Capability,Quality, and Performance of Offshore IS Vendors: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Investigation

Information systems (IS) offshoring has become a widespread practice and a strategic sourcing choice for many firms. While much has been written by researchers about the factors that lead to successful offshoring arrangements from the client's viewpoint, the vendor's perspective has been largely scarce. The vendor perspective is equally important as offshore IS vendors need to make important decisions in terms of delivering operational and strategic performance and aligning their resources and processes in order to meet or exceed targeted outcomes. In this article, we propose and test a three‐level capability–quality–performance (CQP) theoretical framework to understand vendor outcomes and their antecedents. The first level of the framework represents three vendor capabilities: relationship management, contract management, and information technology management. The second level has three mediating variables representing process quality: partnership, service, and deliverable quality. The third level has three dependent variables representing vendor outcomes: operational performance, strategic performance, and satisfaction. The model was tested with 188 vendor firms from India and China, the two most popular destinations for IS offshoring. Results support the CQP framework; vendor capabilities are significant predictors of intermediate quality measures, which in turn affect vendor outcomes. Implications of the study findings to both theory development and IS offshore vendor strategic decision making are discussed.     

Implementation With Contingent Contracts

We study dominant strategy incentive compatibility in a mechanism design setting with contingent contracts where the payoff of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. Our main focus is on the class of linear contracts (one of the most commonly used contingent contracts) which consist of a transfer and a flat rate of profit sharing. We characterize outcomes implementable by linear contracts and provide a foundation for them by showing that, in finite type spaces, every social choice function that can be implemented using a more general nonlinear contingent contract can also be implemented using a linear contract. We then qualitatively describe the set of implementable outcomes. We show that a general class of social welfare criteria can be implemented. This class contains social choice functions (such as the Rawlsian) which cannot be implemented using (uncontingent) transfers. Under additional conditions, we show that only social choice functions in this class are implementable.     

Robust Contracts in Continuous Time

We study a continuous‐time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract that maximizes his utility under the worst‐case scenario subject to the agent's incentive and participation constraints. Robustness generates endogenous belief heterogeneity and induces a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing so that the incentive constraint does not always bind. We implement the optimal contract by cash reserves, debt, and equity. In addition to receiving ordinary dividends when cash reserves reach a threshold, outside equity holders also receive special dividends or inject cash in the cash reserves to hedge against model uncertainty and smooth dividends. The equity premium and the credit yield spread generated by ambiguity aversion are state dependent and high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.     

The Influence of Cost and Quality Priorities on the Propensity to Outsource Production*

Outsourcing of production has escalated over the past decade due to unprecedented competition and worldwide access to low‐cost labor markets. This article examines how cost and quality priorities—two key attributes of manufacturing strategy—influence a manufacturer's propensity to outsource. By doing so, we bridge the existing gap between research on manufacturing strategy and firm boundaries. We develop a theory‐based model that links a manufacturer's cost and quality priorities to its plans to outsource production. Our empirical analyses, based on survey data obtained from 867 manufacturing business units, control for firm‐specific factors previously shown to impact outsourcing, including asset specificity, uncertainty, and current capabilities in cost and quality. We found that the competitive priority placed on cost played an integral role in sourcing decisions, while, surprisingly, conformance quality priorities did not. The cost result is consistent with our expectations and observations in practice. The significant effect of cost priority on outsourcing shows that any theory of firm boundaries that fails to consider competitive priorities is incomplete. The finding regarding quality, which was counter to our expectations, may partially explain why there is an emergence of so many nonconforming products associated with outsourcing. Taken together, our results provide theoretical insights for future research into how manufacturing managers can improve their decision making on outsourcing production.     

Understanding the Elusive Black Box of Dynamic Capabilities

A major challenge for managers in turbulent environments is to make sound decisions quickly. Dynamic capabilities have been proposed as a means for addressing turbulent environments by helping managers extend, modify, and reconfigure existing operational capabilities into new ones that better match the environment. However, because dynamic capabilities have been viewed as an elusive black box, it is difficult for managers to make sound decisions in turbulent environments if they cannot effectively measure dynamic capabilities. Therefore, we first seek to propose a measurable model of dynamic capabilities by conceptualizing, operationalizing, and measuring dynamic capabilities. Specifically, drawing upon the dynamic capabilities literature, we identify a set of capabilities—sensing the environment, learning, coordinating, and integrating—that help reconfigure existing operational capabilities into new ones that better match the environment. Second, we propose a structural model where dynamic capabilities influence performance by reconfiguring existing operational capabilities in the context of new product development (NPD). Data from 180 NPD units support both the measurable model of dynamic capabilities and also the structural model by which dynamic capabilities influence performance in NPD by reconfiguring operational capabilities, particularly in higher levels of environmental turbulence. The study's implications for managerial decision making in turbulent environments by capturing the elusive black box of dynamic capabilities are discussed.     

不完全信息下多阶段移动应用产品与服务合作的可更新契约

考虑不完全信息下由提供移动应用产品与服务的ERP厂商、APP厂商与客户企业组成的产品服务供应链,针对ERP厂商与APP厂商产品服务合作中存在的逆向选择与道德风险问题,构建两阶段的动态博弈模型,分析了APP厂商隐藏与披露能力信息对产品与服务质量、供应链系统绩效与ERP厂商利润的影响,提出了信息披露、收益共享的单阶段契约与存在契约变更的两阶段契约激励策略,比较了两种契约的价值。研究表明：通过在产品开发阶段观察APP厂商的契约菜单选择以及获得的产品质量信息,甄别APP厂商的能力信息,在服务阶段进行契约变更,有利于提高产品与服务质量,降低ERP厂商风险,使供应链系统利润与ERP厂商自身利润实现帕累托改善。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了直观考察和说明。     

Managing the Performance Trade‐Offs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects

Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms' govern partnering relationships through fixed‐price contracts, whereas in others, firms' use more flexible time and materials or performance‐based contracts. How do these choices affect the costs and benefits that arise from greater levels of partner integration? Furthermore, how are these relationships affected when the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship? Our study addresses these questions using data from 172 R&D projects that involve partners. We find that, (i) greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs for all contract types; (ii) greater partner integration is associated with higher product quality only in projects that adopt more flexible time and materials or performance‐based contracts; and (iii) in projects where the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship, greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs, but not with higher product quality. Our results shed light on the subtle interplay between formal and relational contracting. They have important implications for practice, with respect to designing optimal governance structures in partnered R&D projects.     

Incentive Contracts for Managing a Project with Uncertain Completion Time

We examine two time‐related incentive project management contracts (C1 and C2 contracts) when the manager conducts a reverse auction. Under the C1 contract, the contractor with the lowest bid price wins; however, the manager imposes a linear and symmetric incentive/disincentive for early/late completion according to a pre‐specified due date. Under the C2 contract, the winning contractor has the lowest composite score that is based on the quoted price and the quoted due date; however, in addition to the linear and symmetric penalty/incentive, the contractor is subject to an additional penalty for late completion. While the C2 contract is more sophisticated than the C1 contract (in terms of the number of decisions that each party has to make), our analysis reveals that, unless the project is truly urgent, the more complicated C2 contract adds no value to the manager— the simple C1 contract will suffice.     

Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation‐Proof Contracts

What does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible? This paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation‐proof contracts in this environment. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods. As frictions become negligible, all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating, efficient, and straightforward to characterize.     

工艺设计质量信息不对称环境下质量激励合同设计

工艺设计质量决定了产品可制造性，从而对产品质量产生重要影响。在生产外包环境下，不仅供应商的质量努力难以合同化，而且工艺设计质量可能是设计者的私人信息，因此在供应商和制造商之间往往是不对称的，从而为质量激励合同设计带来挑战。本文考虑一个制造商和一个供应商构成的两级供应链。制造商可能自己设计产品，然后将生产外包给供应商，也可能将设计和生产都外包给供应商。本文分析了在这两种外包策略下，制造商的质量激励合同设计。研究发现：1）当工艺设计质量是对称信息时，制造商可以通过质量合同设计实现全局最优质量和利润；2）当工艺设计质量是制造商的私人信息时，工艺设计质量高的制造商可以通过降低对供应商的质量惩罚强度以及增加采购价格来传递工艺设计质量的信号；3）当工艺设计质量是供应商的私人信息时，制造商可以通过质量合同菜单来甄别工艺设计质量信息。与工艺设计质量是对称信息时的均衡合同相比，在针对低工艺设计水平供应商的合同中，制造商降低质量惩罚强度和采购价格；在针对高工艺设计水平供应商的合同中，质量惩罚强度不变，但采购价格提高。     

Contracting Under Vendor Managed Inventory Systems Using Holding Cost Subsidies

Vendor managed inventory systems are becoming increasingly popular. An important issue in implementing a vendor managed inventory scheme is the contracting terms that dictate the ownership of the inventory and the responsibility of inventory replenishment decisions. Thus the performance of a vendor managed system crucially depends on these terms and on how inventory‐related costs are shared in a supply chain. We consider a system where a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer who faces random demand in a competitive market. The retailer incurs a fixed cost per order, inventory holding cost, and a penalty cost for a stockout (unsatisfied demand is back‐ordered). Further, the manufacturer incurs a penalty cost when there is a stockout at the retailer and a fixed replenishment cost. We assume that the players are rational and act noncooperatively. We compare the performance of retailer managed inventory systems, where the retailer places orders and makes replenishment decisions, with vendor managed inventory systems, wherein the vendor or manufacturer makes inventory and replenishment decisions. Specifically, in the vendor managed inventory system, we propose and evaluate holding cost subsidy‐type contracts on inventories offered by the retailer to improve system performance. We evaluate this contract in the context of three widely used inventory systems—deterministic economic order quantity, continuous review (Q, r) policies, and periodic review policies—and show when such contracts may improve channel performance.     

关系契约治理与外包合作绩效——对日离岸软件外包项目的实证研究

对日离岸软件外包项目具有典型的关系契约特性,现有文献对软件外包中的关系契约治理及对合作绩效的影响还缺乏系统的理论分析和实证研究。信任、交流和相互适应调整作为重要的关系规范,在对日软件外包关系契约治理中具有重要意义。本研究根据访谈和110个项目的数据实证检验了关系规范对离岸软件外包项目绩效的影响。通过结构方程模型方法发现,交流的有效性对于项目质量和供应商成本控制绩效有积极影响,相互适应调整对于成本控制绩效也有积极影响。这个发现有助于构建有效的关系契约治理机制,促进软件外包产业发展。     

A Service Provider's Elicitation of Its Customers’ Demand Distributions by a Price Mechanism

In a service environment a service provider needs to determine the amount and kinds of capacity to meet customers’ needs over many periods. To make good decisions, she needs to know the probability distribution of her customers’ demand in each period. We study a situation in which customers’ demand for a given service is random in each period, but inelastic, or modeled well by this assumption, and cannot be delayed to the next period. This article presents a mechanism that allows a service provider to learn the distribution of a customer's demand by offering him a set of contracts through which he can partially prepay for future service for a reduced cost for units of service based on anticipated needs. We describe the form of a set of contracts that will cause the customer to reveal his demand distribution as he minimizes his expected costs. To justify the effort of organizing and offering contracts, we present an application that demonstrates the cost savings to the service provider with better capacity planning using the truthfully elicited distribution.     

Financial Intermediaries and Markets

A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial intermediaries. We distinguish financial intermediaries according to whether they issue complete contingent contracts or incomplete contracts. Intermediaries such as banks that issue incomplete contracts, e.g., demand deposits, are subject to runs, but this does not imply a market failure. A sophisticated financial system—a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation—is incentive‐efficient, if the intermediaries issue complete contingent contracts, or else constrained‐efficient, if they issue incomplete contracts. We argue that there may be a role for regulating liquidity provision in an economy in which markets for aggregate risks are incomplete.     

Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh

Hunger during pre‐harvest lean seasons is widespread in the agrarian areas of Asia and Sub‐Saharan Africa. We randomly assign an $8.50 incentive to households in rural Bangladesh to temporarily out‐migrate during the lean season. The incentive induces 22% of households to send a seasonal migrant, their consumption at the origin increases significantly, and treated households are 8–10 percentage points more likely to re‐migrate 1 and 3 years after the incentive is removed. These facts can be explained qualitatively by a model in which migration is risky, mitigating risk requires individual‐specific learning, and some migrants are sufficiently close to subsistence that failed migration is very costly. We document evidence consistent with this model using heterogeneity analysis and additional experimental variation, but calibrations with forward‐looking households that can save up to migrate suggest that it is difficult for the model to quantitatively match the data. We conclude with extensions to the model that could provide a better quantitative accounting of the behavior.     

Managing Outsourced Software Projects: An Analysis of Project Performance and Customer Satisfaction

We examine the drivers of project performance and customer satisfaction in outsourced software projects using a proprietary panel dataset. The data cover 822 customer observations related to 182 unique projects executed by an India‐based software services vendor. Adopting a multidisciplinary perspective, we investigate how project planning, team stability, and communication effectiveness impact project performance and customer satisfaction. We delineate the direct and interactive influences of the antecedent variables. We also examine how these influences are moderated by two important project contexts: (a) the nature of software work (maintenance and development vs. testing projects) and (b) project maturity (new vs. mature projects). Among other results, we demonstrate that, when project planning capabilities are high, the positive impact of team stability and communication effectiveness on project performance is even higher. In addition, our results suggest that the impact of communication on project performance is muted when team stability is high. Finally, we also demonstrate that the impact of the antecedent variables on project performance varies with the nature of software work. Our findings offer specific and actionable insights to managers that can help them manage outsourced projects better, and open up new research perspectives in the context of outsourced project management.     

Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information

This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable payoffs. This result is related to the ratchet effect in that: (1) a type imitating a less productive type receives an information rent, and (2) with full separation, one imitating a more productive type receives the same future payoff as that more productive type. However, the reason for (2) is fundamentally different than with the ratchet effect. It arises from the dynamic enforcement requirement in relational contracts, not from the principal having all the bargaining power, and applies whatever the distribution between principal and agent of the future gains from the relationship (i.e., whatever the point on the Pareto frontier). This result extends to sufficiently persistent types under certain conditions.     

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.     

Promotion,Turnover, and Compensation in the Executive Labor Market

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.     

Segmentation Opportunities for a Social Planner: Impact of Limited Resources

In this research note, we investigate segmentation opportunities for social planners such as government agencies, nonprofits, and public organizations. These opportunities arise when the potential products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences toward quality. In these cases, whether to offer quality differentiated products and what quality level to choose are important decisions for a social planner. In this research note, we identify the conditions where it is socially optimal to offer either one homogenous or two quality differentiated products. We find that the resource limitations may result in a single product offering and that the quality of the product depends on the maximum surplus per unit resource consumed by the products. We also compare our findings to a profit‐maximizing firm. We find that the resource limitations may cause a profit‐maximizing firm to provide a better service to some consumers than the social planner. Contrary to common wisdom, we also show that the capacity limitations may force the social planner to act like a profit‐maximizing firm in terms of its pricing and product mix choice.