Efficiency Evaluation in Search Advertising

In this article, we use data envelopment analysis combined with principal component analysis to evaluate the efficiency of online retailers in search advertising. We examine various efficiency model specifications involving several resource and performance‐related variables in search advertising. Our analysis based on 200 retailers suggests different efficiency patterns for multichannel and Web‐only retailers. The results of our efficiency pattern analysis indicate that the performance metrics, impressions, online sales, click‐through rate, and conversion rate together reveal differences in efficiency mainly for multichannel retailers. On the other hand, ad positions in sponsored and organic links reveal differences in efficiency for Web‐only retailers. In terms of overall efficiency, we find that multichannel retailers occupy relatively most of the top positions. These results contribute to organizational level understanding of search advertising practices in online retailing and offer insights into keyword management, resource utilization, and performance metrics in search advertising campaigns.     

Demand Growth in Services: A Discrete Choice Analysis of Customer Preferences and Online Selling

The selling of perishable services (e.g., hotel rooms, airline seats, and rental cars) online is increasingly popular with both retailers and consumers. Among the innovative approaches to online sales is opaque selling. First popularized by Priceline.com's name‐your‐own‐price model, opaque selling hides some attributes of the service (notably, brand and specific location) until after the purchase decision, in exchange for a discounted price. This means that a branded “product” is being sold as somewhat of a commodity, but the brand “name” is protected by the opaque model. The attraction of this model for retailers is that they are presumably able to increase their revenue stream, albeit at a lower rate, by selling rooms that otherwise would remain in inventory. In this article, we outline the development and analysis of an online choice survey to understand consumer preferences among three types of online distribution channels: regular full information sales channels, and opaque sales channels with or without consumer bidding. A Multinomial Logit model is employed to analyze the data and measure the consumer trade‐offs between price and other attributes of the product. We use the estimated model to calculate the incremental demand and revenue created by using an opaque channel simultaneously with regular full information channels. On balance, we find that correctly priced opaque channels can add to hotels revenue streams without undue cannibalization of regular room sales.     

考虑网络退货和渠道成本时全渠道BOPS定价与服务决策

随着线上线下融合的全渠道零售的兴起，越来越多的品牌商开始为顾客提供线上购买线下取货BOPS （Buy Online and Pickup in Store）的购物选择。本文考虑网络退货和渠道成本，基于网络渠道、实体渠道和BOPS渠道下的消费者效用函数构建品牌商开设BOPS渠道前后的利润模型，分析BOPS模式对品牌商需求分布和盈利能力的影响，研究定价和服务的最优决策。结果表明：（1）当网络退货率和BOPS渠道不便利程度之间满足特定关系时，开设BOPS渠道可使品牌商总需求增加、网络渠道和实体渠道的需求减少；（2）当网络退货率达到一定阈值或BOPS渠道很便利时，开设BOPS渠道可使品牌商总利润增加；（3）当网络退货率很低而网络渠道购物成本较高时，开设BOPS渠道可使品牌商获利更大；（4）在交通便利之处增设具有体验服务的顾客自提门店，不论网络渠道购物成本和网络退货率高低，甚至适当提升商品定价也可使品牌商有利可图。本研究可为品牌商实施BOPS全渠道战略提供一定的管理见解。     

基于制造商网络渠道选择的双渠道供应链定价 与服务决策研究

本文考虑由线下零售商实体销售与制造商网络销售构成的网络直销,以及由线下零售商实体销售与线上零售商网络销售构成的网络分销两种制造商双渠道模式,研究“搭便车”行为下制造商模式选择和供应链最优定价与服务决策。研究发现:制造商的渠道选择策略与“搭便车”行为程度、消费者偏好网络渠道程度、价格敏感系数等有关。尤其当消费者受到的服务且对价格的敏感性相同时,制造商会选择网络直销双渠道模式。进一步分析消费者“搭便车”行为和网络渠道偏好对制造商渠道选择和定价决策影响发现,制造商在消费者偏好网络渠道程度比较低时应选择网络分销双渠道模式,而当消费者网络渠道偏好和“搭便车”行为程度都比较高时,制造商应选择网络直销双渠道模式。消费者网络渠道偏好或“搭便车”行为程度越大,两种模式下批发价格应设置的更低。网络直销渠道模式下“搭便车”行为程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置的更低,而消费者网络渠道偏好程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置得更高。     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.     

Traffic‐Based Labor Planning in Retail Stores

Staffing decisions are crucial for retailers since staffing levels affect store performance and labor‐related expenses constitute one of the largest components of retailers’ operating costs. With the goal of improving staffing decisions and store performance, we develop a labor‐planning framework using proprietary data from an apparel retail chain. First, we propose a sales response function based on labor adequacy (the labor to traffic ratio) that exhibits variable elasticity of substitution between traffic and labor. When compared to a frequently used function with constant elasticity of substitution, our proposed function exploits information content from data more effectively and better predicts sales under extreme labor/traffic conditions. We use the validated sales response function to develop a data‐driven staffing heuristic that incorporates the prediction loss function and uses past traffic to predict optimal labor. In counterfactual experimentation, we show that profits achieved by our heuristic are within 0.5% of the optimal (attainable if perfect traffic information was available) under stable traffic conditions, and within 2.5% of the optimal under extreme traffic variability. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for researchers and practitioners.     

随机需求和联合促销下双渠道供应链的竞争与协调

针对制造商同时拥有零售渠道和网上直销渠道的双渠道供应链系统,在随机需求和联合促销情况下,对制造商和零售商之间的价格竞争和协调问题进行研究.研究表明价格的纳什均衡解存在,网上渠道的最优价格随零售商促销努力程度的增大而降低.当制造商分担促销成本的比例上升时,零售商促销的努力程度会增加.当比例值较低时,零售商的努力程度变化不大;当比例值超过一定数值时,零售商的努力程度会显著增加.回购契约能给制造商和零售商双方带来好处,但不能实现双渠道供应链的协调.     

Price,Rebate, and Returns Supply Contracts for Coordinating Supply Chains with Price‐Dependent Demands

Channel rebates and returns policies are common mechanisms for manufacturers to entice retailers to increase their order quantities and sales ultimately. However, when the underlying demand depends on the retail price, it has been known that channel coordination cannot be achieved if only one of these mechanisms is deployed. In this article, we show that a policy that combines the use of wholesale price, channel rebate, and returns can coordinate a channel with both additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demands. In addition to determining the sufficient conditions for the contract parameters associated with the equilibrium policy, we show that multiple equilibrium policies for channel coordination exist. We further explore how the equilibrium policy can be adjusted to achieve Pareto improvement. Other issues such as the maximum amount of expected profit that the manufacturer can share under the coordinated channel, the structural properties of the contracts under both the additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demand functions are also discussed.     

Strategic Motive for Introducing Internet Channels in a Supply Chain

Rapid advances of information technology in recent years have enabled both the manufacturers and the retailers to operate their own Internet channels. In this study, we investigate the interaction between the capabilities of introducing the Internet channels, the pricing strategies, and the channel structure. We classify consumers into two segments: grocery shoppers attach a higher utility from purchasing through the physical channel, whereas a priori Internet shoppers prefer purchasing online. We find that when the Internet shoppers are either highly profitable or fairly unimportant, the manufacturer prefers to facilitate the channel separation either through his own Internet channel or the retailer's. In the intermediate region, however, the manufacturer encroaches the grocery shoppers and steals the demand from the retailer's physical channel. With horizontal competition between retailers, a priori symmetric retailers may adopt different channel strategies as a stable market equilibrium. The manufacturer may willingly give up his Internet channel and leverage on the retailer competition. When the manufacturer sells through an online e‐tailer, Internet shoppers may be induced to purchase through the physical channel. This reverse encroachment strategy emerges because selling through the e‐tailer leads to a more severe double marginalization problem.     

Life‐Cycle Channel Coordination Issues in Launching an Innovative Durable Product

We analyze the dynamic strategic interactions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized distribution channel used to launch an innovative durable product (IDP). The underlying retail demand for the IDP is influenced by word‐of‐mouth from past adopters and follows a Bass‐type diffusion process. The word‐of‐mouth influence creates a trade‐off between immediate and future sales and profits, resulting in a multi‐period dynamic supply chain coordination problem. Our analysis shows that while in some environments, the manufacturer is better off with a far‐sighted retailer, there are also environments in which the manufacturer is better off with a myopic retailer. We characterize equilibrium dynamic pricing strategies and the resulting sales and profit trajectories. We demonstrate that revenue‐sharing contracts can coordinate the IDP's supply chain with both far‐sighted and myopic retailers throughout the entire planning horizon and arbitrarily allocate the channel profit.     

双渠道供应链的产品互补合作策略研究

在供应链中,直销渠道和零售渠道商品的可替代性导致渠道冲突。考虑零售商在传统渠道中附带销售直销渠道商品的互补品,建立了渠道产品互补合作的供应链Bertrand博弈模型。发现若消费者对零售商处互补品的价格敏感,则供应链中互补品的价格下降,制造商产品的渠道价格增加,同时直销渠道的需求和收益均上升,对零售渠道中制造商产品的销售和收益增加有利。利用上述模型,通过算例得出,如果零售商选择合适的互补品在零售渠道进行销售,将能促进双方收益的增加,渠道产品互补合作策略是可行的。     

考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道供应链最优策略

基于零售商线上线下销售与消费者退货并存的双渠道供应链,构建考虑退货的双渠道供应链定价模型以及考虑跨渠道退货策略的双渠道供应链定价决策模型。通过理论分析和数值实验对比,研究集中决策与分散决策下的零售商最优定价策略以及总利润的变化情况,同时分析在不同退货策略下顾客偏好以及退货率对零售商定价和收益的影响。结果表明：零售商渠道的最优价格设置与顾客对渠道的偏好成正比,与退货率成正比。当顾客对某一渠道偏好程度高时,分散决策下的利润要高于集中决策,并且随着该渠道退货率的提高,这种利润差距会进一步扩大,因此零售商应实施分散决策的渠道策略,鼓励线上线下两个渠道进行竞争,从而获得更大的收益。从仿真结果可以看出,对于一般的服装产品,提供跨渠道退货服务的零售商总利润更高,在一定条件下跨渠道服务水平的投入会增加零售商的收入,但这种投入应该控制在一个合理的水平上,并保持服务与顾客回报之间的正相关关系。     

O2O模式下考虑消费者参考效应和成员互惠利他的产品——服务供应链微分博弈

成员的互惠利他行为是影响企业决策的重要行为因素,消费者的质量和服务水平参考效应也是影响消费者购买决策的重要行为因素,本文将三者纳入到一个制造商和一个O2O销售模式的零售商构成的产品-服务供应链中,同时考虑运作模式的内在动态性,构建了制造商和零售商间的微分博弈模型。借助贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论,分析了分散、集中、互惠利他三种决策模式下的制造商质量水平策略、零售商服务水平策略以及供应链系统绩效,并对其进行了对比分析。研究表明:相比于分散决策模式,互惠利他行为有助于成员制定更高的质量和服务水平,提高品牌商誉,获得更大效用。数值算例验证了所得结论,并进行了消费者质量和服务水平参考效应、渠道偏好以及成员互惠利他行为对供应链绩效影响的敏感性分析。算例结果表明:1)消费者的参考效应使消费者产生“锚定心理”,导致制造商降低质量水平,零售商降低服务水平,也损害了产品-服务供应链的绩效。消费者的渠道偏好对供应链成员策略和绩效有着重要影响;2)零售商应鼓励消费者进行线上购买产品,并以线下渠道的服务作为销售辅助措施,满足消费者的体验效用;3)成员的互惠利他行为作为一种正向社会偏好能够对分散决策模型下的供应链绩效进行帕累托改进,并且会获得额外的社会福利;4)当且仅当制造商和零售商具有纯利他行为偏好,即具有最低回报程度和最高利他程度时,供应链的总利润能够达到集中决策情形。     

Controlling Power Retailer's Gray Activities Through Contract Design

We develop a model that captures dynamic relationships of a supply chain populated by a dominant retailer and a number of fringe retailers. The two types of retailers are asymmetric in buying power, retailing cost, and the ability to service the manufacturer's product. The wholesale prices offered through a quantity discount (QD) schedule can coordinate such a supply chain, but invite channel flow diversion type of gray trading between the dominant retailer and the fringe retailers. Our analysis is focused on how such a channel can be coordinated and the gray market activities be prevented. We propose a dynamic QD contract or a revenue‐sharing contract that the manufacturer can use to fight the gray market activity. The performance of the supply chain and the manufacturer's profit under each of the two contract forms are compared and managerial guidelines are provided to help the manufacturer make a judicious choice.     

不对称信息下线上零售商定价与O2O渠道策略研究

针对由制造商和线上零售商组成的供应链，考虑消费者退货行为以及产品退货会给企业造成退货损失，且线上零售商退货损失为其私有信息，研究不对称信息下的供应链定价、O2O渠道策略以及合同设计问题，分析线上零售商引入O2O渠道的可行条件及其对供应双方最优决策和消费者剩余的影响，考察不对称信息对各个企业、供应链系统利润的影响。研究表明，线上零售商引入O2O渠道存在可行条件，取决于退货损失的大小；当线上零售商引入O2O渠道时，制造商和供应链系统的期望利润水平均能得到有效提升；O2O渠道策略有利于提高消费者剩余，但到体验店体验产品的消费者不一定能够得到更高的消费者剩余；如果满足一定条件，则线上零售商会选择信息共享谈判与制造商共享其私有信息，进而实现"双赢"。     

联合促销下双渠道VMI供应链的竞争与协调

本文在双渠道VMI供应链中,假设制造商和零售商分别处于领导者和追随者的地位,考虑了制造商通过联合促销协调供应链上下游的策略以及双渠道需求之间的搭便车效应,以此为背景建立了制造商和零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并通过拉格朗日乘数法求解出了制造商的最优发货策略和零售商的最优定价与促销策略。研究发现制造商开辟网上渠道直销产品后,零售商缺货时间比例增大。进一步研究发现,制造商承担促销成本的比例,双渠道之间的搭便车效应对供应链成员的决策和利润有显著影响。另外,双渠道的需求越不稳定,则制造商开辟网上销售渠道后获利越高,同时零售商的利润越低。最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性并对模型中主要参数进行了灵敏度分析。     

考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道闭环供应链决策研究

双渠道闭环供应链存在制造商网络直销渠道和零售商实体店零售渠道。消费者会对购买不满意的产品进行退货，由于网上商店购买的产品缺乏现场体验故退货率较高。相比线下实体商店，线上退货流程更为复杂，这往往容易影响消费者购物体验。因此本文设计考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道闭环供应链结构，并分析跨渠道退货率以及渠道消费偏好对供应链的决策影响，基于Stackelberg博弈和Nash均衡博弈理论，从集中式决策与分散式决策两方面研究不同闭环供应链结构下的定价决策与利润分配，并结合数值算例进行分析。研究结果表明，跨渠道退货率以及消费者渠道偏好对闭环供应链的定价策略以及利润分配等决策具有显著影响。     

互联网平台多属策略、经营模式与商家绩效

目前互联网第三方平台发展迅速,平台选择成为商家重要的经营策略。然而,商家在传统经营模式下依然缺乏对互联网平台策略价值实现的认识,并面临着互联网平台价值实现路径选择的难题。根据资源依赖理论,本文以O2O平台（饿了么,美团,百度外卖）410家水果店商家为样本,实证分析了商家选择互联网平台多属策略对其绩效的影响,并考察了传统连锁加盟模式对该路径选择的调节作用。结果表明,线上平台多属策略正向影响商家绩效,连锁加盟模式强化了平台多属策略对绩效的积极作用。研究结论对未来研究和商家的创新实践提供了针对性的启示。     

消费者退货对在线零售商促销与合同设计的影响研究

针对由制造商和在线零售商组成的供应链系统，在存在消费者退货情形下，考虑在线零售商在线上渠道提供促销与退款保证服务，其中在线零售商促销成本为其私有信息，建立了信息不对称下的供应链博弈模型，研究了在线零售商的最优促销策略与供应链合同设计问题；进而分析了不对称信息对供应链均衡的影响，考察了退款保证对供应双方期望利润、信息价值以及消费者剩余的影响。研究发现，当制造商在决策合同参数（设计合同）时，需要在在线零售商信息租金与供应链系统绩效损失之间进行权衡；若满足一定条件，制造商和在线零售商之间进行谈判并能够实现信息共享而分享整个系统的利润；当退货产品总是会给供应链成员造成损失时，退款保证会导致制造商和零售商期望利润的损失，但在一定条件下却能提升消费者剩余。     

免费搭车行为对供应链横向竞争的影响

考虑两家处于供应链下游的零售商,其中一家为实体店,一家为网上店,其中网上店利用了顾客的免费搭车行为获得部分市场需求。文章研究了免费搭车行为对两零售商价格竞争及利润的影响。研究表明随着实体店服务水平的上升和网上店初始需求的增大,网上店的均衡利润将增加,两家店的价格竞争将更加激烈;当边际服务成本较低时,实体店的均衡利润要高于网上店的均衡利润,允许顾客的免费搭车行为存在,并缓解了两家店之间的价格竞争;当边际服务成本很高时,实体店入不敷出,不再允许顾客的免费搭车行为。