A Periodic Inventory Model for Stocking Modular Components

We study the benefit obtained by exploiting modular product design in fulfilling exogenous demand for both a complete assembly and its components in a service parts inventory system. Our goal is to reduce overall service system costs by allowing assembly and/or disassembly (A/D) to occur at some unit cost per A/D action. In an extensive set of computational experiments, we compare a naïve stocking and operating policy that treats all items independently and ignores the modular product structure and related A/D capability to the optimal base stock policy, and to a policy that allows A/D from the naïve stocking levels. While extensive computational analysis shows that the optimal base stock policy improves the system cost between 3 to 26% over the naïve approach, simply allowing A/D from the naïve stocking levels captures a significant portion (an average of 67%) of the naïve–optimal gap. Our computational results demonstrate that the optimization shifts the component‐assembly mix from the naïve levels and that limiting A/D capacity affects this mix. Limiting A/D capacity can actually increase the expected number of A/D actions (versus the uncapacitated case), since the optimization shifts stocking levels to reduce the probability that “too many” actions will be required.     

Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks

We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network. We show that the question of whether or not the agents learn efficiently depends on the topology of the social network. In particular, we identify a geometric “egalitarianism” condition on the social network that guarantees learning in infinite networks, or learning with high probability in large finite networks, in any equilibrium. We also give examples of nonegalitarian networks with equilibria in which learning fails.     

Gray Markets and Supply Chain Incentives

“Gray markets” are unauthorized channels that distribute a branded product without the manufacturer's permission. Since gray markets are not officially sanctioned by the manufacturer, their existence is assumed to hurt the manufacturer. Yet manufacturers sometimes tolerate or even encourage gray market activities. We investigate the incentives of a manufacturer and its authorized retailer to engage in (or tolerate) gray markets. The firms need to consider the trade‐off between the positive effects of a gray market (price discrimination and cost savings) and the negative effects (cannibalization of sales and a loss in consumer valuation). Generally, gray markets can be categorized into two types: (i) a “local gray market,” where a retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers operating in the same region as the retailer; and, (ii) “bootlegging,” where the retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers in another market where the manufacturer sells through a direct channel. We characterize the equilibrium in each type of gray market and identify conditions under which the retailer will divert products to the gray market. Incentive problems are more complicated when the retailer bootlegs and, in this case, we show that conflicting incentives may lead to the emergence of a gray market where both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits decrease.     

TRUST,COORDINATION, AND THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a “low‐trust” regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism; conversely, the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure. When ideological distance is large, a “high‐trust” regime prevails: lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers, and the policymaker's response threshold is correspondingly lower. Within some intermediate range, both equilibria coexist. We then study the optimal organization of influence activities, contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate. (JEL: D72, D78, D82)     

Timing and Self‐Control

The standard dual‐self model of self‐control, with a shorter‐run self who cares only about the current period, is excessively sensitive to the timing of decisions and to the interpolation of additional “no‐action” time periods in between the dates when decisions are made. We show that when the shorter‐run self is not completely myopic, this excess sensitivity goes away. To accommodate the combination of short time periods and convex costs of self‐control, we introduce a cognitive resource variable that tracks how the control cost depends on the self‐control that has been used in the recent past. We consider models with both linear and convex control costs, illustrating the theory through a series of examples. We examine when opportunities to consume will be avoided or delayed, and we consider the way in which the marginal interest declines with delay.     

Incentive Contracts in Projects with Unforeseeable Uncertainty

Designing incentive contracts that constructively guide employee efforts is a particularly difficult challenge in novel innovation initiatives, where unforeseen events may occur. Empirical studies have observed a variety of incentive structures in innovation settings: “time and material contracts” (compensation for executing orders), “downside protection” (target‐driven incentives with protection from unexpected risks), and “upside rewards” (additional remuneration for pursuing opportunities). This paper develops a model of incentives in presence of unforeseen events and offers a theoretical prediction of which of the empirically observed incentive structures should be used under which circumstances. The combination of three key influences drives the shape of the best incentive contract. First, the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty, or the occurrence of events that cannot possibly be foreseen at the outset. These may force a change in the project's plan, making pure target setting insufficient. Second, fairness concerns dictate that the employee's expected compensation cannot be shifted downward by unforeseen events, because it would cause demotivation, hostility, and defection. Third, management may not be able to observe the detailed actions of the employee (moral hazard) nor whether a positive or negative unforeseen event has occurred (asymmetric information).     

Reducing Packaging Waste and Cost via Consumer Price Discounts

Low‐waste packaging may imply an inconvenience to consumers and cause firms to offer a compensating price discount. For example, Starbucks’ “Take the Mug Pledge” campaign provides a 10‐cent discount for customers who purchase coffee without a standard cup (i.e., customers provide their own cup). Understanding how such a discount drives demand and profit is the focus of this article. We consider a monopolist that can offer a reduced‐packaging option for its product at a variable cost savings. That option implies a transactional “inconvenience” cost for consumers. While that transactional cost is generally positive, our model also permits some consumers to associate convenience with reduced packaging. We derive the optimal price and discount that maximize profits. We show the optimal discount is bounded by the magnitude of the variable cost savings associated with the packaging reduction. We explore when the optimal discount is negative (a price premium), which requires a specific proportion of consumers to associate convenience with reduced packaging. We also derive conditions under which the firm should price to eliminate demand for the standard product, rather than segment the market, to leverage the variable cost savings of reduced packaging. When the variable cost savings are low (e.g., as is true for Starbucks), we show the profit curve for the segmenting policy is relatively flat for a discount up to several multiples of the cost differential. Finally, we demonstrate the potential for the reduced packaging option, with optimal discounting, to simultaneously increase profit and consumer surplus while reducing waste.     

Advance Selling in the Presence of Speculators and Forward‐Looking Consumers

This article examines the pricing policy of a monopolist seller who may sell in advance of consumption in a market that comprises of myopic consumers, forward‐looking consumers, and speculators. The latter group has no consumption value for the goods and is in the market with the sole objective of making a profit by reselling the purchased goods shortly after. Consumers, although homogeneous in terms of their valuations, are different with respect to their perspectives. We show that in an “upward” market where the expected valuation increases over time, the optimal pricing policy is an ex ante “static” one where the seller “prices into the future” and prices the myopic consumers out of the advance market. However, in a “downward” market where the expected valuation decreases over time, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy except for the case when higher initial sales can trigger more demand subsequently and when the downward trend is not too high. In this case, the seller prefers an ex ante “static” pricing strategy and deliberately prices lower initially to sell to speculators. We identify the conditions under which the seller benefits from the existence of speculators in the market. Moreover, although the presence of entry costs is ineffective as an entry deterrence, we determine the conditions under which exit costs can rein in speculative purchase.     

Peer Effects and Peer Avoidance: The Diffusion of Behavior in Coevolving Networks

We study the long‐run emergence of behavioral patterns in dynamic complex networks. Individuals can display two kinds of behavior: G (“good”) or B (“bad”). We assume that the exposure of a G agent to bad behavior on the part of peers/neighbors triggers her own switch to B behavior, but only temporarily. We model the implications of such peer effects as an epidemic process in the standard SIS (Susceptible‐Infected‐Susceptible) framework. The key novelty of our model is that, unlike in the received literature, the network is taken to change over time within the same time scale as behavior. Specifically, we posit that links connecting two G agents last longer, reflecting the idea that B agents tend to be avoided. The main concern of the paper is to understand the extent to which such biased network turnover may play a significant role in supporting G behavior in a social system. And indeed we find that network coevolution has nontrivial and interesting effects on long‐run behavior. This yields fresh insights on the role of (endogenous) peer pressure on the diffusion of social behavior and also has some bearing on the traditional study of disease epidemics. (JEL: C71, D83, D85)     

Trojan Horses or Local Allies: Host-country National Managers in Developing Market Subsidiaries

We investigate a multinational corporation's (MNC) decision to appoint host-country national (HCN) managers to foreign subsidiaries based on the institutional context of and familiarity with the host country. HCN managers are commonly associated with specialized knowledge, superior responsiveness, and higher legitimacy. Yet, we argue that local familiarity of HCNs can also be perceived as risky or harmful by MNC parents. We analyze how formal and informal institutions affect the trade-off between positive effects and potential costs associated with HCN managers (“Local allies” vs. “Trojan horses”). We find that legal institutions protect foreign MNCs from potential costs, encourage the use of HCNs and reinforce their benefits. Corruption and corruption distance, however, increase perceived costs associated with HCN managers up to a point at which they outweigh their perceived benefits.     

The ethical mirage: A temporal explanation as to why we are not as ethical as we think we are

This paper explores the biased perceptions that people hold of their own ethicality. We argue that the temporal trichotomy of prediction, action and recollection is central to these misperceptions: People predict that they will behave more ethically than they actually do, and when evaluating past (un)ethical behavior, they believe they behaved more ethically than they actually did. We use the “want/should” theoretical framework to explain the bounded ethicality that arises from these temporal inconsistencies, positing that the “should” self dominates during the prediction and recollection phases but that the “want” self is dominant during the critical action phase. We draw on the research on behavioral forecasting, ethical fading, and cognitive distortions to gain insight into the forces driving these faulty perceptions and, noting how these misperceptions can lead to continued unethical behavior, we provide recommendations for how to reduce them. We also include a call for future research to better understand this phenomenon.     

Staffing Call Centers with Uncertain Arrival Rates and Co‐sourcing

In a call center, staffing decisions must be made before the call arrival rate is known with certainty. Once the arrival rate becomes known, the call center may be over‐staffed, in which case staff are being paid to be idle, or under‐staffed, in which case many callers hang‐up in the face of long wait times. Firms that have chosen to keep their call center operations in‐house can mitigate this problem by co‐sourcing; that is, by sometimes outsourcing calls. Then, the required staffing N depends on how the firm chooses which calls to outsource in real time, after the arrival rate realizes and the call center operates as a M/M/N + M queue with an outsourcing option. Our objective is to find a joint policy for staffing and call outsourcing that minimizes the long‐run average cost of this two‐stage stochastic program when there is a linear staffing cost per unit time and linear costs associated with abandonments and outsourcing. We propose a policy that uses a square‐root safety staffing rule, and outsources calls in accordance with a threshold rule that characterizes when the system is “too crowded.” Analytically, we establish that our proposed policy is asymptotically optimal, as the mean arrival rate becomes large, when the level of uncertainty in the arrival rate is of the same order as the inherent system fluctuations in the number of waiting customers for a known arrival rate. Through an extensive numerical study, we establish that our policy is extremely robust. In particular, our policy performs remarkably well over a wide range of parameters, and far beyond where it is proved to be asymptotically optimal.     

Turning change resistance into readiness: How change agents’ communication shapes recipient reactions

As employees’ support for an organizational change is critical for its success, change agents require guidelines on how to initiate change recipients’ endorsement. Accordingly, there is a need for an evidence-based understanding of which communication behaviors drive positive versus negative change reactions, as well as about the psychological mechanisms that explain effective communication. To advance our knowledge about successful change communication, we tested how autonomy-supportive communication, autonomy-restrictive communication, and reflective listening are associated with change recipients’ reactions. Building on Self-Determination Theory, we also tested the mediating mechanism of the satisfaction of recipients’ psychological needs between change agents’ actions and change recipients’ reactions. In three studies, we explored how change agents can use their communication to enhance recipients’ change readiness, as manifested in increased energy-saving intentions. In Study 1, we separately examined the effect of each communication behavior on change readiness. We coded dyadic change conversations for autonomy-supportive (vs. autonomy-restrictive) communication and reflective listening. Results showed that autonomy-restrictive communication negatively impacted recipients’ change readiness. Study 2 used an online experiment to distinguish between the effect of change agents’ autonomy-supportive and -restrictive communication. We found an indirect effect of change agents’ communication behaviors on recipients’ change readiness via psychological need fulfillment. In Study 3, we investigated how change agents “in the field” responded to recipients’ expressed resistance. Findings indicated that change agents use more autonomy-restrictive than -supportive communication, suggesting that their communication typically undermines rather than facilitates recipients’ change readiness.     

Optimal pricing for group buying with network effects

In this paper, we analyze online group-pricing mechanisms for sellers and compare them with the option of selling only to individuals. We formulate the demand for group buying and individual buying (GB and IB, respectively) based on the utility a consumer attains from each environment considering two specific types of externalities unique to our problem. First, we assume that consumers receive positive “network effects” from GB, i.e., they obtain utility from shopping with others because of information exchange and collective support. Second, they encounter a negative externality of group buying because of inconvenience costs and delays in receiving the products. The two types of externalities lead to distorted demand, which in turn affects prices and profits. We analyze the optimal and equilibrium strategies for a seller operating in monopoly, duopoly, and multiple-firm competition. We derive the equilibrium strategies and show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium under competition of multiple firms. In addition, we show that positive network effects from group buying often outweigh the negative externalities arising from costs.     

Benefactors and Beneficiaries: The Effects of Giving and Receiving on Cost‐Coalitional Problems

Motivated by supply chain collaborations in practice, we introduce a class of cost‐coalitional problems, which are based on a priori information about the cost faced by each agent in each set that it could belong to. Our focus is on problems with decreasingly monotonic coalitional costs. In this class of problems, we study the effects of giving and receiving when there exist players whose participation in an alliance always contributes to the savings of all alliance members (we refer to these players as benefactors), and there also exist players whose cost decreases in such an alliance (we call them beneficiaries). We use linear and quadratic norm cost games to analyze the role played by benefactors and beneficiaries in achieving stability of different cooperating alliances. We consider different notions of stability (the core and the bargaining set) and provide conditions for stability of an all‐inclusive alliance of agents which leads to minimum value of total cost incurred by all agents.     

On the online multi-agent O–D <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-Canadian Traveler Problem

In this article, we present new results on the online multi-agent O–D k-Canadian Traveler Problem, in which there are multiple agents and an input graph with a given source node O and a destination node D together with edge costs such that at most k edges are blocked. The blocked edges are not known a priori and are not recoverable. All of the agents are initially located at O. The objective is to find an online strategy such that at least one of the agents finds a route from the initial location O to a given destination D with minimum total cost. We focus on the case where communication among the agents is limited in the sense that some travelers can both send and receive information while the others can only receive information. We formalize the definition of agents’ intelligence by specifying three levels. We introduce two online strategies which utilize higher levels of agents’ intelligence to provide updated lower bounds to this problem. We show that one of our strategies is optimal in both cases with complete and limited communication in the special case of O–D edge-disjoint graphs and highest level of agents’ intelligence.     

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFICIENCY OF BARGAINING

We show that efficient bargaining is impossible for a wide class of economic settings and property rights. These settings are characterized by (i) the existence of “adverse efficient opt‐out types”, whose participation does not change the efficient allocation and who, when they opt out, are the worst type other agents can face, and (ii) non‐existence of the “marginal core”, and its multivaluedness with a positive probability. We also examine the optimal allocation of property rights within a given class that satisfies (i), such as simple property rights, liability rules, and dual‐chooser rules. We characterize property rights that minimize the expected subsidy required to implement efficiency. With two agents, simple property rights that are optimal in this way maximize the expected surplus at the status quo allocation, but this no longer holds with more agents. We also study “second‐best” budget‐balanced bargaining under a liability rule. The optimal “second‐best” liability rule may differ from, but is often close to, the expectation of the victim's harm, which would be optimal if there were no bargaining. However, liability rules that are close to a simple property right result in a lower expected surplus than the simple property right they are near.     

Optimal Sequencing of Unpunctual Patients in High‐Service‐Level Clinics

Even though patients often arrive early and out of turn for scheduled appointments in outpatient clinics, no research has been undertaken to establish whether an available provider should see an early patient right away (preempt) or wait for the patient scheduled next. This problem, which we call the “Wait‐Preempt Dilemma,” is particularly relevant for “high‐service‐level” clinics (such as psychotherapy, chiropractic, acupuncture), where preempting may cause the missing patient to wait for an excessively long time, should she show up soon. Typically, the dilemma is resolved by preemption, where the provider starts serving the patient who has already arrived to avoid staying idle. By contrast, we analytically determine the time intervals where it is optimal to preempt and those where it is optimal to wait, and find that in some cases the provider should in fact stay idle, even in the presence of waiting patients. Our results suggest that the proposed analytical method outperforms the always‐preempt policy in clinics that do not overbook and have service times longer than 30 minutes. In these cases, the analytical method dramatically reduces patient waiting times at the cost of a modest increase in overtime. By contrast, in clinics that overbook or have short service times, the two policies perform similarly, and hence the always‐preempt policy is preferable due to its simplicity. A software application is provided that clinics can readily use to solve the wait‐preempt dilemma.     

Perfectionism and Choice

Empirical evidence suggests that perfectionism can affect choice behavior. When striving for perfection, a person can desire to keep normatively appealing options feasible even if she persistently fails to use these options later. For instance, she can “pay not to go to the gym,” as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). By contrast, some perfectionists may avoid normatively important tasks for fear of negative self‐evaluation of their performance. This paper models perfectionist behaviors in Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) menu framework where agents may be tempted to deviate from their long‐term normative objectives. In addition to self‐control costs, I identify a utility component that reflects emotional costs and benefits of perfectionism. My model is derived from axioms imposed on preferences over menus in an essentially unique way.     

合并商誉的本质及会计处理:企业资源基础理论和交易费用视角

合并商誉一直是会计界争论较多的问题之一,本文试图以企业资源基础论对合并商誉的本质进行解释,先从无交易费用的理想情况着手建立模型并逐渐放松假设,考虑各种情况下合并商誉的含义以及出现合并负商誉的条件,最后对合并商誉的会计处理提出一些建议。本文认为,合并正商誉的实质是被并购企业的异质性资源加入并购企业为其带来的商誉增值,合并负商誉产生的根本原因是被并企业本身的价值因素而非交易费用。当被并企业的持续经营价值大于清算价值时,合并负商誉与企业本身的价值因素更相关;反之则与交易费用、清算成本更相关。