OLIGARCHIC VERSUS DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

This paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes. An “oligarchic” society, where political power is in the hands of major producers, protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs. Democracy, where political power is more widely diffused, imposes redistributive taxes on producers, but tends to avoid entry barriers. When taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low, an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency. Because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents, the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time. The typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies: An oligarchic society may first become richer, but later fall behind a similar democratic society. I also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies, how within‐elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy, and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place. (JEL: P16, O10)     

From Domination to Alliance: Shifting Strategies and Accumulation of Power by the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh

Traditionally, the bureaucrats on the Indian subcontinent were unaccustomed to perform under political supervision, and this mindset continued to affect their relationship with politicians in Bangladesh. In the early years of Bangladesh as an independent state, the bureaucracy came under pressure to operate under political supervision, but this phase did not last long. Subsequent phases of military rule reinstated the bureaucrats in their entrenched positions and strengthened their grip over the system. After the restoration of electoral democracy in 1991, the dominant role of bureaucrats continued, mainly due to the tendency to practice confrontational politics and disregard to the political institutions. The bureaucracy draws strength from its permanent stature, organization, expertise and experience in administering the country. Using the resources at their disposal, this institution has been able to exert considerable influence. A number of reforms have been introduced to enhance the accountability of the bureaucracy. The response has been the development of a symbiotic relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats. The bureaucracy has changed its stance from a dominating approach to one of alliance with other powerful groups in the system and continues to exercise power. This has resulted in increasing politicization of the bureaucracy which affects the performance of the critical components of the government.     

REDISTRIBUTION,PORK, AND ELECTIONS

Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on ‘wedge’ issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically‐based patronage—or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide‐the‐dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right‐wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left‐wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right‐wing parties should have an advantage over left‐wing ones in majoritarian systems.     

EQUILIBRIUM INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND EFFICIENCY WAGES

We analyze the optimal (efficiency) wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers' effort nor their match‐specific productivity. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn creates unemployment. Nonetheless, the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits. We also show that more high‐powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates. (JEL: E24, J30, J41)     

WHY IS FISCAL POLICY OFTEN PROCYCLICAL?

Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies. (JEL: E62, D73, D78)     

Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters

Administrative reform is a political, not managerial, issue. This study argues that administrative reform is highly influenced by realities of bureaucratic politics. Reforms usually mean the struggle over power between involved actors. There are evidences of patterns of power struggle among and between politicians and bureaucrats. Including contestation among bureaucrats that are responsible for public management reform. These power struggles and contestations explain the decision-making processes for designing and implementing administrative reform policies and shifts of power relations. This article proposes a new framework to advance the concept of bureaucratic politics, with reference to administrative reform policy. It highlights the missing link between public policy and public management reform literature by revisiting the power of politicians and bureaucrats in making reform policies.     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF PARTIAL DECENTRALIZATION

We revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations, and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization. A capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods. The expectation of high capital taxes, however, results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution. The median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes. She does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the Constitution. The equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results. We show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality, increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision, and decreasing in capital productivity. When public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds, all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized.     

Democracy,Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919–1938

In this paper, we compare how two different types of political regimes—direct versus representative democracy—redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation. Most importantly, we exploit the existence of a population threshold, which partly determined a local government's choice of democracy to implement a regression‐discontinuity design. The results indicate that direct democracies spend 40–60 percent less on public welfare. Our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite's potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization.     

Crime,Search, and Ex‐offenders’ Accessibility to Labor Markets

Rehabilitation for ex‐offenders has positive (e.g. more production) and negative (e.g. more crime) effects on society. We investigate the effect of rehabilitation on criminal behavior and the labor market using a search model. In the case where ex‐offenders cannot join the labor market, promoting rehabilitation for them may reduce crime. In such a case, the equilibrium allocation may be inefficient. Moreover, under the Hosios condition, equilibrium labor market tightness is lower than the efficient outcome because of crime, as the crime option raises the value of unemployed workers. Because this option works as a negative externality on matched firms, equilibrium tightness is lower than the optimal level.     

PORK‐BARREL POLITICS,TARGETABLE POLICIES,AND FISCAL FEDERALISM

This article utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific local projects to analyze the inefficiencies that arise under differing levels of targetability in both taxes/transfers and local projects. The ability to tactically target taxes/transfers and/or local projects leads political parties to engage in pandering to favored groups. However, in equilibrium, we find that greater targetability in the set of available policies actually intensifies the competition between the political parties and so increases efficiency in the provision of local projects. (JEL: D72, H41)     

A Theory of the Firm with Non‐binding Employment Contracts

This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non‐binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers. The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm's workforce. The analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions. The main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria: the profit maximizing and stationary equilibria. The unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient: it exhibits inefficient over‐employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers' reservation wage. It confirms earlier results derived by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities. In contrast, in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark‐up over the reservation wage.     

Government,management and the environmental crisis

In case there should be any doubt that the human predicament will soon be a global crisis the reasons why this must be so are discussed. The increased use of resources and the growing dependence on a fuel-based technology are crisis enough, but to this is added the growing population of the part of the world less advanced in technology, where attitudes are different and cannot be changed to conform to the richer population's idea of what is what in the world.Most of our problems are created because the total effect of an operation is not properly considered when it is undertaken for the part that is wanted. Thus the rich countries have got themselves into a predicament the fault for which the poor see lying entirely with the rich, while the rich see the danger in the growing poor populations.The mechanism of evolution by selection from spontaneous variety must be followed because we cannot foresee needs. To keep the process healthy we must retain room for manoeuvre and choice and we must studiously avoid trying to operate monolithic technological ways of maintaining our society.Policies should seek to anticipate the imminent pressures of the future so as to retain freedom of movement, and the most obvious policy should be to make the price of fuel artificially high to conserve resources and stimulate the right kind of new technologies.     

Income Maintenance and Labor Force Participation

The paper studies the optimal tax‐subsidy schedules in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to work, or not, with an application to the case of France. Given an income guarantee provided by the welfare state, the tax schedule that maximizes government revenue provides a benchmark, the Laffer bound, above which it is inefficient to tax. In fact, under mild conditions, a feasible allocation is second best optimal if and only if the associated taxes are lower than the Laffer bound. The only restriction that efficiency puts on the shape of the tax scheme is this upper Laffer bound. The Laffer tax scheme itself can be computed from the joint distribution of the agents' productivities and work opportunity costs. Depending on the economy, it can take widely different forms, and exhibit, for instance, negative marginal tax rates. After estimating the joint distribution of productivities and work opportunity costs on French data, I compute the Laffer bound for two subpopulations, single women and married women with two children or more. Quite surprisingly, the actual incentives to work appear to be very close to the bound.     

Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Theoretical Analysis

This article addresses the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, bureaucratic politics and democratic politics. Bureaucratic theories and politics are discussed, democratic theories and politics are analyzed, and the argument in favor of reconciling bureaucracy and democracy is analyzed with implications for democratic theory and public administration. Persistence of bureaucracy is stressed, deficiencies in democratic theory and practice are noted, and the importance of a functionally balanced and professionally competent bureaucracy is reminded for administration of sound governance in both developed and developing societies. It is hypocrisy to speak of functioning democracy without a balanced professional bureaucracy.     

MARKET DISTORTIONS AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY

In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.     

Politics and Power within Multinational Corporations: Mainstream Studies,Emerging Critical Approaches and Suggestions for Future Research

Given the increased public interest in the use and misuse of power in multinationals in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is notable that power relations in multinational corporations (MNCs) have not gained enhanced attention in the academic community. What is missing so far in the study of MNCs is a systematic examination of how power and politics within MNCs have been addressed in mainstream international business (IB) and sociological research studying the MNC. This paper starts by critically reviewing these two mainstream approaches in the study of MNCs as organizations and seeking to understand the shortcomings of former research. Next, it reviews new emergent critical perspectives, which the authors call socio‐political studies of MNCs, where power and politics are addressed not just more prominently, but also differently, from a more bottom‐up and actor‐centred perspective. After reviewing this emergent stream of research, the authors propose that future studies should take a more micro‐political perspective and focus in more detail on the micro‐foundations of power relations. In the concluding section, the authors show how future studies of MNCs can learn from both critical interactionist and discursive theories when analysing organizational politics and power relations. A framework is proposed for the study of micro‐level political game‐playing in MNCs, based on a three‐dimensional framework for organizational power (episodic, rules of the game and domination), and some key research questions for future studies are suggested.     

基于税盾效应的供应链贸易信用融资优化决策研究

针对中小企业融资困境的现实,本文基于贸易信用融资模式,引入税盾效应,建立了由单一核心供应商和单一经销商组成的含税盾的贸易信用模型,探讨有融资需求的经销商进行订货、核心供应商定价的决定策略,探究不同计息方式的价值实现和融资模式优选。通过stackbelberg博弈、比较分析和算例验证,研究发现以订货量确定为基准,融资需求出现的时点对供应链企业计息方式的选择均有影响。税法关于利息抵扣上限、贸易信用贷款利率、订货量等均影响经销商计息方式的选择,融资额度影响其订货策略;生产成本的差额、定价策略影响供应商的计息方式。     

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE CROSS‐SECTION OF BUSINESS CYCLES

Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers whereas poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. (1) Because new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demand than those of poor countries. (2) Because skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labor supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross‐country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data. (JEL: E32, FA5, F41)     

FAMILY VALUES AND THE REGULATION OF LABOR

To be efficient, flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers. Otherwise firms can take advantage of workers' immobility and extract rents at their expense. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, to limit the rents of firms and to avoid moving, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets, even though regulation generates higher unemployment and lower incomes. Empirically, we find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages and higher unemployment, and support more stringent labor market regulations. We find a positive association between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the 21st century and family values prevailing before World War II, and between family structures in the Middle Ages and current desire for labor market regulation. Both results suggest that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.     

虚拟第三方控制下的供应链逆向选择研究

在供应链逆向选择问题中,代理人只获得基本的保留收益或者可怜的信息租金,导致对代理人的激励不足,缺乏效率.为了解决这个问题,文章在一个供应商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链中,引入不占有利润的虚拟第三方进行集中控制、利润分配、信息甄别.最后制定了逆向选择的最优契约,并且证明了在虚拟第三方控制下,各参与者均可获得正的租金,应用数值分析说明供应链的整体收益有所增加.