Value of Sharing Production Yield Information in a Serial Supply Chain

New developments in corporate information technology such as enterprise resource planning systems have significantly increased the flow of information among members of supply chains. However, the benefits of sharing information can vary depending on the supply chain structure and its operational characteristics. Most of the existing research has studied the impact of sharing downstream information (e.g., a manufacturer sharing information with its suppliers). We evaluate the benefits of sharing upstream yield information (e.g., a supplier sharing information with the manufacturer) in a two‐stage serial supply chain in which the supplier has multiple internal processes and is faced with uncertain output due to yield losses. We are interested in determining when the sharing of the supplier's information is most beneficial to the manufacturer. After proposing an order‐up‐to type heuristic policy, we perform a detailed computational study and observe that this information is most beneficial when the supplier's yield variance is high and when end‐customer demand variance is low. We also find that the manufacturer's backorder‐to‐holding cost ratio has little, if any, impact on the usefulness of information.     

Managing Slow‐Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

We address the value of information and value of centralized control in the context of a two‐echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provide a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow‐moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as decentralized information sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit‐maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, centralized control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company‐owned stores or vendor‐managed inventory. We measure the value of information and value of centralized control as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the value of information, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto‐improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.     

Differential Pricing for Information Sharing Under Competition

We consider a two‐echelon supply chain with a manufacturer supplying to multiple downstream retailers engaged in differentiated Cournot competition. Each retailer has private information about uncertain demand. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader who sets the contract terms with the retailers, and benefits from retailers sharing their private information. When all retailers are given the same wholesale price, truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium outcome. We propose two variants of differential pricing mechanisms that induce truthful information sharing by all retailers. The first variant rewards a retailer for providing optimistic information and achieves truthful information sharing as a unique equilibrium. The differential pricing mechanism is optimal in the class of linear‐price, incentive‐compatible, direct mechanisms. The second variant, which incorporates provision for a fixed payment in addition to wholesale prices, preserves all the equilibrium properties of the first variant and additionally “nearly coordinates” the supply chain. Our analysis of differential pricing with a fixed payment provides interesting observations regarding the relationship between product substitutability, number of retailers, information precision, and market power. As products become closer substitutes and/or number of retailers increase, the manufacturer's market power increases, enabling her to extract a larger fraction of the supply chain surplus.     

The Bullwhip Effect—Impact of Stochastic Lead Time,Information Quality,and Information Sharing: A Simulation Study

We use a simulation model called ‘SISCO’ to examine the effects in supply chains of stochastic lead times and of information sharing and quality of that information in a periodic order‐up‐to level inventory system. We test the accuracy of the simulation by verifying the results in Chen et al. (2000a) and Dejonckheere et al. (2004). We find that lead‐time variability exacerbates variance amplification in a supply chain, and that information sharing and information quality are highly significant. For example, using the assumptions in Chen et al. (2000a) and Dejonckheere et al. (2004), we find in a numerical experiment of a customer‐retailer‐wholesaler‐distributor‐factory supply chain that variance amplification is attenuated by nearly 50 percent at the factory due to information sharing. Other assumptions we make are based on interviews or conversations with managers at large supply chains.     

基于决策者风险规避特性的供应链需求信息共享价值分析

在随机需求条件下,利用条件风险估值(conditional value-at-risk,CVaR)的风险度量准则建立了供应链的需求信息共享决策模型,着重分析了零售商的风险规避程度以及市场需求的不确定性信息对供应链各决策者以及供应链整体信息共享价值的影响。研究结果表明,需求信息共享价值与零售商的风险规避程度、市场不确定性大小以及市场不确定信息所预测的市场需求变化情况有关。数值分析结果表明,零售商越害怕市场的不确定性风险,需求信息共享越有利于提升分散供应链的运作效率;但当市场信息反映出未来的市场需求是消极且零售商接近风险中性时,供应链的需求信息共享价值反而小于零,此时没有进行信息共享的必要。     

供应链成员信息共享技术策略博弈分析

运用博弈论分析不确定条件下供应链成员的信息共享技术策略。首先建立基于需求不确定和供应不确定两种参数的"供应商+零售商"的期望收益模型,证实在不确定条件下的存在双方期望收益的最优解;建立三阶段博弈模型,探讨双方信息共享技术策略的博弈关系;分析四种的均衡状态:探讨初始需求不确定性、供应商的信息推测能力与零售商收益的不同关系对双方信息共享技术策略的影响,结论显示:当初始需求不确定性较大时,零售商以拒绝策略为先,进一步的策略取决于供应商的信息推测能力及其对零售商收益的影响,如果该能力较强,零售商将采取接受策略,反之则反。     

Supply Contract Design for Competing Heterogeneous Suppliers under Asymmetric Information

This study considers a supply chain with two heterogeneous suppliers and a common retailer whose type is either low‐volume or high‐volume. The retailer's type is unknown to the suppliers. The flexible supplier has a high variable cost and a low fixed cost, while the efficient supplier has a low variable cost and a high fixed cost. Each supplier offers the retailer a menu of contracts. The retailer chooses the contract that maximizes its expected profit. For this setting, we characterize the equilibrium contract menus offered by the suppliers to the retailer. We find that the equilibrium contract menus depend on which supplier–retailer match can generate the highest supply chain profit and on how much information rent the supplier may need to pay. An important feature of the equilibrium contract menus is that the contract assigned to the more profitable retailer will coordinate the supply chain, while the contract assigned to the less profitable retailer may not. In addition, in some circumstances, the flexible supplier may choose not to serve the high‐volume retailer, in order to avoid excessive information rent.     

信息共享与协同合作对两级供应链的收益影响

研究了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的按订单生产的2级供应链系统。用数学的方法分析了信息共享与协同合作在供应商与制造商的不同策略组合下对该供应链收益的影响。通过具体算例对各种策略进行实验分析,并根据实验结果对信息共享与协调合作在各种策略中,对供应链各成员及整个供应链的收益影响进行评估。结果表明,供应链从传统模式转向完全信息共享与协同合作模式,制造商的订货次数、供应商的调整准备次数以及运输次数都大大减少,系统总成本降低了22.76%。信息共享能够降低成本,但主要收益来自系统的协调决策,而且这些收益并不是均匀地在各成员间进行分配的,而是随策略的不同而不同。     

Supply Chain Sourcing Under Asymmetric Information

We study a supply chain with two suppliers competing over a contract to supply components to a manufacturer. One of the suppliers is a big company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a small part of his business. The other supplier is a small company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a large portion of his business. We analyze the problem from the perspective of the big supplier and address the following questions: What is the optimal contracting strategy that the big supplier should follow? How does the information about the small supplier's production cost affect the profits and contracting decision? How does the existence of the small supplier affect profits? By studying various information scenarios regarding the small supplier's and the manufacturer's production cost, we show, for example, that the big supplier benefits when the small supplier keeps its production cost private. We quantify the value of information for the big supplier and the manufacturer. We also quantify the cost (value) of the alternative‐sourcing option for the big supplier (the manufacturer). We determine when an alternative‐sourcing option has more impact on profits than information. We conclude with extensions and numerical examples to shed light on how system parameters affect this supply chain.     

信息不对称下基于区块链驱动的供应链减排信息共享机制研究

信息不对称是阻碍供应链多主体协同减排的主要因素,针对消费者隐匿低碳偏好导致的供应链协同减排效率损失问题,通过与基于委托-代理理论的供应链减排信息甄别机制比较,设计了基于区块链驱动的供应链协同减排信息共享机制。研究表明,消费者获得额外的信息租金是导致供应链减排效率损失的主要因素,生产商和供应商通过分担一定比例的“区块链+协同减排”投资成本,可以获得额外的信息共享收益。“区块链+协同减排”信息共享机制在消除信息租金的同时,可以有效提高供应链收益,并且存在一最优收益分配比例使得生产商与供应商收益达到均衡以及供应链收益达到最优。“区块链+协同减排”信息共享机制可以有效提高供应链上下游企业协同减排效率,是推进我国“十四五”时期减排任务的重要路径之一。     

供应链中具有产能限制的竞争企业中的信息共享研究

本文研究由一个供货商和两个制造商组成的二级供应链中，制造商之间的横向信息共享策略和供应商的定价问题。在模型中，上游供应商同时为下游两家制造商提供价格相同的原材料，下游制造商生产具有替代性的商品进行数量竞争，并受到相同的产能限制。以Cournot博弈为研究手段，求解了制造商的均衡订货决策和信息共享策略，分析比较了在不同的信息共享策略下制造商的利润、供应商的利润和批发价格。本文在研究制造商的信息共享策略时考虑了上游供应商的批发价格的影响。研究表明，当均衡解受到产能约束时，制造商的信息共享策略会反向。在某些情况下，完全信息共享和完全信息不共享都可能成为博弈的占优策略。上游供应商通过调整批发价格可以影响制造商的信息共享决策。该模型为上游供应商提供了一种最优定价策略，也为下游制造商提供了求解自身最优订货量和信息共享决策的方法。     

Information Sharing in a Manufacturer–Supplier Relationship: Suppliers' Incentive and Production Efficiency

While there have been vast discussions on the materialistic benefits of continuous improvement from the Toyota and Honda experiences, the academic literature pays little attention to information sharing. In this study, we construct a dynamic adverse selection model in which the supplier privately observes her production efficiency, and in the contractual duration the manufacturer obtains an informative but imprecise signal regarding this private efficiency. We show that despite the disclosure of proprietary information, information sharing may benefit the supplier; the supplier's voluntary participation is more likely to occur when the shared information is rather imprecise. On the other hand, our analysis also reveals that this information sharing unambiguously gives rise to an upward push of the production quantity, and may sometimes lead to an upward distortion that ultimately hurts the supply chain. We also document the non‐trivial impact of the timing of information sharing on the supplier's incentive to participate.     

The Impact of Information Sharing on Supply Chain Performance under Asymmetric Information

The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One main assumption in this context is that managers without specific incentives would rather use their private information strategically than reveal it truthfully. This harms supply chain performance. This study investigates the impact of information sharing in a principal‐agent setting that is typical for many supply chain transactions. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether information sharing has an influence on supply chain coordination. We find that information sharing within the supply chain has two positive effects. First, information sharing reduces the inefficiencies resulting from information deficits if there is a certain amount of trust in the supply chain. Second, communication can limit out‐of‐equilibrium behavior with a small impact on the firm's own payoff, but a large impact on the supply chain partner. Furthermore, we find that both effects are amplified when communication takes place in an environment that allows the less informed supply chain party to punish or to reward the better informed party. Although our extended mechanisms substantially enhance the poor performance of the theoretically optimal coordination contract menu, we find no mechanism that implements supply chain performance superior to the theoretically predicted second‐best level.     

Sharing shipment quantity information in the supply chain

This paper evaluates the benefit of a strategy of sharing shipment information, where one stage in a supply chain shares shipment quantity information with its immediate downstream customers—a practice also known as advanced shipping notice. Under a periodic review inventory policy, one supply-chain member places an order on its supplier every period. However, due to supplier's imperfect service, the supplier cannot always exactly satisfy what the customer orders on time. In particular, shipment quantities arriving at the customer, after a given lead-time, may be less (possibly more) than what the customer expects—we define this phenomenon as shipment quantity uncertainty. Where shipment quantity information is not shared with customers, the only way to respond is through safety stock. However, if the supplier shares such information, i.e. customers are informed every period of the shipment quantity dispatched, the customer may have enough time to adapt and resolve this uncertainty by adjusting its future order decisions. Our results indicate that in most circumstances this strategy, enabled by information technologies, helps supply-chain members resolve shipment quantity uncertainty well. This study provides an approach to quantify the value of shared shipment information and to help supply-chain members evaluate the cost-benefit trade-off during information system construction. Numerical examples are provided to indicate the impact of demand/shipment parameters on strategy implementation. While previous studies mainly focus on the information receiver's perspective, we evaluate a more general three-tier linear supply chain model via simulation, studying how this strategy affects the whole supply chain: the information sender, the information receiver and the subsequent downstream tier.     

评估供货量信息的共享在供应链管理中的价值

本文衡量了一种共享供货量信息的信息策略-即供应商向其客户(下游厂商)发布每次供货的具体数量,并通过数学建模以及模拟对此问题进行分析。结果显示,在大多数情况下,这种由信息技术支持的策略有助于供应链中的厂商适应并解决供货量不稳定的问题,供货量越是不稳定,企业越是能够从中获益。但是,当供应商及时稳定地补足缺货时,这种受益并不明显。本文的另一个发现是,供货量信息的共享可以使信息获得者受益,但是可能并不有利于发布者。也就是说,这样的信息共享能够为供应商的客户带来好处,但是供应商本身并不能因此获得显著的额外利益,反而要承担实施成本。这种不对称可能会阻碍企业间信息系统的实施,从而促使供应链成员协调信息沟通的费用,以激励供应商发布信息。我们的研究提供了对供货量信息价值进行量化的途径,同时也能够帮助供应链中的厂商评估他们在信息系统建设中的成本-收益率。     

Optimal Quantity Discount Design with Limited Information Sharing*

In this article we address the optimal quantity discount design problem of a supplier in a two‐stage supply chain where the supplier and the buyer share annual demand information only. The supply chain faces a constant deterministic demand that is not price sensitive and operates with fixed setup costs in both stages. We show that the supplier can actually moderate a cost‐minimizing buyer to order in quantities different than the buyer's optimal order quantity in the traditional setting and develop a multi‐breakpoint quantity discount scheme that maximizes supplier's expected net savings. The proposed multi‐breakpoint discount scheme can be easily computed from the available information and, while also maximizing the supplier's net savings, is very effective in achieving high levels of supply chain coordination efficiency in the presence of limited information.     

供应商机会主义行为对信息共享与运营绩效的影响

在交易成本理论基础上,构建供应商机会主义行为、信息共享与运营绩效之间关系的理论模型。以广东省珠三角地区189家制造企业为研究对象,利用结构方程模型对供应商机会主义行为、信息共享与运营绩效的关系进行实证研究。将信息共享划分为信息共享内容和信息共享质量两个维度,将运营绩效划分为速度、服务和财务3个维度。研究结果表明,在供应商机会主义行为与信息共享的关系层面,供应商机会主义行为对信息共享内容和信息共享质量均有显著的负向影响;在信息共享与运营绩效的关系层面,信息共享内容和信息共享质量均对运营绩效有显著的正向影响;而供应商机会主义行为对运营绩效有显著的负向影响。根据上述实证研究结论给出供应链企业和政府的相关管理启示。     

在ARIMA(0,1,1)需求下的牛鞭效应与信息共享的评价

本文考虑一个包含一个供应商和一个零售商的两级供应链,研究在需求模型ARIMA(0,1,1)下牛鞭效应的量化和信息共享的价值,比较信息共享之前和之后的差异,其结果表明信息共享能给供应商带来减轻牛鞭效应、减少现有平均库存以及降低成本等好处。     

The Effects of Sharing Upstream Information on Product Rollover

The process of introducing new and phasing out old products is called product rollover. This paper considers a periodic‐review inventory system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer introduces new and improved products over an infinite planning horizon using the solo‐roll strategy. We consider two scenarios: (1) the manufacturer does not share the upstream information about new‐product introduction with the retailer and (2) the manufacturer shares the information. For each scenario, we first derive the decentralized ordering policy and the system‐optimal ordering policy with given cost parameters. We then devise an optimal supply chain contract that coordinates the inventory system. We demonstrate that when the inventory system is coordinated, information sharing improves the performance of both supply chain entities. However, this may not be true if the inventory system is not coordinated. We also show that under the optimal contract, the manufacturer has no incentive to mislead the retailer about new‐product information in the information‐sharing model. When demand variability increases, information sharing adds more benefits to the coordinated supply chain. Our research provides insights about coordinating product, financial, and information flows in supply chains with product rollover.     

The Impact of External Demand Information on Parallel Supply Chains with Interacting Demand

This paper considers two parallel supply chains with interacting demand streams. Each supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer. The two demand streams are jointly described with a vector autoregressive time‐series process in which they interact and their respective innovation errors correlate contemporaneously. For each supply chain, we develop insights into when and how much the supplier and the retailer can improve on their forecasting accuracy if the external demand history of the other supply chain is utilized. When this external demand history is not available or made available after a time lag, we develop a partial process and a delayed process to characterize the demand structure that the retailer can recover from the available demand histories. Our results show that the external demand history of the other supply chain always helps the retailer make better forecasts when demand streams interact; however, the enhanced information alters the retailer's order process, which may produce larger forecasting errors for the supplier. Conditions are established for the supplier to benefit from the external demand history of the other supply chain.