共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 11 毫秒
1.
Increasingly, donors that subsidize socially‐desirable products in the developing world are shifting from distributing through non‐commercial to commercial channels, ceding control of the product price to for‐profit intermediaries. This study advises a donor as to how the donor’s loss of price control and the level of consumer awareness—defined as the fraction of the consumer population that is informed of the product’s benefits—influence the donor’s optimal subsidy and utility: First, in shifting to the commercial channel, the donor should increase (decrease) the subsidy when consumer awareness is low (high). Second, with the commercial channel, the donor should be prepared to increase the subsidy as awareness increases, which is contrary to her actions with a non‐commercial channel. Third, contrary to the lesson obtained with non‐commercial distribution, with commercial distribution the donor can be hurt by increased awareness. This occurs when awareness is moderate. The implication is that a donor that operates in such a setting should be wary in encouraging entities (e.g., governments, non‐governmental organizations) to institute campaigns that increase the awareness of the product’s benefits. The intermediary’s decision of whether to target either only informed consumers or the broad market drives our results. 相似文献
2.
We examine the use of consumer cash mail‐in rebates offered by a manufacturer in a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Our analysis indicates that rebates are profitable for manufacturers if consumers are inconsistent in the sense that their rebate valuation when they make purchase decisions is independent of their redemption probabilities when they make redemption decisions. If the manufacturer keeps the wholesale price unchanged, then the rebate increases the retailer's profit by a larger amount than the increase in the manufacturer's profit. If the manufacturer jointly optimizes the wholesale price and rebate, then the increase in the manufacturer's profit is twice the increase in the retailer's profit. The retailer responds to rebates by increasing the retail price, which increases the margin paid by consumers who do not redeem the rebate. On average, consumer surplus decreases when it is optimal for manufacturers to offer rebates. We suggest incentive schemes that make it worthwhile for retailers to limit the price increase. In these incentive schemes, the manufacturer imposes a negative relationship between the rebate value and the retail price. We show that such incentives increase supply chain profits. 相似文献
3.
We study the joint decisions of offering mail‐in rebates (MIRs) in a single‐manufacturer–single‐retailer supply chain using a game theoretic framework. Either party can offer an MIR to the end consumer if it is in his best interest. The consumer demand is stochastic and depends on the product price and the amount of MIRs. When the retail price is exogenous, we show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium under both additive and multiplicative demand functions and characterize it completely. We show that any of the following four scenarios can be the equilibrium: both parties offer MIR, only one party offers MIR, none offers MIR. When the retail price is a decision variable for the retailer and the rebate redemption rate increases with the amount of MIR, we once again prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium where both the retailer and the manufacturer offer MIRs. Using a numerical study, we show that the average post‐purchase price of the product is higher not only than the perceived pre‐purchase price but also than the newsvendor optimal price without an MIR. This implies that an MIR makes a product look cheaper while the consumers actually pay more on average. 相似文献
4.
Large numbers of new products introduced annually by manufacturers may strain the relationship between retailers and manufacturers regarding assortments carried by retailers. For example, many retailers in the grocery industry will agree to broaden their assortments only if the manufacturer agrees to pay slotting fees for the new products. We investigate the role played by slotting fees in coordinating the assortment decisions in a supply chain. To do so, we study a single‐retailer, single‐manufacturer supply chain, where the retailer decides what assortment to offer to end customers. Double marginalization results in a discrepancy between the retailer's optimal assortment and the assortment that maximizes total supply chain profits. We consider a payment scheme that is analogous to slotting fees used in the grocery industry: the manufacturer pays the retailer a per‐product fee for every product offered by the retailer in excess of a certain target level. We show that, if the wholesale price is below some threshold level, this payment scheme induces the retailer to offer the supply‐chain‐optimal assortment and makes both parties better off. 相似文献
5.
Distributed product development is becoming increasingly prevalent in a number of industries. We study how the global distribution of product development impacts the profit‐maximizing product line that a firm offers. Specifically, we formulate a model to understand the linkage between cost arbitrage as a driver of distributed development and consequent market implications such as customer perceived quality loss to remotely developed products. Analysis of the model reveals that a firm should expand the product line for a development‐intensive good only at intermediate values of cost advantage and quality loss. We modify the base model to include development capacity constraints as a driver of distributed development and find that the results are robust to this change. Our analysis affirms the need for product managers to incorporate the implications of distributed development in making their product line design decision. 相似文献
6.
Soo‐Haeng Cho Kevin F. McCardle Christopher S. Tang 《Production and Operations Management》2009,18(4):426-446
For many product categories, manufacturers and retailers often offer rebates to stimulate sales. Due to certain adverse effects, however, some manufacturers and retailers are contemplating the elimination of their rebate programs. This paper sheds light on the debate about the value of rebate programs by presenting a model for evaluating the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates in a competitive environment. Specifically, we consider a two‐level supply chain comprising one manufacturer and one retailer. Each firm makes three decisions: the regular (wholesale or retail) price, whether or not to offer rebates, and the rebate value should the firm decide to launch a rebate program. We determine the equilibrium of a vertical competition game between the manufacturer (leader) and the retailer (follower), and we provide insights about how competition affects the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates in equilibrium. 相似文献
7.
《Production and Operations Management》2018,27(6):1148-1167
Consumers seek for not only base functionalities of products they buy but also fairness in transactions. In this work, we investigate how such fairness‐seeking behavior affects a manufacturer's distribution channel structure selection. Specifically, the manufacturer can sell the product directly to consumers (named direct selling ) or via a middleman retailer (named agent selling ). The manufacturer then decides which distribution channel to adopt with an aim to maximize his profit. Under a newsvendor framework, the distribution channel structure endogenizes the procurement cost and thus impacts consumers’ fairness perception and willingness to pay. Interestingly, we show that it may be in the manufacturer's best interest to downward decentralize his distribution channel by adopting agent selling when consumers are extremely fairness‐minded. However, when the consumer's fairness concern is weak, direct selling is preferred by the manufacturer. We further show that the above results qualitatively hold when we take into consideration the downstream competition, the dominance of the manufacturer in retail pricing and the heterogeneity of the consumers in their fairness seeking. 相似文献
8.
《Production and Operations Management》2018,27(1):80-99
While suppliers are often an excellent source of product innovation for buyers, their propensity to undertake or continue a product development project can be elusive. This study examines how characteristics of the innovation project, including the type of project revenue, type of cost uncertainty, and the contract frame, influence the decision to accept, and subsequently continue, an innovation project. Through a series of controlled behavioral experiments, we find that acceptance rates increase when projects are characterized by a low real options value or an entirely new (vs. replacement) revenue stream. While these factors have less influence on the supplier's decision to continue the project, once accepted, continuation rates do increase if acceptance and continuation decisions are made by the same person. We also find that using a reward (vs. penalty) frame for sustaining supplier engagements significantly increases acceptance rates. 相似文献
9.
Juzhi Zhang Suresh P. Sethi Tsan‐Ming Choi T. C. E. Cheng 《Production and Operations Management》2020,29(6):1397-1430
The classical newsvendor problem seeks to minimize the expected inventory cost or maximize the expected profit. But optimizing an expected value alone does not fully capture the stochastic nature of the newsvendor problem. Inspired by the higher‐moment analyses explored in finance literature, we conduct a mean‐variance‐skewness‐kurtosis (MVSK) analysis for the newsvendor problem. We first derive the analytical expressions for the profit’s mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis in the standard newsvendor setting, and reveal their structural properties. We then establish various MVSK optimization problems and find the solution to each of them. We show that kurtosis aversion always induces the newsvendor to order less, while skewness seeking can induce the newsvendor to order either more or less depending on the specific structure of the profit’s skewness, which is affected by the symmetric and asymmetric properties of the demand distribution. Finally, based on the Pareto‐optimality concept, we address the challenge of supply chain coordination (SCC) in the presence of MVSK agents in two specific cases: (i) each agent maximizes its MVSK‐objective‐function and (ii) each agent maximizes its expected profit function, subject to given constraints on the profit’s variance, skewness, and kurtosis. In each case, we explore whether and how the supply chain can be coordinated. We find that considering the MVSK preferences of supply chain agents will affect the achievability of SCC and flexibility of the coordinating contract. We also uncover that if we assume an individual MVSK agent to be an MV one, the achievability of SCC by contracts will be very much negatively affected. 相似文献
10.
在单个拥有线下传统批发及线上直销双渠道的制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,基于供应链成员博弈权力的差异,构建制造商占优或零售商占优的两类Stackelberg博弈及双方同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响。研究发现:当制造商线下传统批发渠道所占市场份额较小时,(1)渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时和不为0时,三种博弈权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链均衡解的影响具有一定的鲁棒性;(2)三种博弈权力结构下,制造商线上直销渠道价格相同;两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下,线下传统批发渠道价格相同且大于Nash博弈下的传统渠道价格;制造商批发价格随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;(3)当渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时,三种博弈权力结构对线上直销渠道需求的影响是无差异的;当渠道间交叉价格弹性系数不为0时,两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下的线下传统批发渠道需求相同且小于Nash博弈下的传统渠道需求,线上直销渠道需求相同且大于Nash博弈下的线上直销渠道需求;(4)三种博弈策略下,制造商收益及零售商收益随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;Nash博弈下,供应链总... 相似文献
11.
The future of the European industry is in its capability to innovate and upgrade. This requirement concerns products, manufacturing and the underlying support systems ranging from organizational arrangements down to decision support systems. Europe has a desperate need for effective and flexible innovation, improving industrial infrastructure where the most value-adding nodes of the supply chains are those in the roles of subcontractors on the one hand and distributors on the other. The necessary managerial changes (such as JIT, lean manufacturing and simultaneous engineering) have so far just superficially influenced these crucial nodes. It can be estimated that by responsive customer-driven supply chains the profitability of these chains could be improved drastically. This potential for improvement is based on the reduction of inventory-carrying costs, reduction of indirect and direct labour costs and the increase of sales and sales margins via better delivery performance at the operative level and a reduction in time-to-market at the tactical and strategic levels. As a necessary prerequisite for responsive supply chains in many branches, reorganization of the supply chains in both the manufacturing and distribution ends of these chains is needed. 相似文献
12.
In this special issue, the contributing authors address several emerging marketing and operations interface problems and develop innovative approaches for solving them. Specifically, by explicitly modeling active consumer behavior under different pricing schemes, the papers in this special issue examine how firms can coordinate their marketing and operations to improve their competitiveness and profit. The papers also provide insights on how to develop and operate new and innovative market mechanisms. 相似文献
13.
《中国管理科学》2025,33(2)
聚焦由资金约束制造商、银行、零售商以及第三方平台构成的双渠道供应链系统;考虑零售商与第三方平台的渠道参与者及贷款提供者的双重角色;分别研究集中决策与分散决策下资金约束制造商的最佳融资策略;并探讨不同初始资金水平对其融资策略选择的影响。研究表明;集中决策下;第三方平台融资策略始终优于银行融资策略;在融资利率相等条件下;若初始资金水平使得两种融资策略都能选择;则第三方平台融资策略较银行融资策略可更有效地解决资金约束问题。分散决策下;随着渠道竞争加剧、收益共享率或生产成本降低;或初始资金增加;均会使制造商倾向于选择零售商融资策略;融资利率相等条件下;若初始资金水平使得三种融资策略都能选择;则零售商融资策略较其他两种融资策略可更有效地解决制造商的资金约束问题。 相似文献
14.
Online discount voucher market In the discount voucher market, customers usually face two types of valuation uncertainty, namely, preference uncertainty and consumption state uncertainty. Preference uncertainty is related to the customer's lack of relevant experience with the merchant, whereas consumption state uncertainty is related to the advance selling nature of the discount voucher mechanism. By taking a comprehensive perspective (i.e., considering revenue management and promotion effect at the same time), we find (i) no show of voucher buyers may not be a good thing for the merchant, especially for those large or start‐up ones; (ii) offering refund may always hurt the merchant's profit and the PayPal model may not be optimal in terms of maximizing social welfare; and (iii) market segmentation is not necessary for the profitability of promotion. 相似文献
15.
This study investigates a firm's return window decision in a distribution channel. Conventional wisdom posits that compared to a centralized channel, a decentralized channel induces worse services (e.g., a shorter return window) because of double marginalization. We build a model consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for product quality. Counterintuitively, we find that the return window can be longer in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. Furthermore, the return window can decrease along with product quality, which means that high‐quality products can be offered shorter return windows than low‐quality products. When endogenizing product quality, we reveal, contrary to previous findings, that the product quality in a decentralized channel may be higher, even when consumer heterogeneity in product quality follows a uniform distribution. This higher product quality induces a decentralized channel to generate a consumer surplus higher than that of a centralized channel. 相似文献
16.
In recent years, an increasing number of brick‐and‐mortar retailers have entered into the new brick‐and‐click era. Within this context, when a manufacturer presents a new product offering to a retailer, the ultimate decision is often made by the retailer regarding (1) whether to carry the new product, and (2) the channel outlet the product will be carried in (i.e., in‐store only, online‐exclusive, or brick‐and‐click). In response to this trend, we examine how a manufacturer may use product design to influence a dual‐channel retailer's outlet designation decision. This is the first study to investigate a manufacturer's optimal product design strategy when a brick‐and‐mortar retailer expands online. We demonstrate that, to induce the retailer to carry a new product both offline and online, it may not always be optimal for the manufacturer to enhance product quality (compared with when the retailer only operates offline). With the online store addition, the retailer may also be incentivized to adjust his participation criterion to a level less than what is determined by his outside option. 相似文献
17.
Many retailers are increasingly turning to home delivery as a new arena of operational competition. This study controlled for industry by investigating the online home delivery grocery business, and an analysis of 1,919 customers of home delivery grocers identified four groups of online customers based on reasons for selecting this service. These four groups were next linked to operational execution in terms of service, product, and Internet quality, and found to vary in predicable ways. Subsequent to the initial data collection, five month's of post hoc longitudinal purchasing history was collected on the four groups of online customers to determine the relative profitability. Finally, as a follow‐on analysis, the study used regression to predict future consumer purchases based upon operational execution. Time savings and service quality emerged as the two most important independent variables in terms of future buying from such online home delivery services. 相似文献
18.
Gerard J. Burke Janice E. Carrillo Asoo J. Vakharia 《Production and Operations Management》2009,18(4):475-484
Supplier sourcing strategies are a crucial factor driving supply chain success. In this paper, we investigate the implications of uncertain supplier reliability on a firm's sourcing decisions in an environment with stochastic demand. In particular, we characterize specific conditions under which a firm should choose a single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategy. In an environment with both uncertain demand and supply, we characterize the total order quantity, the number of suppliers selected for order placement, and the allocation of the total order quantity among these selected suppliers. For deeper managerial insight, we also examine the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to interactions between uncertainties in product demand and supply reliability. We show that sourcing from a single supplier is an optimal strategy for environments characterized by high levels of demand uncertainty or high salvage values. A numerical analysis based on data obtained from an office products retailer further reinforces our analytical results. In addition, we also find that when minimal order quantities are imposed, there are situations where it is not optimal to place an order with the lowest cost supplier. 相似文献
19.
Rachel Croson Karen Donohue Elena Katok John Sterman 《Production and Operations Management》2014,23(2):176-196
The bullwhip effect describes the tendency for the variance of orders in supply chains to increase as one moves upstream from consumer demand. We report on a set of laboratory experiments with a serial supply chain that tests behavioral causes of this phenomenon, in particular the possible influence of coordination risk. Coordination risk exists when individuals' decisions contribute to a collective outcome and the decision rules followed by each individual are not known with certainty, for example, where managers cannot be sure how their supply chain partners will behave. We conjecture that the existence of coordination risk may contribute to bullwhip behavior. We test this conjecture by controlling for environmental factors that lead to coordination risk and find these controls lead to a significant reduction in order oscillations and amplification. Next, we investigate a managerial intervention to reduce the bullwhip effect, inspired by our conjecture that coordination risk contributes to bullwhip behavior. Although the intervention, holding additional on‐hand inventory, does not change the existence of coordination risk, it reduces order oscillation and amplification by providing a buffer against the endogenous risk of coordination failure. We conclude that the magnitude of the bullwhip can be mitigated, but that its behavioral causes appear robust. 相似文献
20.
We consider manufacturer rebate competition in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling to a common retailer. We fully characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium rebate decisions and show how they depend on parameters such as the fixed cost of a rebate program, market size, the redemption rate of rebate, the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers in the market and competition intensity. Interestingly, more intense competition induces a manufacturer to lower rebate value or stop offering rebate entirely. Without rebate, it is known that more intense competition hurts the manufacturers and benefits the retailer. With rebate, however, more intense competition could benefit the manufacturers and hurt the retailer. We find similar counterintuitive results when there is a change in some other parameters. We also consider the case when the retailer subsidizes the manufacturers sequentially to offer rebate programs. We fully characterize the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy, and show that subsidy always benefits the retailer but may benefit or hurt the manufacturers. When the retailer wants to induce both manufacturers to offer rebate, he always prefers to subsidize the manufacturer with a higher fixed cost first. Sometimes the other manufacturer will then voluntarily offer rebate even without subsidy. 相似文献