考虑渠道权利结构的产品服务能力竞争机制研究——制造商服务视角

本文针对两个制造商和一个零售商构成的产品服务供应链,以制造商提供服务为视角,研究了产品服务能力竞争问题。运用Stackelberg动态博弈,分别从制造商Stackelberg、零售商Stackelberg和垂直纳什三种不同权利结构情形,求解了供应链成员企业的均衡策略。通过分析服务成本与不同渠道权利结构下均衡结果之间的变化关系,提出能够满足不同客户需求特征的产品服务能力竞争策略。结果表明,当价格与服务能力水平都比较低时,RS价格领先型策略能够满足实惠型客户需求;当服务能力水平比较高时,VN服务领先型策略能够满足经济型客户需求;当价格比较高时,MS产品领先型策略能够满足专业型客户需求;当价格与服务能力水平都比较高时,产品服务融合策略能够满足品质型客户需求。最后,结合批发价格、服务能力水平、零售价格与服务成本之间的数值变化关系,分析了产品服务能力竞争策略的有效性。     

不同渠道权力结构下的S-M两级闭环供应链绩效分析

与传统正向供应链相比,闭环供应链关注对消费阶段后的废旧产品进行回收再制造,从而减少环境污染、降低资源消耗,对推动制造业的可持续发展具有非常重要与深远的意义。为了探讨产品再制造战略对闭环供应链中成员企业的影响,本文采用博弈论对一个供应商和一个制造商构成的S-M两级闭环供应链进行研究,着重分析供应商强势、制造商强势以及供应商和制造商双方势力均衡时的定价策略和供应链系统绩效。研究结果表明:当实施产品再制造战略时,产品的销售价格降低、产品的市场销量增加,零部件的批发价格则上涨。从成员企业个体来看,再制造战略总是有助于制造商获得更多额外收益,而对供应商的影响效应则与供应商在渠道中的权力地位有关,处于强势地位的供应商可以通过大幅提高零部件批发价格的方式来保证自己从再制造中获益,而处于弱势地位的供应商则有可能遭受利益损失。从系统整体绩效来看,再制造战略具有提升供应链系统整体赢利水平的积极作用,但是供应商和制造商之间的权力结构会影响再制造的经济价值。具体而言,供应商和制造商势力均衡时的供应链绩效最优,其次是制造商主导的供应链,最差的是供应商主导的供应链。     

多部件采购外包的两阶段均衡投标策略

本文考虑一个由单个制造商和多个供应商群体组成的供应链——该制造商需要采购多个部件,对于每个部件在市场上均存在多个供应商。不同于传统的从各供应商群体分别采购各个部件,制造商考虑将所有部件的采购整体外包给某个供应商。在第一阶段,制造商使用一级价格密封投标的逆向拍卖来确定赢得整体采购合约的供应商。接下来,第一阶段投标的获胜者生产其所能供应的部件,并使用逆向拍卖向第一阶段中未获胜的其他竞标者采购其余部件。我们分析了供应商在两个阶段的均衡竞价策略,并比较了制造商在亲自逐件采购和外包整体采购两种情况下的期望采购成本。我们证明了在两种机制下制造商的总的期望采购成本相等。     

An Exploratory Study of Procurement Strategies for Multi‐Item RFQs in B2B Markets: Antecedents and Impact on Performance

This research explores procurement strategies for multi‐item requests for quotation (RFQs) in business‐to‐business (B2B) markets using responses from 825 purchasing professionals. The study first establishes procurement strategies that differ based on their level of strategic emphasis, i.e., the importance that is placed on the pursuit of four strategic objectives. Underlying objectives, which are obtained via factor analysis, include the focus on price, security of supply, internal procurement efficiencies, and bundle building. Next, cluster analysis is used to derive prototypical strategic approaches. The three cluster groups that emerge possess the same relative ranking of the four objectives, but differ based on the intensity with which these objectives are pursued. The clusters are labelled as the three strategic groups of strategists, opportunists, and responders. The research then explores, using an industrial buyer behavior lens, the impact of environmental antecedents in determining a particular strategy. Environmental variables include purchase importance, market uncertainty, supply base availability, buyer bargaining power, item experience, and supply base experience. Finally, the study tests the impact of procurement strategy on the buyer's perceived performance, suggesting that strategists, placing more emphasis on the pursuit of strategic sourcing objectives, achieve better performance than opportunists and responders.     

不同突发事件下进口原油采购策略

石油对经济生活的重要性不言而喻,中国原油的高对外依存度及集中的进口来源区域引起我们对能源安全的广泛关注,如何有效最小化国际原油价格波动和供应短缺或中断带来的风险,制定突发事件影响下的最佳采购策略是我们必需关注的焦点,但目前结合突发事件的采购策略研究还不足。论文通过采用符合中国原油进口习惯的月度数据,建立了突发事件下的CVaR模型,综合考虑价格波动、供应中断造成的GDP冲击和战略石油储备因素,分析三种不同突发事件情景下的原油进口采购策略。研究表明：当预期中东区域出现危机时,非洲和欧洲/俄罗斯是增加采购量的理想选择,若迪拜价格波动不剧烈,亚太采购量也可适当增加;对于仅仅只有价格变动,动用战略石油储备降低风险有限,只有当供给中断时,动用战略储备才能发挥巨大的降低风险,更好的减少对国民经济冲击的作用。本文在最小化原油进口风险值且同时考虑进口来源多样化、风险、成本及价格变动率的情况下,构建的基于CVaR的应急原油进口采购策略模型,丰富了该领域的研究成果,为中国原油进口采购策略提供了具体可操作的参考。     

Coordinating Sales and Raw Material Discounts in a Global Supply Chain

In this paper, the supplier of a key component to a global manufacturer offers a one‐time price discount; we study the firm's optimal response to the discount under two different strategies. In the first strategy, the firm does not pass along the discount to its customers (sales subsidiaries); the firm simply coordinates purchasing and production among the different factories to take advantage of this one‐time price discount. In the second strategy, the firm offers price discounts for its most profitable products in different sales subsidiaries to increase their demand. We carried out experiments for the two strategies based on a mathematical programming model, built around Toshiba's global notebook supply chain. Model constraints include, among others, material constraints, bill‐of‐materials, capacity and transportation constraints, minimum lot size constraints, and a constraint on minimum fill rate (service level constraint). Unlike most models of this type in the literature, which define variables in terms of single arc flows, we employ path variables, which allow for direct identification and manipulation of profitable and non‐profitable products.     

Split‐Award Procurement Auctions—Can Bayesian Equilibrium Strategies Predict Human Bidding Behavior in Multi‐Object Auctions?

We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi‐object auctions. We focus on two sealed‐bid split‐award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi‐object extensions of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction. We derive the risk‐neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the same expected costs to the buyer, other aspects of the two models, including the equilibrium bidding strategies, differ significantly. The strategic considerations in these auction formats are more involved than in single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, and it is questionable whether expected utility maximization can explain human bidding behavior in such multi‐object auctions. Therefore, we analyzed the predictive accuracy of our equilibrium strategies in the laboratory. In human subject experiments we found underbidding, which is in line with earlier experiments on single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. To control for regret, we organize experiments against computerized bidders, who play the equilibrium strategy. In computerized experiments where bid functions are only used in a single auction, we found significant underbidding on low‐cost draws. In experiments where the bid function is reused in 100 auctions, we could also control effectively for risk aversion, and there is no significant difference of the average bidding behavior and the risk‐neutral Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function. The results suggest that strategic complexity does not serve as an explanation for underbidding in split‐award procurement auctions, but risk aversion does have a significant impact.     

SHORT‐TERM E‐PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES VERSUS LONG‐TERM CONTRACTS

In this paper we compare the following procurement strategies based on their expected costs: strategic partnership, which is based on a long‐term relationship with a single supplier; online search, which is a short‐term strategy; and a combined strategy, which is some combination of the first two strategies. In addition, we determine for the online search and combined strategy the optimal number of suppliers to contact for a price quote, and analyze how it depends on the various cost and demand parameters. The main contribution of this paper is that it does not assume a single procurement strategy, but rather compares three alternatives.     

Supply Chain Strategy,Product Characteristics,and Performance Impact: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturers*

Supply chain management has become one of the most popular approaches to enhance the global competitiveness of business corporations today. Firms must have clear strategic thinking in order to effectively organize such complicated activities, resources, communications, and processes. An emerging body of literature offers a framework that identifies three kinds of supply chain strategies: lean strategy, agile strategy, and lean/agile strategy based on in‐depth case studies. Extant research also suggests that supply chain strategies must be matched with product characteristics in order for firms to achieve better performance. This article investigates supply chain strategies and empirically tests the supply chain strategy model that posits lean, agile, and lean/agile approaches using data collected from 604 manufacturing firms in China. Cluster analyses of the data indicate that Chinese firms are adopting a variation of lean, agile, and lean/agile supply chain strategies identified in the western literature. However, the data reveal that some firms have a traditional strategy that does not emphasize either lean or agile principles. These firms perform worse than firms that have a strategy focused on lean, agile, or lean/agile supply chain. The strategies are examined with respect to product characteristics and financial and operational performance. The article makes significant contributions to the supply chain management literature by examining the supply chain strategies used by Chinese firms. In addition, this work empirically tests the applicability of supply chain strategy models that have not been rigorously tested empirically or in the fast‐growing Chinese economy.     

Uniform vs. Retailer‐Specific Pricing: Incentive Alignment to Enhance Supply Chain Efficiency

We consider a supplier selling to multiple retailers using one of two constant wholesale pricing strategies: a uniform wholesale price (UWP) vs. a retailer‐specific wholesale price (RSWP). In line with the prior literature in economics, our initial finding is that as long as retailers are asymmetric, then (a) the supplier and less efficient retailer would prefer the RSWP strategy and (b) the more efficient retailer would prefer the UWP strategy. By examining the total profits of the supply chain under each pricing strategy, we present a new result: the UWP strategy results in a greater degree of supply chain efficiency as compared to the RSWP strategy. The key intuition driving this result is that by charging a UWP, the supplier signals a fair treatment for downstream retailers, which leads to the more efficient retailer being able to reduce market prices and hence capture a larger share of market demand. Noting that the supplier prefers the RSWP scheme as compared to the UWP scheme, we propose a contract which comprises two components: a UWP per unit complemented with a slotting allowance or side payment. The contract is always preferred by the supplier and also leads to greater supply chain efficiency.     

展厅现象下的双渠道供应链定价策略

针对双渠道供应链中展厅现象将加剧传统渠道与电子渠道的价格竞争问题，利用消费者效用理论，以存在展厅现象的差异化定价策略为基准，分别设计能够消除展厅现象的一致性定价策略和限价策略。研究结果显示相比差异化定价策略，一致性定价策略可以减轻传统渠道与电子渠道的价格竞争，并总是对零售商有利，但当顾客到传统渠道麻烦成本较高和批发价格较低时，也将有利于制造商；此外，双渠道供应链成员是否选择限价策略，依赖于传统渠道与电子渠道的价差，随着价差的降低制造商与零售商的利润都将提高，特别当两个渠道的价差较小时，限价策略可以有效降低价格竞争，从而促进双渠道供应链成员达到双赢状态。     

出口供应安全及基础设施影响下的天然气进出口博弈

鉴于出口国时常出现天然气出口供应安全问题,进口国因基础设施滞后引发的天然气供需矛盾,考虑出口供应安全、基础设施与需求量三者之间的相互影响,文章构建了进出口两国之间的动态博弈模型。运用最优控制等理论,求得了双方的均衡策略及效用。结果表明,天然气出口价格越高,使得进口国的天然气销售价格越高及其对基础设施投入越少;出口国为保障出口供应安全付出的努力与天然气出口价格之间呈倒“U”型关系;与天然气寡头竞争市场相比,出口垄断市场的天然气出口价格、出口供应安全、基础设施存量以及出口国效用更高,进口国效用更低;在寡头竞争市场,与合作方式相比,两国在议价下的天然气出口价格、出口供应安全、基础设施存量以及出口国效用更高,进口国效用更低。     

Dynamic Pricing,Production, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning

We consider a decentralized two‐period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price‐dependent demand. The manufacturer's second‐period production cost declines linearly in the first‐period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the resulting problems as two‐period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium solutions explicitly. We then examine the impact of mean learning rate and learning rate variability on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the manufacturer's production decisions, and on the retailer's procurement decisions. We show that as the mean learning rate or the learning rate variability increases, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. In particular, when the manufacturer may hold inventory, we identify two major drivers for inventory carryover: market growth and learning rate variability. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results by examining a model in which cost learning takes place continuously.     

基于制造商建议零售价的供应链定价策略

为了阐述制造商建议零售价格对供应链定价策略的影响,以其作为消费者的参照价格,引入到供应链系统中。采用博弈论的方法进行研究,结果表明：当制造商建议零售价格较低时,零售商将采用最低参照价格策略,当制造商建议零售价格较高时,零售商将采用最高参照价格策略,当制造商建议零售价格介于两者之间时,零售商将采用价格保持策略。在此基础上,研究了相关参数对上述三种策略的影响,以及三种策略之间的差异。不仅指出最低参照价格策略或者最高参照价格策略都有可能使制造商的收益最大化,还给出了选择的条件。最后,用数值分析比较了不同策略下的供应链系统收益,指出在最高参照价格策略下的系统收益是最优的。相关结论为制造商建议零售价格制定提供了理论依据。     

不同权力结构下制造商双渠道供应链的博弈分析

在单个拥有线下传统批发及线上直销双渠道的制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,基于供应链成员博弈权力的差异,构建制造商占优或零售商占优的两类Stackelberg博弈及双方同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响。研究发现：当制造商线下传统批发渠道所占市场份额较小时,（1）渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时和不为0时,三种博弈权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链均衡解的影响具有一定的鲁棒性;（2）三种博弈权力结构下,制造商线上直销渠道价格相同;两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下,线下传统批发渠道价格相同且大于Nash博弈下的传统渠道价格;制造商批发价格随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;（3）当渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时,三种博弈权力结构对线上直销渠道需求的影响是无差异的;当渠道间交叉价格弹性系数不为0时,两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下的线下传统批发渠道需求相同且小于Nash博弈下的传统渠道需求,线上直销渠道需求相同且大于Nash博弈下的线上直销渠道需求;（4）三种博弈策略下,制造商收益及零售商收益随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;Nash博弈下,供应链总利润最大。     

Supply Chain Coordination in the Presence of Gray Markets and Strategic Consumers

The practice of diverting genuine products to unauthorized gray markets continues to challenge companies in various industries and creates intense competition for authorized channels. Recent industry surveys report that the abuse of channel incentives is a primary reason for the growth of gray market activities. Therefore, it is crucial that companies take the presence of gray markets into consideration when they design contracts to distribute products through authorized retailers. This issue has received little attention in the extensive literature on contracting and supply chain coordination. In this study, we analyze the impacts of gray markets on two classic contracts, wholesale price and quantity discount, in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer when the retailer has the opportunity to sell to a domestic gray market. Our analysis provides interesting and counterintuitive results. First, a classic quantity‐discount contract that normally coordinates the supply chain can perform so poorly in the presence of a gray market that the supply chain would be better off using a wholesale price contract instead. Second, the presence of gray market can also degrade the performance of the wholesale price contract; therefore, a more sophisticated contract is needed for coordinating the supply chain. We show that contracts that solely depend on retailer's order quantity cannot coordinate the supply chain, and provide the conditions for coordinating the supply chain with price‐dependent quantity discount contracts. We also provide comparative statics and show that when there is a gray market, coordinating the supply chain enhances total consumer welfare.     

不对称信息下“农超对接”供应链定价及合同设计

农超对接"模式有助于缩减农产品流通环节,缓解农户农产品"卖难"和消费者"买贵"同时存在的矛盾。本文针对由一个农户（或合作社）和一个超市组成的"农超对接"系统,考虑消费者对农产品质量偏好的异质性,且消费者偏好与农产品质量之间的不匹配成本为不对称信息,研究农产品供应链定价及合同设计问题。研究结果表明,在对称信息下,农产品总是不会滞销,农户通过"批发价格+一次性转移支付"的合同设计能够实现农产品供应链的完美协调;在不对称信息下,农户存在低批发价格合同、固定批发价格合同以及高批发价格合同等三种策略,在后两种策略下,农产品有可能滞销;不对称信息的存在总是会给农户造成损失,给超市带来额外信息租金,但不一定会造成消费者剩余或社会福利的损失;当农户选择高批发价格合同时,若满足一定条件,则超市与农户能够达成信息共享谈判而共同分享整个农产品供应链的利润。     

Coordinated Contract Decisions in a Make‐to‐Order Manufacturing Supply Chain: A Stochastic Programming Approach

One of the important objectives of supply chain S&OP (Sales and Operations Planning) is the profitable alignment of customer demand with supply chain capabilities through the coordinated planning of sales, production, distribution, and procurement. In the make‐to‐order manufacturing context considered in this paper, sales plans cover both contract and spot sales, and procurement plans require the selection of supplier contracts. S&OP decisions also involve the allocation of capacity to support sales plans. This article studies the coordinated contract selection and capacity allocation problem, in a three‐tier manufacturing supply chain, with the objective to maximize the manufacturer's profitability. Using a modeling approach based on stochastic programming with recourse, we show how these S&OP decisions can be made taking into account economic, market, supply, and system uncertainties. The research is based on a real business case in the Oriented Strand Board (OSB) industry. The computational results show that the proposed approach provides realistic and robust solutions. For the case considered, the planning method elaborated yields significant performance improvements over the solutions obtained from the mixed integer programming model previously suggested for S&OP.     

努力弹性系数与成本同时扰动的闭环供应链协调应对研究

针对突发事件下销售努力弹性系数、回收努力弹性系数、制造成本和再制造成本同时扰动,研究了闭环供应链的制造(回收)策略、销售价格(回收价格)策略、销售努力(回收努力)策略与协调机制,给出了不同扰动条件下不同的制造(回收)调整策略、销售价格(回收价格)调整策略与销售努力(回收努力)调整策略,并设计了新的回馈与惩罚契约,使得闭环供应链能够在突发事件前后都能够实现协调应对,最后通过数值实例验证了文中结论的正确性。研究表明:闭环供应链受突发事件的影响很大,但通过对回馈与惩罚契约的调整及其相对应的制造(回收)策略、销售价格(回收价格)策略和销售努力(回收努力)策略的调整,可有效减少突发事件对闭环供应链利润的损失。     

采购赋能情境下平台供应链的库存风险共担策略研究

近年来,平台供应链中核心企业的采购赋能行为迅速增加,这有助于帮助供应链成员降本增效,但也可能引发核心企业自身的高库存风险。本文在同时考虑供应商产出不确定和零售商需求不确定的情境下,构建了由一个平台型电商企业、一个供应商和多个零售商组成的三级供应链系统,探讨了采购赋能情境下供应链的库存风险共担机制。研究发现,引入需求风险共担契约有助于提升供应商的生产投入水平、平台的订购量以及零售商的销售努力,并提高供应商与平台的利润。其次,引入产出风险共担契约会降低供应链成员的决策水平和利润。最后,对于不同类型的供应链风险应采取差异化的应对策略。