Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect

Many violations of the independence axiom of expected utility can be traced to subjects' attraction to risk‐free prospects. The key axiom in this paper, negative certainty independence ([Dillenberger, 2010]), formalizes this tendency. Our main result is a utility representation of all preferences over monetary lotteries that satisfy negative certainty independence together with basic rationality postulates. Such preferences can be represented as if the agent were unsure of how to evaluate a given lottery p; instead, she has in mind a set of possible utility functions over outcomes and displays a cautious behavior: she computes the certainty equivalent of p with respect to each possible function in the set and picks the smallest one. The set of utilities is unique in a well defined sense. We show that our representation can also be derived from a “cautious” completion of an incomplete preference relation.     

Admissibility in Games1

Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement—that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question. Specifically, we formulate conditions of rationality and mth‐order assumption of rationality (RmAR) and rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR). We show that (i) RCAR is characterized by a solution concept we call a “self‐admissible set”; (ii) in a “complete” type structure, RmAR is characterized by the set of strategies that survive m+1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies; (iii) under certain conditions, RCAR is impossible in a complete structure.     

Temptation and Self‐Control

We study a two‐period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision‐maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self‐control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self‐control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self‐control and relate them to our representations.     

A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity

We propose and characterize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker prefers act f to act g if and only if 𝔼_μφ(𝔼_πu○f) 𝔼_μφ(𝔼_πu○g), where 𝔼 is the expectation operator, u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, φis an increasing transformation, and μis a subjective probability over the set Πof probability measures πthat the decision maker thinks are relevant given his subjective information. A key feature of our model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. We show that attitudes toward pure risk are characterized by the shape of u, as usual, while attitudes toward ambiguity are characterized by the shape of φ. Ambiguity itself is defined behaviorally and is shown to be characterized by properties of the subjective set of measures Π. One advantage of this model is that the well‐developed machinery for dealing with risk attitudes can be applied as well to ambiguity attitudes. The model is also distinct from many in the literature on ambiguity in that it allows smooth, rather than kinked, indifference curves. This leads to different behavior and improved tractability, while still sharing the main features (e.g., Ellsberg's paradox). The maxmin expected utility model (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) with a given set of measures may be seen as a limiting case of our model with infinite ambiguity aversion. Two illustrative portfolio choice examples are offered.     

Random Expected Utility

We develop and analyze a model of random choice and random expected utility. A decision problem is a finite set of lotteries that describe the feasible choices. A random choice rule associates with each decision problem a probability measure over choices. A random utility function is a probability measure over von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions. We show that a random choice rule maximizes some random utility function if and only if it is mixture continuous, monotone (the probability that a lottery is chosen does not increase when other lotteries are added to the decision problem), extreme (lotteries that are not extreme points of the decision problem are chosen with probability 0), and linear (satisfies the independence axiom).     

Perfectionism and Choice

Empirical evidence suggests that perfectionism can affect choice behavior. When striving for perfection, a person can desire to keep normatively appealing options feasible even if she persistently fails to use these options later. For instance, she can “pay not to go to the gym,” as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). By contrast, some perfectionists may avoid normatively important tasks for fear of negative self‐evaluation of their performance. This paper models perfectionist behaviors in Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) menu framework where agents may be tempted to deviate from their long‐term normative objectives. In addition to self‐control costs, I identify a utility component that reflects emotional costs and benefits of perfectionism. My model is derived from axioms imposed on preferences over menus in an essentially unique way.     

Testing and Characterizing Properties of Nonadditive Measures Through Violations of the Sure‐Thing Principle

In expected utility theory, risk attitudes are modeled entirely in terms of utility. In the rank‐dependent theories, a new dimension is added: chance attitude, modeled in terms of nonadditive measures or nonlinear probability transformations that are independent of utility. Most empirical studies of chance attitude assume probabilities given and adopt parametric fitting for estimating the probability transformation. Only a few qualitative conditions have been proposed or tested as yet, usually quasi‐concavity or quasi‐convexity in the case of given probabilities. This paper presents a general method of studying qualitative properties of chance attitude such as optimism, pessimism, and the “inverse‐S shape” pattern, both for risk and for uncertainty. These qualitative properties can be characterized by permitting appropriate, relatively simple, violations of the sure‐thing principle. In particular, this paper solves a hitherto open problem: the preference axiomatization of convex (“pessimistic” or “uncertainty averse”) nonadditive measures under uncertainty. The axioms of this paper preserve the central feature of rank‐dependent theories, i.e. the separation of chance attitude and utility.     

A Theory of Intergenerational Altruism

Modeling intergenerational altruism is crucial to evaluate the long‐term consequences of current decisions, and requires a set of principles guiding such altruism. We axiomatically develop a theory of pure, direct altruism: Altruism is pure if it concerns the total utility (rather than the mere consumption utility) of future generations, and direct if it directly incorporates the utility of all future generations. Our axioms deliver a new class of altruistic, forward‐looking preferences, whose weight put on the consumption of a future generation generally depends on the consumption of other generations. The only preferences lacking this dependence correspond to the quasi‐hyperbolic discounting model, which our theory characterizes. Our approach provides a framework to analyze welfare in the presence of altruistic preferences and addresses technical challenges stemming from the interdependent nature of such preferences.     

EGO UTILITY,OVERCONFIDENCE, AND TASK CHOICE

This paper models behavior when a decision maker cares about and manages her self‐image. In addition to having preferences over material outcomes, the agent derives “ego utility” from positive views about her ability to do well in a skill‐sensitive, “ambitious,” task. Although she uses Bayes' rule to update beliefs, she tends to become overconfident regarding which task is appropriate for her. If tasks are equally informative about ability, her task choice is also overconfident. If the ambitious task is more informative about ability, she might initially display underconfidence in behavior, and, if she is disappointed by her performance, later become too ambitious. People with ego utility prefer to acquire free information in smaller pieces. Applications to employee motivation and other economic settings are discussed. (JEL: D83, D11)     

Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level‐k Rationality

Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players' rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality of the players, the better the set of obtainable outcomes. In this paper, we prove this fundamental intuition for players with possibilistic beliefs, a model long considered in epistemic game theory. Specifically, • We define a sequence of monotonically increasing revenue benchmarks for single‐good auctions, G⁰≤G¹≤G²≤⋯, where each Gⁱ is defined over the players' beliefs and G⁰ is the second‐highest valuation (i.e., the revenue benchmark achieved by the second‐price mechanism). • We (1) construct a single, interim individually rational, auction mechanism that, without any clue about the rationality level of the players, guarantees revenue G^k if all players have rationality levels ≥k+1, and (2) prove that no such mechanism can guarantee revenue even close to G^k when at least two players are at most level‐k rational.     

Ambiguity Aversion,Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences

We characterize, in the Anscombe–Aumann framework, the preferences for which there are a utility functionu on outcomes and an ambiguity indexc on the set of probabilities on the states of the world such that, for all acts f and g, . The function u represents the decision maker's risk attitudes, while the index c captures his ambiguity attitudes. These preferences include the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler and the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent. This provides a rigorous decision‐theoretic foundation for the latter model, which has been widely used in macroeconomics and finance.     

Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem

Harsanyi's impartial observer must consider two types of lotteries: imaginary identity lotteries (“accidents of birth”) that she faces as herself and the real outcome lotteries (“life chances”) to be faced by the individuals she imagines becoming. If we maintain a distinction between identity and outcome lotteries, then Harsanyi‐like axioms yield generalized utilitarianism, and allow us to accommodate concerns about different individuals' risk attitudes and concerns about fairness. Requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent as to which individual should face similar risks restricts her social welfare function, but still allows her to accommodate fairness. Requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent between identity and outcome lotteries, however, forces her to ignore both fairness and different risk attitudes, and yields a new axiomatization of Harsanyi's utilitarianism.     

The Event: An Underexamined Risk Concept

Some of the terms used in risk assessment and management are poorly and even contradictorily defined. One such term is “event,” which arguably describes the most basic of all risk‐related concepts. The author cites two contemporary textbook interpretations of “event” that he contends are incorrect and misleading. He then examines the concept of an event in A. N. Kolmogorov's probability axioms and in several more‐current textbooks. Those concepts are found to be too narrow for risk assessments and inconsistent with the actual usage of “event” by risk analysts. The author goes on to define and advocate linguistic definitions of events (as opposed to mathematical definitions)—definitions constructed from natural language. He argues that they should be recognized for what they are: the de facto primary method of defining events.     

A Genuine Rank‐Dependent Generalization of the Von Neumann‐Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem

This paper uses “revealed probability trade‐offs” to provide a natural foundation for probability weighting in the famous von Neumann and Morgenstern axiomatic set‐up for expected utility. In particular, it shows that a rank‐dependent preference functional is obtained in this set‐up when the independence axiom is weakened to stochastic dominance and a probability trade‐off consistency condition. In contrast with the existing axiomatizations of rank‐dependent utility, the resulting axioms allow for complete flexibility regarding the outcome space. Consequently, a parameter‐free test/elicitation of rank‐dependent utility becomes possible. The probability‐oriented approach of this paper also provides theoretical foundations for probabilistic attitudes towards risk. It is shown that the preference conditions that characterize the shape of the probability weighting function can be derived from simple probability trade‐off conditions.     

Time Consistency: Stationarity and Time Invariance

A sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic “preference reversals” between sooner‐smaller and later‐larger rewards, when the sooner reward could be immediate. The theoretically motivated design permits separate identification of time consistent, stationary, and time invariant choices. At least half of the subjects are time consistent, but only three‐quarters of them exhibit stationary choices. About half of subjects with time inconsistent choices have stationary preferences. These results challenge the view that present‐bias preferences are the main source of time inconsistent choices.     

Costly Self‐Control and Random Self‐Indulgence

We study the random Strotz model, a version of the Strotz (1955) model with uncertainty about the nature of the temptation that will strike. We show that the random Strotz representation is unique and characterize a comparative notion of “more temptation averse.” Also, we demonstrate an unexpected connection between the random Strotz model and a generalization of the Gul–Pesendorfer (GP) (2001) model of temptation which allows for the temptation to be uncertain and which we call random GP. In particular, a preference over menus has a random GP representation if and only if it also has a representation via a random Strotz model with sufficiently smooth uncertainty about the intensity of temptation. We also show that choices of menus combined with choices from menus can distinguish the random GP and random Strotz models.     

Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality—the weight placed on the moral goal—is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact.     

Distributed Decisions in Networks: Laboratory Study of Routing Splittable Flow

We study network games in which users choose routes in computerized networks susceptible to congestion. In the “unsplittable” condition, route choices are completely unregulated, players are symmetric, each player controls a single unit of flow and chooses a single origin–destination (O–D) path. In the “splittable” condition, which is the main focus of this study, route choices are partly regulated, players are asymmetric, each player controls multiple units of flow and chooses multiple O–D paths to distribute her fleet. In each condition, users choose routes in two types of network: a basic network with three parallel routes and an augmented network with five routes sharing joint links. We construct and subsequently test equilibrium solutions for each combination of condition and network type, and then propose a Markov revision protocol to account for the dynamics of play. In both conditions, route choice behavior approaches equilibrium and the Braess Paradox is clearly manifested.     

Precautionary Bidding in Auctions

We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk‐averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when the risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price, second price, and English auctions with affiliated common (interdependent) values. This “precautionary bidding” effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk, so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly. We also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make DARA bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk‐neutral or CARA bidders would be indifferent. Thus the potential for a “winner's curse” can be a blessing for rational DARA bidders.     

THE SEU CALCULUS: EFFECTS OF RESPONSE MODE,SEX, AND SEX ROLE ON UNCERTAIN DECISIONS *

Subjects were instructed on how to use simple subjective probability and utility scales, and they were asked to actively role-play a decision maker in seven risk-dilemma situations. Each scenario provided subjects with specific subjective expected utility (SEU) information for both a certain and uncertain decision alternative, but left out one critical SEU component. Subjects supplied either the lowest probability or the lowest utility for success that they found necessary before they would select the uncertain over the certain alternative in each dilemma. Three experiments examined: (a) the degree to which Ss' estimations deviated from a pattern predicted by SEU models; (b) differences in choice patterns induced by response format variations (e.g., probability vs. utility estimation); (c) the effects of sex of S; and (d) the effects of the sex-role framing of the decision problems. Ss generally chose in accord with SEU maximization principles and did so with decreasing deviations from theoretical values as practice over situations increased (Experiments I, II and III). Decisions were initially more conservative on items requesting probability estimates (Experiment I), but this effect washed out over situations. Sex differences were revealed (Experiments I and III), but in limited fashion. Rather, a replicable (Experiments I, II and III) sex-by-sex role appropriateness by response format interaction was found, in which females responded “rationally” under both probability and utility estimation conditions and under both role sets (male and female). Males, however, responded extremely conservatively under female-framed, probability estimate conditions. Ss' choices were stable over a three-week interval (Experiment III).