Unobservable Investment and the Hold‐Up Problem

We study a two‐person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining. We show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small, then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus. Hence, bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold‐up problem even when the agent who makes the relation‐specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible. We consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two‐sided investment.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

DEEP FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND VOLATILITY

We investigate the relationship between foreign direct ownership of firms and firm‐ and region‐level output volatility using a novel panel data set for European countries. We document a positive, highly robust, relationship between firm‐level foreign ownership and volatility of value added. This relationship holds cross‐sectionally and in panels with firm fixed effects where the relationship captures within‐firm variation over time. Considering domestic firms with assets in foreign countries, we document that it is international diversification, rather than the nationality of the owner, that explains this positive correlation. Our results can also be found at the aggregate level, where we show that region‐level volatility is correlated positively with foreign investment in the region. We show that this positive relation between aggregate volatility and foreign investment can be explained by the granularity of the firm size distribution and the fact that foreign ownership is concentrated among the largest firms.     

CLUSTERING IN N‐PLAYER PREEMPTION GAMES

We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A finite number of firms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a firm receives flow profits, which decrease in the number of firms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over time exogenously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect equilibrium outcome, which is unique up to a permutation of players. When the preemption race among late investors is sufficiently intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears, and two or more investments occur at the same time. We identify a sufficient condition in terms of model parameters: clustering of investments occurs if the flow profits from consecutive investments are sufficiently close. This shows how clustering can occur in the absence of coordination failures, informational spillovers, or positive payoff externalities.     

研发投入对企业绩效的影响研究 ——基于企业金融化水平门限回归

本文选取1435家A股上市公司2011—2018年度的面板数据,以企业金融化水平作为门限变量,研究企业研发投入对企业绩效的非线性影响关系。研究结果表明:(1)企业金融化行为给研发投入对企业绩效的促进作用带来严重的时滞效应,研发投入对当年企业绩效不存在促进作用;(2)研发投入对未来一年企业绩效有双门限效应,二者呈倒N型关系,在第二区间内研发投入促进未来一年企业绩效;研发投入对未来二年企业绩效有单门限效应,在第一区间内研发投入促进未来二年企业绩效;(3)在适度的企业金融化水平区间内,研发投入才会促进未来企业绩效。本文指出上市公司金融化水平最优区间占比分布具有区域、行业和企业性质异质性,并进一步基于实证研究结果提出了相应的政策建议,有利于企业合理管理研发投入和防止企业脱实向虚。     

基于(k,y)空间技术分解的企业投资效率评价

目前国内外企业层次上综合投资效率评价的研究还是一个未探索的领域,现有企业业绩评价方法没有将投资效率列为评价的内容,对企业发展能力的评价呈现出明显的不合理。本文在相关领域投资效率评价方法以及对投资效率内涵界定的基础上,总结投资效率评价基本出发点,利用技术效率评价在(k,y)空间的投影来建立企业层次上综合投资效率的评价方法。在(k,y)空间内,可以识别并分解企业资产技术和运营效率,能够有效跟踪企业资产及相应运营效率的变化。在此基础上建立的投资效率评价指标融合了目前宏观经济和微观具体项目投资效率评价方法,反映的是企业投资活动对其经营效率的带动作用,能够准确评价企业投资效率的真实业绩。     

Process Improvement,Learning, and Real Options

We use a real‐options approach to analyze investments in process improvement. We develop a simple, stochastic model of a firm making investment decisions in process improvement. Our analysis offers several interesting insights into investments in process improvement. First, early investment in process improvement results in valuable knowledge, which helps increase the value of the option to invest in process improvement in future periods. This may motivate a firm to invest in process improvements as early as possible. Second, it may be optimal for a firm to stop investing when such investments do not create enough value in the later stages of the investment horizon. Third, although one would expect the state of a firm's process relative to that of other firms to impact a firm's decision to invest in process improvement, this study finds that the impetus is conditional and identifies these conditions. Finally, in such an environment, the delay of investment in process improvement incurs an opportunity cost for a firm, and we show that the traditional net present value rule must incorporate this opportunity cost and the knowledge‐induced change in future option values to lead to a correct investment decision.     

Does International Economic Integration Lead to a Cleaner Production in China?

In contrast to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, the Trade‐Up Hypothesis holds that international integration helps improve firms' environmental performance in developing countries. Using firm‐level data from Shanghai, this article examines how international linkages, in the form of foreign direct investment or international trade, affect firms' environmental compliance and performance. We find that firms with international linkage via ownership exhibit better compliance with environmental regulation and emit less pollution than firms with no international linkage. We also find that firms with international linkage via market exposure are more likely to exhibit better compliance with environmental regulation than firms with no international linkage, but find no evidence that the former emit less pollution than the latter. This provides a piece of empirical evidence for the Trade‐Up Hypothesis.     

Ownership structure,investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Research on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance shows no convergent evidence concerning the sign and form of the above-mentioned relationship. Similarly, there is no homogeneous evidence documenting family ownership concentration is always positively or negatively correlated with firm value, or irrelevant. This paper analyses whether and how the de facto investor protection provided by the judicial system affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 1314 firms operating in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) over a five-year period, 2010–2014. Moreover, we analyse whether judicial system efficiency influences if and how family firms in the controlling coalition collude for expropriating minority shareholders. Our findings show that the level of shareholder protection, derived from judicial efficiency, is relevant to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, thus corroborating literature in that institutional contexts matter in explaining such relations. The results suggest the need for more efficient external mechanisms of corporate governance to facilitate investment in equity capital, thus decreasing the country risk perceived by investors.     

A Theory of the Stakeholder Corporation

There is a widely held view within the general public that large corporations should act in the interests of a broader group of agents than just their shareholders (the stakeholder view). This paper presents a framework where this idea can be justified. The point of departure is the observation that a large firm typically faces endogenous risks that may have a significant impact on the workers it employs and the consumers it serves. These risks generate externalities on these stakeholders which are not internalized by shareholders. As a result, in the competitive equilibrium, there is under‐investment in the prevention of these risks. We suggest that this under‐investment problem can be alleviated if firms are instructed to maximize the total welfare of their stakeholders rather than shareholder value alone (stakeholder equilibrium). The stakeholder equilibrium can be implemented by introducing new property rights (employee rights and consumer rights) and instructing managers to maximize the total value of the firm (the value of these rights plus shareholder value). If there is only one firm, the stakeholder equilibrium is Pareto optimal. However, this is not true with more than one firm and/or heterogeneous agents, which illustrates some of the limits of the stakeholder model.     

An empirical investigation of advanced manufacturing technology investment patterns: Evidence from a developing country

Advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) investment patterns in developing countries is in need of further investigation, particularly in the light of the conflicting evidence from the literature. This paper provides new evidence on AMT investment patterns from the Turkish automotive industry and develops a taxonomy by exploring the relationships between AMT investment patterns, ownership structure, firm size and performance. Analysis of industry survey data suggests the existence of three groups with different AMT investment strategies. Results suggest that AMT investment patterns are not only significantly correlated with firm performance or ownership, but also reveals significant differences in manufacturing performance across investment patterns.     

Ability, individual development and optimal selection decisions

The paper analyzes different selection policies in education and business. We show that incorrect self-perceptions combined with imperfect performance measurement may cause significant welfare losses in selective educational systems, in particular if selection starts too early. Of course, these welfare losses can be mitigated by an investment in better ability assessment. However, an affirmative action policy could serve the same purpose as such an investment. We apply our analysis also to diversity management in firms. Based on positive discrimination we establish an efficiency argument for diversity management.     

INVESTMENT AND TIME TO PLAN AND BUILD: A COMPARISON OF STRUCTURES VS. EQUIPMENT IN A PANEL OF ITALIAN FIRMS

“Time‐to‐build” models of investment expenditures play an important role in many traditional and modern theories of the business cycle, especially for explaining the dynamic propagation of shocks. We estimate the structural parameters of a time‐to‐build model using annual firm‐level investment data on equipment and structures. For expenditures on equipment, we find no evidence of time‐to‐build effects beyond one year. For expenditures on structures, by contrast, there is clear evidence of such effects in the range of two to three years. The contrast between equipment and structures is intuitively reasonable and consistent with previous results. The estimates for structures also indicate that initial‐period expenditures are low and increase as projects near completion. These results provide empirical support for including “time‐to‐plan” effects for investment in structures. More generally, these results suggest a potential source of specification error for Q models of investment and production‐based asset pricing models that ignore the time required to plan, build, and install new capital. (JEL: D24, G31, C33, C34)     

Skill Management in Large‐Scale Service Marketplaces

Large‐scale, web‐based service marketplaces have recently emerged as a new resource for customers who need quick resolutions for their short‐term problems. Due to the temporary nature of the relations between customers and service providers (agents) in these marketplaces, customers may not have an opportunity to assess the ability of an agent before their service completion. On the other hand, the moderating firm has a more sustained relationship with agents, and thus it can provide customers with more information about the abilities of agents through skill screening mechanisms. In this study, we consider a marketplace where the moderating firm can run two skills tests on agents to assess if their skills are above certain thresholds. Our main objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of skill screening as a revenue maximization tool. We, specifically, analyze how much benefit the firm obtains after each additional skill test. We find that skill screening leads to negligible revenue improvements in marketplaces where agent skills are highly compatible and the average service times are similar for all customers. As the compatibility of agent skills weakens or the customers start to vary in their processing time needs, we show that the firm starts to experience sizable improvements in revenue from skill screening. Apparently, the firm can reap the most of these substantial benefits when it runs only one test. For instance, in marketplaces where agents posses uncorrelated skills, the second skill test only brings an additional 2% improvement in revenue. Accounting for possible skill screening costs, we then show the optimality of offering only one test when the compatibility between agent skills is sufficiently low. The results of this study also have important implications in terms of the right level of intervention in the marketplaces we study.     

Marketing Is from Mars,IT Is from Venus: Aligning the Worldviews for Firm Performance

A typical firm is operated by multiple functional managers who may collaborate as well as compete to achieve firm performance. In the digital age, firm performance is essentially customer‐dependent and technology‐dependent, with both marketing and information technology (IT) playing key roles. Unfortunately the two functions often have very different worldviews. We show how these differences can damage firm performance, and suggest ways to mitigate this damage. We build a worldview difference model, synthesized from multiple disciplines. The model is tested using both matched and nonmatched observations from marketing and IT managers, and is analyzed with hierarchical linear models using both perceptual and objective firm performance data over a 4‐year period. We find that differences between the beliefs and perceptions of marketing managers and IT managers generate a negative impact on firm performance, and suggest appropriate technology‐culture associations to effectively align their worldviews for firm performance. To improve firm performance, a cross‐functional appreciation for market and technology drivers can be achieved by making marketing managers more learning‐oriented and by providing IT managers a culture that is congruent with technology.     

Production,Process Investment,and the Survival of Debt‐Financed Startup Firms

Whether to invest in process development that can reduce the unit cost and thereby raise future profits or to conserve cash and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy is a key trade‐off faced by many startup firms that have taken on debt. We explore this trade‐off by examining the production quantity and cost reducing R&D investment decisions in a two period model wherein a startup firm must make a minimum level of profit at the end of the first period to survive and operate in the second period. We specify a probabilistic survival measure as a function of production and investment decisions to track and manage the risk exposure of the startup depending on three key market factors: technology, demand, and competitor's cost. We develop managerial insights by characterizing how to create operational hedges against the bankruptcy risk: if a startup makes a “conservative” investment decision, then it also selects an optimal quantity that is less than the monopoly level and hence sacrifices some of first period expected profits to increase its survival chances. If it decides to invest “aggressively,” then it produces more than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk. We also illustrate that debt constraint shrinks the decision space, wherein such process investments are viable.     

CEO burnout,managerial discretion,and firm performance: The role of CEO locus of control,structural power,and organizational factors

Despite the possibility of burnout resulting from dynamics in firms' upper echelons, little if any work has focused on chief executive officer's (CEO's) burnout and firm performance. Drawing on managerial discretion theory, this article analyzes the influence of CEO burnout on firm performance and the moderating roles of the individual (CEO locus of control), structural power (CEO duality and CEO tenure), and organizational characteristics (size, age, and resource availability) related to managerial discretion. Using a sample of 156 CEOs in Swedish firms, we find a negative association between CEOs who report higher burnout and firm performance. Our results confirm that CEO duality and resource availability ameliorate and firm size exacerbates the negative association between CEO burnout and firm performance. Contrary to our expectations, CEO locus of control, CEO tenure, and firm age do not influence this relationship. We discuss the implications of our research for upper echelons theory and strategic leadership theory.     

Promotion,Turnover, and Compensation in the Executive Labor Market

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.     

代理冲突下企业多元化投资行为的实物期权分析

利用实物期权的方法,本文分别建立了以股东利益最大化以及企业价值最大化为目标时的负债企业多元化投资模型.通过两种决策目标下多元化投资政策的比较,分析了负债代理下股东存在的投资决策非最优化问题.结果发现,若负债企业在投资前后都不存在债务风险,股东的投资决策将符合企业价值最大化原则;若投资能使债务由无风险变为有风险,企业将过度投资;若投资前后都存在风险,企业将投资不足.     

Does Outsourcing Really Improve Firm Performance? Empirical Evidence and Research Agenda

The phenomenon of outsourcing has spawned a rich body of scholarly work in the last two decades. Yet, the answer to one important question has remained elusive: Does outsourcing really improve firm performance? Addressing this question is important as firms across nations continue to embark on the practice of outsourcing to save operating costs and remain competitive. Scholars, practitioners and policy‐makers need to understand whether and how outsourcing benefits the firm. However, no comprehensive review of empirical evidence has been published so far that can address this question. This study reviews 57 empirical research articles that investigated the outsourcing–firm performance relationship in 47 peer‐reviewed scholarly journals over a 20‐year time‐span (1996–2015). The articles differ widely in research scope, context, level of analysis, data source, time‐span, industry sector, extent of outsourcing and measure of performance. The findings suggest that outsourcing can produce positive, negative, mixed, moderated or no significant impact on the firm. This study also provides useful directions for future research on outsourcing and firm performance.