Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

Welfare analysis and redistributive policies

Applied welfare analyses of redistributive systems nowadays benefit from powerful tax-benefit microsimulation programs combined with administrative data. Arguably, most of the distributional studies of that kind focus on social welfare defined as a function – typically inequality or poverty indices – of household equivalized income. In parallel, economic research has made considerable progress in the measurement of welfare along several dimensions. Distinct but related branches of the literature have attempted (i) to model different behavior (in a way that matter for incidence and redistribution of tax-benefit policies), (ii) to go beyond income, (iii) to better define and estimate equivalence scales, (iv) to open the household black box and measure welfare at the individual level. I suggest a general framework to critically review these streams of literatures and to discuss whether recent advances in each of these fields have been or could be readily operationalized in welfare analyses and policy simulations.     

Social welfare functions with a reference income

A foundation of social welfare functions is considered with a given reference income (or utility): relative and absolute invariance of the underlying welfare ordering are defined to hold for societies with either all members having incomes below the reference income or all members having incomes above the reference income. These conditions, alongside standard properties of a social preference relation, provide reference income dependent extensions of traditional classes of welfare functions. Dalton’s principle of positive transfers is incorporated, under which relative invariance leads to a class of piecewise (rank-)linear welfare functions, including the class of generalized Gini social welfare functions as a special case. To ensure quasi-concavity a new preference condition is proposed, which has the interpretation of aversion to income dropping below the reference income.     

The sociopolitical origins of the American Legion

The American Legion was one of the most politically consequential organizations in the twentieth-century United States. It was a local bedrock of anti-communism in two post-war red scares and throughout the cold war. It also built a lavish and cross-nationally unique welfare state for American veterans. In this article, I examine the origins of the American Legion and demonstrate that it was organized by rentier capitalists acting in their intraclass and interclass interests. Most importantly, the Legion was an organization that fought the “battle over class” by denying the importance of class as a social concept and proposing “Americanism” as an alternative. I also argue that the Legion’s extreme anti-communism combined with its dedication to welfare provision for American veterans altered the course of American welfare state development.     

Hansson’s theorem for generalized social welfare functions: an extension

 Hansson (1969) sets forth four conditions satisfied by no generalized social welfare function (GSWF), a mapping from profiles of individual preferences to arbitrary social preference relations. Though transitivity is not imposed on social preferences, one of Hansson’s conditions requires that socially maximal alternatives always exist. Of course, this condition is not satisfied by the majority GSWF. We prove a generalization of Hansson’s theorem that requires the existence of maximal alternatives only in very special cases. Our result applies to the majority GSWF and a large class of other GSWFs that sometimes produce no maximal alternatives. Received: 10 July 1995/Accepted: 4 March 1996     

Taking empirical studies seriously: the principle of concentration and the measurement of welfare and inequality

The paper investigates the implications of empirical studies by Amiel and Cowell (J Public Econ 47:3–26, 1992) of the public’s attitude towards inequality. It demonstrates that the value judgments concerning the redistribution of income which have been revealed in these studies can be represented by the principle of concentration. A concentration is a redistribution of income which reduces the distance between each income and the average income in the same proportion. Imposing this principle and some other basic properties the paper characterizes several families of social welfare orderings which imply generalized Atkinson inequality measures. They do not necessarily satisfy the principle of progressive transfers. I thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach

We consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. First, conditional on a given ranking of individual opportunity sets, we define the notion of an equalizing transformation. Then, assuming that the opportunity sets are ranked according to the cardinality ordering, we formulate the analogues of the notions of the Lorenz partial ordering, equalizing (Dalton) transfers, and inequality averse social welfare functions – concepts which play a central role in the literature on income inequality. Our main result is a cardinality-based analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement: one distribution Lorenz dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a finite sequence of rank preserving equalizations, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse social welfare functions. In addition, we characterize the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of our cardinality-based Lorenz inequality ordering. Received: 2 May 1995 / Accepted: 11 October 1996     

Utility-gap Dominances and Inequality Orderings

The justification for using Lorenz dominance as an inequality ranking condition has been based on the aggregate social welfare comparison and the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers. Since both the aggregating aspect of the social welfare function and certain implications of the principle of transfers are debatable, ordering conditions stronger than Lorenz dominance are worth exploring. A particularly interesting direction to pursue is to follow the frequently invoked notion that inequality is the “gap” between the rich and the poor. This paper follows this notion to formally propose a unified utility-gap concept and characterizes several utility-gap based conditions as general stronger-than-Lorenz-dominance ranking criteria. Specifically, we propose utility-gap dominance which requires all pair-wise utility-gaps in one distribution to be uniformly smaller than those of the other distribution. We then explore a conceptually weaker dominance concept – quasi dominance – which imposes conditions only on the gap between each person’s utility and some reference utility point of the distribution. I am grateful to two anonymous referees and Peter Lambert for their very constructive comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. The usual caveat applies.     

Inequality comparisons when the populations differ in size

This paper considers the problem of comparing two income distributions with different numbers of income recipients. The approach eschews the “replication of populations” of Dalton’s Population Principle which has been a fixture of the literature on income inequality since its inception. We start from a preorder which is a generalization of majorization, construct the “better-than” set and characterize the order-preserving welfare functions in a unified framework. The fixed population case falls off as a particular case.     

Monetizing Longevity Gains under Welfare Interdependencies: An Exploratory Study

Whereas existing indicators of standards of living neglect the dependence of individual well-being on other people’s welfare, this paper aims at constructing an income-based indicator taking welfare interdependencies into account. For that purpose, an extension of Usher’s longevity-adjusted income measure is developed, where the selfish representative agent is replaced by a two-generation representative household, whose members are connected by altruistic links. Longevity-adjusted income figures are shown, for the U.S. (1901–1999), to be significantly sensitive to the postulated altruism, so that conventional measures, by neglecting joint survival achievements, may underestimate actual improvements in living conditions. Methodological issues raised by the inclusion of interdependencies are also discussed, such as the increased difficulty, for indicators, to reflect the complexity and diversity of preferences.

Part of the welfare mix: The third sector as an intermediate area

This article presents a conceptional framework which analyses the third sector as a part of a mixed welfare system, otherwise made up of the market, the state and the informal private household spheres. From this perspective, the third sector appears as a dimension of the public space in civil societies: an intermediate area rather than a clear-cut sector. Third sector organisations are understood as polyvalent organisations whose social and political roles can be as important as their economic ones; they are portrayed as hybrids, intermeshing resources and rationales from different sectors. In present policies of ‘welfare pluralism’ the emphasis is consequently more on ‘synergetic’ mixes of resources and rationales than on mere issues of substitution processes between different sectors of provision. The last section discusses the potential distinguishing features of such policies with respect to ‘pluralist’ approaches which try to safeguard the conventional hierarchies in a mixed economy of welfare. This paper draws in part on the author's introduction to Evers and Svetlik (1993).     

Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition algebras

 In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow’s Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow’s axioms can be satisfied, unequal treatment of individuals thus persists. Second, Neutrality is consistent with Unanimity (and Independence). However, there are both dictatorial and nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Unanimity and Independence but not Neutrality. In Armstrong’s setting, one can naturally view Neutrality as a stronger condition of informational simplicity than Independence. Received: 11 August 1994/Accepted: 1 April 1996     

The sensitivity of income polarization

This study looks at polarization and its components’ sensitivity to assumptions about equivalence scales, income definition, ethical income distribution parameters, and the income accounting period. A representative sample of Danish individual incomes from 1984 to 2002 is utilised. Results show that polarization has increased over time, regardless of the applied measure, when the last part of the period is compared to the first part of the period; primary causes being increased inequality (alienation) and faster income growth among high incomes relative to those in the middle of the distribution. Increasing the accounting period confirms the reduction in inequality found for shorter periods, but polarization is virtually unchanged, because income group identification increases. Applying different equivalence scales does not change polarization ranking for different years, but identification ranks are affected. The welfare state considerably reduces income polarization and inequality, but at the expense of some more identification.      

Towards a Philosophy of Containment: Reading Goffman in the 21st Century

On the occasion of the re-publication of Erving Goffman’s Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order, including the remarkable appendix, “Insanity of Place,” the authors propose new ways of reading Goffman’s work in order to highlight his attention to havoc and containment. Goffman’s “Insanity of Place,” explores the phenomenon of mental illness by asserting that it is an instance of havoc, a symbolic and practical condition that disrupts the social order of life, and one that must be contained. By situating this essay at the center of Goffman’s oeuvre they examine Goffman’s “philosophy of containment,” and trace its trajectory from Asylums, Stigma and “The Insanity of Place” to its full crystallization in Frame Analysis. The authors offer a generative reading of havoc and containment in order to understand the incoherence, irrationality, unreason, incomprehensibility and unbearableness of social life and the imperative to preserve social order from collapsing, dissolving or imploding. This reading enables us to see the cracks in the social order and understand containment as the constant effort exerted to recuperate transgressions and deviations back into that order. Goffman’s analysis becomes an opening into engagements with the work of Judith Butler and Michel Foucault around the notion of the normative order and the issues of containment and transgression. Thinking through Goffman’s philosophy of containment as the framework for an analysis of socialization, normalization, and social ordering affords an approach to thinking macro-micro linkages of order and instability that confront both our contemporary society and the discipline of sociology.     

Inequality, new directions: full ethical foundation and consequences

Deriving comparisons and measures of inequality from full ethical foundations was a main innovation of the 1960s and pursuing it is still a most fruitful direction. This implies using “equal equivalents” and some principles particularly rich in meanings. Multidimensional inequalities can be measured and compared thanks to the “equal-equivalent manifolds”. The “equal-equivalent utility function” defines individual “welfare” cleaned of differences in sui generis individual tastes and hedonic capacities deemed irrelevant for “macrojustice”. Then, equal allocation is a deeper end-value than equal welfare but has to be complemented by free choice for freedom, Pareto efficiency and a demanded partial self-ownership. The result is the richly multi-meaning “equal-labour income equalization”.     

Ranking Income Distributions According to Equality of Opportunity

According to the opportunity egalitarian ethics, economic inequalities due to factors beyond the individual responsibility are inequitable and to be compensated by society, whereas inequalities due to personal responsibility are equitable and not to be compensated. In this paper we derive welfare and inequality criteria that respect this principle of justice. We characterize axiomatically classes of opportunity egalitarian social evaluation functions. Then, by requiring unanimous agreement among such classes, we provide simple distributional conditions to rank income distributions. These criteria extend the Lorenz and generalized Lorenz partial orderings, commonly used in the unidimensional case of income distributions, to the current context of equality of opportunity.     

Index-number tests and the common-scaling social cost-of-living index

For a change in prices, the common-scaling social cost-of-living index is the equal scaling of each individual’s expenditure level needed to restore the level of social welfare to its pre-change value. This index does not, in general, satisfy two standard index-number tests. The reversal test requires the index value for the reverse change to be the reciprocal of the original index. And the circular test requires the product of index values for successive price changes to be equal to the index value for the whole change. We show that both tests are satisfied if and only if the Bergson–Samuelson indirect social-welfare function is homothetic in prices, a condition which does not require individual preferences to be homothetic. If individual preferences are homothetic, however, stronger conditions on the Bergson–Samuelson indirect must be satisfied. Given these results, we ask whether the restrictions are empirically reasonable and find, in the case that individual preferences are not homothetic, that they make little difference to estimates of the index.     

The possibility of group choice: pairwise comparisons and merging functions

Preferences in Arrow’s conditions are ordinal. Here we show that when intensity of preference represented by reciprocal pairwise comparisons is considered, it is always possible to construct an Arrowian social welfare function using a two-stage social choice process. In stage 1, the individual pairwise relations are mapped into a social pairwise relation. In stage 2, the social pairwise relation is used to generate a cardinal ranking and this ranking is then used to select a particular member of the choice set.     

Discrete choice models of labour supply,behavioural microsimulation and the Spanish tax reforms

The aim of the present study is to show the potential of behavioural microsimulation models as powerful tools for the ex ante evaluation of public policies. We analyse the impact of recent Spanish income tax reforms upon efficiency and household and social welfare and study the effects of various (basic-income and vital-minimum) flat tax schemes. The analysis is performed using a microsimulation model in which labour supply is explicitly taken into account. Instead of following the traditional continuous approach (Hausman, Labour supply, Aaron and Pechman (eds.), How Taxes Affect Economic Behaviour, The Brooking Institution, Washington, DC, 1981; Econometrica, 53: 1255–1282, 1985; Taxes and labour supply, Auerbach and Feldstein, (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, vol. 1, 1979), we estimate the direct utility function employing the methodology proposed by Aaberge et al. (Scand. J. Econ., 97: 635–659, 1995) and Van Soest (J. Hum. Resour., 30: 63–88, 1995). We maintain population heterogeneity by applying a social welfare analysis to the complete sample, rather than merely focusing on the active population. The source of our data is a sample of Spanish individuals in the 1995 wave of the EC Household Panel. We find that the redistribution policies considered have only had a minor impact on economic efficiency but, by contrast, have significantly affected social welfare. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Time–space intensification: Karl Polanyi, the double movement, and global informational capitalism

This article advances the concept of “time–space intensification” as an alternative to existing notions of time–space distanciation, compression and embedding that attempt to capture the restructuring of time and space in contemporary advanced capitalism. This concept suggests time and space are intensified in the contemporary period – the social experience of time and space becomes more explicit and more crucial to socio-economic actors’ lives, time and space are mobilized more explicitly in individual and corporate action, and the institutionalization of time and space becomes more politicized. Drawing on Polanyi’s concepts of fictitious commodities and the double movement, and developing them through an analysis of work organization and economic development in the Irish software industry, the article argues that the concept of time–space intensification can add significantly to our understanding of key features of the restructuring of the temporal and spatial basis of economic development and work organization.