QUANTIFYING THE PREMIUM EXTERNALITY OF THE UNINSURED

In insurance markets, the uninsured can generate a negative externality on the insured, leading insurance companies to charge higher premia. Using a novel panel data set and a staggered policy change that introduces exogenous variation in the rate of uninsured drivers at the county level in California, we find that uninsured drivers lead to higher insurance premia: a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of uninsured drivers raises premia by roughly 1%. We calculate the monetary fine on the uninsured that would fully internalize the externality and conclude that actual fines in most US states are inefficiently low.     

EXPECTATIONS‐BASED REFERENCE‐DEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND ASSET PRICING

This paper explores the quantitative asset‐pricing implications of expectations‐based reference‐dependent preferences, as introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(3), 909–936), in an otherwise traditional Lucas‐tree model. I find that the model easily succeeds in matching the historical equity premium and its variability when the preference parameters are calibrated in line with micro evidence. The equity premium is high because expectations‐based loss aversion makes uncertain fluctuations in consumption more painful. Additionally, loss aversion introduces variation in returns because unexpected cuts in consumption are particularly painful, and the agent wants to postpone such cuts to let his reference point decrease. This variation generates strong predictability. However, it also causes counterfactually high volatility in the risk‐free rate, which I address by allowing for variation in expected consumption growth, heteroskedasticity in consumption growth, time‐variant disaster risk, and sluggish belief updating.     

SLOW INFORMATION DIFFUSION AND THE INERTIAL BEHAVIOR OF DURABLE CONSUMPTION

This paper studies the aggregate dynamics of durable and nondurable consumption under slow information diffusion (SID) due to noisy observations and learning within the permanent income hypothesis framework. We show that SID can significantly improve the model's predictions on the joint behavior of income, durable consumption, and nondurable consumption at the aggregate level. Specifically, we find that SID can significantly improve the model's predictions for: (i) smoothness in durable and nondurable consumption, (ii) autocorrelation of durable consumption, and (iii) contemporaneous correlation between durable and nondurable consumption.     

OPTIMAL AGING AND DEATH: UNDERSTANDING THE PRESTON CURVE

Does prosperity lead to greater longevity? If so, what is the strength of the income channel? To address these questions we develop a life cycle model in which households are subject to physiological aging. In modeling aging we draw on recent research in the fields of biology and medicine. The speed of the aging process, and thus the age of death, are endogenously determined by optimal health investments. A calibrated version of the model accounts well for the observed nonlinear cross‐country link between longevity and income, also known as the Preston curve.     

THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND QUITTING IN HIGH POWER TOURNAMENTS

Tournaments may be characterized by the performance they induce as well as by the rate of quitting and dropouts of participants. Although most of the attention in the literature is on the performance induced by high power incentives, there are many daily situations in which dropouts and quitting are a major concern. Using a field experiment in schools and a model of dynamic tournament we examine the effect of different levels of rewards on the rate of quitting. Our experiment indicates that there is a possible tradeoff between performance and quitting. Strong incentives tournaments induced participants to exert more effort and exhibit a better performance but, at the same time, it induces a higher rate of quitting. We present a multi‐stage tournament model that gives rise to a similar characterization.     

RELATIVE RISK AVERSION IS CONSTANT: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA

Most classical tests of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) based on individual portfolio composition use cross‐sectional data. Such tests must assume that the distributions of wealth and preferences are independent. We use panel data to analyze how individuals’ portfolio allocation between risky and riskless assets varies in response to changes in total financial wealth. We find the elasticity of the risky asset share to wealth to be small and statistically insignificant, supporting the CRRA assumption; this finding is robust when the sample is restricted to households experiencing large income variations. In addition, we find a small but significant negative correlation between wealth and risk aversion. Various extensions are discussed.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS WITH ENFORCEMENT RISK

I build a model where potentially biased judges verify complex states by interpreting an imperfect signal whose noise captures factual ambiguities. In a sales and a financial transaction I show that judicial biases amplify and distort factual ambiguities, creating enforcement risk. To insure against such risk, parties write simple noncontingent contracts that optimally protect the party that is most vulnerable to judicial error. These results shed light on the empirical association between law and finance and rationalize salient features of real world enforcement regimes.     

RANKING THE SCHOOLS: HOW SCHOOL‐QUALITY INFORMATION AFFECTS SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE NETHERLANDS

This paper analyzes whether information about the quality of high schools published in a national newspaper affects school choice in the Netherlands. We find that negative (positive) school‐quality scores decrease (increase) the number of first‐year students who choose a school after the year of publication. These effects are only large for the college‐preparatory track, such that a school receiving the most positive score for its most academic track sees 16–18 more first‐year students enroll. We find that parents respond to the most recent and most prominently displayed information. The effects of information about school quality do not seem to be greater in regions with larger relevant newspaper circulation, suggesting that direct exposure to news about school quality does not explain the response to this information.     

UNCERTAINTY,PERSISTENCE, AND HETEROGENEITY: A PANEL DATA PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this paper is to review newly developed identification and estimation tools that are relevant for the analysis of dynamic dependence structures of income risk. I present an application to nonlinear permanent–transitory models of household income using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), but the empirical approach is more generally applicable. Household income processes are of interest because the size of shocks, the nature of their persistence, and cross‐household heterogeneity are all important to understand how income inequality varies with age and cohort and how it translates into consumption inequality. I argue that going from an econometrics of autocovariances to an econometrics of flexible distributions is feasible and has the potential to reveal richer aspects of risk—for example, nonlinear persistence of unusual shocks.     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND THE SIZE OF EXPORTERS

How important are economies of scale in exporting? We argue that firm size cannot be the main determinant of export status if a model is to be consistent with the observed number and size of exporters. Instead, we need a lot of variation independent of firm size to reconcile the model with the data. We show that the augmented model also has markedly different implications regarding the margin of adjustment in the event of a trade liberalization: most of the adjustment is through the intensive margin and productivity gains due to reallocation are halved.     

SPECULATIVE ATTACKS AND THE INFORMATION ROLE OF THE INTEREST RATE

This paper models currency attacks as carried out by speculators who condition their actions on private signals about the state and on the market‐clearing interest rate. Besides affecting speculators' payoffs, this interest rate also provides an endogenous public signal. For a plausible type of investment strategies, the dual role of the interest rate allows the model to explain abrupt and intense speculative attacks solely via economic fundamentals, without resorting to sunspot variables. This result underlies a novel policy implication: An official intervention in the foreign exchange market may reinforce a currency peg by influencing the precision of public information. (JEL: D82, D84, F31)     

COGNITIVE STYLE AND THE USEFULNESS OF INFORMATION*

The desirability of a merger/acquisition alternative depends in part on the perceptions of the decision maker. What sources of information are “useful” to the decision maker & Does the set of useful information remain constant for all decision makers; if not, do individuals using similar information sets have similar information processing characteristics? Do these sets vary as feedback is obtained during the decision process? To answer these questions, graduate students participated in a modified Delphi experiment, and the resulting data were analyzed by the two-way aligned-ranks nonparametric test. These test results affirm that in a merger/acquisition scenario, decision makers with different cognitive styles prefer different sets of information and these sets vary dynamically as feedback is incorporated in the decision-making process. Furthermore, information that contains worker and community welfare considerations is identified as “useful” five times more frequently by decision makers with a “feeling” cognitive style than those with a “thinking” style.     

THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION

Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92)     

COMPETITION AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE

Abstract When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long‐term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.     

EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL CONTRACTS IN SOVEREIGN BANK LENDING

This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a “punishment” effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities (“loss of reputation”). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present discounted value of the net benefits of future borrowing, which create dynamic incentives. Using data on bank loans to developing countries for 1973–1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel.     

EXPONENTIAL‐GROWTH BIAS AND LIFECYCLE CONSUMPTION

Exponential‐growth bias (EGB) is the tendency for individuals to partially neglect compounding of exponential growth. We develop a model wherein biased agents misperceive the intertemporal budget constraint, and derive conditions for overconsumption and dynamic inconsistency. We construct an incentivized measure of EGB in a US‐representative population and find substantial bias, with approximately one third of subjects estimated as the fully biased type. The magnitude of the bias is negatively associated with asset accumulation, and does not respond to a simple graphical intervention.     

MANAGERS AND (SECRET) SOCIAL NETWORKS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE FREEMASONRY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE

In this paper, I study the impact of managers’ affiliations with the Freemasonry on the performances of companies. Using a unique data set of 412 companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange between 1895 and 1902, I find that young and small firms run by Masonic managers exhibited larger leverage ratios. These companies earned higher profits, although the effect is not statistically significant. Large publicly quoted corporations managed by Freemasons instead had lower profits and lower Tobin’s Q. I discuss the issue of the endogeneity of Freemasonry membership, and I use four different approaches to partially address this.     

WILLPOWER AND THE OPTIMAL CONTROL OF VISCERAL URGES

Common intuition and experimental psychology suggest that the ability to self‐regulate (willpower) is a depletable resource. We investigate the behavior of an agent with limited willpower who optimally consumes over time an endowment of a tempting and storable consumption good or cake. We assume that restraining consumption below the most tempting feasible rate requires willpower. Any willpower not used to regulate consumption may be valuable in controlling other urges. Willpower thus links otherwise unrelated behaviors requiring self‐control. An agent with limited willpower will display apparent domain‐specific time preference. Such an agent will almost never perfectly smooth his consumption, even when it is feasible to do so. Whether the agent relaxes control of his consumption over time as experimental psychologists predict or tightens it as most behavioral theories predict depends in our model on the net effect of two analytically distinct but opposing forces.     

A MODEL OF NONBELIEF IN THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS

People believe that, even in very large samples, proportions of binary signals might depart significantly from the population mean. We model this “nonbelief in the Law of Large Numbers” by assuming that a person believes that proportions in any given sample might be determined by a rate different than the true rate. In prediction, a nonbeliever expects the distribution of signals will have fat tails. In inference, a nonbeliever remains uncertain and influenced by priors even after observing an arbitrarily large sample. We explore implications for beliefs and behavior in a variety of economic settings.     

CONCEPTUAL LEVELS AND THE DESIGN OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS*

This article attempts to expand and clarify the discussions in the literature on complexity theory applied to accounting via two central assertions: (a) affecting the cognitive conceptual level of an individual through the financial reporting system can be accomplished not only by varying the immediate information load, but also, in the long run, by modifying the types of information and the mode of user-system interface. In other words, a properly designed accounting information system can have developmental cognitive effects in both the short and long run. (b) attempting to maximize the conceptual level of the decision maker is not always desirable. In certain types of environments, a high conceptual level actually impedes appropriate decision making. Therefore, the appropriate conceptual level must be related to the type of decision being made as well as to the type of decision maker.