墨家对于逻辑规律的研究

墨子是伟大的哲学家，科学家、逻辑学家和军事工程师．《墨经》是“世界最古名学之书”。其在中国和世界逻辑史上都占据着极其重要的地位。墨家对于逻辑学的三条规律进行了详尽的阐述，这些构成了墨家逻辑学之重要内容之一。墨家对于逻辑学规律的研究对中国逻辑史作出了极其重要的贡献，对于我们的逻辑思维也是富有启发性的。     

Bayesian decision theory,rule utilitarianism,and Arrow's impossibility theorem

The first part of this paper reexamines the logical foundations of Bayesian decision theory and argues that the Bayesian criterion of expected-utility maximization is the only decision criterion consistent with rationality. On the other hand, the Bayesian criterion, together with the Pareto optimality requirement, inescapably entails a utilitarian theory of morality. The next sections discuss the role both of cardinal utility and of cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility in ethics. It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework. Finally, rule utilitarianism is contrasted with act utilitarianism and judged to be preferable for the purposes of ethical theory.     

The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager??s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit??s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ??general logic?? built in this framework.     

逻辑方法演进的哲学思考

逻辑学经历了从传统到现代的演进过程,从亚里士多德创立演驿逻辑、培根批判亚氏逻辑提出归纳逻辑,到莱布尼兹肯定亚氏逻辑提出逻辑的数学形式的发展方向,预示着新的逻辑方法的形成.新逻辑方法的形成,对哲学方法产生了重大的指导作用.西方哲学史上的三次重大转换之一的"语言转向"就是借助于逻辑分析的方法,对传统哲学问题进行改造,它给当代哲学一种新的哲学研究方法,这种逻辑方法也是现实哲学研究的需要.     

Humor and Politics

The problem of the relationship between formal logic and philosophy, which arose when formal logic arose, continues to concern both Soviet and foreign philosophers and logicians. Interest in this problem is traceable to a number of factors, among which, it should be noted at the outset, is the appearance of dialectical, logic. With the emergence of dialectical logic, the question of the relationship of formal logic to philosophy is posed anew. No matter how we approach the question of the subject matter of dialectical logic, there is no doubt of the fact that, being logic, it is concerned with the investigation of philosophical problems. It follows that logic (or part of logic, some form of logic) is at the same time philosophy or, at least, a portion of philosophy.     

On the integration and development of psychology and logic within the framework of cognitive science

心理学研究感性认识形式，逻辑学研究理性认识形式。二者密切相关但却长期分离。认知科学的建立和发展，为心理学和逻辑学的交叉融合提供了科学依据和学科框架。在认知科学的框架下，逻辑学发生了本质的变化，产生了认知逻辑新的研究框架。在这个框架下，心理学与逻辑学交叉融合，产生了心理逻辑这一新兴学科。它认为逻辑推理受心理因素影响，是由人参与的、涉身的经验科学。认知逻辑开启了当代逻辑学发展的新时代，走上了作为多学科共同工具的广阔发展道路。认知科学的发展将带来一个学科综合交叉、问题引领科学研究、科学研究引领学科建设、人才全面发展的新时代。     

逻辑方法与哲学视野

逻辑方法曾囿于哲学视野之内 ,为哲学论证服务 ;外化于哲学视野的逻辑方法 ,发展成为哲学分析的有效工具 ;现代逻辑以特有的形式化分析方法 ,改变了哲学的发展方向。对哲学进行逻辑分析、对逻辑进行哲学反思 ,构成了 2 0世纪逻辑与哲学多姿多彩的发展图景     

Applications of pseudo-Boolean methods to economic problems

The use of Boolean algebra in logic, switching and automata theory, coding and other technically oriented areas is well known. The role of this paper is to show that Boolean algebra can be instrumental in taking economic decisions.By a pseudo-Boolean function, a real-valued function with bivalent (0–1) variables will be understood. The symbols 0 and 1 will stay both for their logical meaning and their arithmetical value.The basic problems which arise frequently in connection with pseudo-Boolean functions are: (1) solution of systems of equations and/or inequalities involving only pseudo-Boolean functions, (2) problems of determining the maximum or the minimum of a free pseudo-Boolean function, or of a pseudo-Boolean function whose variables are subject to constraints; (3) problems of finding the minimax or the maximin of a pseudo-Boolean function.The basic problems outlined above are exemplified on the case of a company wishing to locate a number of service stations, which - under different assumptions - lead to the above formulated models.Paper presented at the Meeting of the Econometric Society, Chicago, December 27–30, 1968.     

从社会运行的角度看《论法的精神》中的社会

至今,学界对孟德斯鸠《论法的精神》的阐释颇多。处于现代新时期的时间点上,解析著作中所隐含的社会概念,然后从社会运行的核心要素、社会运行的机制和社会运行的逻辑及推演原则四方面揭示著作中隐含的社会逻辑,从而条理化地透射出著作所隐含的社会的真正内涵,将著作的阐释开阔到一个全新的视角。     

The logic of preference reconsidered

Preferences are an important object of study in economic theory. Their logico-mathematical study has become prominent with the raise of modern decision theory and with the new conceptions of utility-functions and personalistic probabilities. The ‘basic logic’ at the foundation of the more advanced theories of preference, however, has been relatively little investigated. The pioneer work is Hallden's The Logic of ‘Better’ of the year 1957, followed by von Wright's The Logic of Preference in 1963. The topic has turned out unexpectedly problematic and there is as yet little consensus among logicians about the basic laws of preferring. A reason for this is apparently that there exist several concepts of preference which must be disentangled and kept apart in a logical theory. How this is to be done is discussed in the introductory sections (1–5) of the present paper. In Section 8 is sketched a logic for an asymmetric and connected preference-relation which holds between ‘possible worlds’ within a subject's ‘preference-horizon’ (Section 7). Preferences between states of affairs generally are called holistic when they hold ceteris paribus, i.e., when there is a corresponding preference-relation between any pairs of possible worlds which differ only in those two states and in no others. (Section 6.) Holistic preferences between states are asymmetrical and transitive but they do not form a linear preference order. (Section 9.) Failure to notice this, the author maintains, is responsible for much confusion in the traditional treatment of the subject. In the concluding sections (10–12) the author discusses the mutual relations of the value-absolutes, the good and the bad. Can they be defined in the terms of the relative notion of betterness or preference (and logical constants) alone? The definition which says that the goodness of a state is the holistic preference of it over its contradictory, answers the question affirmatively but conflicts with several deep-rooted axiological intuitions of ours. A more satisfying definition of the value-absolutes requires the additional notion of a value-less state (world) with which all the other states may be compared. In this connection some ideas of G. E. Moore about the notion of an ‘empty’ world can be interestingly exploited.     

Bounds to Memory Loss

If we express our knowledge in sentences, we will find that these sentences are linked in complex patterns governed by our observations and our inferences from these observations. These inferences are to a large extent driven by logical rules. We ask whether the structure logic imposes on our knowledge restricts what we forget and what we remember. The model is a two period S5 logic. In this logic, we propose a memory loss operator: the agent forgets a sentence pif and only if he knows pat time 1 and he does not know pat time 2. Equipped with the operator, we prove theorems on the relation between knowledge and memory loss. The main results point to classes of formulas that an agent cannot forget, and classes of formulas he must forget. A desirable feature is that most results hold in the S4 logic. The results illustrate bounds to memory loss, and thus to bounded rationality. We apply the model to single-agent conventions: conventions made between an agent and himself.     

The epistemic structure of a theory of a game

This paper is a contribution to the systematic study of alternative axiom-sets for theories of (normal-form, complete-information) games. It provides an introduction to epistemic logic, describes a formulation in epistemic logic of the structure of a theory of a game (the broad theory of that game), and applies methods of epistemic logic to define strategies for dealing with two disturbing features of game theory, its hyperrationality assumptions and its indeterminacy. The analysis of these problems is conducted in terms of two principles which impregnate much game theory, Cleverness and Cloisteredness (the principles that players know respectively all, and only, the logical consequences of their assumed knowledge). Broad theories allow us to formulate and revise these principles despite their metatheoretical character. It is shown how Cleverness may be weakened by using logics which restrict the Rule of Epistemization, and Cloisteredness by using default logic or autoepistemic logic; the latter is used to characterize Nash equilibrium beliefs as parts of certain autoepistemic extensions of players' knowledge bases, but these particular extensions are rejected as ungrounded.I am grateful for most helpful comments to Robin Cubitt, Joe Halpern, Ernest Geffner, Philippe Mongin, David Squires, Elias Thijsse and Tim Williamson.     

Towards a Lacanian Group Psychology: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trans‐subjective

Revisiting Lacan's discussion of the puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma provides a means of elaborating a theory of the trans‐subjective. An illustration of this dilemma provides the basis for two important arguments. Firstly, that we need to grasp a logical succession of modes of subjectivity: from subjectivity to inter‐subjectivity, and from inter‐subjectivity to a form of trans‐subjective social logic. The trans‐subjective, thus conceptualized, enables forms of social objectivity that transcend the level of (inter)subjectivity, and which play a crucial role in consolidating given societal groupings. The paper advances, secondly, that various declarative and symbolic activities are important non‐psychological bases—trans‐subjective foundations—for psychological identifications of an inter‐subjective sort. These assertions link interesting to recent developments in the contemporary social psychology of interobjectivity, which likewise emphasize a type of objectivity that plays an indispensible part in co‐ordinating human relations and understanding.     

Sophisticated voting under the plurality procedure: A test of a new definition

The Niemi-Frank definition of sophisticated voting can now be evaluated on two grounds. First, we can compare our definition to Farquharson's. For the most part, the two definitions yield identical outcomes. Both pickCondorcet winners a very high proportion of the time and prevent the selection of Condorcet losers. The major differences are in the logic underlying the two definitions and in the rate of determinacy of outcomes. Here there is a tradeoff. The logic underlying the Farquharson model is especially persuasive, although it is our feeling that the Niemi-Frank definition comes closer to mirroring the way in which voters might actually analyze a plurality situation. In any case, the price paid by the Farquharson definition for its ironclad logic is a much higher rate of indeterminacy. In over half of the cases, the Farquharson logic fails to lead to any conclusion whatsoever. The Niemi-Frank definition yields many more determinate situations, with mostly Condorcet winners and with strategies that make good, if not completely unassailable sense. A second way of evaluating the Niemi-Frank definition is in comparison with sincere voting. A commonly-cited shortcoming of plurality voting is that often fails to choose a Condorcet winner. As we notedearlier, sophisticated plurality voting, unlike binary voting, is imperfect in this respect. Nonetheless, even taking account of the indeterminacy thatremains in the Niemi-Frank definition, sophisticated voting picked a Condorcet winner about 10 percent more frequently than did sincere voting as well as eliminating the possibility of a Condorcet loser being chosen. By this measure, the Niemi-Frank definition is not only acceptable but suggests that this form of strategic behavior actually leads tobetter outcomes. By proposing and now by testing a new definition of sophisticated voting under plurality rule, we have begun to make some headway on understanding strategic behavior and its effects in an outwardly simple yet deceptively complex voting system. We are, of course, far from finished. Most significantly, our definition applies to only three alternatives, and Farquharson's (even if one is willing to live with its high indeterminacy) becomes extraordinarily cumbersome with more than three alternatives? In any event, the results of this foray into sophisticated nonbinary voting suggests once again that strategic behavior, rather than making things worse, improves the chances that the outcome will be the one most favored by the majority criterion.     

The word ‘variable’ in logic,mathematics and economics

The paper deals with the meaning of the word variable as used by various authors in various disciplines. In the first part of his article the author explains the synonyms used for this word such as indefinite numbers, mappings or concepts. He further discusses the meaning of variables and unknowns as applied in modern logic and traditional mathematics. In economic models the variable is inseparably linked to the economic quantity by which it is characterized and interpreted. Distinctions are made between endogenous and exogenous variables and between a variable and its time path.The author is indebted to Tor Fernholm for valuable comments on a preliminary draft.     

论理性与非理性的原始统一

在原始精神和原始思维中 ,非理性先于理性、非逻辑思维先于逻辑思维而产生。在漫长的历史长河中 ,它们浑沌地统一在一起 ,这其中非理性在人类早期精神和思维的进化中发挥了十分重要的作用 ,成为理性及逻辑思维产生的前提和基础。原始社会后期及文明社会初期 ,伴随着语言的产生和工具的使用 ,原始思维中的逻辑思维逐渐产生并从浑沌中分化出来 ,使人类的认识和思维的发展有了本质的飞跃 ,但这并不意味着非理性的消亡 ,相反它标志着非理性从人的本能意识发展成为一种非逻辑的认识的表现形式 ,即思维的一种表现形式 ,从而使人类的自我意识具有了本能与理性的双重结构 ,同时也说明人的非理性的作用领域和形式发生了变化 ,非理性不再独立地存在 ,它作为理性的补充形式 ,在理性及逻辑思维的基础上发挥着作用 ,这表明理性与非理性在更高的层次上获得统一     

Won't You Be My Neighbor? Norms of Cooperation,Public Broadcasting,and the Collective Action Problem*

Objectives. The logic of collective action suggests that public broadcasting stations should not receive the empirically observed level of member support they do. Why do people contribute to public television when they can view it without contributing? Methods. The hypothesis tested is that “norms of cooperation” govern the behavior of individuals in collective action situations. This article tests the hypothesis with an original survey of public television viewers in three large communities. Results. The survey data provide support for the “norms of cooperation” hypothesis. The higher the level of characteristics of an individual that measure cooperation, the more likely the individual is to give to public broadcasting, all other factors being equal. Conclusions. Norms of cooperation—an important part of social capital—help overcome the logic of collective action where it concerns public television contributions.     

试论墨家对矛盾律排中律表述问题

人们对墨家关于矛盾律排中律的表述持有不同的学术观点。而墨家的逻辑体系的确揭示了矛盾律排中律在人们的思维实践中相互依存的规律。并且墨家对矛盾律排中律的表述具有合理性、科学性。我国古代墨家的逻辑观点,虽经历时代的不断演进,仍对后世学习研究并完善我国的逻辑学理论产生深远影响。     

Social psychology and neoliberalism: A critical commentary on McDonald,Gough, Wearing,and Deville (2017)

McDonald, Gough, Wearing, and Deville (2017) call for the discipline of social psychology to investigate issues of neoliberalism, consumption and self‐identity more seriously. We make two contributions in relation to their analysis. First, we highlight some current issues associated with neoliberalism as a concept that leave us in doubt regarding the analytical usefulness of the term. Due to its imprecision and over‐extension, predominant association with the left who use it pejoratively, and altered economic circumstances, we are increasingly skeptical of neoliberalism's analytical validity to social psychology. Second, we also stress the importance of interdisciplinarity, but suggest that empirical insights from mainstream social psychology have much to offer social scientists concerned with how current economic developments impact upon self‐identity and social behaviour. We conclude by pointing out that a greater openness to heterodoxy within and between critical and mainstream strands and the wider social sciences are required if social psychologists are going to make more persuasive impacts to the study and resistance of market logic.     

Modesty can promote trust: Evidence from China

When people let others know about their accomplishments, they can improve their social standing, but doing so may also have a cost, especially within social environments in which there is great emphasis on the value of modesty. One particular downside of self‐promotion, the risk of being seen as untrustworthy, was examined among children in China. Across three studies, children ranging in age from 7 to 11 years (total N = 251) judged the trustworthiness of protagonists who exhibited either modesty or immodesty. In Study 1, protagonists who told lies in the service of modesty were judged as more trustworthy than those who told lies to avoid getting into trouble. In Study 2, protagonists who demonstrated modesty were rated as trustworthy, but those who demonstrated immodesty were not. Study 3 showed that the positive implications of modesty for trust are specific to downplaying one’s own accomplishments and do not extend to downplaying the accomplishments of a peer. Taken together, the results suggest that for children in China, the level of modesty serves as a cue about which people can be trusted.