Costly Self‐Control and Random Self‐Indulgence

We study the random Strotz model, a version of the Strotz (1955) model with uncertainty about the nature of the temptation that will strike. We show that the random Strotz representation is unique and characterize a comparative notion of “more temptation averse.” Also, we demonstrate an unexpected connection between the random Strotz model and a generalization of the Gul–Pesendorfer (GP) (2001) model of temptation which allows for the temptation to be uncertain and which we call random GP. In particular, a preference over menus has a random GP representation if and only if it also has a representation via a random Strotz model with sufficiently smooth uncertainty about the intensity of temptation. We also show that choices of menus combined with choices from menus can distinguish the random GP and random Strotz models.     

Multiple Temptations

We use a preference‐over‐menus framework to model a decision maker who is affected by multiple temptations. Our two main axioms on preference—exclusion and inclusion—identify when the agent would want to restrict his choice set and when he would want to expand his choice set. An agent who is tempted would want to restrict his choice set by excluding the normatively worst alternative of that choice set. Simultaneously, he would want to expand his choice set by including a normatively superior alternative. Our representation identifies the agent's normative preference and temptations, and suggests the agent is uncertain which of these temptations will affect him. We provide examples to illustrate how our model improves on those of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009).     

Preference for Flexibility and Random Choice

We study a two‐stage model where the agent has preferences over menus as in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) in the first period and then makes random choices from menus as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) in the second period. Both preference for flexibility in the first period and strictly random choices in the second period can be, respectively, rationalized by subjective state spaces. Our main result characterizes the representation where the two state spaces align, so the agent correctly anticipates her future choices. The joint representation uniquely identifies probabilities over subjective states and magnitudes of utilities across states. We also characterize when the agent completely overlooks some subjective states that realize at the point of choice.     

Perfectionism and Choice

Empirical evidence suggests that perfectionism can affect choice behavior. When striving for perfection, a person can desire to keep normatively appealing options feasible even if she persistently fails to use these options later. For instance, she can “pay not to go to the gym,” as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). By contrast, some perfectionists may avoid normatively important tasks for fear of negative self‐evaluation of their performance. This paper models perfectionist behaviors in Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) menu framework where agents may be tempted to deviate from their long‐term normative objectives. In addition to self‐control costs, I identify a utility component that reflects emotional costs and benefits of perfectionism. My model is derived from axioms imposed on preferences over menus in an essentially unique way.     

Temptation and Self‐Control

We study a two‐period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision‐maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self‐control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self‐control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self‐control and relate them to our representations.     

Anticipating Regret: Why Fewer Options May Be Better

We study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the agent selects an alternative from a menu and experiences regret if her choice is ex post inferior. Since regret arises from comparisons between the alternative selected and the other available alternatives, our axioms reflect the agent's desire to limit her options. We prove that our representation is essentially unique. We also introduce two measures of comparative regret attitudes and relate them to our representation. Finally, we explore the formal connection between the present work and the literature on temptation.     

Random Choice and Private Information

We consider an agent who chooses an option after receiving some private information. This information, however, is unobserved by an analyst, so from the latter's perspective, choice is probabilistic or random. We provide a theory in which information can be fully identified from random choice. In addition, the analyst can perform the following inferences even when information is unobservable: (1) directly compute ex ante valuations of menus from random choice and vice versa, (2) assess which agent has better information by using choice dispersion as a measure of informativeness, (3) determine if the agent's beliefs about information are dynamically consistent, and (4) test to see if these beliefs are well‐calibrated or rational.     

MEASURING SELF‐CONTROL PROBLEMS: A STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION

Abstract We adopt a two‐stage Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the preference parameters in a life‐cycle consumption‐saving model augmented with temptation disutility. Our approach estimates the parameters from the comparison between simulated moments with empirical moments observed in the US Survey of Consumer Finances; to identify the parameters we consider moments from liquid and illiquid asset holdings at different ages. We find evidence of a small but significantly positive degree of temptation. The temptation model predicts consumption choices similar to the model with standard preferences, and holdings of liquid and illiquid assets closer to those observed in the empirical data.     

Temptation and Taxation

We study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self‐control problems. Embedding the class of preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting, we first prove, in a two‐period model, that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by “excessive” impatience. The savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive. We then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests, as a special case, the Phelps–Pollak–Laibson multiple‐selves model (thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model). We prove that when period utility is logarithmic, the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon. Moreover, as the horizon grows large, the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy, in contrast to the well known Chamley–Judd result.     

Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion

We characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a “preference for flexibility” in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu. Other cases display varying levels of “choice aversion,” where the agent prefers to remove items from a menu if their ex ante value is below a threshold. We show that higher choice aversion, as measured by dislike of bigger menus, also corresponds to an increased preference for putting off decisions as late as possible.     

People's Risk Recognition Preceding Evacuation and Its Role in Demand Modeling and Planning

Evacuation planning and management involves estimating the travel demand in the event that such action is required. This is usually done as a function of people's decision to evacuate, which we show is strongly linked to their risk awareness. We use an empirical data set, which shows tsunami evacuation behavior, to demonstrate that risk recognition is not synonymous with objective risk, but is instead determined by a combination of factors including risk education, information, and sociodemographics, and that it changes dynamically over time. Based on these findings, we formulate an ordered logit model to describe risk recognition combined with a latent class model to describe evacuation choices. Our proposed evacuation choice model along with a risk recognition class can evaluate quantitatively the influence of disaster mitigation measures, risk education, and risk information. The results obtained from the risk recognition model show that risk information has a greater impact in the sense that people recognize their high risk. The results of the evacuation choice model show that people who are unaware of their risk take a longer time to evacuate.     

Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation

We present an axiomatic model depicting the choice behavior of a self‐interest seeking moral individual over random allocation procedures. Individual preferences are decomposed into a self‐interest component and a component representing the individual's moral value judgment. Each component has a distinct utility representation, and the preference relation depicting the choice behavior is representable by a real‐valued function defined on the components utilities. The utility representing the self‐interest component is linear and the utility representing the individual's moral value judgment is quasi‐concave. The addition of a hexagon condition implies that the utility representing the individual's preference is additively separable in the components utilities.     

Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space

We extend Kreps' (1979) analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps (1992) as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps' model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the representations, the agent acts as if she had coherent beliefs about a set of possible future (ex post) preferences, each of which is an expected‐utility preference. We show that this set of ex post preferences, called the subjective state space, is essentially unique given the restriction that all ex post preferences are expected‐utility preferences and is minimal even without this restriction. Because the subjective state space is identified, the way ex post utilities are aggregated into an ex ante ranking is also essentially unique. Hence when a representation that is additive across states exists, the additivity is meaningful in the sense that all representations are intrinsically additive. Uniqueness enables us to show that the size of the subjective state space provides a measure of the agent's uncertainty about future contingencies and that the way the states are aggregated indicates whether these contingencies lead to a desire for flexibility or commitment.     

Savage in the Market

We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of subjective expected utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent's behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave utility function over money) that accounts for the given asset purchases.     

What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers

We construct a new index of media slant that measures the similarity of a news outlet's language to that of a congressional Republican or Democrat. We estimate a model of newspaper demand that incorporates slant explicitly, estimate the slant that would be chosen if newspapers independently maximized their own profits, and compare these profit‐maximizing points with firms' actual choices. We find that readers have an economically significant preference for like‐minded news. Firms respond strongly to consumer preferences, which account for roughly 20 percent of the variation in measured slant in our sample. By contrast, the identity of a newspaper's owner explains far less of the variation in slant.     

A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation

We study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the individual is uncertain of her tastes, but is able to engage in costly contemplation before selecting an alternative from a menu. Since contemplation is costly, our key axiom, aversion to contingent planning, reflects the individual's preference to learn the menu from which she will be choosing prior to engaging in contemplation about her tastes for the alternatives. Our representation models contemplation strategies as subjective signals over a subjective state space. The subjectivity of the state space and the information structure in our representation makes it difficult to identify them from the preference. To overcome this issue, we show that each signal can be modeled in reduced form as a measure over ex post utility functions without reference to a state space. We show that in this reduced‐form representation, the set of measures and their costs are uniquely identified. Finally, we provide a measure of comparative contemplation costs and characterize the special case of our representation where contemplation is costless.     

Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value

We present a noncooperative game model of coalitional bargaining, closely based on that of Gul (1989) but solvable by backward induction. In this game, Gul's condition of “value additivity” does not suffice to ensure the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that supports the Shapley value, but a related condition—“no positive value‐externalities”—does. Multiple equilibria can arise only in the event of ties, and with a mild restriction on tie‐break rules these equilibria all support the Shapley value.     

An Empirical Model of Perceived Mortality Risks for Selected U.S. Arsenic Hot Spots

Researchers have long recognized that subjective perceptions of risk are better predictors of choices over risky outcomes than science‐based or experts’ assessments of risk. More recent work suggests that uncertainty about risks also plays a role in predicting choices and behavior. In this article, we develop and estimate a formal model for an individual's perceived health risks associated with arsenic contamination of his or her drinking water. The modeling approach treats risk as a random variable, with an estimable probability distribution whose variance reflects uncertainty. The model we estimate uses data collected from a survey given to a sample of people living in arsenic‐prone areas in the United States. The findings from this article support the fact that scientific information is essential to explaining the mortality rate perceived by the individuals, but uncertainty about the probability remains significant.     

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.     

基于制造商网络渠道选择的双渠道供应链定价 与服务决策研究

本文考虑由线下零售商实体销售与制造商网络销售构成的网络直销,以及由线下零售商实体销售与线上零售商网络销售构成的网络分销两种制造商双渠道模式,研究“搭便车”行为下制造商模式选择和供应链最优定价与服务决策。研究发现:制造商的渠道选择策略与“搭便车”行为程度、消费者偏好网络渠道程度、价格敏感系数等有关。尤其当消费者受到的服务且对价格的敏感性相同时,制造商会选择网络直销双渠道模式。进一步分析消费者“搭便车”行为和网络渠道偏好对制造商渠道选择和定价决策影响发现,制造商在消费者偏好网络渠道程度比较低时应选择网络分销双渠道模式,而当消费者网络渠道偏好和“搭便车”行为程度都比较高时,制造商应选择网络直销双渠道模式。消费者网络渠道偏好或“搭便车”行为程度越大,两种模式下批发价格应设置的更低。网络直销渠道模式下“搭便车”行为程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置的更低,而消费者网络渠道偏好程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置得更高。