An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism

This paper constructs an efficient, budget‐balanced, Bayesian incentive‐compatible mechanism for a general dynamic environment with quasilinear payoffs in which agents observe private information and decisions are made over countably many periods. First, under the assumption of “private values” (other agents' private information does not directly affect an agent's payoffs), we construct an efficient, ex post incentive‐compatible mechanism, which is not budget‐balanced. Second, under the assumption of “independent types” (the distribution of each agent's private information is not directly affected by other agents' private information), we show how the budget can be balanced without compromising agents' incentives. Finally, we show that the mechanism can be made self‐enforcing when agents are sufficiently patient and the induced stochastic process over types is an ergodic finite Markov chain.     

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex‐ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex‐post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey‐Clark‐Groves mechanism guarantees both ex‐ante as well as ex‐post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex‐ante and ex‐post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub‐ and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex‐post efficient mechanisms lead to private under‐ or over‐acquisition of information.     

Large Robust Games

With many semi‐anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous‐move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous‐play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.     

多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究

在允许"价格-质量"投标的多因素投标环境下,设计了一种多因素采购组合拍卖的动态机制(规则),提出了竞争均衡打分的概念。构建了多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制的优化模型,讨论了拍卖规则和优化模型实现互补松弛条件之间的必然联系。基本结论是:在本拍卖机制中,投标者采用最佳近视反应投标策略,将使拍卖的分配结果趋向最优,最终在拍卖结束时实现系统效用最大化。     

企业动态联盟的协调机制

企业动态联盟是近年来出现的由多利益主体联盟结成的一种新型的网络组织形态,这种网络组织的运作效率和联盟目标的实现,不仅取决于联盟成员企业的独立运作能力,而且更需要联盟体内成员企业间的精诚合作与相互协调。针对企业动态联盟实践中遇到的协调困难及由此而导致的诸多风险问题,本文在阐明企业动态联盟协调的价值基础、关键要素和基于信息平台的协调管理构架的基础上,提出了三种形态的企业动态联盟的协调机制,并给出了一些具体的协调方法,以期为企业动态联盟管理实践提供参考。     

Robust Mechanism Design

The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on richer type spaces. We ask when ex post implementation is equivalent to interim (or Bayesian) implementation for all possible type spaces. The equivalence holds in the case of separable environments; examples of separable environments arise (1) when the planner is implementing a social choice function (not correspondence) and (2) in a quasilinear environment with no restrictions on transfers. The equivalence fails in general, including in some quasilinear environments with budget balance. In private value environments, ex post implementation is equivalent to dominant strategies implementation. The private value versions of our results offer new insights into the relationship between dominant strategy implementation and Bayesian implementation.     

参数不确定性和效用最大化下的动态投资组合选择

标准投资组合选择理论假设投资者准确地知道与资产收益率相关的各种参数(例如均值和方差),忽视了参数不确定性引致的估计风险给投资决策带来的影响.本文研究引入参数不确定和学习时的连续时间动态投资组合选择问题,使用鞅方法求导出了具有CRRA型效用函数的投资者的最优投资策略的显式表达式.在此基础上,我们结合中国证券市场中的实际数据深入分析了参数不确定性以及投资者初始信念对最优投资策略的影响.     

国有土地拍卖机制研究

本文基于贝叶斯均衡上的执行问题,讨论了参与人参数环境空间受机制设计者影响时,不同机制选择的执行条件,给出了目标函数不变时机制对偶等价性的充分必要条件。并比较了中国国有土地拍卖三大机制的效率,给出了土地拍卖机制在实话实说可执行下对的社会福利影响,研究发现：当参与者可以策略性选择行动,实现政府利益最大时,选择限房价或者限地价机制是等价的;非市场机制和市场机制相比,关键还是土地财政和消费者利益之间的权衡;实话实说可执行机制直接显示了政府利益、开发商利润与消费者利益三者之间的权衡关系,但并未改进社会福利。     

面向动态评价的长效机制及其构建研究

事物的动态发展变化催生了对动态评价方法的需求。为解决动态评价中跨阶段动态可比性和对新增阶段的适应性等动态评价长效性需求问题,提出动态评价长效机制的构建原理。通过对数据标准化方式和多种评价方法的特征分析,在分析动态评价过程各环节技术的动态有效性基础上,从数据采集、数据标准化、评价方法的选择与使用等方面,基于线性加权模式下的竞优评析方法,构建了一种面向动态评价的“客观民主式”动态评价长效机制。最后,通过一个实例说明本研究在实际应用上的有效性。面向动态评价的长效评价机制为解决动态评价有效性问题提供了思路,可作为综合评价理论方法的一种有益补充。     

Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach

We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three contributions. First, we provide a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an envelope formula for the derivative of an agent's equilibrium expected payoff with respect to his current type. It combines the familiar marginal effect of types on payoffs with novel marginal effects of the current type on future ones that are captured by “impulse response functions.” The formula yields an expression for dynamic virtual surplus that is instrumental to the design of optimal mechanisms and to the study of distortions under such mechanisms. Second, we characterize the transfers that satisfy the envelope formula and establish a sense in which they are pinned down by the allocation rule (“revenue equivalence”). Third, we characterize perfect Bayesian equilibrium‐implementable allocation rules in Markov environments, which yields tractable sufficient conditions that facilitate novel applications. We illustrate the results by applying them to the design of optimal mechanisms for the sale of experience goods (“bandit auctions”).     

土地使用权机制的实现与执行

机制设计者的目的是想最优化一个基于环境参数空间的社会福利函数,但是有关环境参数的相关信息分散于经济之中,因此机制设计者既想收集尽可能多的相关信息,又想充分利用这些信息制定一个社会决策。机制通常在两个框架下讨论,分为实现和执行,两者本质区别在于后者利用了对策性思维方式。本文给出了土地使用权机制在二维信息传递空间下的实现问题,将激励相容条件引入信息有效的机制实现中,给出了占优均衡下的机制执行。研究发现:在实话实说假设下,能够降低信息传递空间维度,并且通过一个信息有效的机制来实现政府目标函数;参与人能够利用私有信息时,实话实说不能成为一个纳什均衡,但在占优均衡下可以通过机制来执行。     

Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design From Exogenously Incomplete Regimes

We formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of constrained credit/insurance that allow for moral hazard and limited commitment. We compare them to full insurance and exogenously incomplete financial regimes (autarky, saving only, borrowing and lending in a single asset). We develop computational methods based on mechanism design, linear programming, and maximum likelihood to estimate, compare, and statistically test these alternative dynamic models with financial/information constraints. Our methods can use both cross‐sectional and panel data and allow for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate the models using data on Thai households running small businesses from two separate samples. We find that in the rural sample, the exogenously incomplete saving only and borrowing regimes provide the best fit using data on consumption, business assets, investment, and income. Family and other networks help consumption smoothing there, as in a moral hazard constrained regime. In contrast, in urban areas, we find mechanism design financial/information regimes that are decidedly less constrained, with the moral hazard model fitting best combined business and consumption data. We perform numerous robustness checks in both the Thai data and in Monte Carlo simulations and compare our maximum likelihood criterion with results from other metrics and data not used in the estimation. A prototypical counterfactual policy evaluation exercise using the estimation results is also featured.     

食品供应链中企业与农户短期合作交易契约设计

依据食品供应链中企业与农户间的交易特性,在不完全契约理论框架下,建立了双方承诺不再进行协商的短期合作交易契约设计理论模型。研究结论表明,企业的试验代理人地位是保证农户在第一阶段诚实宣告其类型,从而保证双方专用性投资为最优水平的关键,子博弈精炼纳什均衡的主要限制为,企业支付函数必须为单调函数条件才不会说谎。     

基于价值创造和动态基础薪酬的经营者激励机制研究

目前,经营者激励机制研究通常以净收益为业绩标准,采用固定基础薪酬制度,且大多数局限于薪酬激励。本文以价值创造为业绩标准,采用动态基础薪酬制度,将薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合设计经营者激励模型,在传统委托代理模型基础上得出如下三点结论:第一,实行动态基础薪酬制度可以有效提升经营者努力水平;第二,经营者激励应采用薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合的手段,并依据非薪酬激励敏感度灵活设计二者的组合比例;第三,垄断行业经营者努力水平低于竞争性行业,需要引入竞争机制。     

管理创新效力机制研究:基于动态能力观视角的研究框架

管理创新逐渐成为企业竞争优势最重要和持续的来源,但其复杂性及其对组织绩效影响的滞后性使得学者和实业家对管理创新效力提升问题倍感困惑。为此,以普遍存在的引进型管理创新为研究对象,尝试从企业动态能力观视角提出提升管理创新效力的思路或研究框架,并进一步从管理者个人和组织双层面阐释动态能力的提升路径,旨在为管理创新研究提供一个新的研究视角。     

基于拍卖机制的资源转移时间型动态分布式多项目调度

实践中,企业并行实施地域上分散的多个项目时,资源在各子项目之间的转移时间是影响多项目整体进度的关键因素,同时在动态多项目环境下,新项目不断到达且到达时间不可预知使得制定多项目调度计划遭遇更大困难。本文在动态环境下对资源转移时间型分布式多项目调度问题进行建模和求解,基于多代理系统建立分布式多项目调度问题的动态模型,并将拍卖理论引入其中,设计一种基于时间窗拍卖机制的分布式多代理系统(DMAS/ATW),在动态环境和资源转移时间约束下为多项目配置全局资源。通过一个具体的分布式多项目示例详细分析DMAS/ATW算法的动态调度过程,并基于MPSPLIB中的分布式多项目算例开展数值实验。实验结果表明：无资源转移时间约束时,DMAS/ATW算法求得的平均项目延迟同比相关文献中的DMAS/RIA算法最多减少42%,平均减少26%;有资源转移时间约束时,DMAS/ATW算法对1/3算例集的求解结果优于DMAS/RIA算法在无资源转移时间约束时的结果,验证了本文DMAS/ATW算法求解效果的优异性。对算例规模和全局资源利用系数的实验分析还表明,DMAS/ATW算法对不同规模和资源约束紧张程度的算例都具有良好的适应性。     

消费者策略行为视角下短生命周期产品的定价机制研究

本文从消费者策略行为出发,通过运用经典的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论面对消费者策略行为时,短生命周期产品厂商如何有效进行收益管理.结论表明,在短生命周期产品收益管理过程中,忽视消费者策略行为会导致利润的严重损失,厂商应根据库存和消费者的理性预期制定相应的价格决策.当库存较少时,厂商基本可以忽略消费者策略行为而制定较高价格;当库存相对较多,厂商的最优定价决策依赖于理性预期均衡;当库存非常充裕时,最优定价决策与消费者折扣因子紧密相关.厂商可通过适当的库存数量增加产品缺货风险,而减少消费者策略行为的不利影响.这对短生命周期产品的收益管理具有一定的现实意义.     

基于过程管理的工程项目多目标综合动态调控机理模型

针对现代项目管理控制的现实要求,提出以过程管理为基础,通过构建多目标综合调控模型,实现对工程项目多目标体系的综合集成化动态调控。在分析过程动态控制基本原理和多目标综合调控系统过程的基础上,融合控制论方法和网络技术方法,通过选取关键线路上的关键控制点,对控制目标进行实时监控,重点探讨了多目标综合动态调控模型和相应的调控规则机理,以便实现过程管理与多目标调控之间的统一。     

公私合作制(PPP)项目的政府动态激励与监督机制

针对PPP基础设施项目建设中激励机制涉及的企业最优努力水平、政府监督及关系契约的预期收益三大因素加以分析;从动态的角度出发,在Holmstrom和Tirole激励模型的基础上,运用委托代理理论设计公私部门两阶段合作的激励合同,通过对不同阶段企业最优努力水平和政府监督奖惩因子的分析,得到影响企业最优努力水平和政府监督奖惩因子的相关因素以及企业两阶段决策中的动态影响;最后分别通过对政府外部监督与企业内在激励的分析,提出PPP项目建设中权变激励的激励机制和方向,从而为PPP项目建设中有效激励合同的设计提供一定的指导。     

生产能力无限时逢低买入与固定价格机制的比较

逢低买入是一种新型的基于网络的动态价格机制,它通过联合单个消费者形成规模来获得价格折扣。作为双向拍卖的一种变体,逢低买入的适用条件是亟待研究的问题。本文通过研究存在规模效应的前提下,当商家能够完全满足消费者的需求时,采用逢低买入拍卖所能获得的收益情况,证明了在这种情况下逢低买入将会绝对优于固定价格机制,从而表明逢低买入适用于这种环境。