基金管理人行为对股票市场的作用机制研究

基金管理人作为股票市场上的主要投资者,其投资心理和行为将会对股票市场产生深刻的影响.本文建立数学模型研究基金管理人过去的成败经历对其现在的投资心理和行为的影响以及这种投资心理和行为对股票市场交易量、价格波动性和基金管理人自身投资业绩的影响机制.研究结果表明,基金管理人过去经常失败的经历将使其变得过度悲观,过去经常成功的经历将使其变得过度自信;股票市场的均衡预期股票交易量和均衡价格波动性总是与基金管理人过去的成功经历正相关;过去过分成功或过分失败的基金管理人都不会在未来取得最好的实际预期业绩.     

Beauty Is a Beast,Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve not only complementarity in types of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also monotonicity in type of the degree of transferability between partners. We apply our conditions to study some models of risk sharing and incentive problems, deriving new results for predicted matching patterns in those contexts.     

Changing perspectives on the capital investment process

The environment within which institutions undertake commercial and industrial activity changes both as a result of decisions dependent on the institution itself and as a result of decisions independent of the institution. In recent years many of these changes have resulted in changing perspectives on the range of criteria which should be considered when determining how and where large corporations should invest their money. This paper examines these changes in corporate practice and identifies the cumulative results of these changes in the environment of corporate activity. The paper also examines some of the key elements in new approaches which corporations are adopting to capital investment decisions by utilizing data on a broadly based research project which examines in depth the capital investment/ resource allocation processes of five large, worldwide, manufacturing firms. The subject is of vital importance to large and small businesses, both because of the crucial importance of investment decisions and because of the importance for future strategic planning of identifying the environment within which corporate activities take place.     

Producing Synergy: Innovation,IT, and Productivity

Bringing innovations to market is critical to industrial progress and economic growth. We explore the potential for information technology (IT) to enable innovations, and thus improve productivity. We hypothesize that a knowledge stock of process‐oriented research and development (R&D) increases total factor productivity growth by leveraging traditional forms of capital and labor, and further enhances the ability of IT capital to increase productivity. We estimate these relationships using two broad panels of U.S. industries covering the periods 1987–1998 and 1998–2005. The results indicate qualified support for a synergistic effect of R&D and IT investment in both periods.     

Marriage,Labor Supply,and Home Production

We develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility from private consumption and leisure, and from a non‐market good that is produced in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, education, and an index of family attitudes. A match‐specific, stochastic bliss shock induces variation in matching given wages, education, and family values, and triggers renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991–2008) data, we take as given changes in wages, education, and family values by gender, and study their impact on marriage decisions and intrahousehold resource allocation. The model allows to evaluate how much of the observed gender differences in labor supply results from wages, education, and family attitudes. We find that family attitudes are a strong determinant of comparative advantages in home production of men and women, whereas education complementarities induce assortative mating through preferences.     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

Production,Process Investment,and the Survival of Debt‐Financed Startup Firms

Whether to invest in process development that can reduce the unit cost and thereby raise future profits or to conserve cash and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy is a key trade‐off faced by many startup firms that have taken on debt. We explore this trade‐off by examining the production quantity and cost reducing R&D investment decisions in a two period model wherein a startup firm must make a minimum level of profit at the end of the first period to survive and operate in the second period. We specify a probabilistic survival measure as a function of production and investment decisions to track and manage the risk exposure of the startup depending on three key market factors: technology, demand, and competitor's cost. We develop managerial insights by characterizing how to create operational hedges against the bankruptcy risk: if a startup makes a “conservative” investment decision, then it also selects an optimal quantity that is less than the monopoly level and hence sacrifices some of first period expected profits to increase its survival chances. If it decides to invest “aggressively,” then it produces more than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk. We also illustrate that debt constraint shrinks the decision space, wherein such process investments are viable.     

The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Decisions: Evidence from Italy

Based on a study of new investment announcements from 1989 to 1995 by Italian firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find a positive stock price reaction to new investment decisions. The stock price reaction is larger for joint venture announcements. The market response is also larger for non-state owned companies and when the announcement is released in a period of rising stock prices. The announced investment has no impact on the non-voting shares but increases the voting shares' market price through a significant revaluation of their vote-segment. We find some evidence that new investments lead to management's private benefits rather than towards firm value. This is consistent with the typical Italian corporate governance structure, where a majority shareholder safely controls a listed company while having only a fractional claim on the firm's cash flows.     

THE REPLACEMENT PROBLEM IN FRICTIONAL ECONOMIES: A NEAR‐EQUIVALENCE RESULT

We examine how technological change affects wage inequality and unemployment in a calibrated model of matching frictions in the labor market. We distinguish between two polar cases studied in the literature: a “creative destruction” economy, where new machines enter chiefly through new matches and an “upgrading” economy, where machines in existing matches are replaced by new machines. Our main results are: (i) these two economies produce very similar quantitative outcomes, and (ii) the total amount of wage inequality generated by frictions is very small. We explain these findings in light of the fact that, in the model calibrated to the US economy, both unemployment and vacancy durations are very short, i.e., the matching frictions are quantitatively minor. Hence, the equilibrium allocations of the model are remarkably close to those of a frictionless version of our economy where firms are indifferent between upgrading and creative destruction, and where every worker is paid the same market‐clearing wage. These results are robust to the inclusion of machine‐specific or match‐specific heterogeneity into the benchmark model. (JEL: J41, J64, O33)     

Large Matching Markets as Two‐Sided Demand Systems

This paper studies two‐sided matching markets with non‐transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large. We consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners, and agents' types are only partially observed by the econometrician. We show that in a large market, the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent's endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a given observable type. Furthermore, while the number of pairwise stable matchings for a typical realization of random utilities grows at a fast rate as the number of market participants increases, the inclusive values resulting from any stable matching converge to a unique deterministic limit. We can therefore characterize the limiting distribution of the matching market as the unique solution to a fixed‐point condition on the inclusive values. Finally we analyze identification and estimation of payoff parameters from the asymptotic distribution of observable characteristics at the level of pairs resulting from a stable matching.     

P2P Marketplaces and Retailing in the Presence of Consumers' Valuation Uncertainty

Can peer‐to‐peer (P2P) marketplaces benefit traditional supply chains when consumers may experience valuation risk? P2P marketplaces can mitigate consumers' risk by allowing them to trade mismatched goods; yet, they also impose a threat to retailers and their suppliers as they compete over consumers. Further, do profit‐maximizing marketplaces always extract the entire consumer surplus from the online trades? Our two‐period model highlights the effects introduced by P2P marketplaces while accounting for the platform's pricing decisions. We prove that with low product unit cost, the P2P marketplace sets its transaction fee to the market clearing price, thereby extracting all of the seller surplus. In this range of product unit cost, the supply chain partners are worse off due to the emergence of a P2P marketplace. However, when the unit cost is high, the platform sets its transaction fee to be less than the market clearing price, intentionally leaving money on the table, as a mechanism to stimulate first period demand for new goods in expectation for some of them to be traded later, in the second period, via the marketplace. It is not until the surplus left with the sellers is sufficiently high that the supply chain partners manage to extract some of this surplus, ultimately making them better off due to a P2P marketplace. We further analyze the impact of a P2P marketplace on consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, we consider model variants accounting for a frictionless platform and consumer strategic waiting.     

Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions

We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement for a stable matching, namely that there should not be two participants who would prefer to exchange partners. The problem is motivated by the experience of real-world medical matching schemes that use stable matchings, where cases have arisen in which two participants discovered that each of them would prefer the other’s allocation, a situation that is seen as unfair. Our main result is that the problem of deciding whether an instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits a stable matching, with the additional property that no two men would prefer to exchange partners, is NP-complete. This implies a similar result for more general problems, such as the hospitals/residents problem, the many-to-one extension of stable marriage. Unlike previous NP-hardness results for variants of stable marriage, the proof exploits the powerful algebraic structure underlying the set of all stable matchings. In practical matching schemes, however, applicants’ preference lists are typically of short fixed length, and we describe a linear time algorithm for the problem in the special case where all of the men’s preference lists are of length ≤3.     

DISTANCE TO FRONTIER,SELECTION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

We analyze an economy where firms undertake both innovation and adoption of technologies from the world technology frontier. The selection of high‐skill managers and firms is more important for innovation than for adoption. As the economy approaches the frontier, selection becomes more important. Countries at early stages of development pursue an investment‐based strategy, which relies on existing firms and managers to maximize investment but sacrifices selection. Closer to the world technology frontier, economies switch to an innovation‐based strategy with short‐term relationships, younger firms, less investment, and better selection of firms and managers. We show that relatively backward economies may switch out of the investment‐based strategy too soon, so certain policies such as limits on product market competition or investment subsidies, which encourage the investment‐based strategy, may be beneficial. However, these policies may have significant long‐run costs because they make it more likely that a society will be trapped in the investment‐based strategy and fail to converge to the world technology frontier. (JEL: O31, O33, O38, O40, L16)     

NEW TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS IN MULTISTAGE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

The introduction of new technologies in production and manufacturing (such as robotics, flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), and computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM)) frequently motivates capital investment decisions. Traditionally, the need for additional capacity has motivated the evaluation of investment decisions which were undertaken based on financial factors such as the net present value (NPV), internal rate of return, taxation, and depreciation. This research integrates investment decisions with operational decisions for the case of multistage production assembly systems. We show that for such systems investment decisions affect not only the financial structure but also production scheduling and material flow in the system.     

投资机会变动与风险收益关系实证研究

应用跨期资本资产定价模型研究股市投资机会变动时的风险收益关系和跨期风险对冲策略。以25个规模-账面市值比组合以及扩展组合作为检验资产,以经济、情绪和市场指标作为状态变量反映投资机会,以DCC-MVGARCH方法估计的资产超额收益与市场超额收益的条件协方差衡量市场风险,以DCC-MVGARCH方法估计的资产超额收益与状态变量新息的条件协方差衡量跨期风险,应用面板回归方法检验资产超额收益与风险的关系。研究结果表明,在单状态变量中,货币供应增长率、房地产投资增长率、宏观经济景气指数、规模溢价等新息降低,投资机会出现不利变动,与这些新息负相关的资产能对冲投资机会的不利变动;存贷差增长率、利率、股市波动等新息增加时,投资机会出现不利变动,与这些新息正相关的资产能对冲投资机会的不利变动;各模型具有良好的解释能力,其中规模溢价、股市波动和货币供应的解释能力较高。还对多状态变量进行检验、比较,并提供了相应投资策略。     

Liquidity and Trading Dynamics

In this paper, we build a model where the presence of liquidity constraints tends to magnify the economy's response to aggregate shocks. We consider a decentralized model of trade, where agents may use money or credit to buy goods. When agents do not have access to credit and the real value of money balances is low, agents are more likely to be liquidity constrained. This makes them more concerned about their short‐term earning prospects when making their consumption decisions and about their short‐term spending opportunities when making their production decisions. This generates a coordination element in spending and production which leads to greater aggregate volatility and greater comovement across producers.     

竞争供应链中制造商环保技术投资决策研究

本文考虑消费者对质量差异化产品的异质性偏好以及环保意识,建立了消费者效用函数以及产品需求函数,构建了差异化竞争制造商及其零部件供应商之间的动态博弈模型;进而,研究了竞争供应链中制造商环保技术投资策略,考察了市场竞争对供应链均衡定价决策、环保技术投资决策以及消费者福利的影响。研究结果表明：拥有较高技术水平的制造商总是会选择更高的环保技术投资水平,但消费者也需为此支付更高的产品溢价;制造商环保技术投资会影响产品销售价格并有利于提升消费者福利,拥有较高技术水平的制造商总是有动机选择投资环保技术,而技术水平较低的制造商则不会有动机选择投资环保技术;市场竞争会导致供应商和制造商定价决策的变化,但此时供应商反而能够获得更多利润。     

从委托理财收益率看上市公司委托代理问题

本文将委托理财收益率作为研究对象,考察了上市公司的委托代理问题.通过研究发现,"可操控现金"与委托理财收益率显著负相关;若给定"可操控现金",大股东持股比例越高的公司其委托理财收益率越高.这一结果说明,"可操控现金"越多,上市公司的委托代理问题越严重;大股东的持股比例越高,其对管理层代理问题的约束力越强.研究还发现国外同类研究常用的"自由现金流"变量不能捕捉这一现象.     

JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION,OR BECKER MARRIED TO SPENCE

This paper considers a matching model of the labor market where workers, who have private information on their quality, signal to firms that also differ in quality. Signals allow assortative matching in which the highest‐quality workers send the highest signals and are hired by the best firms. Matching is considered both when wages are rigid (nontransferable utility) and when they are fully flexible (transferable utility). In both cases, equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend on the distributions of worker and firm types. This is in contrast to separating equilibria of the standard model, which do not respond to changes in supply or demand. With sticky wages, despite incomplete information, equilibrium investment in education by low‐ability workers can be inefficiently low, and this distortion can become worse in a more competitive environment. In contrast, with flexible wages, greater competition improves efficiency.