Assessing the Predictive Value of Fertility Expectations Through a Cognitive–Social Model

This paper grounds its analysis in a novel model (Bachrach and Morgan in Popul Dev Rev, 39:459–485, 2013) that suggests that responses to questions about fertility intentions may reflect distinct phenomena at distinct points in the life course. The model suggests that women form "true" intentions when their circumstances make the issue of childbearing salient and urgent enough to draw the cognitive resources needed to make a conscious plan; before this, women report intentions based on cognitive images of family and self. We test the implications of this model for reported fertility expectations using NLSY79 data that measure expectations throughout the life course. We find that early in the life course, before marriage and parenthood, women’s fertility expectations are associated with family background and cognitive images of family and future self. Later in the life course, as women experience life course transitions that confer statuses normatively associated with childbearing—such as marriage—and parenthood itself, their reported expectations are better predictors of their fertility than before they passed these life course milestones. Our empirical results provide support for a model which has important implications for both the measurement and conceptualization of women’s intended and expected fertility.     

The Correspondence Between Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the United States

Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we describe the correspondence between intended family size and observed fertility for US men and women in the 1957–64 birth cohorts. Mean fertility intentions calculated from reports given in the mid‐20s modestly overstate completed fertility. But discrepancies between stated intent and actual fertility are common—the stated intent at age 24 (for both women and men) is more likely to miss than to match completed fertility. We focus on factors that predict which women and men will have fewer or more children than intended. Consistent with life‐course arguments, those unmarried, childless, or (for women) still in school at approximately age 24 were most likely to underachieve their intended parity (i.e., had fewer children than intended at age 24). We discuss how such discrepancies between intentions and behavior may cumulate to produce sizable cross‐group fertility differences.     

Intention and uncertainty at later stages of childbearing: the united states 1965 and 1970

While births may be dichotomous, fertility intentions are not inherently so. Intentions are predictions about the future and, as such, are couched in considerable uncertainty. Ignoring this uncertainty hides much of what could be learned from data on fertility intentions. This paper presents a model which allows analysis of the full range of intentions. After selecting a sample of women in the later stage of childbearing (e.g., those who intend fewer than two additional children) from the 1965and 1970 National Fertility Studies, it is shown that: (1) substantial portions of women at this stage of the reproductive life cycle were indeed uncertain of their parity-specific intention; (2) this certainty, like more firm intentions, varies by age and parity as the model predicts; and (3) there were significant shifts in the level of certainty between 1965 and 1970. Specifically, while intentions for third, fourth, and fifth births declined, more women “didn’t know” if they intended to have another child or not. Among those not intending another child, more seemed uncertain of this intention in 1970 than did comparable women in 1965. In contrast, those intending another child seemed more certain. These changes in intention and uncertainty indicate that the observed decline in intended parity was tentative. Post-1970 evidence suggests that this tentative decline has become an unequivocal one.     

Missing the Target? Correspondence of Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the U.S.

Building on a framework suggested by Bongaarts (2001)and using data from the 1979 National LongitudinalSurvey of Youth, we describe the correspondencebetween intended family size and observed fertilityfor the 1957 to 1961 birth cohorts of U.S. women andmen. Over an 18-year period (1982–2000), we showthat while aggregate intentions are quite stable,discrepancies are very common at the individual level.Women and men were more likely to err in predictingnumber of additional births in the period 1982–2000 thanto hit their target number. A very strong predictor of over-and underachieving fertility is initial intended parity. Thosewho intended more than two children tended to have fewerchildren than intended, while those who intended fewer thantwo children tended to have more children than intended. Inaddition and consistent with life course arguments, thoseunmarried in 1982, childless in 1982, and (for women) stillin school in 1982 were most likely to underachieve their 2000intended parity (i.e., have fewer children than intended). Weconclude by reflecting on how the circumstances that allowdiscrepancies between intentions and behavior to almost``balance'' in the U.S. may cumulate differently elsewhere toproduce much lower fertility.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

The Effect of Couple Disagreement about Child‐Timing Intentions: A Parity‐Specific Approach

Using couple data from a longitudinal study conducted in Italy, a country with persistently low fertility levels, we examined the effect of partners' discrepant child‐timing intentions on reproductive behavior. We found that the effect of couple disagreement on subsequent fertility is parity‐specific and does not depend on whether only the male or the female partner intends to have a(nother) child. The disagreement tends to produce an intermediate childbearing outcome at parities zero and one, while the outcome is shifted more toward agreement on not having a(nother) child at parity two. The empirical evidence suggests that gender equality in reproductive decisionmaking is not driven by partners' equal bargaining power or partners' equal access to economic resources. The findings indicate that the predictive power of child‐timing intentions strongly improves if both partners' views are considered in fertility models, and thus support the adoption of couple analysis in fertility research.     

Economic Insecurity and the Fertility Intentions of Italian Women with One Child

The present study addresses the issue of economic insecurity and its relationship with the reproductive plans of 5,358 Italian women in couples who have recently had their first child. Data were sourced from the ISTAT Sample Survey on Births, 2005 edition. This article’s originality lies in the conceptualization of economic insecurity and the investigation of its effects on fertility intentions. We propose to capture economic insecurity by considering both the insecurity associated to the two partners’ employment status and a variety of aspects that contribute to the household’s ability to cope with possible unpredictable future events. Then, we investigate whether and how economic insecurity shapes the fertility intentions of women over their entire reproductive life span. With specific respect to women who intend to have one additional child only, we also observe the effect of economic insecurity on their intention to give birth sooner (i.e., within the next 3 years) or later. Our data show the existence of a critical factor in the passage from the generic fertility intentions to the contingent plan to have a child in the next 3 years: only half of women with one child who intend to follow the two-child family model feel ready to plan to have a second child in the next 3 years. The study also reinforces an argument that is frequently made: fertility intentions over the entire lifetime are less conditioned upon contingent constraints, and are often more closely related to individual traits and/or preferences.     

Sex of Previous Children and Intentions for Further Births in the United States, 1965-1976

The research reported herein, using samples of women interviewed in the 1965 and 1970 National Fertility Studies and the 1976 National Survey of Family Growth, shows that the sex of women’s previous children has an effect on their subsequent fertility intentions which differs at each parity. The persistence of that effect among women with two children in particular argues strongly for including sex of previous children as an independent variable in models of fertility intentions, since the decline in family size norms makes factors which affect the decision to have (or not have) a third child increasingly important.     

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below. An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’ Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’ In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4. Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959. The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.     

Can we study the family environment through census data? A comparison of households,dwellings, and domestic units in rural Mali

Are ‘statistical households’, as defined in national censuses, able to describe the family environment in Africa? Do they correspond to the family units that individuals identify with? To address this issue, we build on a follow-up survey in south-east Mali, which links national censuses with local censuses at the individual level (N?≈?28,000 census observations). Three cross-sectional snapshots of family arrangements are compared: households recorded in national censuses, and family economic units and residential units recorded by local censuses. The national census household data appear poorly suited to documenting family living arrangements. They do not account for family economic units or residential units, but are highly conditioned by a normative representation centred on the nuclear family. Therefore, they fail to describe the complexity and diversity of people’s living spaces, making particular types of living arrangements invisible and increasing the likelihood of omitting individuals who do not fit into a nuclear model.     

Did Australia’s Baby Bonus Increase Fertility Intentions and Births?

In May 2004, the Australian government announced a “Baby Bonus” policy, paying women an initial A$3,000 per new child. We use household panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (N = 14,932) and a simultaneous equations approach to analyze the effects of this bonus on fertility intentions and ultimately births. The results indicate that opportunity costs influence intentions and births in predictable ways. Fertility intentions rose after the announcement of the Baby Bonus, and the birth rate is estimated to have risen modestly as a result. The marginal cost to the government for an additional birth is estimated to be at least A$3,000 per new child. We use household panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (N = 14,932) and a simultaneous equations approach to analyze the effects of this bonus on fertility intentions and ultimately births. The results indicate that opportunity costs influence intentions and births in predictable ways. Fertility intentions rose after the announcement of the Baby Bonus, and the birth rate is estimated to have risen modestly as a result. The marginal cost to the government for an additional birth is estimated to be at least A126,000.     

The Emergence of Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe During the 1990s

Lowest‐low fertility, defined as a period total fertility rate at or below 1.3, has rapidly spread in Europe during the 1990s. This article traces the emergence of this new phenomenon to the interaction of five factors. First, tempo and compositional distortions reduce the total fertility rate below the associated level of cohort fertility. Second, socioeconomic changes—including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood—have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals and couples. Third, social interaction effects reinforce this behavioral adjustment and contribute to large and persistent postponement in the mean age at birth. Fourth, institutional settings favor an overall low quantum of fertility. Fifth, postponement–quantum interactions amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when combined with ongoing delays of child‐bearing. The article concludes with speculations about future trends in current and prospective lowest‐low‐fertility countries.     

The impact of childhood mortality on Fertility in six rural Thanas of Bangladesh

In this article, we examine the relationship between child mortality and subsequent fertility using prospective longitudinal data on births and childhood deaths occurring to nearly 8000 Bangladeshi mothers observed over the 1982-1993 period, a time of rapid fertility decline. Generalized hazard-regression analyses are employed to assess the effect of infant and child mortality on the hazard of conception, with controls for birth order and maternal age and educational attainment. Results show that childhood mortality reduces the time to subsequent conception if the death occurs within a given interval, representing the combined effect of biological and volitional replacement. The time to conception is also reduced if a childhood death occurs during a prior birth interval, a finding that signifies an effect of volitional replacement of the child that died. Moreover, mortality effects in prior birth intervals are consistent with hypothesized insurance (or hoarding) effects. Interaction of replacement with elapsed time suggests that the volitional impact of child mortality increases as the demographic transition progresses. This volitional effect interacts with sex of index child. Investigation of higher-order interactions suggests that this gender-replacement effect has not changed over time.     

The concept and measurement of child dependency: An approach to family formation analysis

Abstract Two distinctions appear crucial in the study of human fertility: (1) aggregate versus individuallevel analysis; and (2) true explanations versus 'demographic explanations', using Stinchcombe's terminology. Social demographers analysing fertility have been accustomed to using fertility measurements derived from aggregative population analyses, and have largely terminated their analytic efforts at the level of a 'demographic explanation'. The failure to arrive at a social analysis of the process of fertility decision-making may in part to be due to this measurement heritage, which may be inappropriate for individual-level analyses. As a first step in the direction of creating measurement suitable for such analyses, fertility decision-making is labelled as family formation decision-making, and this is linked to the concept of child dependency. Measures of child-years-of-dependency (CYD) are proposed for use in family formation analysis. These integrate current quantity and tempo measures, and have greater potential for use at the level ofthe family. They require no additional data beyond fertility histories, are flexible in terms of non-modal family situations (e.g. divorce, infant or child mortality) and may be indicators of criteria used by couples in planning their fertility. Refinements of the basic CYD measures are explored. These include analyses of average versus marginal costs of child-rearing, age gradients of costs and social class differentials in costs. All of these are intended to make CYD measures more useful in individual cost-benefit analyses of child-bearing and child-rearing.     

中国失独妇女总量、结构及变动趋势计算机仿真研究

在回顾以往对独生子女死亡和失独家庭研究的基础上，文章从基本概念、分析方法和关键研究问题等方面指出以往研究中存在的问题，提出终身失独概率估计方法和失独育龄妇女再生育可能性等，指出用独生子女死亡概念近似失独妇女，其结果有可能大大高估时期失独妇女的总量。由于受计划生育政策影响，中国育龄妇女二孩生育水平和生育模式发生巨大变化，将失独育龄妇女再生育看做是1－＞2递进生育也有可能高估失独妇女的总量。通过人口普查、抽样调查数据和计算机微观人口系统仿真分析技术，估计目前35岁及以上失独妇女数量在140万左右，2050年前中国时期失独妇女总量超过600万的可能性不大，失独家庭达到或超过1000万的可能性也不大。     

Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in a model of fertility choice

We examine the relationship between assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and the microeconomics of fertility choice. Along the way, we develop a model consistent with between-country differences in overall fertility and fertility timing. Our analysis of ART centers around the distinction between biomedical and behavioral effects. While improvements in ART have the biomedical effect of raising fertility, they may cause some women who would otherwise have tried to have children earlier on in life to postpone childbirth to later in life when the conception success probability is lower. This behavioral effect of postponement may reduce the fertility rate.     

Decent Living Standards: Material Prerequisites for Human Wellbeing

Children whose parents experience adverse social, economic, or health-related living conditions are more likely to face similar types of disadvantage in their adult life. However, a limitation of many earlier studies is that they do not account for the multidimensionality of the concept of living conditions, and that the child generation’s life courses are targeted as static and independent from the societal context in which they are imbedded. The current investigation addressed these aspects by focusing on the complexity, duration, and timing of disadvantage with regard to how adverse circumstances in the family of origin are associated with trajectories of social, economic, and health-related living conditions across adulthood. We also examined the role of educational attainment for these associations. Analyses were based a Swedish cohort born in 1953 (n = 14,294). We first conducted sequence analysis, followed by hierarchical cluster analysis, to generate ‘outcome profiles’, i.e. trajectories of adult disadvantage. Second, several indicators of adverse circumstances in childhood were analysed by means of multinominal regression analysis, showing the odds of ending up in the different trajectories. The results indicated that individuals who grew up under adverse conditions were more likely to experience disadvantaged social, economic, and health-related trajectories. This was particularly the case for trajectories characterised by a high degree of complexity, i.e. coexisting disadvantages, and—among men only—by a longer duration of disadvantage. Educational attainment was identified as a powerful mediator, suggesting that efforts to increase equal educational opportunity may be a way of reducing the intergenerational transmission of disadvantage.     

Intended and Ideal Family Size in the United States, 1970–2002

Cross‐nationally, observed fertility is well below mean levels of reported ideal family size and also usually well below survey respondents' fertility desires and intentions. The United States is an exception. In this article we: (1) discuss the importance of fertility ideals and intentions for understanding observed fertility levels, (2) propose a model that can account for variable attitude‐behavior consistency, and (3) use this model as a framework to examine trends in American women's fertility ideals, intentions, and actual fertility. Our study uses data from the General Social Surveys and the Current Population Surveys. We ask whether preferences and intentions for moderate family sizes have eroded with time. The answer is remarkably clear: the dominant American ideals and intentions are for two or three children, and these preferences have persisted across the last three decades. The unusual aggregate correspondence between fertility intentions and behavior in the United States is explained by an apparent offsetting of factors that increase/decrease fertility relative to intentions.     

Some aspects of the relationship between the levels of infant mortality and fertility in the ESCAP region

The death of a child within the first year of life is a crucial factor in fertility decisions in a developing country. The infant mortality rate gives a close, inverse indication of the socioeconomic conditions of a country. This paper presents studies by Brass, Rutherford, Chowdhury, Khan and Chen, Agrawal, Iskander and Jones, in summary/abstract form. It concludes that the probabilities of survival are poorer for births of older women and/or higher parities. Early child deaths may increase the total period of exposure to the risk of conception. A lower infant and child mortality norm calls for fewer births to meet the needs for survivors. Child replacement motivational response seems to be strongest with the birth immediately following a death event. Agrawal analyzed the interval between successive births of 1107 women of Patna, Pakistan, according to the age of mother and sex and fate of the previous child. He observed that if a child died shortly after its birth, often a new pregnancy began within a short interval. The interval between 2 consecutive live births when the previous child was male and alive was greater than when the previous child was female and alive. The interval between 2 births was reduced if the child died in infancy and specially if this was a male child.