Improving Voting Systems through Service‐Operations Management

We apply service‐operations‐management concepts to improve the efficiency and equity of voting systems. Recent elections in the United States and elsewhere have been plagued by long lines, excessive waiting times, and perceptions of unfairness. We build models for the waiting lines at voting precincts using both traditional steady‐state queueing methods and simulation models. We develop solution methods to allocate voting machines optimally to precincts. Our objective functions consider both the efficiency and the equity of the voting system. We compare our allocation algorithm to several competing methods, including those used in practice. We examine several different strategies for improving voting operations on both the demand and the capacity side of voting systems, and we present a complete case study of applying our method to data from the 2008 election for Franklin County, Ohio. We conclude that our method is superior to existing polices in terms of efficiency and equity and that it is robust in terms of uncertainties regarding turnout rates on Election Day. We also suggest several operational improvements to the voting process drawn from the service‐operations literature.     

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.     

Voting Technology,Political Responsiveness,and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil

This paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in Brazilian elections. Estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual (error‐ridden and uncounted) votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens. Estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology's phase‐in across states over time suggest that, as predicted by political economy models, it shifted government spending toward health care, which is particularly beneficial to the poor. Positive effects on both the utilization of health services (prenatal visits) and newborn health (low‐weight births) are also found for less educated mothers, but not for the more educated.     

REDISTRIBUTION,PORK, AND ELECTIONS

Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on ‘wedge’ issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically‐based patronage—or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide‐the‐dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right‐wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left‐wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right‐wing parties should have an advantage over left‐wing ones in majoritarian systems.     

SOCIAL INCENTIVES AND VOTER TURNOUT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SWISS MAIL BALLOT SYSTEM

This paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior. The main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act. This incentive is particularly high in small and close‐knit communities. Empirically, I analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in Switzerland. Optional postal voting decreased the voting costs, but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote. In spite of the large reduction in voting costs, the effect on aggregate turnout was small. However, voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities. This lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people's voting decisions. (JEL: H0, Z13)     

ELECTORAL RULES AND CORRUPTION

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? Recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer. But little is known about the data. We try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s. We exploit the cross‐country variation in the data, as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors. Larger voting districts—and thus lower barriers to entry—are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists—and thus less individual accountability—are associated with more corruption. Individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality‐rule elections, even though open party lists also seem to have some effect. Because different aspects roughly offset each other, a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption. (JEL: E62, H3)     

One Person,Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. Standard analyses assume voters have a fixed preference ordering over candidates. Coordination problems cannot be overcome in such a case, and it is possible that inferior candidates win. In our setup the majority is also divided as a result of information imperfections. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. We show that when the common value component is strong enough, approval voting produces full information and coordination equivalence: the equilibrium is unique and solves both problems. Thus, the need for information aggregation helps resolve the majority's coordination problem under approval voting. This is not the case under standard electoral systems.     

Cursed Equilibrium

There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people's actions depend on these other people's information. This paper defines and applies a new equilibrium concept in games with private information, cursed equilibrium, which assumes that each player correctly predicts the distribution of other players' actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with other players' information. We apply the concept to common‐values auctions, where cursed equilibrium captures the widely observed phenomenon of the winner's curse, and to bilateral trade, where cursedness predicts trade in adverse‐selections settings for which conventional analysis predicts no trade. We also apply cursed equilibrium to voting and signalling models. We test a single‐parameter variant of our model that embeds Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a special case and find that parameter values that correspond to cursedness fit a broad range of experimental datasets better than the parameter value that corresponds to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.     

Political Economy of Mechanisms

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self‐interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes.     

Cognition and Behavior in Normal‐Form Games: An Experimental Study

This paper reports experiments designed to study strategic sophistication, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others’ decisions, taking their incentives into account. We study subjects’ initial responses to normal‐form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure‐strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to search for hidden payoff information, while recording their searches. Monitoring subjects’ information searches along with their decisions allows us to better understand how their decisions are determined, and subjects’ deviations from the search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.     

Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections

If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do large elections deliver outcomes “as if” the state were common knowledge? While the existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information regarding the state induces all voters to switch in favor of only one alternative, we allow for more general preferences where a change in information can induce a switch in favor of either alternative. We show that information is aggregated for any voting rule if, for a randomly chosen voter, the probability of switching in favor of one alternative is strictly greater than the probability of switching away from that alternative for any given change in belief over states. If the preference distribution violates this condition, there exist equilibria that produce outcomes different from the full information outcome with high probability for large classes of voting rules. In other words, unless preferences closely conform to the jury metaphor, information aggregation is not guaranteed to obtain.     

Communication With Unknown Perspectives

Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes the target's opinion. This choice involves a trade‐off between well‐informed targets, whose signals are precise, and well‐understood targets, whose perspectives are well known. Opinions are informative about the target's perspective, so observed individuals become better understood over time. We identify a simple condition under which long‐run behavior is history independent. When this fails, each individual restricts attention to a small set of experts and observes the most informed among these. A broad range of observational patterns can arise with positive probability, including opinion leadership and information segregation. In an application to areas of expertise, we show how these mechanisms generate own field bias and large field dominance.     

Route vs. Segment: An Experiment on Real‐Time Travel Information in Congestible Networks

We report the results of an experimental study of route choice in congestible networks with a common origin and common destination. In one condition, in each round of play network users independently committed themselves at the origin to a three‐segment route; in the other condition, they chose route segments sequentially at each network junction upon receiving en route information. At the end of each round, players received ex‐post complete information about the distribution of the route choices. Although the complexity of the network defies analysis by common users, traffic patterns in both conditions converged rapidly to the equilibrium solution. We account for the observed results by a Markov adaptive learning model postulating regret minimization and inertia. We find that subjects' learning behavior was similar across conditions, except that they exhibited more inertia in the condition with en route information.     

Enhancing Self‐Protective Behavior: Efficacy Beliefs and Peer Feedback in Risk Communication

In times of a high‐impact safety incident citizens may have a variety of sources available to help them cope with the situation. This research focuses on the interplay of efficacy information in risk communication messages and peer feedback, such as responses on social network sites (SNSs) in the context of a high‐impact risk on the intention to engage in self‐protective behavior. The study pitted high and low efficacy information messages against supporting and opposing peer feedback (N = 242). Results show a significant interaction effect between efficacy information in a news article and peer feedback from SNS messages on both the intention to engage in self‐protective behavior and levels of involvement. Participants who received the article with more efficacy information and also received supportive peer feedback via SNS messages were more likely to express higher levels of involvement and greater intentions to engage in protective behavior. When confronted with a low efficacious news article, the effect of peer feedback on these two variables was significantly stronger. Finally, implications for theory and government risk communication are discussed.     

Managing Supply Chain Execution: Monitoring Timeliness and Correctness via Individualized Trace Data

Improvements in information technologies provide new opportunities to control and improve business processes based on real‐time performance data. A class of data we call individualized trace data (ITD) identifies the real‐time status of individual entities as they move through execution processes, such as an individual product passing through a supply chain or a uniquely identified mortgage application going through an approval process. We develop a mathematical framework which we call the State‐Identity‐Time (SIT) Framework to represent and manipulate ITD at multiple levels of aggregation for different managerial purposes. Using this framework, we design a pair of generic quality measures—timeliness and correctness—for the progress of entities through a supply chain. The timeliness and correctness metrics provide behavioral visibility that can help managers to grasp the dynamics of supply chain behavior that is distinct from asset visibility such as inventory. We develop special quality control methods using this framework to address the issue of overreaction that is common among managers faced with a large volume of fast‐changing data. The SIT structure and its associated methods inform managers on if, when, and where to react. We illustrate our approach using simulations based on real RFID data from a Walmart RFID pilot project.     

Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis

The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice. The estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households, observed and unobserved characteristics of communities, and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures, as well as the self‐selection of households into communities of their choice. We estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the Boston Metropolitan Area. The empirical findings reject myopic voting models. More sophisticated voting models based on utility‐taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities.     

Confluence and Contours: Reflexive Management of Environmental Risk

Government institutions have responsibilities to distribute risk management funds meaningfully and to be accountable for their choices. We took a macro‐level sociological approach to understanding the role of government in managing environmental risks, and insights from micro‐level psychology to examine individual‐level risk‐related perceptions and beliefs. Survey data from 2,068 U.K. citizens showed that lay people's funding preferences were associated positively with beliefs about responsibility and trust, yet associations with perception varied depending on risk type. Moreover, there were risk‐specific differences in the funding preferences of the lay sample and 29 policymakers. A laboratory‐based study of 109 participants examined funding allocation in more detail through iterative presentation of expert information. Quantitative and qualitative data revealed a meso‐level framework comprising three types of decisionmakers who varied in their willingness to change funding allocation preferences following expert information: adaptors, responders, and resistors. This research highlights the relevance of integrated theoretical approaches to understanding the policy process, and the benefits of reflexive dialogue to managing environmental risks.     

Toward an Understanding of the Influence of Cultural Background and Domain Experience on the Effects of Risk‐Pricing Formats on Risk Perception

Risk‐information framing can be a powerful tool for aiding the communication of risk and improving decision making. However, little work has investigated the extent that these framing effects depend on the characteristics of the perceiver. In our study, we examine whether the effects of different risk‐pricing formats on risky choices are the same for all individuals, no matter their domain experience or cultural background, or whether there are interactions between these factors. Survey 1 revealed that three risk‐pricing formats of the same choice problem resulted in the same individuals making different risky choices (preference reversal), suggesting that risk perception was distorted by the risk‐pricing format manipulation. In Survey 2, the effects of the risk‐pricing formats were shown to differ by the participants’ cultural background (Asian vs. European) and the extent of their domain experience. The fact that there were no differences between the cultural or domain experience groups in their overall tendency to select riskier (cf. safer) choices indicates that risk behavior differences between groups are often closely linked to perceptual, rather than simply attitudinal, cognitive processes. The results demonstrate the complex, interactive cognitive processes that are used to encode risk information, involving the framing of the information and the cultural background and previous experiences of the individual. We conclude that it is important to consider the characteristics of the individual (e.g., culture, domain experience, etc.) when manipulating risk‐information framing with the aim of improving risk communication.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

You Have Been Framed! How Antecedents of Information Need Mediate the Effects of Risk Communication Messages

This study investigates the processes that mediate the effects of framing flood risks on people's information needs. Insight into the effects of risk frames is important for developing balanced risk communication that explains both risks and benefits of living near water. The research was inspired by the risk information seeking and processing model and related models. In a web‐based survey, respondents (n = 1,457) were randomly assigned to one of three communication frames or a control frame (experimental conditions). Each frame identically explained flood risk and additionally refined the message by emphasizing climate change, the quality of flood risk management, or the amenities of living near water. We tested the extent to which risk perceptions, trust, and affective responses mediate the framing effects on information need. As expected, the frames on average resulted in higher information need than the control frame. Attempts to lower fear appeal by stressing safety or amenities instead of climate change were marginally successful, a phenomenon that is known as a “negativity bias.” Framing effects were mediated by negative attributes (risk perception and negative affect) but not by positive attributes (trust and positive affect). This finding calls for theoretical refinement. Practically, communication messages will be more effective when they stimulate risk perceptions and evoke negative affect. However, arousal of fear may have unwanted side effects. For instance, fear arousal could lead to lower levels of trust in risk management among citizens. Regular monitoring of citizens’ attitudes is important to prevent extreme levels of distrust or cynicism.