存在性和不同市场、股票类型折价的差异性以及造成这些差异的原因等进行实证研究,并对承销商声誉的衡量、股市上升期和下降期的折价表现、同一企业A股和B股发行顺序对折价的影响等进行研究,揭示中国IPO折价的存在性、股票市场的差异性以及造成差异的原因,探索股票一、二级市场的有机结合路径,对规范和完善IPO市场定价机制、帮助监管者制定规则和引导投资者理性投资等具有一定的指导意义.     

服务质量影响市场需求下资金约束型网购供应链协调研究

高质量发展服务业已经写入国家战略，其重要性在以顾客需求为导向的网购市场经济中尤为突出。企业服务质量直接决定顾客的购物体验。在供应链意图改善顾客体验但零售商受资金约束的背景下，考虑服务质量对市场需求的影响，设计回购契约与"基于目标销售量的信用契约"组合，构建资金约束型网购供应链协调决策模型，并对其进行求解以获得供应链最优经营策略。研究结果显示，运用最优策略不仅有助于缓解零售商的资金压力，而且能激励其提高服务质量，改善顾客购物体验；所得契约设计不仅能实现网购供应链协调，而且能实现供应链总利润在节点企业之间的任意分配，提高了契约的操作性，保障了最优策略的有效性。