Mean-risk decision analysis

Some decision theorists criticize expected utility decision analysis and propose mean-risk decision analysis as a replacement. They claim that expected utility decision analysis neglects attitudes toward risk whereas mean-risk decision analysis accords these attitudes their proper status. However mean-risk decision analysis and expected utility decision analysis are not incompatible, and it is advantageous for decision theory to develop each in a way that complements the other. Here I present a mean-risk rule that governs preferences among options and options given states. This mean-risk rule complements an expected utility rule that takes the utility of an option-state pair as the utility of the option given the state. I argue for the mean-risk rule using principles concerning basic intrinsic desires. The rule is comparative, but the last section offers some suggestions for its quantitative development.I am grateful for comments from my colleague, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.     

Strategic communication with reporting costs

A decision maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Some information is never revealed. In contrast to setups without communication costs, our decision maker can benefit by ex ante committing to an ex post suboptimal decision rule. Moreover, committing ex ante not to listen to one of the parties may also be beneficial for the decision maker.

     

Causality in the logic of decision

In recent years there has been an active debate between proponents of two different models of rational decision. One model is evidential decision theory, which is characterized by the fact that it holds the principle of maximizing expected utility to be appropriate whenever the states are probabilistically independent of the acts. The other model, causal decision theory, holds that the principle of maximizing expected utility is appropriate whenever the states are causally independent of the acts. The proponents of evidential decision theory include Richard Jeffrey and Ellery Eells, who claim that evidential decision theory has significant advantages over causal decision theory. In this paper I discuss the two main advantages which have been claimed for evidential decision theory, and show that in fact evidential decision theory does not possess either of these advantages.     

Game Trees For Decision Analysis

Game trees (or extensive-form games) were first defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. In this paper we examine the use of game trees for representing Bayesian decision problems. We propose a method for solving game trees using local computation. This method is a special case of a method due to Wilson for computing equilibria in 2-person games. Game trees differ from decision trees in the representations of information constraints and uncertainty. We compare the game tree representation and solution technique with other techniques for decision analysis such as decision trees, influence diagrams, and valuation networks.     

Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems

In a stimulating paper, Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) argued how a decision maker could undertake dynamically inconsistent choices when, in an extensive form decision problem, she has a particular type of imperfect recall named absentmindedness. Such memory limitation obtains whenever information sets include decision histories along the same decision path. Starting from work focusing on the absentminded driver example, and independently developed by Segal (2000) and Dimitri (1999), the main theorem of this article provides a general result of dynamically consistent choices, valid for a large class of finite extensive form decision problems without nature.      

Decision settings analysis – a tool for analysis and design of human activity systems

The paper describes a methodology to be used for analysis and design of human activity systems. The methodology is based on an analysis of the decision settings whereas most other decision analysis methodologies are analysing the process. The decision concept is analysed and discussed. A distinction between programmed and programmable as well as non-programmed and non-programmable decisions is proposed. A classification of different information types for decision making is presented. A methodology based on a systemic and systematic analysis of the information requirements of an organization is proposed. This methodology also indicates organizational discrepancies and information imbalances. The methodology focuses the settings of the decisions on all levels of organizations. The methodology can be regarded as a dynamic, learning system. The author proposes further research on the individuals decision making abilities.     

Delivering decision making support to people with cognitive disability — What has been learned from pilot programs in Australia from 2010 to 2015

The UNCRPD has generated debate about supported decision making as a way to better enable people with cognitive disability to participate in decision making. In Australia, between 2010–2015, a series of projects have piloted various models of delivering decision making support. A critical review was conducted on the program documents and evaluations of these pilot projects. The pilots were small scale, conducted by both statutory and non‐statutory bodies, and adopted similar designs centred on supporting a decision maker/supporter dyad. Primarily, participants were people with mild intellectual disability. Themes included: positive outcomes; uncertain boundaries of decision support; difficulty securing supporters; positive value of program staff and support to supporters; limited experience and low expectations; and varying value of written resources. The lack of depth and rigour of evaluations mean firm conclusions cannot be reached about program logics, costs or outcomes of the pilots. The pilots demonstrate feasibility of providing support for decision making rather than resolving issues involved in delivering support. They suggest that some form of authority may facilitate the role of decision supporters, help to engage others in a person's life, and integrate decision making support across all life domains.     

Understanding and Representing Human Services Knowledge

Expert systems-computerized decision consultants-offer potential for human service professionals to share expertise and reduce variability in decision making. The development of such systems is particularly important in the field of child protection because of high staff turnover and complex decision making requirements. This paper presents a method for knowledge acquisition in building a prototype expert system in child welfare. Patterns of decision making are traced and translated into computer-based rules. Solutions to research problems in developing expert systems are presented. Continued refinement of research practice in this area can lead to the development of usable expert systems for the social services.     

Indigenous Australians and Impaired Decision‐Making Capacity

This article explores issues associated with impaired decision‐making capacity for Indigenous Australians. There is very little published on the subject of impaired decision‐making capacity in Australia, particularly in relation to Indigenous people. To gain some insight into this subject, this article looks at some indicators of impaired decision‐making capacity for Indigenous Australians such as rates of intellectual disability and mental illness. The Australian state‐based Guardianship and Administration system—the legislative framework designed to provide for decision‐making for people with impaired capacity—is briefly described before looking at the cultural relevance of this Western system and its constructs for Indigenous Australians. Future investigation should be directed at exploring existing and alternative strategies to support Indigenous Australians with impaired capacity and their carers.     

The price for information about probabilities and its relation with risk and ambiguity

In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker??s risk and ambiguity attitudes affect the reservation price for ambiguity resolution. These effects are analyzed for different levels of ambiguity of the act. Operating instructions for the elicitation of the reservation price for ambiguity resolution in an experimental setting are provided at the end of the article.     

Family participation in child protection practice: an observational study of family group meetings

Over the past two decades, child protection authorities internationally have begun to implement models of family participation in child protection decision‐making. Debate exists about the extent to which these models promote family involvement in decision‐making. While a significant body of research on family and professional experience and perceptions of models of family participation in decision‐making has emerged, there has been little observational research of these approaches. In this paper, we report on observational data from 11 family group meetings (FGMs) in a child protection context in Queensland, Australia. Under Queensland child protection law, these meetings are referred to as an inclusive process for child protection decision‐making and planning. We draw on observational data to analyse how family inclusion in child protection decision‐making is facilitated, or limited, by the FGM process. We consider tensions in the realization of a participatory ethos in child protection services systems and discuss what practitioners can practically do to enhance family participation in child protection decision‐making.     

The Likelihood Method for Decision under Uncertainty

This paper introduces the likelihood method for decision under uncertainty. The method allows the quantitative determination of subjective beliefs or decision weights without invoking additional separability conditions, and generalizes the Savage–de Finetti betting method. It is applied to a number of popular models for decision under uncertainty. In each case, preference foundations result from the requirement that no inconsistencies are to be revealed by the version of the likelihood method appropriate for the model considered. A unified treatment of subjective decision weights results for most of the decision models popular today. Savage’s derivation of subjective expected utility can now be generalized and simplified. In addition to the intuitive and empirical contributions of the likelihood method, we provide a number of technical contributions: We generalize Savage’s nonatomiticy condition (“P6”) and his assumption of (sigma) algebras of events, while fully maintaining his flexibility regarding the outcome set. Derivations of Choquet expected utility and probabilistic sophistication are generalized and simplified similarly. The likelihood method also reveals a common intuition underlying many other conditions for uncertainty, such as definitions of ambiguity aversion and pessimism.     

The Effectiveness of Assigned Goals in Complex Financial Decision Making and the Importance of Gender

Evidence suggests that men are more confident and less risk averse in financial decision making. Researchers did not address how men and women respond differently to goals in financial decision situations, however. In the present study, men set more challenging personal goals and risked more resources than women in a complex financial decision task. Men did not report higher self-efficacy versus women. As expected, gender interacted with assigned goals to predict self-efficacy, risk behavior, and personal goals. Results concur with recent financial decision research that suggests men and women differ in their use of externally-provided information such as assigned goals. Suggestions for future research are offered and limitations are discussed.     

Propagation of Individual Bias through Group Judgment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - Group decision making is commonly used in juries, businesses, and in politics to increase the informational basis for a decision and to improve judgment accuracy....     

行政决策的民主化探析

本文阐述了行政决策民主化的重要性,分析了目前行政决策的现状,并从行政决策的制度、流程、方式及公众参与等方面入手探讨了实现我国行政决策民主化的有效途径。     

Stochastic dominance in multicriterion analysis under risk

Traditionally, in the literature on the modelling of decision aids one notes the propensity to treat expected utility models and outranking relation models as rivals. It may be possible, however, to benefit from the use of both approaches in a risky decision context. Stochastic dominance conditions can be used to establish, for each criterion, the preferences of a decision maker and to characterise them by a concave or convex utility function.Two levels of complexity in preference elicitation, designated as clear and unclear, are distinguished. Only in the case of unclear preferences is it potentially interesting to attempt to estimate the value function of the decision maker, thus obtaining his (her) preferences with a reduced number of questions. The number of questions that must be asked of the decision maker depends upon the level of the concordance threshold that he(she) requires in the construction of the outranking relations using the ELECTRE method.     

Dynamic Choice, Independence and Emotions

From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the investment decision, but before the resolution of the decision risk; (iii) after the resolution of the decision risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under the different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a violation of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combinations of anticipated and experienced emotions influence decision making.      

Compatibility of multiple goal programming and the maximize expected utility criterion

Assuming a decision maker accepts the basic axioms of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory and is therefore an expected utility maximizer, this paper argues that the domain of the decision variables in a multiobjective program should be altered in order to guarantee that it will be compatible with the maximize expected utility critierion. Stochastic dominance is employed to approximate this new domain, and for a certain class of decision problems it is shown that this approximation is very good.     

The implications of irreversibility in emergency response decisions

The irreversibility effect implies that a decision maker who neglects the prospect of receiving more complete information at later stages of a sequential decision problem will in certain cases too easily take an irreversible decision, as he ignores the existence of a positive option value in favour of reversible decisions. This option value represents the decision maker's flexibility to adapt subsequent decisions to the obtained information. In this paper we show that the economic models dealing with irreversibility as used in environmental and capital investment decision making can be extended to emergency response decisions that produce important irreversible effects. In particular, we concentrate on the decision whether or not to evacuate an industrial area threatened by a possible nuclear accident. We show in a simple two-period evacuation decision model that non-optimal conclusions may be drawn when evacuation is regarded as a `now or never decision'. The robustness of these results is verified by means of a sensitivity analysis of the various model parameters. The importance of `options thinking' in this decision context is illustrated in an example.