教育投入与社会保障对城乡收入差距的联合影响

当前城乡收入差距扩大化趋势引起广泛关注。文章使用世代交叠模型研究公共教育和社会保障对收入分配的作用机制,在此基础上分析公共教育和社会保障对城乡收入差距的影响。研究发现,公共教育通过作用于教育投资、社会保障通过作用于有效家庭时间共同影响人力资本积累从而影响收入。一方面,数值模拟结果显示公共教育和社会保障的增加能够显著地增加收入;另一方面,结合中国城乡实际的实证研究结果显示,本应该起到调节和缩小城乡收入差距的公共教育和社会保障制度,并没有发挥其收入再分配的功能,反而形成了"逆向调节"的负效应,扩大了城乡收入差距,对此,文章通过理论与实证得出,缩小我国城乡人均教育投资和社会保障税率差距对缩小城乡收入差距具有重要的现实意义。     

On the political economy of social security and public education

This paper analyzes simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. The presence of ability differences introduces a time-consistency problem with repeated voting. This can be solved by trigger strategies, which do not punish upward deviations in the wage tax rate. If there are multiple equilibria, then higher tax rates are associated with more education. Surprisingly, the median voter may be a young citizen, even when cohorts are of the same size.

生育激励与个人所得税 ——理论逻辑与经验论据

中共十九大报告提出要进一步“促进生育政策和相关经济社会政策配套衔接”。在厘清税收激励生育的理论逻辑基础上,运用工资税模型,获取OECD国家对此的经验论据。结果显示,许多国家运用税收政策向有子女家庭提供正向激励,且更注重中低收入家庭。进一步分析发现,通常为符合资格条件的儿童设计相同的或递增的定额税收优惠,甚至为大规模家庭赋予额外优惠;将儿童税收宽免转化为抵免,引进收入限制和可退抵免制;单亲家庭可享受额外优惠,而已婚家庭还通过个人申报纳税、婚姻优惠、家庭申报纳税等多种举措受益。应汲取和借鉴OECD国家的成功经验,逐步构建我国“生育友好型”的税收制度。     

Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy

This paper studies the relationship between public education and pay-as-you-go social security in a representative democracy, where the government reacts both to voting and lobbying activities of workers and pensioners. While an intergenerational conflict prevails concerning actual social security contributions, workers may prefer public education for its positive effect on later pension benefits. Population aging diminishes the relative lobbying power of pensioners, leading to a higher contribution rate, educational expansion, and higher per capita income growth. Received: 05 April 1999/Accepted: 20 December 1999     

Reducing the excess burden of subsidizing the stork: joint taxation, individual taxation, and family tax splitting

Analyzing a homogenous household setting with endogenous fertility and endogenous labor supply, we demonstrate that moving from joint taxation to individual taxation and adapting child benefits so as to keep fertility constant entails a Pareto improvement. The change is associated with an increase in labor supply and consumption and a reduction of the marginal income tax, while the child benefit may move in either direction. Similarly, a move from joint taxation to some scheme of family tax splitting increases labor supply and welfare.     

Pay-as-you-go social security and endogenous fertility in a neoclassical growth model

This paper theoretically studies how unfunded pay-as-you-go social security affects economic growth, the fertility rate, and welfare in a neoclassical growth model. In addition, this paper considers a more general form of child-rearing cost, which is a mixture of time and money. The first observation is that whether the fertility rate increases or not by the expansion of the pay-as-you-go social security depends on (1) the size of the monetary child-rearing cost relative to the time spent on child-rearing and (2) the current fertility and interest rate in laissez faire. The second observation is that income per worker can increase by an expansion in pay-as-you-go social security when the output elasticity of capital is sufficiently small and the payroll tax rate is high. The last finding is that welfare can be improved even though capital is underaccumulated in an economy.     

Social security and fertility: An international perspective

A number of population scholars have asserted that social security programs such as old-age programs lead to decreased fertility levels because parents need not rely on children for "security" in old age. There is, however, a paucity of empirical data on the above. This paper analyzes 67 countries and shows that social security programs have a measurable negative effect on subsequent levels of fertility. In fact, the social security programs appear to have as much of an independent impact on fertility as do the traditional correlates of fertility (infant mortality, education and per capita income).     

How does social security affect economic growth? Evidence from cross-country data

This paper investigates how social security interacts with growth and growth determinants (savings, human capital investment, and fertility). Our empirical investigation finds that the estimated coefficient on social security is significantly negative in the fertility equation, insignificant in the saving equation, and significantly positive in the growth and education equations. By contrast, the estimated coefficient on growth is insignificant in the social security equation. The results suggest that social security may indeed be conducive to growth through tipping the trade-off between the number and quality of children toward the latter.All correspondence to Junsen Zhang. We would like to thank the editor, two anonymous referees, Jim Davies, Frank Denton, Se-Jik Kim, and Mike McAleer for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining omissions and errors are the authors responsibility. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

The marginal cost of public funds with an aging population

"As populations in the United States and other advanced economies grow older, the burden of social security and health care financing is expected to rise markedly. Payroll, income, and other taxes on working populations are projected to rise accordingly. The marginal welfare cost to workers of social security and other public expenditures is analyzed within the context of a two-period life cycle model. By relaxing separability assumptions that have become common in the literature, the theoretical structure properly incorporates the effect of these public expenditures on labor supply. Comparative statics results indicate that changing age structure is likely to raise the marginal welfare to workers of social security, education, and other public expenditures. Illustrative calculations for the United States confirm this result, suggesting that the cost to workers of incremental social security benefits may easily double by 2025-2050."     

Private versus public old-age security

We directly compare two institutions, a family compact—a parent makes a transfer to her parent in anticipation of a possible future gift from her children—with a pay-as-you-go, public pension system, in a life cycle model with endogenous fertility wherein children are valued both as consumption and investment goods. Absent intragenerational heterogeneity, we show that a benevolent government has no welfare justification for introducing public pensions alongside thriving family compacts since the former is associated with inefficiently low fertility. This result hinges critically on a fiscal externality—the inability of middle age agents to internalize the impact of their fertility decisions on old-age transfers under a public pension system. With homogeneous agents, a strong-enough negative aggregate shock to middle-age incomes destroys all family compacts, and in such a setting, an optimal public pension system cannot enter. This suggests the raison d’être for social security must lie outside of its function as a pension system—specifically its redistributive function which emerges with heterogeneous agents. In a simple modification of our benchmark model—one that allows for idiosyncratic frictions to compact formation such as differences in infertility/mating status—a welfare-enhancing role for a public pension system emerges; such systems may flourish even when family compacts cannot.     

On social security financial crisis

We indicate that financial crisis in social security programs might be endogenous because social security affects fertility and human capital's decisions and thus, the aggregate growth rate of the economy. These effects lead to an endogenous erosion of the financial basis of the PAYG social security program so that, as a consequence, the PAYG system is not sustainable and it requires continuous increases in the social security tax rate. I received helpful comments in an earlier version of this paper from G.S. Becker, Larry Sjaastad, two anonymous referees and participants at seminars at Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and The University of Chicago. Remaining errors are my own responsibility. Responsible editor: Junsen Zhang.     

Social security,social welfare and the aging population

This study examines the effects of pay-as-you-go social security programs in aging economies when the middle-aged both educate their dependent children and subsidize the retirement of the old. Using an overlapping generations framework in which agents are three-period lived but timing of death in the third period is uncertain, we analyze the effects of social security tax schemes, under various demographic assumptions, on capital accumulation, education expenditures, social welfare, and economic growth. We find that in many cases social security crowds out education, and reduces economic growth and social welfare. Received: 29 April 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999     

Effects of capital taxation on economies with different demographic changes: short term versus long term

We examine the effect of source-based capital taxation on capital accumulation in countries with endogenous fertility and free international capital mobility. When fertility is constant, a tax cut accelerates domestic capital accumulation through international arbitrage and exerts negative influences on the welfare of a foreign country. In contrast, with endogenous fertility, a tax cut by an economy with a higher tax rate and exporting capital may deter capital accumulation and hence lower the welfare in not only domestic but also foreign economies in the long term, although the tax cut may accelerate domestic capital accumulation in the short term.     

基层民主自治进程中乡村计划生育政策落实的困境及出路——基于基层治理中“不出事逻辑”的分析视角

本文对基层民主自治进程中乡村计划生育政策落实的困境及出路进行了探讨。基层民主自治是我国的一项基本政治制度,实行基层民主自治是发展中国特色社会主义民主政治的重要内容。但是在乡村推行基层民主自治的过程中,乡村计划生育政策的落实陷入一些困境,这些困境集中表现为计生政策与村民生育愿望、与村委会选举、与社会保障体系、与利益导向机制及与其它相关部门和政策的冲突与矛盾。鉴于此,本文相对应地提出了加强宣传教育、完善村民自治、健全社会保障体系、健全舆论导向机制以及加强政策的同向性与协调度等对策建议,以期推动计划生育政策在乡村进一步落实。     

A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits, and its impact on factor prices. I then focus on the impact of implementing a social security system on the equilibrium levels of education funding and on welfare. I find that although in the benchmark economy, the presence of social security might generate support for public funding of education, its overall effect on the well-being of individuals is negative for any level of social security taxation.

The Pronatalist Undercurrent of the $500-per-Child Tax Credit

A review of studies which find a positive impact of tax structure on American fertility suggests this effect will increase with the tax benefits legislated by the 1997 $500-per-child tax credit. The tax credit also resembles pronatalist family allowances in other developed countries. First, however, the article investigates the intent of the tax credit, showing that key supporters hope it will increase fertility among tax-paying Americans. Lastly, the pronatalist undercurrent of the tax credit suggests that future efforts will push for further increasing the tax benefits of children in order to increase the American birth rate.     

Fertility, child care outside the home, and pay-as-you-go social security

We examine the long-run effects of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security scheme on fertility and welfare of individuals in an overlapping generations model, assuming that child-care services are available in the market. We show that the impact of a tax increase on fertility depends on the relative magnitudes of the standard intergenerational redistribution effect through the social security system, the (implicit) subsidy effect through tax-exemption of child rearing at home, and the price effect through changes in the relative price of market child care, and that if parental child-rearing time is inelastic, a tax cut could bring about a Pareto-improving allocation.

An attempt at evaluation of the economic and social factors [influencing] the Polish population's fertility formation

This analysis of economic determinants of fertility in Poland shows that couples' fertility decisions are negatively influenced by factors affecting family income. Social and demographic factors were found to be unrelated to fertility. 17 socioeconomic measures were grouped as those expressing the level of economic development and determining family income size, those reflecting the level of socioeconomic development and determining the level of children's education, and those characterizing the level of social development and determining the need for health care and social security. The level of actual fertility is modeled as a linear function of variables in a main components factor analysis. Average monthly pay in the national economy (37.6%), the sold industrial production per person (13.8%), and the global agricultural production per person (13.2%) account for 64.6% of the variance. Among the social factors, findings indicate that a higher feeling of security is related to lower fertility, but economic factors have a stronger influence. Voivodeships are grouped as having low levels of economic development (24), as having high educational levels (24), and as having low levels of social security (24). Voivodeships with low levels of economic development and high parity include all the grouped voivodeships with the exception of three. Low-security voivodeships showed mixed patterns of fertility. High-education voivodeships showed a weak correlation with high fertility. Only three voivodeships have low economic and security factors and high education factors, and only one voivodeship has high fertility. Of the three voivodeships with high security and economic factors and low education factors, all have low parity.     

The Optimal Trade-Off Between Quality and Quantity with Unknown Number of Survivors

In a model of endogenous fertility where individuals know the probability of child survival but not the final number of survivors, parents do not always formulate a precautionary demand for children. For some utility functions, parents have fewer children than what they would have in a situation in which the number of survivors is known earlier. The properties of the optimal economic policy depend on the degree to which the social welfare function takes ignorance into account. If social welfare is evaluated after parents know how many children survived, the parental response to uncertainty is socially inefficient. Individual decisions then should be corrected through tax or transfer on both births and education. This property helps determine the optimal public response to mortality crisis in the presence of educational externalities.     

Population growth and social security financing

By allowing the population growth to be flexible, this paper analyzes the effect of a tax reform that involves an introduction of consumption taxation for social security financing. It is found that population growth and labor supply play an important role in determining the effect of the tax reform. If population growth and labor supply are exogenous, then an introduction of a consumption tax for social security financing, with the payroll tax rate being endogenous, decreases the interest rate and increases capital accumulation. However, if population growth and labor supply are endogenous, then an introduction of a consumption tax for social security financing increases the interest rate and reduces capital accumulation. Received: 26 February 2001/Accepted: 26 August 2001