The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

The theory of global games has shown that coordination games with multiple equilibria may have a unique equilibrium if certain parameters of the payoff function are private information instead of common knowledge. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the predictions of this theory. Comparing sessions with common and private information, we observe only small differences in behavior. For common information, subjects coordinate on threshold strategies that deviate from the global game solution towards the payoff‐dominant equilibrium. For private information, thresholds are closer to the global game solution than for common information. Variations in the payoff function affect behavior as predicted by comparative statics of the global game solution. Predictability of coordination points is about the same for both information conditions.     

Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning,Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

Global games of regime change—coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it—have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time. We first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria. We then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time, or with changes in fundamentals, leads to interesting equilibrium properties. First, multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Second, fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks. Finally, equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility—where no attack is possible—and phases of distress—where a large attack can occur—even without changes in fundamentals.     

Games With Discontinuous Payoffs: A Strengthening of Reny's Existence Theorem

We provide a pure Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). In comparison with Reny's argument, our proof is brief. Our result subsumes a prior existence result of Reny (1999) that is not covered by his theorem. We use the main result to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in a class of finite games in which agents' pure strategies are subsets of a given set, and in turn use this to prove the existence of stable configurations for games, similar to those used by Schelling (1971, 1972) to study residential segregation, in which agents choose locations.     

Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known

It is shown that an exponentially small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number T of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually rational outcome of any one-shot game can be approximated by a subgame perfect equilibrium of a finitely repeated version of that game. The sense in which the departure from common knowledge is small is as follows: (I) With probability one, the players know T with precision ±K. (ii) With probability 1 −ε, the players know T precisely; moreover, this knowledge is mutual of order εT. (iii) The deviation of T from its finite expectation is exponentially small.     

Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games With Incomplete Information

This paper studies the inference of interaction effects in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose a test for the signs of state‐dependent interaction effects that does not require parametric specifications of players' payoffs, the distributions of their private signals, or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly invoked assumption that players' private signals are independent conditional on observed states. The procedure is valid in (but does not rely on) the presence of multiple equilibria in the data‐generating process (DGP). As a by‐product, we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the DGP. We also implement the test using data on radio programming of commercial breaks in the United States, and infer stations' incentives to synchronize their commercial breaks. Our results support the earlier finding by Sweeting (2009) that stations have stronger incentives to coordinate and air commercials at the same time during rush hours and in smaller markets.     

经济复苏走势、经济刺激政策及其退出计划有关问题的国内外综述

为应对本轮经济危机,各国政府纷纷出台经济刺激计划及相应配套政策,以遏制经济增长显著下滑的态势。随着经济危机渐行渐远,如何实现经济刺激计划的平稳退出,成为各国政府亟需面对的首要问题,理论界也对此展开了激烈的探讨。本文以判断经济复苏走势为切入点,选择经济刺激计划退出过程中面临的相关问题为研究对象,对国内外学者的研究成果进行综述,并在此基础上展望了未来我国宏观经济政策走向。     

业务退出的动力机制

企业业务退出过程中各参与者的利益冲突制约了退出决策的顺利进行.本文认为,为了促进业务退出,企业除了应建立完善的经营体制和以董事会为首的内部监控体系外,更应该注意从企业管理层和公司战略决策层的角度,建立起一个战略业务退出的动力机制.     

Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias

Comparisons of learning models in repeated games have been a central preoccupation of experimental and behavioral economics over the last decade. Much of this work begins with pooled estimation of the model(s) under scrutiny. I show that in the presence of parameter heterogeneity, pooled estimation can produce a severe bias that tends to unduly favor reinforcement learning relative to belief learning. This occurs when comparisons are based on goodness of fit and when comparisons are based on the relative importance of the two kinds of learning in hybrid structural models. Even misspecified random parameter estimators can greatly reduce the bias relative to pooled estimation.     

Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The main result establishes existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) under a condition we call the single crossing condition (SCC), roughly described as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (in the sense that higher types choose higher actions), a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing. When the SCC holds, a PSNE exists in every finite‐action game. Further, for games with continuous payoffs and a continuum of actions, there exists a sequence of PSNE to finite‐action games that converges to a PSNE of the continuum‐action game. These convergence and existence results also extend to some classes of games with discontinuous payoffs, such as first‐price auctions, where bidders may be heterogeneous and reserve prices are permitted. Finally, the paper characterizes the SCC based on properties of utility functions and probability distributions over types. Applications include first‐price, multi‐unit, and all‐pay auctions; pricing games with incomplete information about costs; and noisy signaling games.     

Reviewing Implications of Urban Growth Management and Spatial Governance in the Global South

ABSTRACT

Urban containment policies have been applied in the global north as a strategy towards creating compact urban development. In the south the urban growth management discourse have been part of planning practice for the past three decades. There are however several reasons, both structural and political that have contributed to its limited success. The purpose of the research is to review practices of growth management in the south in an attempt to find lessons from the implementation of different mechanisms. The study focuses on the challenges of growth management mechanisms and its associated spatial governance approaches.     

企业技术联盟与一类“产学研”合作技术创新模式选择研究

面向创新网络,将企业间与"产学研"合作创新模式进行统一考虑,建立了企业技术联盟和一类"产学研"合作技术创新模式选择动态博弈模型。在投入规模、投入比例、产品价格与创新利润等均衡变量的基础上,分析了企业间、企业-高校间资源共享进行合作研发的条件:探讨"产学研-集成创新模式"下技术许可与合资企业2种模式的有效选择问题:研究了由企业联合体模式向"产学研-集成创新模式"进行演化的过程及条件。     

知识链组织之间合作与冲突的稳定性结构研究

知识链组织在合作过程中的机会主义行为可能产生冲突,导致知识链的运行并不稳定.本文构建了知识链组织之间合作与冲突的博弈支付矩阵,在区分了合作收益大于背叛收益与合作收益小于背叛收益的前提下,分析了知识链稳定运行的影响因素.研究表明,知识链运行的稳定性与协同价值创造、长期合作的期望和社会惩罚力度正相关.与机会主义收益和知识溢出损失负相关.     

基于信任和企业进入退出机制的产业集群规模演化研究

本文从信任演化的角度出发,以产业集群规模为研究对象,建立了基于信任和企业进入退出机制的演化模型,并利用计算机辅助语言,研究不同进入壁垒的集群规模演化的规律。结果发现,由于信任机制和进入壁垒对集群企业竞争与合作的调节作用,集群规模的演化呈现一定的规律性,演化过程可区分为生长、淘汰、震荡和稳定四个阶段,演化曲线呈倒"S"型,稳定成熟期规模的大小与进入壁垒的高低有关,且进入壁垒对企业进入和生存作用相反。     

技术创新网络中企业间依赖、企业开放度对合作绩效的影响

技术创新网络中企业的合作绩效受到企业间依赖关系与企业开放度的影响。本文在对相关文献梳理的基础上,提出了网络内企业间依赖与开放度对合作绩效影响的理论假设,利用我国企业技术创新合作过程中的实际数据,对其进行了实证检验。结果表明,技术创新网络中企业间联合依赖与不对称依赖的程度会影响到企业在合作过程中的开放度,同时也会影响到企业的合作绩效。进而,作为企业间依赖与企业合作绩效间重要的中介,开放度也显著影响着企业合作的绩效。     

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x^* and every payoff vector limit u^* resulting from strategies approaching x^*, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u_i^* even if the others deviate slightly from x^*. If strategy spaces are compact and convex, payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner's strategy, and the game is better-reply secure, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Better-reply security holds in many economic games. It also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy Nash equilibria.     

全球价值链驱动、知识转移与我国制造业升级

知识、信息在全球价值链中的加速流动有助于我国制造业通过接受国际领先企业的知识和技术转移来提高核心能力.基于国内外研究成果,从全球价值链驱动模式入手,对全球价值链下的知识转移进行了分析,认为不同价值链驱动模式下我国本土制造业通过嵌入全球价值链获取来自领先企业的知识存在差异,从而决定了其技术进步与升级路径的不同.     

On the Existence of Monotone Pure‐Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games

We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure‐strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally complete metric semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based on contractibility rather than convexity of best‐reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi‐unit auctions with risk‐averse bidders.     

金融危机10年来中国股市动态演化与市场稳健研究——一个基于复杂网络视角的实证

将复杂网络理论最小生成树(MST)算法和滑窗分析相结合,在2008年全球金融危机和2015年中国股市震荡的背景下,以2003年至2017年的上证A股收益率数据作为实证样本,构建股票市场动态关联网络,并从网络节点移除和连边变化两个角度出发,对其在不同时期的动态演化特征和市场稳健性质进行探讨。研究结果表明:网络结构整体上在金融危机之前和之后较为松散,而在金融危机和股市震荡期间则变得非常紧凑,节点的度分布和影响强度分布更加聚集。这意味着在金融危机和股市震荡期间,系统重要性公司的影响力持续增强,其股价的变化对其它公司将产生更为显著的影响;不同类型的事件对股市网络连通性和稳健性的影响程度不同,区域性事件(股市震荡)比全球性事件(金融危机)对市场的冲击更大;短期来看,金融危机和股市震荡对网络连边的稳健性并没有造成太大的冲击,整个研究时段网络的存活比率都维持在较高的水平。但随着步长的增加,网络的存活比率急剧下降,这意味着股市网络相关结构的长期稳健性是减弱的。     

我国汽车业全球竞争-合作的模式选择

在经济全球化和我国已加入WTO的背景之下,我国汽车业如何在全球的竞争和合作中寻求发展是当前受到广泛关注的重要问题.文章在评述目前国内外对中国汽车业未来发展的主要观点的基础上,通过建立数理经济模型,深入地分析了汽车厂商在国际合作竞争中的收益状况,得出对外进一步合作,对内加强竞争是未来我国汽车厂商发展的方向.文章认为我国汽车业应采取综合的发展模式即一方面通过国际合作求得生产的发展和技术积累;另一方面在引进技术的基础上,通过自主研究和刨新在经济型车型上取得跨越式发展.最终通过二者的结合,进一步开发高档车型,使中国汽车工业在世界市场上获得长久立足之地.     

Dynamic Competition With Random Demand and Costless Search: A Theory of Price Posting

This paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under demand uncertainty. Firms must produce output in advance. After observing aggregate sales in prior periods, firms post prices for their unsold output. In each period, the demand of a new batch of consumers is randomly activated. Existing customers who have not yet bought and then new customers arrive at the market in random order, observe the posted prices, and either purchase at the lowest available price or delay their purchase decision. We construct a sequential equilibrium in which the output produced and its allocation across consumers is efficient. Thus consumers endogenously sort themselves efficiently, with the highest valuations purchasing first. Transaction prices in each period rise continuously, as firms become more optimistic about demand, followed by a market correction. By the last period, prices are market clearing.