共查询到7条相似文献,搜索用时 3 毫秒
1.
Petra Persson Ekaterina Zhuravskaya 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2016,14(2):338-374
Performance‐based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who have risen from low to high positions within the province they govern (“locals”) spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure than party secretaries who have made their most significant career advancements in other provinces (“outsiders”). Identification comes from variation in central leadership and term limits. As the promotion mechanism rewards infrastructure investments, locals are less likely to be promoted at the end of the term. We explore various mechanisms and provide evidence that the difference between locals and outsiders is not driven by knowledge or experience. Several pieces of evidence suggest that locals cater to low‐level provincial elites, who helped them rise to power. Thus, local career trajectories limit the power of career concerns by fostering competing allegiances. 相似文献
2.
Abstract Based on a major reform of Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI), we examine the behavioral impacts of soft and hard UI duration constraints. A constraint is interpreted as hard if a claimant cannot rely on any form of income support after exhaustion, and as soft if UI is replaced by follow‐on benefits or participation in active labor market programs (ALMP). We find that both hard and soft constraints raise the job hazard significantly, with surprisingly similar spikes at UI exhaustion. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job, but at the cost of lengthening the overall job‐search period. 相似文献
3.
Abstract When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long‐term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity. 相似文献
4.
Kyle Hyndman Erkut Y. Ozbay Andrew Schotter Wolf Zeev Ehrblatt 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2012,10(3):573-604
Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady state where players hold correct beliefs about the other players’ behavior and act rationally. We experimentally examine the process that leads to this steady state. Our results indicate that some players emerge as teachers—those subjects who, by their actions, try to influence the beliefs of their opponent and lead the way to a more favorable outcome—and that the presence of teachers appears to facilitate convergence to Nash equilibrium. In addition to our experiments, we examine games, with different properties, from other experiments and show that teaching plays an important role in these games. We also report results from treatments in which teaching is made more difficult. In these treatments, convergence rates go down and any convergence that does occur is delayed. 相似文献
5.
Jesús Fernndez‐Villaverde Jeremy Greenwood Nezih Guner 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2014,12(1):25-61
Societies socialize children about sex. This is done in the presence of peer‐group effects, which may encourage undesirable behavior. Parents want the best for their children. Still, they weigh the marginal gains from socializing their children against its costs. Churches and states may stigmatize sex, both because of a concern about the welfare of their flocks and the need to control the cost of charity associated with out‐of‐wedlock births. Modern contraceptives have profoundly affected the calculus for instilling sexual mores. As contraception improves there is less need for parents, churches, and states to inculcate sexual mores. Technology affects culture. 相似文献
6.
Ruixue Jia Masayuki Kudamatsu David Seim 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2015,13(4):631-668
Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders—a pool of candidates for top political office—and examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders. 相似文献
7.
Ruben Durante Louis Putterman Joël van der Weele 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2014,12(4):1059-1086
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how demand for redistribution of income depends on self‐interest, insurance motives, and social concerns relating to inequality and efficiency. Our choice environments feature large groups of subjects and real‐world framing, and differ with respect to the source of inequality (earned or arbitrary), the cost of taxation to the decision maker, the dead‐weight loss of taxation, uncertainty about own pretax income, and whether the decision maker is affected by redistribution. We estimate utility weights for the different sources of demand for redistribution, with the potential to inform modeling in macroeconomics and political economy 相似文献