信息禀赋差异下制造商信息获取策略：“躺平”或“进取”

在市场需求信息不对称下，没有需求预测能力的制造商总是需要权衡实施“躺平”策略还是“进取”策略来获取下游零售商拥有的需求信息。本文考虑一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链，通过构建信息对称、信息推测和信息甄别三种情形下的博弈模型，分析了制造商的最优信息获取策略、不同策略和信息禀赋优势对制造商、零售商决策的影响。研究发现，无论零售商信息禀赋优势高或低，对于制造商来说，“躺平”策略为其最优信息获取策略，且在该策略下制造商更倾向于根据零售商的零售价对需求信息进行推测。而对于零售商来说，制造商选择“进取”策略时对其最有利。若制造商选择“躺平”策略，零售商则更倾向于主动披露信息，在该情形下零售商的信息禀赋优势越低对零售商越有利，越高则对制造商越有利。     

Manufacturer Rebate Competition in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

We consider manufacturer rebate competition in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling to a common retailer. We fully characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium rebate decisions and show how they depend on parameters such as the fixed cost of a rebate program, market size, the redemption rate of rebate, the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers in the market and competition intensity. Interestingly, more intense competition induces a manufacturer to lower rebate value or stop offering rebate entirely. Without rebate, it is known that more intense competition hurts the manufacturers and benefits the retailer. With rebate, however, more intense competition could benefit the manufacturers and hurt the retailer. We find similar counterintuitive results when there is a change in some other parameters. We also consider the case when the retailer subsidizes the manufacturers sequentially to offer rebate programs. We fully characterize the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy, and show that subsidy always benefits the retailer but may benefit or hurt the manufacturers. When the retailer wants to induce both manufacturers to offer rebate, he always prefers to subsidize the manufacturer with a higher fixed cost first. Sometimes the other manufacturer will then voluntarily offer rebate even without subsidy.     

回馈与惩罚契约下闭环供应链应对突发事件的协调性研究

考虑一个制造商和一个零售商组成的闭环供应链,在考虑随机性需求下,首先分析了回馈与惩罚契约对闭环供应链的协调作用;然后,探讨了回馈与惩罚契约对突发事件的协调作用,研究表明:基准的回馈与惩罚契约对突发事件将不再发挥协调作用,为此,给出了闭环供应链对突发事件的最优应对策略,并调整了原来的回馈与惩罚契约使其具有抗突发事件性。     

Coping with Gray Markets: The Impact of Market Conditions and Product Characteristics

Gray markets, also known as parallel imports, have created fierce competition for manufacturers in many industries. We analyze the impact of parallel importation on a price‐setting manufacturer that serves two markets with uncertain demand, and characterize her policy against parallel importation. We show that ignoring demand uncertainty can take a significant toll on the manufacturer's profit, highlighting the value of making price and quantity decisions jointly. We find that adjusting prices is more effective in controlling gray market activity than reducing product availability, and that parallel importation forces the manufacturer to reduce her price gap while demand uncertainty forces her to lower prices. Furthermore, we explore the impact of market conditions (such as market base, price sensitivity, and demand uncertainty) and product characteristics (“fashion” vs. “commodity”) on the manufacturer's policy towards parallel importation. We also provide managerial insights about the value of strategic decision‐making by comparing the optimal policy to the uniform pricing policy that has been adopted by some companies to eliminate gray markets entirely. The comparison indicates that the value of making price and quantity decisions strategically is highest for moderately different market conditions and non‐commodity products.     

The Effect of Delayed Incentives on Supply Chain Profits and Consumer Surplus

We examine the use of consumer cash mail‐in rebates offered by a manufacturer in a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Our analysis indicates that rebates are profitable for manufacturers if consumers are inconsistent in the sense that their rebate valuation when they make purchase decisions is independent of their redemption probabilities when they make redemption decisions. If the manufacturer keeps the wholesale price unchanged, then the rebate increases the retailer's profit by a larger amount than the increase in the manufacturer's profit. If the manufacturer jointly optimizes the wholesale price and rebate, then the increase in the manufacturer's profit is twice the increase in the retailer's profit. The retailer responds to rebates by increasing the retail price, which increases the margin paid by consumers who do not redeem the rebate. On average, consumer surplus decreases when it is optimal for manufacturers to offer rebates. We suggest incentive schemes that make it worthwhile for retailers to limit the price increase. In these incentive schemes, the manufacturer imposes a negative relationship between the rebate value and the retail price. We show that such incentives increase supply chain profits.     

不对称信息下考虑产能约束的供应链合同设计

本文针对由产能约束品牌制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑市场上消费者对产品的异质性偏好,以及品牌制造商和零售商之间存在信息不对称,研究品牌制造商最优合同设计与零售商定价策略,考察产能约束与不对称信息对产品定价和供应双方合作的影响。研究发现：受到产能约束的品牌制造商有三种合同策略,即低价合同、固定价格合同以及高价合同等三种合同,在低价合同下品牌制造商可以充分利用其产能约束,而在后两种合同下产品有可能滞销;不对称信息会导致"批发价格+一次性转移支付"合同不能完美协调供应链。当品牌制造商和零售商进行信息共享谈判时,若二者在高价合同下进行合作,则品牌制造商与零售商在一定条件下可以达成信息共享谈判,实现"双赢"。     

Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

非对称成本扰动信息非线性需求函数下的供应链契约设计

为了分析非对称的成本扰动信息对于供应链契约设计的影响,研究了当制造商的成本发生扰动并且扰动信息是非对称的情形下的零售商的最优契约设计问题。假定市场需求是关于价格的非线性函数,使用委托-代理理论,设计了非对称的成本扰动信息下的供应链最优契约菜单,并且分析了非对称的扰动信息对于供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明,当需求为常数柔性函数或者指数函数形式时,可以设计有效的契约菜单来改善供应链的绩效;在非对称的成本扰动信息下,当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时,初始的生产计划仍然是最优的;非对称的成本扰动信息并不必然会给供应链带来利润损失。最后通过数值算例对模型的结果进行了验证。     

非对称信息下闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件策略研究

研究了非对称信息下一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级闭环供应链在回购契约下的协调问题。在考虑零售商销售成本信息为非对称信息和随机性市场需求基础上,首先,分析了在正常状态下分散式系统决策情况,通过重新设计可变参数解决了信息不对称的问题,实现了回购契约下的信息共享和供应链的完美协调;然后,探讨了闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件的协调问题。研究结果表明：当突发事件造成市场规模和制造商生产成本同时扰动时,闭环供应链的销售活动将受影响,闭环供应链的协调将被打破,而闭环供应链的废旧品回收活动却不受突发事件的影响。为此,给出了闭环供应链回购契约的应急决策。最后通过数值算例验证了结论。     

买方市场时效性产品的供应链弹性契约优化模型

在买方市场环境下,产品越来越具有时效性,寿命周期越来越短,为了规避风险,经销商往往不以实际预测量来订货。针对该问题,本文在已有的数量弹性契约研究的基础上,以激励相容理论和供应链理论为理念,引入回购契约的方法,提出了一个可以激励经销商的弹性契约优化模型,弥补了弹性契约的不足。用一个算例分析检验了该模型,结果表明,通过调节批发价格和返利比例来引导经销商的订货量趋势,当经销商期望利润最大的订货量与市场平均需求相等时,经销商会客观地估测未来需求量并报给制造商,同时制造商还在此基础上确定具体批发价格和返利比例以使自己利润最大化,从而使经销商与制造商共担供应链环节中的市场风险,并共同为优化整体供应链做出努力。     

Technical Note—Demand Uncertainty Reduction in Decentralized Supply Chains

This note analyzes the effects associated with reducing demand uncertainty in a decentralized supply chain comprising one manufacturer, one retailer, and a wholesale price contract that governs the transactions between them. The demand uncertainty level is parameterized through a mean‐preserving spread, and the manufacturer's and the retailer's equilibrium decisions are solved accordingly. We consider the case of an exogenous retail price as well as the case of an endogenous retail price, and we find in both cases that the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected profits in equilibrium are not necessarily monotone decreasing in the uncertainty level. Thus, we find that, even if the cost of reducing demand uncertainty is zero, uncertainty reduction can hurt rather than benefit either or both members of the supply chain.     

Price,Rebate, and Returns Supply Contracts for Coordinating Supply Chains with Price‐Dependent Demands

Channel rebates and returns policies are common mechanisms for manufacturers to entice retailers to increase their order quantities and sales ultimately. However, when the underlying demand depends on the retail price, it has been known that channel coordination cannot be achieved if only one of these mechanisms is deployed. In this article, we show that a policy that combines the use of wholesale price, channel rebate, and returns can coordinate a channel with both additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demands. In addition to determining the sufficient conditions for the contract parameters associated with the equilibrium policy, we show that multiple equilibrium policies for channel coordination exist. We further explore how the equilibrium policy can be adjusted to achieve Pareto improvement. Other issues such as the maximum amount of expected profit that the manufacturer can share under the coordinated channel, the structural properties of the contracts under both the additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demand functions are also discussed.     

专利技术授权、生产外包与合同设计

专利授权及其授权协议是知识产权转化为现实生产力的关键。本文针对由一个专利技术提供商、一个品牌制造商和一个OEM组成的供应链,考虑市场需求信息不对称以及OEM存在规模经济效应,研究了专利技术提供商最优专利授权合同设计问题,考察了不对称信息、规模经济效应等因素对专利授权合同设计、供应链利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明：在不对称信息下,专利技术提供商通过设计一组合同菜单可以有效甄别市场需求信息;OEM会有动机去提升其规模经济效应,但却不一定有利于其他供应链成员和消费者;不对称信息的存在会影响供应链成员企业的利润水平以及消费者剩余,并总是会导致供应链系统利润的损失,但若满足一定条件,则专利技术提供商与品牌制造商可以达成信息共享谈判,实现"双赢"。     

Evaluating manufacturer's buyback policies in a single-period two-echelon framework under price-dependent stochastic demand

This paper attempts to model the profitability of a secondary market, in a newsvendor setting, to a profit-maximizing manufacturer, who is offering to the retailer a buyback policy for the unsold merchandise left at the end of the selling season. With a buyback agreement, the manufacturer shares the risks of demand uncertainty, thus inducing the buyer to place larger orders. The manufacturer's risk is mitigated to some extent by the availability of an extra market to dispose off the unsold merchandise. Both parties are risk-neutral profit-maximizers and both have the same information about the final demand for the product and its uncertainty. The manufacturer's decision is to arrive at an optimal wholesale price and the buyback price. Based on this offer, the retailer in turn sets the optimal amount of merchandise to purchase, as well as the unit selling price to meet a price-dependent uncertain demand for the merchandise in question. Due to the difficulty of obtaining analytical results, we have undertaken a numerical analysis to (i) compare the optimal policies across demand functions and error structures for three situations namely the no-incentive case and the buyback policies with and without a secondary market; (ii) indicate the conditions whereby the trade incentive is beneficial to both parties; (iii) assess the efficacy of the policies using two other performance indices (probability of achieving a target profit, and pass-through ratios) alternate to profit maximization; and (iv) conjecture the conditions for successful buyback policies and the nature of the benefits from the secondary market.     

绿色供应链中不对称需求预测下的信息共享研究

研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链和他们的需求预测信息共享问题。考虑了两种方案：订货型生产方案和库存型生产方案，两种方案下分别考虑了无信息共享和信息共享两种情况。分析了预测信息对两种方案下制造商利润、零售商利润和信息共享价值的影响，同时研究了绿色成本系数对信息共享的影响。研究表明，两种方案中制造商始终能从信息共享中获利，而零售商只有在制造商绿色成本系数较低时才会自愿共享预测信息。当绿色成本系数较高时，制造商可以通过一个讨价还价合同，促进零售商进行信息共享。当绿色成本系数很高时，供应链成员之间不存在信息共享。此外，库存型生产方案中信息共享带来的总收益增量要高于订货型生产方案，因此，库存型生产方案中参与者信息共享的可能性要高于订货型生产方案。     

Retailer's Response to Alternate Manufacturer's Incentives Under a Single‐Period,Price‐Dependent,Stochastic‐Demand Framework*

This article considers the joint development of the optimal pricing and ordering policies of a profit‐maximizing retailer, faced with (i) a manufacturer trade incentive in the form of a price discount for itself or a rebate directly to the end customer; (ii) a stochastic consumer demand dependent upon the magnitude of the selling price and of the trade incentive, that is contrasted with a riskless demand, which is the expected value of the stochastic demand; and (iii) a single‐period newsvendor‐type framework. Additional analysis includes the development of equal profit policies in either form of trade incentive, an assessment of the conditions under which a one‐dollar discount is more profitable than a one‐dollar rebate, and an evaluation of the impact upon the retailer‐expected profits of changes in either incentive or in the degree of demand uncertainty. A numerical example highlights the main features of the model. The analytical and numerical results clearly show that, as compared to the results for the riskless demand, dealing with uncertainty through a stochastic demand leads to (i) (lower) higher retail prices if additive (multiplicative) error, (ii) lower (higher) pass throughs if additive (multiplicative) error, (iii) higher claw backs in both error structures wherever applicable, and (iv) higher rebates to achieve equivalent profits in both error structures.     

考虑向上销售和渠道主导结构的BOPS定价与服务合作

在"线上下单,线下取货"的BOPS模式下进行了供应链主体的定价与服务合作决策分析。研究发现：1）在零售商主导的结构下,单位补偿契约可以实现合理的利润分配,且向上销售产品的批发价格将不会影响BOPS产品价格、服务决策和最优利润;2）在制造商主导的结构下,批发价格契约可以有效实现服务合作,单位补偿值可影响定价与服务决策继而影响主体间利润分配,且当单位补偿值为0时,供应链总利润最大;3）制造商主导下的供应链效率高于零售商主导下的情形,呈现的双重边际化效应较不明显。研究结论对商家进行全渠道实践提供了参考。     

Impact of Reseller's Forecasting Accuracy on Channel Member Performance

This article studies a three‐layer supply chain where a manufacturer sells a product through a reseller who then relies on its own salesperson to sell to the end market. The reseller has superior capability in demand forecasting relative to the manufacturer. We explore the main trade‐offs between the risk‐reduction effect and the information–asymmetry–aggravation effect of the improved forecasting accuracy. We show that under the optimal wholesale price contract, both the manufacturer and the reseller are always better off as the reseller's forecasting accuracy improves. Nevertheless, under the menu of two‐part tariffs, the manufacturer prefers the reseller to be either uninformed or perfectly informed about the market condition. We further find that the improved forecasting accuracy is beneficial for the reseller if its current forecasting system is either very poor or very good.     

产需不确定下基于零售商风险规避的三级供应链组合契约模型

针对产需不确定下单一供应商、制造商和风险规避的零售商组成的三级供应链系统,建立了分散和集中情况下的最优决策模型。通过设计风险共担和GL组合契约实现了三级供应链的协调。讨论了风险规避零售商的最优订购决策,分析了风险规避对供应链期望效益的影响。比较了风险规避和风险中性两种情况下零售商的最优决策。探讨了组合契约的协调问题及契约参数之间的关系。研究表明供应链的期望利润随着产需不确定的增加而减少,风险规避下零售商的期望利润低于风险中性时的期望利润,零售商的期望利润随着风险规避程度的加大而减少,零售商最优订购量随风险规避程度的增加而变化。最后数值算例验证了模型和契约协调的有效性。     

Enhancing corporate social responsibility: Contract design under information asymmetry

We consider a two-stage supply chain in which a contract manufacturer (CM) sells products through a brand name retailer. The contract manufacturer can invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to improve customer perception about the firm and increase demand, while the retailer can influence the demand by exerting marketing efforts. We design optimal contracts for such a supply chain, which faces information asymmetry. The wholesale price contract was developed as the base model to derive insight into the value of information sharing. We examine the impact of CSR cost on CSR commitment and profits. We find that CM׳s CSR cost impacts the CM׳s and the retailer׳s profits differently. Under certain conditions, the CM׳s profit will increase with cost, while that of the retailer is uncertain. We also propose two-part tariff contracts for both the symmetric and asymmetric cases with the aim of maximizing the retailer׳s profit and improving CM׳s commitment to CSR. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights.