The Census Bureau on Prospects for US Population Growth in the Twenty‐First Century

The U.S. Census Bureau periodically releases projections of the US resident population, detailed by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. The most recent of these, issued 13 January 2000, for the first time extend to the year 2100 and also include information on the foreign‐bom population. (Earlier projections were carried up to 2080.) The extensive tabulations presenting the new set, and detailed explanation of the methodology and the assumptions underlying the projections, are accessible at the Census Bureau's web site: http://www.census.gov . A brief summary of some of the main results of these projections is reproduced below from United States Department of Commerce News, Washington, DC 20230. (The Census Bureau is an agency of the Department of Commerce.) Uncertainties as to future trends in fertility, mortality, and net migration over a period of some 100 years are very great, as is illustrated by the massive difference in the projected size of the population for 2100 in the three variants produced. The “middle” projected population figure of 571 million (which represents a growth of some 109 percent over its current level) is bracketed by “lowest” and “highest” alternative projections of 283 million and 1.18 billion, respectively. With somewhat lesser force, the point also applies to the 50‐year time span considered in the well‐known country‐by‐country projections of the United Nations. These projections are also detailed in three variants: low, middle, and high. The UN projections (last revised in 1998) envisage less rapid growth in the United States during the first part of the twenty‐first century than do the Census Bureau's. The projected population figures for 2050 in the three variants (low, middle, and high) are as follows (in millions):

Recent net alien immigration to the United States: Its impact on population growth and native fertility

Estimates of the size and structure of recent alien immigration to the United States are made. Substituting these revised estimates in the Series II projections of the U.S. Bureau of the Census implies a future U.S. population smaller than that implied by the Census Bureau’s estimates of immigration. The analysis of Coale (1972)—which calculates the decline in native-born fertility required to accommodate immigration and, at the same time, maintain a stationary population—is replicated, using both the Census Bureau’s estimates and the revised estimates reported here. The revised estimates indicate a smaller reduction in native fertility and a smaller ultimate size of the stationary population than are implied by the Census Bureau’s immigration estimates. The importance of age structure in all of these calculations is demonstrated.     

U.S. Bureau of the Census: facing the future labor shortage

"This article begins with a brief overview of the [U.S.] Census Bureau's preparations for the future, then discusses the demographic and social changes that are affecting the national labor force, from which the Census Bureau hires its workers. The final section considers how the bureau and its mission are affected by these changes."     

Diverging Demography: Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Contributions to U.S. Population Redistribution and Diversity

The substantial growth and geographic dispersion of Hispanics is among the most important demographic trends in recent U.S. demographic history. Our county-level study examines how widespread Hispanic natural increase and net migration has combined with the demographic change among non-Hispanics to produce an increasingly diverse population. This paper uses U.S. Census Bureau data and special tabulations of race/ethnic specific births and deaths from NCHS to highlight the demographic role of Hispanics as an engine of new county population growth and ethnoracial diversity across the U.S. landscape. It highlights key demographic processes—natural increase and net migration—that accounted for 1990–2010 changes in the absolute and relative sizes of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations. Hispanics accounted for the majority of all U.S. population growth between 2000 and 2010. Yet, Hispanics represented only 16 % of the U.S. population in 2010. Most previous research has focused on Hispanic immigration; here, we examine how natural increase and net migration among both the Hispanic and non-Hispanic population contribute to the nation’s growing diversity. Indeed, the demographic impact of rapid Hispanic growth has been reinforced by minimal white population growth due to low fertility, fewer women of reproductive age and growing mortality among the aging white population America’s burgeoning Hispanic population has left a large demographic footprint that is magnified by low and declining fertility and increasing mortality among America’s aging non-Hispanic population.     

U.S. population: where we are; where we're going

This Bulletin reviews recent trends in the dynamics and character of the U.S. population, the outlook for the remainder of the 1980s, and prospects for longterm growth. Estimated at 232 million as of mid-1982, the U.S. population is currently growing at about 1% a year, one of the developed world's highest growth rates. Natural increase (births-deaths) still adds some 1.7 million people a year, despite the rapid postbaby boom fall in fertility to a near-record low rate of 1.9 births/woman in 1981. With increasing numbers of refugees, net legal immigration averaged 600,000/year in 1979-81 and the net inflow of illegal immigrants may now be 500,000 a year. Uncertainty over potentially large numbers of immigrants complicates projections of future U.S. population size. Currently, the U.S. death rate is at an alltime low. More than 1/2 the population now resides in the South and West. Rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas in the 1970s for the 1st time in over a century. Educational attainment is at an alltime high, as is labor force participation, due to increasing employment among women and the baby boom generation's arrival at working ages. The age composition of the population, with the bulge of the baby boom generation surrounded by the older "depression" generation born during the 1930s and the younger "baby bust" generation born since the end of the 1960s, presents special problems for U.S. society.     

U.S. population in the 21st century: Which scenario is reasonable?

A major Census Bureau study released in January 1989 has evoked renewed warnings in the media and among some population analysts that the U.S. faces population decline in the next century if it does not increase fertility and/or raise immigration. The report's middle scenario rests on an assumed future total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8, life expectancy of 81.2 years, and net immigration of 500,000 annually. These mid-range assumptions would yield a United States population of 268 million by 2000, peaking at 302 million in 2040 and falling to 292 million by 2080. Questionable assumptions in the report's most likely scenario are discussed. These are:

1. that immigrants bear children at the same rate as their equivalent age and racial group in the United States population.
2. that the high TFR of Hispanics will not raise the overall 1.8 TFR foreseen for whites as the Hispanic proportion of the white population continues to grow.
3. that net yearly immigration will fall to 575,000 in 1990 and 500,000 by 2000. The Census Bureau's "high" assumption of 800,000 net yearly may be more realistic.

The report's low growth scenario projects future population size that is more reassuring than alarming: 264 million in 2000, rising to 288 million in 2030, and falling to 266 million in 2080. Thus, in ninety years the United States would still have 20 million more people than now. While some fear that such slow growth will lower United States influence and bring labor shortages and an aging population, the nation's quality of life would be less at risk with a population of 266 million than with one approaching the one-half billion projected by the Census report's high estimates.     

The Environmental Impact of Immigration: An Analysis of the Effects of Immigrant Concentration on Air Pollution Levels

Despite growing interest in the impact of immigration on U.S. society, research has rarely examined the effects of immigration flows on the natural environment. The current study addresses this gap in research using data on 183 Metropolitan Statistical Areas drawn from the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to empirically assess the relationships between contemporary immigration and seven measures of air pollution. In doing so, we seek to (1) broaden knowledge about the social consequences of immigration to include its potential effects on the environment, (2) address competing theoretical perspectives about immigration-environment relationships (i.e., population pressure/social disorganization versus ecological footprint/community resource perspectives), and (3) extend knowledge about the predictors and sources of environmental harm within local communities. In contrast to popular opinion and population pressure positions, our research indicates that immigration does not contribute to local air pollution levels across any of the seven pollution measures examined.     

State-Level 2010 Census Coverage Rates for Young Children

The Census Bureau’s demographic analysis (DA) shows that the net undercount rate for children aged 0–4 was 4.6 percent in the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census while adults (age 18 and older) had a net overcount rate of 0.7 percent. For the population aged 0–4, DA estimates are seen as more accurate than the U.S. Decennial Census because the estimates for this young population rely heavily on highly accurate birth certificate data. Given the relatively high net undercount rate for young children, it would be useful to examine census coverage rates for this population in subnational geographic units. In this study, the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census counts of children aged 0–4 are compared to the corresponding figures from the Census Bureau’s Vintage 2010 Population Estimates in each state. Differences between the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census count and the Vintage 2010 Population Estimates for the population aged 0–4 range from an estimated net undercount of 10.2 percent in Arizona to an estimated net overcount of 2.1 percent in North Dakota. Larger states tended to have higher net undercounts than smaller states. The ten largest states account for about 70 percent of the national net undercount of the population aged 0–4. Of all the factors examined here, the relative size of the Blacks Alone or in Combination plus Hispanics population is most highly correlated with the estimated net undercount of the population aged 0–4. Other measures that were highly correlated with net undercount rates for the population aged 0–4 were linguistic isolation, percent of adults without a high school degree, and the unemployment rate. In general, characteristics of people are more highly correlated with the net undercount rates of young children than the characteristics of housing units.     

A Church-Based Sampling Design for Research with Latina Immigrant Women

The U.S. is experiencing its highest immigration rate since the 1930s. The largest proportion of immigrants comes from Latin America, and women constitute a large and growing fraction of this group. Although our knowledge of the relationship between migration and women’s health is increasing, research in this area is still needed, particularly in areas experiencing rapid changes in their Latino populations. Yet research is impeded by the absence of an adequate sampling frame: Latina immigrants remain a largely hidden population. This study tests in four North Carolina counties a church-based sampling frame for Latina immigrant women in their reproductive years. In the study area, on an average week, 20% of the Spanish-speaking population attends church (two-thirds are Catholic). Compared against Census data for the study area, the study sample (n = 706) provided a comparable representation of different national origins. New entrants to the U.S. and married women were overrepresented in the church-based sample. The young (under age 30), and women at the lowest and highest extremes of educational attainment were underrepresented in churches. While a church-based sample is not entirely comparable to the Census, churches can provide timely and cost-effective access to a rapidly changing population of new immigrants. Church-based research should be complemented with research in other settings, adjusting sampling weights for overlap between sampling frames.     

U.S. Family Household Momentum and Dynamics: An Extension and Application of the ProFamy Method

The classic headship-rate method for demographic projections of households is not linked to demographic rates, projects a few household types without size, and does not deal with household members other than heads. By comparison, the ProFamy method uses demographic rates as input and projects more detailed household types, sizes, and living arrangements for all members of the population. Tests of projections from 1990 to 2000 using ProFamy and based on observed U.S. demographic rates before 1991 show that discrepancies between our projections and census observations in 2000 are reasonably small, validating the new method. Using data from national surveys and vital statistics, census microfiles, and the ProFamy method, we prepare projections of U.S. households from 2000 to 2050. Medium projections as well as projections based on smaller and larger family scenarios with corresponding combinations of assumptions of marriage/union formation and dissolution, fertility, mortality, and international migration are performed to analyze future trends of U.S. households and their possible higher and lower bounds, as well as enormous racial differentials. To our knowledge, the household projections reported in this article are the first to have found empirical evidence of family household momentum and to have provided informative low and high bounds of various indices of projected future households and living arrangements distributions based on possible changes in demographic parameters.     

Assessing state population projections with transparent multiregional demographic models

Population projection models that are conceptually simple enough to be called transparent may be used to check the validity of projections generated by black box models whose behavior may be somewhat shrouded in mystery. This paper adopts a multiregional demographic model to illustrate how such a validation procedure might be carried out on state population projections produced by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1988.     

Development and accuracy of projections of population and households in the united states

The history of the official U. S. projections of population and house-holds in recent decades is briefly reviewed, with particular attention to methodology and the relation of the methodology to the accuracy of the projections. The introduction of the cohort-component procedure in the 1930’s opened the way for separate analysis of the trend of the components of births, deaths, and net immigration in connection with making population projections. As a further development, the period-fertility method of projecting births gave way in the 1960’s to the cohort-fertility method. Consideration is now being given to various methods involving parity-progression procedures. Some alternative methods and problems of measuring the accuracy of population projections are then considered. The percent “error” in the projected population growth, by components and age, and the range from high to low expressed as a percent should also be examined in addition to the percent “error” in the total population. However accuracy is measured, the projections made in the 1930’s and 1940’s were often wide of the mark, and those made in the 1950’s and 1960’s failed to anticipate the sharp changes which occurred, even though the actual figures usually fell within the range projected. Elaboration of projection methodology has not resulted in any great increase in the precision of the projections, largely because birth rates have fluctuated widely, and the fluctuations have proven difficult, if not impossible, to predict. The projections of households have had a roughly similar history, and the methods and problems of evaluation are somewhat similar. Their development has been characterized by the introduction of alternative and changing “headship” rates and increasing disaggregation of the data and procedures. The paper concludes with some generalizations based on U. S. experience. Although refinement of methods may contribute little to accuracy, accuracy is only one aspect of the usefulness of projections. The need for conditional projections and their analytical usefulness are such that there is no question that we should confidently continue to make them.     

Internal Migration of the Foreign-Born: Population Concentration or Dispersion?

Recent analyses of the 1990 census migration data have pointed to the different demographic effects of internal migration and immigration. States and metropolitan areas either have large population gains through immigration or internal migration, but rarely both, leading to what has been labeled as an increasing demographic balkanization of the U.S. population. This paper explores the proposition that the internal migration of the foreign-born (pre-1985 arrivals) is likely to reinforce the demographic effects of immigration. Analysis is based on the five-percent Public Use Microdata file of the U.S. Census, with the demographic effects evaluated at both the state and metropolitan area levels. Distinctions were also made between nineteen separate national origin groups, increasing the detail of the analysis. Despite high internal migration rates and large net migration, there was little change in the overall distribution and concentration of the foreign-born population between 1985 and 1990. More important, however, distinctions were found across the national origin groups. While secondary migration leads to dispersion among some groups, other groups were becoming increasingly concentrated, suggesting that demographic balkanization of the American population is more variable than the literature would suggest.     

Aboriginal population prospects

Data from the 1991 Census largely confirm earlier projections of the size and structure of the Aboriginal population, although the data for Torres Strait Islanders are markedly inconsistent with previous counts. The 1986 and 1991 Censuses mark the first intercensal period for decades for which Aboriginal population counts have been consistent. This provides an opportunity, taken in this paper, to examine closely the discrepancies between projections and the 1991 Census and to comment on ways in which determinants of Aboriginal population change are diverging from the parameters used for previous projections. We pay particular attention to mortality prospects, because of the occurrence in the 1991 Census of a higher than expected sex ratio and differences between projections and counts for certain age groups. We note the evidence for under-enumeration of the Aboriginal population in particular age groups in the 1991 Census as in previous censuses, and estimate the size of adjustments necessary to correct for some, but not all, of these deficiencies. The analysis shows that Aboriginal fertility increased in the second half of the 1980s.     

Increasing longevity and medicare expenditures

Official Medicare projections forecast that the elderly population will be less healthy and more costly over the next century. This prediction stems from the use of age as an indicator of health status: increases in longevity are assumed to increase demand for health care as individuals survive to older and higher-use ages. In this paper I suggest an alternative approach, in which time until death replaces age as the demographic indicator of health status. Increases in longevity are assumed to postpone the higher Medicare use and costs associated with the final decade of life. I contrast the two approaches, using mortality forecasts consistent with recent projections from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration. The time-until-death method yields significantly lower-cost forecasts. The hypothetical cost savings from improved health care small, however, relative to the size of the Medicare solvency problem caused by population aging.     

Family reunification and the immigration multiplier: U.S. immigration law,origin-country conditions,and the reproduction of immigrants

This paper reports estimates of the total numbers of actual legal immigrants to the United States that result from the family reunification provisions of U.S. immigration law. These immigration multipliers are estimated separately for major visa categories and by gender and are obtained in the context of an analysis of how individual characteristics of immigrants and their origin country conditions affect (a) the decision to migrate to the United States and (b) once admitted, their propensity to remain and to become U.S. citizens. The analyses combine longitudinal data on the 1971 cohort of legal immigrants and data from the 1970 Census Public Use Tapes. The results suggest that the actual multipliers differ importantly by visa category and that they are substantially lower than the potential multipliers and lower as well than previously supposed.     

How responsive is U.S. population growth to immigration? A situational sensitivity analysis

There has been public concern about the effect of immigration on population growth in the U.S. But how responsive is population growth to immigration? This paper examines the sensitivity of intrinsic population growth to immigration and situates such sensitivity in fertility and survival changes. The application of second derivatives on a modified Leslie matrix facilitates the analysis of situational sensitivity of U.S. population growth to immigration. The results show that the sensitivity to immigration is not as influential as the sensitivity to fertility, and that the sensitivity to immigration further depends on changes in fertility and survival.     

The equivalence of united states census data for persons of Russian stock or descent with American Jews: An evaluation

While the U.S. Bureau of the Census has had a long-standing policy of abstaining from enumerating the religious beliefs or backgrounds of the American people, at least two-thirds of the Jewish population of the United States has been enumerated in decennial censuses and sample surveys in the guise of persons of Russian stock or origin. This has come about through the migration policy of the old Russian Empire and the statistical categories utilized by American immigration authorities and by the U. S. Bureau of the Census for immigrants and their children. Comparisons between the returns from an ethnic survey and a survey on the religious composition demonstrate the close congruence between persons of Russian stock or descent and American Jews on the national level.     

Crude death rates in the U.S.S.R.: Comment on Grandstaff's remarks

Abstract My appraisal of death rates in the U.S.S.R. goes beyond the question whether a simple correlation really measures what the critic purports to measure. Normally, the crude death rates depend upon the age structure and the force of mortality. If one persists in assuming that a reasonably high correlation between the official death rates and their independent estimates should be the main criterion of validity, the best technique will be to relate the proportion of persons aged 60 and over to the official death rates recorded for some 109 observations. The force of mortality would be approximately reflected by a given proportion of survivors to the first or second year of age. But in the 1959 Soviet Census the latter data had been concealed within the 0 to 9 age group, possibly for no other reason than to prevent the curious few from tinkering with infant mortality.     

Population,projections, and policy: A cautionary perspective

Population projections depend on censuses, vital statistics and sample surveys, all of which have deficiencies that are most marked in the less developed countries (LDCs). Long-range projections by international agencies have recently undergone major revisions, while forecasts of the U.S. population have changed drastically over the past four years. The United Nations typically prepares “high,” “medium” and “low” projections. Even the high projection contains optimistic assumptions about fertility decline, while assumptions of constant or increasing fertility receive no serious attention. The paper suggests that high and constant fertility projections should receive more attention from policy makers, with medium estimates treated more as targets achievable only through considerable programmatic effort. At the same time, economic and social plans should be laid for dealing with the population sizes implied by the “high” variants.