A Competitive Model of Customization with Lead‐Time Effects

In this article, we study the competitive interactions between a firm producing standard products and a firm producing custom products. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between n standard products, which may not meet their preferences exactly but are available immediately, and a custom product, available only after a certain lead time l. Standard products incur a variety cost that increases with n and custom products incur a lead time cost that is decreasing in the lead time l. We consider a two‐stage game wherein at stage 1, the standard product firm chooses the variety and the custom firm chooses the lead time and then both firms set prices simultaneously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We find that both firms can coexist in equilibrium, either sharing the market as local monopolists or in a price‐competitive mode. The standard product firm may offer significant or minimal variety depending on the equilibrium outcome. We provide several interesting insights on the variety, lead time, and prices of the products offered and on the impact of problem parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, we show that the profit margin and price of the custom product are likely to be higher than that of standard products in equilibrium under certain conditions. Also, custom firms are more likely to survive and succeed in product markets with larger potential market sizes. Another interesting insight is that increased consumer sensitivity to product fit may result in lower lead time for the custom product.     

Quality Provision with Heterogeneous Consumer Reservation Utilities

This study examines a firm's quality and price decisions when consumers differ not only in their willingness‐to‐pay for quality but also in their reservation utility for the basic product. We find that while the firm offers lower‐quality products when consumers' valuations for quality deteriorate, the optimal quality may increase with a negative shift in consumers' reservation utilities. We also investigate the optimal price and quality of the products within a vertically differentiated product line when the number of products is exogenously given. The existing literature shows that when consumers differ only in their willingness‐to‐pay for quality, the firm sets the efficient quality for consumers with the highest valuation for quality, whereas the concern for cannibalization pushes down the quality of inferior products. We find that when consumers are heterogeneous in both their reservation utility and valuation for quality, the concern for cannibalization may distort the quality upwards, even for consumers with the highest willingness‐to‐pay for quality. In addition, a low‐quality product may enjoy a higher profit margin than a high‐quality product within the product line.     

Fusion Product Planning: A Market Offering Perspective*

Devices that integrate multiple functions together are popular in consumer electronic markets. We describe these multifunction devices as fusion products as they fuse together products that traditionally stand alone in the marketplace. In this article, we investigate the manufacturer's fusion product planning decision, adopting a market offering perspective that allows us to address the design and product portfolio decisions simultaneously. The general approach adopted is to develop and analyze a profit‐maximizing model for a single firm that integrates product substitution effects in identifying an optimal market offering. In the general model, we demonstrate that the product design and portfolio decisions are analytically difficult to characterize because the number of possible portfolios can be extremely large. The managerial insight from a stylized all‐in‐one model and numerical analysis is that the manufacturer should, in most cases, select only a subset of fusion and single‐function products to satisfy the market's multidimension needs. This may explain why the function compositions available in certain product markets are limited. In particular, one of the key factors driving the product portfolio decision is the margin associated with the fusion products. If a single all‐in‐one fusion product has relatively high margins, then this product likely dominates the product portfolio. Also, the congruency of the constituent single‐function products is an important factor. When substitution effects are relatively high (i.e., the product set is more congruent), a portfolio containing a smaller number of products is more likely to be optimal.     

Consumer Effort in Promotional Incentives

Consumers need to exert effort to use the incentives provided in a promotion campaign. This effort is critical in the consumers’ decision process and for the success of the campaign. We develop a model of consumer redemption effort that is general in nature and is applicable to coupons, rebates, and other price‐discrimination devices. We find that the impact of redemption effort is quite intricate on a firm’s profit and consumers’ surplus. We find that there are cases where a firm would like to operate in a low redemption cost environment while consumers would be better off with higher costs. We identify cases where price can remain the same with or without the promotion. In these cases, it is possible that the surplus for each individual consumer is higher when a firm price discriminates and improves its profit. Our results indicate that a firm would rather have variation in consumer redemption costs than to have variation in consumer valuations. However, in a market with low valuation variability, consumer redemption cost variability is essential for an efficient promotion campaign. Therefore, the markets that naturally have a lot of variability in consumer valuations should be the ones targeted for online promotion programs that reduce consumer effort levels, not the markets with low variability.     

Strategic Product/Service Innovations of an Online Firm

We study the incentives that drive an online firm to make various types of innovations in a competitive environment. We develop and use a simplified price competition model between two retailers, one online and one offline. A given fraction of consumers, called the Internet penetration, comparison shop online, independent of their customer type, thereby creating two markets for the offline retailer, a captive market and a competitive market. The online product has the steeper of the two linear utility functions, which means that the customers who buy online in our model are high end. We focus on the competitive region in which both retailers are (strictly) profitable in the competitive market and consider innovations that increase high‐end appeal, low‐end appeal, and/or reduce unit cost. We find that the online firm has a strong incentive to invest in innovations that either reduce unit cost and/or, equivalently, increase the appeal to all consumers equally. Investments of this type are strategic complements: implementing one increases the value of another, so the value of two innovations of this type is more than the sum of the values of each individually. We identify a relative strength measure of the online firm such that, as its high‐end appeal increases and/or its unit cost decreases, we say that the online firm is stronger. This strength measure facilitates drawing an explicit dividing line between strong and weak online firms. If Internet penetration increases, the online firm's profits increase if and only if it is strong. If penetration increases over time, it is possible for a strong firm to turn weak and see its profits decrease and possibly disappear completely. A strong online firm has more opportunity to profit from low‐end innovations than does a weak one, while the opposite is true for high‐end innovations. Interestingly, some innovations may actually decrease the online firm's profits. We discuss the implications of our results for existing and future online innovations.     

Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection

This paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection. Prices are determined by zero‐profit conditions, and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry. Crucially for applications, contract characteristics are endogenously determined, consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information, and an equilibrium always exists. Equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products Bertrand game. We apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates. Mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences. With adverse selection, an insurance mandate reduces the price of low‐coverage policies, which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage.     

Multi‐Product Quality Competition: Impact of Resource Constraints

We study a multi‐product firm with limited capacity where the products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the customer base is heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. While the demand structure creates opportunities through proliferation, the firm should avoid cannibalization between its own products. Moreover, the oligopolistic market structure puts competitive pressure and limits the firm's market share. On the other hand, the firm has limited resources that cause a supply‐side fight for adequate and profitable production. We explicitly characterize the conditions where each force dominates. Our focus is on understanding how capacity constraints and competition affect a firm's product‐mix decisions. We find that considering capacity constraints could significantly change traditional insights (that ignore capacity) related to product‐line design and the role of competition therein. In particular, we show that when the resources are limited, the firm should offer only the product that has the highest margin per unit capacity. We find that this product could be the diametrically opposite product suggested by the existing literature. In addition, we show that for intermediate capacity levels, whereas the margin per unit capacity effect dominates in a less competitive market, proliferation and cannibalization effects dominate in a more competitive market.     

Product Positioning in a Two‐Dimensional Market Space

This paper examines the optimal product portfolio positioning for a monopolist firm in a market where consumers exhibit vertical differentiation for product performance and horizontal differentiation for product feature. Our key results are as follows: (i) Variable costs drive vertical differentiation. In the presence of significant volume‐dependent manufacturing costs, the optimal portfolio contains a mix of vertically and horizontally differentiated products and an increase in the variable cost makes adding vertically differentiated products relatively more profitable; if fixed volume‐independent design costs dominate, the portfolio exhibits solely horizontal differentiation. (ii) Horizontal differentiation is the main profit lever, and vertical differentiation brings only a marginal benefit; this is true even when most of the consumers exhibit low willingness to pay for performance, which is often used as an excuse to offer low‐end products. (iii) There are more low‐quality products than high‐quality ones, and market coverage increases when the willingness to pay for performance increases. In summary, the model shows how portfolio composition decisions depend on the product cost structure and the consumer preferences.     

Seeking Closure: Competition in Complementary Markets*

When offering a product that has a complementary product in a different market, a firm must consider the interdependence between the complementary products as well as the competition within markets. If the firm participates in both markets, the balancing act becomes even more challenging. This article provides insights about strategies in this latter setting: when should the firm seek to keep its products closed to competing complementary products, and when would the firm be better off by accepting a common standard? To address these questions, we employ standard game theoretic analysis to a simple spatial model that captures aspects of both intermarket externalities and intramarket competition. We find that if a firm participates in both markets and chooses a closed standard, it achieves lower profits compared to an open standard, but gains greater market share. Surprisingly, we find that customers are better off when standards are kept closed.     

Distributed Development and Product Line Decisions

Distributed product development is becoming increasingly prevalent in a number of industries. We study how the global distribution of product development impacts the profit‐maximizing product line that a firm offers. Specifically, we formulate a model to understand the linkage between cost arbitrage as a driver of distributed development and consequent market implications such as customer perceived quality loss to remotely developed products. Analysis of the model reveals that a firm should expand the product line for a development‐intensive good only at intermediate values of cost advantage and quality loss. We modify the base model to include development capacity constraints as a driver of distributed development and find that the results are robust to this change. Our analysis affirms the need for product managers to incorporate the implications of distributed development in making their product line design decision.     

Retail Strategies for Extended Warranty Sales and Impact on Manufacturer Base Warranties

Consider two competing manufacturers selling their products through the same retailer. If this retailer derives profits from extended warranty sales, the manufacturers face a dilemma in setting their base warranties. Although they have incentive to increase their warranties to make their products attractive to consumers, the retailer might prefer selling lower‐warranty products to enhance extended warranties sales. We develop a stylized model to determine and analyze optimal manufacturer and retailer strategies in this setting. Consistent with the ongoing decline in warranties for products that are sold through independent retailers, we show that these interactions exert downward pressure on manufacturer warranties. Rather than pitching the extended warranty at the checkout after customers have selected a certain product, we find that retailers can often benefit from inducing simultaneous consideration of product and extended warranty characteristics, for example by posting extended warranty information right on the product shelf.     

Improving Profits by Bundling Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider a firm managing a category of vertically differentiated goods, that is, products which differ with respect to an attribute for which all consumers prefer more to less. The goods can be sold individually, in which case they are referred to as components, or in bundles. The firm chooses the assortment of components and bundles and their selling prices to maximize profit. We show that each bundling strategy (pure components, pure bundling or mixed bundling) can be optimal and obtain closed‐form expressions for the optimal selling prices. We provide insights on the structure of the optimal assortment and prices. In particular, we show that, when consumers benefit from consuming the components jointly, the products in the optimal assortment form nested sets. When consumers do not benefit from the joint consumption of components, the bundles should be offered at a positive discount. We find that bundling vertically differentiated products can significantly improve profits, even if consumers do not benefit from consuming the components jointly. The value of bundling comes from increased sales: a firm, which understands that its customers may buy multiple types of components, offers bundles of components, incentivizing customers to buy more.     

The Influence of Cost and Quality Priorities on the Propensity to Outsource Production*

Outsourcing of production has escalated over the past decade due to unprecedented competition and worldwide access to low‐cost labor markets. This article examines how cost and quality priorities—two key attributes of manufacturing strategy—influence a manufacturer's propensity to outsource. By doing so, we bridge the existing gap between research on manufacturing strategy and firm boundaries. We develop a theory‐based model that links a manufacturer's cost and quality priorities to its plans to outsource production. Our empirical analyses, based on survey data obtained from 867 manufacturing business units, control for firm‐specific factors previously shown to impact outsourcing, including asset specificity, uncertainty, and current capabilities in cost and quality. We found that the competitive priority placed on cost played an integral role in sourcing decisions, while, surprisingly, conformance quality priorities did not. The cost result is consistent with our expectations and observations in practice. The significant effect of cost priority on outsourcing shows that any theory of firm boundaries that fails to consider competitive priorities is incomplete. The finding regarding quality, which was counter to our expectations, may partially explain why there is an emergence of so many nonconforming products associated with outsourcing. Taken together, our results provide theoretical insights for future research into how manufacturing managers can improve their decision making on outsourcing production.     

Prices,Markups, and Trade Reform

This paper examines how prices, markups, and marginal costs respond to trade liberalization. We develop a framework to estimate markups from production data with multi‐product firms. This approach does not require assumptions on the market structure or demand curves faced by firms, nor assumptions on how firms allocate their inputs across products. We exploit quantity and price information to disentangle markups from quantity‐based productivity, and then compute marginal costs by dividing observed prices by the estimated markups. We use India's trade liberalization episode to examine how firms adjust these performance measures. Not surprisingly, we find that trade liberalization lowers factory‐gate prices and that output tariff declines have the expected pro‐competitive effects. However, the price declines are small relative to the declines in marginal costs, which fall predominantly because of the input tariff liberalization. The reason for this incomplete cost pass‐through to prices is that firms offset their reductions in marginal costs by raising markups. Our results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity and variability in markups across firms and time and suggest that producers benefited relative to consumers, at least immediately after the reforms.     

Product Positioning Using a Self‐Organizing Map and the Rings of Influence

In this article, we propose a new product positioning method based on the neural network methodology of a self‐organizing map. The method incorporates the concept of rings of influence, where a firm evaluates individual consumers and decides on the intensity to pursue a consumer, based on the probability that this consumer will purchase a competing product. The method has several advantages over earlier work. First, no limitations are imposed on the number of competing products and second, the method can position multiple products in multiple market segments. Using simulations, we compare the new product positioning method with a quasi‐Newton method and find that the new method always approaches the best solution obtained by the quasi‐Newton method. The quasi‐Newton method, however, is dependent on the initial positions of the new products, with the majority of cases ending in a local optimum. Furthermore, the computational time required by the quasi‐Newton method increases exponentially, while the time required by the new method is small and remains almost unchanged, when the number of new products positioned increases. We also compute the expected utility that a firm will provide consumers by offering its products. We show that as the intensity with which a firm pursues consumers increases, the new method results in near‐optimal solutions in terms of market share, but with higher expected utility provided to consumers when compared to that obtained by a quasi‐Newton method. Thus, the new method can serve as a managerial decision‐making tool to compare the short‐term market share objective with the long‐term expected utility that a firm will provide to consumers, when it positions its products and intensifies its effort to attract consumers away from competition.     

Managing Product Rollovers

We study the product rollover strategy decision, where a firm decides whether to phase out an old generation of a product to be replaced by a new with either a dual or single roll. Our model considers a final build of the old product and preannouncement of the new, and incorporates dynamic pricing and inventory decisions. We find that the optimal price path closely follows changes in reservation price curves for the two products over time. We also identify the drivers of the rollover strategy decision, finding that lower market risk (faster diffusion, higher market responsiveness to preannouncements) and higher performance improvement for the new generation are associated with the single roll strategy.     

Promotion,Turnover, and Compensation in the Executive Labor Market

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.     

Delayed Differentiation for Multiple Lifecycle Products

Modular design allows several generations of products to co‐exist in the installed base as product designs change to take advantage of improved performance via modular upgrades. Use of a common base platform and modular design approach allows a firm to offer updates for improved performance and flexibility via remanufacturing when products have multiple lifecycles. However, as the product evolves through multiple lifecycles, the large pool of product variants leads to the curse of product proliferation. In practice, product proliferation causes high levels of line congestion and results in longer lead times, higher inventory levels, and lower levels of customer service. To offer insights into the product proliferation problem, the authors employ a delayed differentiation model in a multiple lifecycle context. The delayed differentiation model gives flexibility to balance trade‐offs between disassembly and reassembly costs by adaptively changing the push‐pull boundary. An adaptive, evolving push‐pull boundary provides flexibility for a remanufacturing firm to meet changing customer demands. The delayed differentiation model includes both a mixed‐integer linear program and an analytical investigation of the evolutionary nature of the push‐pull boundary. Both field observations and experimental results show that the nature of product proliferation and changing demand structures play significant roles in the cost and flexibility of the evolving delayed differentiation system.     

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.     

Knowledge Life Cycle,Knowledge Inventory,and Knowledge Acquisition Strategies*

For a knowledge‐ and skill‐centric organization, the process of knowledge management encompasses three important and closely related elements: (i) task assignments, (ii) knowledge acquisition through training, and (iii) maintaining a proper level of knowledge inventory among the existing workforce. Trade‐off on choices between profit maximization in the short run and agility and flexibility in the long term is a vexing problem in knowledge management. In this study, we examine the effects of different training strategies on short‐term operational efficiency and long‐term workforce flexibility. We address our research objective by developing a computational model for task and training assignment in a dynamic knowledge environment consisting of multiple distinct knowledge dimensions. Overall, we find that organizational slack is an important variable in determining the effectiveness of training strategies. Training strategies focused on the most recent skills are found to be the preferred option in most of the considered scenarios. Interestingly, increased efficiencies in training can actually create preference conflict between employees and the firm. Our findings indicate that firms facing longer knowledge life cycles, higher slack in workforce capacity, and better training efficiencies actually face more difficult challenges in knowledge management.