Inter‐organizational Quality Management: The Use of Contractual Incentives and Monitoring Mechanisms with Outsourced Manufacturing

Quality‐related incidents involving contract manufacturers (CMs) are becoming increasingly prevalent. The quality management (QM) literature, however, has focused mostly on QM within a single firm. Thus, the need for data‐driven research on managing quality with outsourced production is evident. We investigate the use and effectiveness of external failure penalties and audits of CMs’ facilities to manage inter‐firm quality. Building on agency theory and extant QM literature, this study addresses two research questions: (i) whether the control mechanisms of quality audits and contractual external quality failure penalties are substitutes or complements in use and (ii) whether they are substitutes or complements in their effectiveness at aligning the quality interests of customers and their CMs. Our analysis uses dyadic data gathered from brand‐owning firms and their CMs representing 95 contract manufacturing relationships in Food and Drug Administration (FDA)‐regulated industries. The results indicate that more severe external failure penalties correspond to a lower use of facility audits (i.e., they are substitutes‐in‐use). We also find that both external failure penalties and facility audits have a unique positive effect on the CM's perception of relative quality importance. Finally, some evidence supports the hypothesis that each mechanism is more effective in the presence of the other (i.e., they are complements‐in‐effectiveness).     

Sourcing from Multiple Suppliers for Price‐Dependent Demands

We analyze a model that integrates demand shaping via dynamic pricing and risk mitigation via supply diversification. The firm under consideration replenishes a certain product from a set of capacitated suppliers for a price‐dependent demand in each period. Under deterministic capacities, we derive a multilevel base stock list price policy and establish the optimality of cost‐based supplier selection, that is, ordering from a cheaper source before more expensive ones. With general random capacities, however, neither result holds. While it is optimal to price low for a high inventory level, the optimal order quantities are not monotone with respect to the inventory level. In general, a near reorder‐point policy should be followed. Specifically, there is a reorder point for each supplier such that no order is issued to him when the inventory level is above this point and a positive order is placed almost everywhere when the inventory level is below this point. Under this policy, it may be profitable to order exclusively from the most expensive source. We characterize conditions under which a strict reorder‐point policy and a cost‐based supplier‐selection criterion become optimal. Moreover, we quantify the benefit from dynamic pricing, as opposed to static pricing, and the benefit from multiple sourcing, as opposed to single sourcing. We show that these two strategies exhibit a substitutable relationship. Dynamic pricing is less effective under multiple sourcing than under single sourcing, and supplier diversification is less valuable with price adjustments than without. Under limited supply, dynamic pricing yields a robust, long‐term profit improvement. The value of supply diversification, in contrast, mainly comes from added capacities and is most significant in the short run.     

Analysis of the Market‐Based Adjustable Outsourcing Contract under Uncertainties

The market‐based adjustable contract for customized goods or services has emerged in outsourcing practices. Its objective is to minimize the operational risks inherent in today's volatile environment of operations. Our research reveals several important properties of this contract through a continuous‐time analytical approach. Specifically, we consider the determination of this contract between two risk‐averse firms through a Nash bargaining process. We derive the optimal adjusting mechanism analytically and extensively analyze the application boundary of the market‐based adjustable outsourcing contract. We conclude by discussing implications for practice and research.     

信息共享程度对物流外包激励契约的影响

本文分析了由供应商、制造商和第三方物流企业(3PLs)组成的物流外包系统,考虑了供应商和制造商信息共享程度的影响,建立了协同工作环境下的激励契约模型.结果表明,委托人偏好低努力水平时,信息共享对激励契约没有影响;委托人偏好高努力水平时,信息共享能更好的激励代理人选择委托人希望的行动.信息不共享时,3PLs只有提高对供应商努力水平的积极性;信息共享时,3PLs收入波动性增大,提高对供应商和对制造商的努力水平都能使其获得帕累托改进.本研究为物流成本在供应链成员中的分摊提供了理论依据,并提出了模型改进和研究建议.     

How to Win “Spend” and Influence Partners: Lessons in Behavioral Operations from the Outsourcing Game

The Outsourcing Game is a role‐play simulation that has been deployed in industry and academic training courses worldwide. It incorporates the concepts of hidden actions, hidden information, and misaligned incentives, and conveys messages about power, trust, and reputation. The game depicts the adventures of Acme, the brand owner of a product manufactured by an outsourced supply chain. Through a series of negotiations, Acme attempts to influence its partners (two suppliers and two service providers) by distributing its procurement “spend.” These partners, in turn, sway each other via side payments. To simulate the non‐linear shifts in power that occur as outsourcing increases, we represent decision‐making by a voting scheme with uneven vote allocations. This paper analyzes a database of game results to reveal behavioral factors that can undermine conspicuous win–win process improvements. For instance, preferences can be sensitive to the sequence in which the alternatives are encountered; decision‐makers might value not only their own rewards, but also fairness in the allocation of total gains; and effectiveness of negotiation tactics will vary with community norms of acceptable behavior. Along the way we extend the political economics literature about power in block‐based voting by proposing a heuristic approach for incorporating voter preferences.     

Quality Management in Multi‐Level Supply Chains with Outsourced Manufacturing

Outsourcing stretches supply chains longer with added contract manufacturers responsible for the manufacturing of parts and final products. Should a firm change its quality management approach as its supply chain becomes longer with outsourced manufacturing? This paper studies a brand owner's optimal choice between two commonly used quality management approaches: an inspection‐based approach and an external failure‐based approach, in two supply chains – a dyadic supply chain and a multi‐level supply chain where the brand owner outsources manufacturing to an independent contract manufacturer. Our study finds that the brand owner's optimal choice between the two quality management approaches could be opposite in the two supply chains. Specifically, we show that if agency costs exist between the contract manufacturer and the brand owner, the brand owner may prefer an inspection‐based approach in the multi‐level supply chain in contrast to preferring an external failure‐based approach in the dyadic supply chain. In particular, inspections can be effective for the brand owner to limit the manufacturer's profit by excluding defective finished products and components, which in turn reduce agency costs in the multi‐level supply chain. Hence, the efficiency of an inspection‐based approach relative to an external failure‐based approach can be higher in the multi‐level supply chain as compared to the dyadic one. Our findings suggest that firms should adjust to changes in supply chain structures and re‐evaluate the efficiencies of different quality management approaches accordingly.     

Peakedness‐Based Staffing for Call Center Outsourcing

This study considers the staffing problem of a vendor call center in a co‐sourcing setting. The aim is to take short‐term variability and correlations in time for call arrivals at such a vendor call center into account. To do so, peakedness is proposed as a useful measure of the burstiness in the arrival stream. The study empirically demonstrates the presence of bursty arrivals at a call center and proposes an approach to the measurement of the peakedness of the arrival stream making use of standard call center data. The problematic nature of bursty arrivals in the context of call center co‐sourcing is demonstrated along with an asymptotic result establishing that the problem persists in large call centers. The study then analyzes two peakedness‐based staffing methods: one which is a well known extension of the square root staffing rule and another which makes use of the Hayward approximation principles. Both approaches are simple and enable the vendor to improve its staffing procedure with good accuracy.     

Price,Rebate, and Returns Supply Contracts for Coordinating Supply Chains with Price‐Dependent Demands

Channel rebates and returns policies are common mechanisms for manufacturers to entice retailers to increase their order quantities and sales ultimately. However, when the underlying demand depends on the retail price, it has been known that channel coordination cannot be achieved if only one of these mechanisms is deployed. In this article, we show that a policy that combines the use of wholesale price, channel rebate, and returns can coordinate a channel with both additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demands. In addition to determining the sufficient conditions for the contract parameters associated with the equilibrium policy, we show that multiple equilibrium policies for channel coordination exist. We further explore how the equilibrium policy can be adjusted to achieve Pareto improvement. Other issues such as the maximum amount of expected profit that the manufacturer can share under the coordinated channel, the structural properties of the contracts under both the additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demand functions are also discussed.     

Assessing End‐Of‐Supply Risk of Spare Parts Using the Proportional Hazard Model

Operators of long field‐life systems like airplanes are faced with hazards in the supply of spare parts. If the original manufacturers or suppliers of parts end their supply, this may have large impacts on operating costs of firms needing these parts. Existing end‐of‐supply evaluation methods are focused mostly on the downstream supply chain, which is of interest mainly to spare part manufacturers. Firms that purchase spare parts have limited information on parts sales, and indicators of end‐of‐supply risk can also be found in the upstream supply chain. This article proposes a methodology for firms purchasing spare parts to manage end‐of‐supply risk by utilizing proportional hazard models in terms of supply chain conditions of the parts. The considered risk indicators fall into four main categories, of which two are related to supply (price and lead time) and two others are related to demand (cycle time and throughput). The methodology is demonstrated using data on about 2,000 spare parts collected from a maintenance repair organization in the aviation industry. Cross‐validation results and out‐of‐sample risk assessments show good performance of the method to identify spare parts with high end‐of‐supply risk. Further validation is provided by survey results obtained from the maintenance repair organization, which show strong agreement between the firm's and the model's identification of high‐risk spare parts.     

Outsourcing to a Powerful Contract Manufacturer: The Effect of Learning‐by‐Doing

The contract manufacturing industry has grown rapidly in recent years as firms have increasingly outsourced production to reduce costs. This growth has created powerful contract manufacturers (CMs) in several industries. Achieving a competitive cost position is often a primary motive for outsourcing. Outsourcing influences both the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) and the CM's production levels, and, therefore, through learning‐by‐doing renders future costs dependent on past outsourcing decisions. As such, outsourcing should not be viewed as a static decision that, once made, is not revisited. We address these considerations by analyzing a two‐period game between an OEM and a powerful CM wherein both firms can reduce their production costs through learning‐by‐doing. We find that partial outsourcing, wherein the OEM simultaneously outsources and produces in‐house, can be an optimal strategy. Also, we find that the OEM's outsourcing strategy may be dynamic—i.e., change from period to period. In addition, we find both that the OEM may engage in production for leverage (i.e., produce internally when at a cost disadvantage) and that the CM may engage in low balling. These and other findings in this paper demonstrate the importance of considering learning, the power of the CM, and future periods when making outsourcing decisions.     

Revenue‐Sharing vs. Wholesale‐Price Contracts in Assembly Systems with Random Demand

Assembly and kitting operations, as well as jointly sold products, are rather basic yet intriguing A decentralized supply chains, where achieving coordination through appropriate incentives is very important, especially when demand is uncertain. We investigate two very distinct types of arrangements between an assembler/retailer and its suppliers. One scheme is a vendor‐managed inventory with revenue sharing, and the other a wholesale‐price driven contract. In the VMI case, each supplier faces strategic uncertainty as to the amounts of components, which need to be mated with its own, that other suppliers will deliver. We explore the resulting components' delivery quantities equilibrium in this decentralized supply chain and its implications for participants' and system's expected profits. We derive the revenue shares the assembler should select in order to maximize its own profits. We then explore a revenue‐plus‐surplus‐subsidy incentive scheme, where, in addition to a share of revenue, the assembler also provides a subsidy to component suppliers for their unsold components. We show that, by using this two‐parameter contract, the assembler can achieve channel coordination and increase the profits of all parties involved. We then explore a wholesale‐price‐driven scheme, both as a single lever and in combination with buybacks. The channel performance of a wholesale‐price‐only scheme is shown to degrade with the number of suppliers, which is not the case with a revenue‐share‐only contract.     

Coordinated Contract Decisions in a Make‐to‐Order Manufacturing Supply Chain: A Stochastic Programming Approach

One of the important objectives of supply chain S&OP (Sales and Operations Planning) is the profitable alignment of customer demand with supply chain capabilities through the coordinated planning of sales, production, distribution, and procurement. In the make‐to‐order manufacturing context considered in this paper, sales plans cover both contract and spot sales, and procurement plans require the selection of supplier contracts. S&OP decisions also involve the allocation of capacity to support sales plans. This article studies the coordinated contract selection and capacity allocation problem, in a three‐tier manufacturing supply chain, with the objective to maximize the manufacturer's profitability. Using a modeling approach based on stochastic programming with recourse, we show how these S&OP decisions can be made taking into account economic, market, supply, and system uncertainties. The research is based on a real business case in the Oriented Strand Board (OSB) industry. The computational results show that the proposed approach provides realistic and robust solutions. For the case considered, the planning method elaborated yields significant performance improvements over the solutions obtained from the mixed integer programming model previously suggested for S&OP.     

Co‐opetition and Investment for Supply‐Chain Resilience

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss‐sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non‐cooperative game. We describe an incentive‐compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal “gain” for all players, when the solution is “interior” (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an “information rent” in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.     

Coordination in a Single‐Supplier,Multi‐Retailer Distribution System: Supplier‐Facilitated Transshipments

We consider supplier‐facilitated transshipments for achieving supply chain coordination in a single supplier, multi‐retailer distribution system with non‐cooperative retailers. The previous transshipment literature has focused on coordination through retailer‐negotiated transshipments and thus does not consider the supplier's decision‐making. In contrast, in this study, we assume the supplier is an active participant in the system and we seek to understand how the supplier can facilitate the implementation of coordinating transshipments. We study a two‐period model with wholesale orders at the start of the first period and preventive transshipments performed at the start of the second period. Inspired by a supplier‐facilitated transshipment scheme observed in practice, we assume the supplier implements transshipments through a bi‐directional adjustment contract. Under this contract, each retailer can either buy additional inventory from, or sell back excess inventory to, the supplier. We show that coordination can be achieved through carefully designed contracts with state‐dependent adjustment prices and a wholesale price menu. We demonstrate that the supplier's role in facilitating coordinating transshipments is critical. In addition, we use our understanding of the coordinating contract form to derive some simpler and easier‐to‐implement heuristic contracts. We use a numerical study to demonstrate the value, to the supplier, of using the coordinating adjustment and wholesale prices, and to evaluate the heuristics’ performance.     

Complexity as a Contract Design Factor: A Human‐to‐Human Experimental Study

Despite being theoretically suboptimal, simpler contracts (such as price‐only contracts and quantity discount contracts with limited number of price blocks) are commonly preferred in practice. Thus, exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. Using human subject experiments, Kalkancı et al. (2011) showed that such simpler contracts perform effectively for a supplier interacting with a computerized buyer under asymmetric demand information. We use a similar set of experiments with the modification that a human supplier interacts with a human buyer. We show that human interactions strengthen the supplier's preference for simpler contracts. We find that suppliers have fairness concerns even when they interact with computerized buyers. These fairness concerns tend to be even stronger when suppliers interact with human buyers, particularly when the complexity of the contract is low. We also find that suppliers are more prone to random decision errors (i.e., bounded rationality) when interacting with human buyers. In the absence of social preferences, Kalkancı et al. identified reinforcement and bounded rationality as key biases that impact suppliers' decisions. In human‐to‐human experiments, we find evidence for social preference effects. However, these effects may be secondary to bounded rationality.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supply Chain Disruptions on Long‐Run Stock Price Performance and Equity Risk of the Firm

This paper investigates the long‐term stock price effects and equity risk effects of supply chain disruptions based on a sample of 827 disruption announcements made during 1989–2000. Stock price effects are examined starting one year before through two years after the disruption announcement date. Over this time period the average abnormal stock returns of firms that experienced disruptions is nearly –40%. Much of this underperformance is observed in the year before the announcement, the day of the announcement, and the year after the announcement. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that firms do not quickly recover from the negative effects of disruptions. The equity risk of the firm also increases significantly around the announcement date. The equity risk in the year after the announcement is 13.50% higher when compared to the equity risk in the year before the announcement.     

Optimizing Customer Forecasts for Forecast‐Commitment Contracts

We study a “Forecast‐Commitment” contract motivated by a manufacturer's desire to provide good service in the form of delivery commitments in exchange for reasonable forecasts and a purchase commitment from the customer. The customer provides a forecast for a future order and a guarantee to purchase a portion of it. In return, the supplier commits to satisfy some or all of the forecast. The supplier pays penalties for shortfalls of the commitment quantity from the forecast, and for shortfalls of the delivered quantity from the customer's final order (not exceeding the commitment quantity). These penalties allow differential service among customers. In Durango‐Cohen and Yano (2006), we analyzed the supplier's problem for a given customer forecast. In this paper, we analyze the customer's problem under symmetric information, both when the customer is honest and when he strategically orders more than his demand when doing so is advantageous. We show that the customer gains little from lying, so the supplier can use his control over the contract parameters to encourage honesty. When the customer is honest, the contract achieves (near‐)coordination of the supply chain in a great majority of instances, and thus provides both excellent performance and flexibility in structuring contracts.     

New Product Design under Channel Acceptance: Brick‐and‐Mortar,Online‐Exclusive,or Brick‐and‐Click

In recent years, an increasing number of brick‐and‐mortar retailers have entered into the new brick‐and‐click era. Within this context, when a manufacturer presents a new product offering to a retailer, the ultimate decision is often made by the retailer regarding (1) whether to carry the new product, and (2) the channel outlet the product will be carried in (i.e., in‐store only, online‐exclusive, or brick‐and‐click). In response to this trend, we examine how a manufacturer may use product design to influence a dual‐channel retailer's outlet designation decision. This is the first study to investigate a manufacturer's optimal product design strategy when a brick‐and‐mortar retailer expands online. We demonstrate that, to induce the retailer to carry a new product both offline and online, it may not always be optimal for the manufacturer to enhance product quality (compared with when the retailer only operates offline). With the online store addition, the retailer may also be incentivized to adjust his participation criterion to a level less than what is determined by his outside option.     

Heuristics for Base‐Stock Levels in Multi‐Echelon Distribution Networks

We study inventory optimization for locally controlled, continuous‐review distribution systems with stochastic customer demands. Each node follows a base‐stock policy and a first‐come, first‐served allocation policy. We develop two heuristics, the recursive optimization (RO) heuristic and the decomposition‐aggregation (DA) heuristic, to approximate the optimal base‐stock levels of all the locations in the system. The RO heuristic applies a bottom‐up approach that sequentially solves single‐variable, convex problems for each location. The DA heuristic decomposes the distribution system into multiple serial systems, solves for the base‐stock levels of these systems using the newsvendor heuristic of Shang and Song (2003), and then aggregates the serial systems back into the distribution system using a procedure we call “backorder matching.” A key advantage of the DA heuristic is that it does not require any evaluation of the cost function (a computationally costly operation that requires numerical convolution). We show that, for both RO and DA, changing some of the parameters, such as leadtime, unit backordering cost, and demand rate, of a location has an impact only on its own local base‐stock level and its upstream locations’ local base‐stock levels. An extensive numerical study shows that both heuristics perform well, with the RO heuristic providing more accurate results and the DA heuristic consuming less computation time. We show that both RO and DA are asymptotically optimal along multiple dimensions for two‐echelon distribution systems. Finally, we show that, with minor changes, both RO and DA are applicable to the balanced allocation policy.