Can complementary pension plans help improve retirement income in the Dominican Republic?

In the 1990s, following the earlier example of Chile, pension system reforms were implemented in a number of Latin American and other countries. These reforms focused on introducing models of pension provision that were fully‐funded and privately managed. Although aspects of these reforms have been positive, for many persons covered by these systems retirement income is not adequate. The development of occupational pension plans may offer an alternative, complementary mechanism to help improve pension adequacy. This article discusses different complementary pension plan models and examines the case of the Dominican Republic. It argues that complementary occupational pension plans may be a viable policy option for this developing country.     

Pensions in Nigeria: The performance of the new system of personal accounts

In 2004, Nigeria copied the 1981 Chilean pension reform and established a funded system based upon personal accounts. The new system was neither appropriate for a country such as Nigeria, nor did it meet aspirations of improving pension coverage or helping economic growth. The current financial and economic crisis hit the scheme in so far as it hit stock values. However, more important has been the negative real interest rates that can be earned on government bonds and on bank deposits — where the majority of contributions are invested. Bank scandals and rising fiscal deficits do not breed confidence in the system or the government's ability to deliver meaningful benefits in old age.     

Political risk and pension privatization: The case of Argentina (1994-2008)

Proponents of pension privatization in Latin America argued that systems of private fully pre-funded defined-contribution individual accounts would be better insulated from politics than was the case with public pay-as-you-go pension systems. However as the Argentinean case demonstrates, most recently with the 2008 nationalization of its private individual accounts system, transferring pension management and investment to the private sector does not necessarily reduce or eliminate political risk. In fact, the implementation of systems of individual accounts creates a new set of political risks, in part because they are a potential financial resource for governments, especially during times of economic stress. This article describes the range of political risks inherent to individual account pension systems, with specific reference to Argentina's 1994-2008 experience with privatization.     

The Impact of Neo-liberalism on South Korea's Public Pension: A Political Economy of Pension Reform

This article examines the recent Korean pension reforms from a political economy perspective. It argues that these reforms are of particular interest because, unlike major pay-as-you-go pension schemes in Europe, the Korean pension scheme is a funded one and, therefore, is subject to market exposure. Also in contrast to the problems that public pension reforms have encountered in European and other OECD countries, especially 'blame avoidance', the more radical Korean reforms were implemented without significant challenge or resistance. First of all, the National Pension Scheme is described prior to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Then the impact of this crisis on the Korean welfare state and, especially, its pension system are analysed. The main part of the article consists of a political economy of the pension reform process, in which the key roles of the international governmental organizations and the domestic neo-liberal policy elite are pinpointed. This neo-liberal ideology was critical in developing and sustaining an influential discourse on the 'crisis' in Korea's national pension fund. The article concludes by arguing, against the neo-liberal tide, for the inclusion of a pay-as-you-go element in the national pension in order to tackle escalating poverty in old age.     

Inequity in access to the Argentinian pension system (1994–2017)

Pension coverage in Argentina is inequitably distributed between different income levels, both during working years and during retirement. The objective of the article is to study the evolution of inequity in access to the Argentinian pension system in terms of its association with the socio‐economic status of individuals during the period 1994–2017. An evaluation is offered of how variables such as sex, age, and educational attainment influence such inequity. It is concluded that, although the level of average coverage increased, inequity in access increased significantly in the years following the 1994 reform, both among the active and the inactive population. However, inequity in access among active persons did not improve substantially with the return to the pay‐as‐you‐go pension system, while it was considerably reduced among the inactive population. While the former are found to be affected to a greater extent in terms of coverage as a result of the pro‐educated bias among the active population, the latter outcome is thought to be a direct result of the transitory plan (Pension Inclusion Plan) for pension inclusion, after which inequity was to resume its upward course.     

Economic crisis and social policy reform in Korea

The economic crisis that broke out in Korea in December 1997 has had a chilling impact on social development in the country. Today unemployment is the highest that Korea has experienced in the past thirty years. This paper aims to examine the impact of the economic crisis on social development and the role of public policy to mitigate the problems caused by the crisis. The economic crisis has hit vulnerable groups harder, increased the proportion of part-time and daily workers, and reversed the trend of steady improvement of income distribution. The economic crisis along with the trend of aging population, globalization, and competition calls for an expanded role of social policy, which the Korean government has neglected for a long time. The main targets of social policy reform in Korea include the expansion of government programs and safety nets for the unemployed and redesigning the national pension and health insurance scheme to provide adequate income security as well as to improve the system sustainability.     

From pension funds to piggy banks: (Perverse) consequences of the Stability and Growth Pact since the crisis

As part of their strategy for economic and monetary union, European governments committed themselves to fiscal discipline – particularly by placing limits on annual deficits and on public debt. Subsequently, and as they sought to respond to the “current crisis”, they embraced the view that only if public finances were kept under control would sustainable recovery be possible. Rules of fiscal governance were strengthened. To help them meet these rules, the governments of many member States of the European Union made changes to their pension systems or to funds they had established specifically to pay the costs of population ageing. The intention was not to cut retirement benefits or to improve the efficiency of the relevant pension schemes and institutions. Rather, it was to free up resources immediately. Funded pension schemes and pension funds were treated like “piggy banks” that were raided when times became hard. Moreover, the policies pursued succeeded in meeting their objectives only because the system of national accounts according to which outcomes are judged does not recognize the way in which most of the fiscal gains are matched by future fiscal liabilities.     

The mandatory private pension pillar in Hungary: An obituary

In 1998, the left‐of‐centre government of Hungary carved out a second‐pillar mandatory private pension scheme from the original mono‐pillar public system. Participation in the two‐pillar system was optional for those who were already working, but mandatory for new entrants to the workforce. About 50 per cent of the workforce joined the second pillar voluntarily and another 25 per cent were mandated to do so by law between 1999 and 2010. The second pillar has not improved the financial stability of the social security system. Moreover, the international financial and economic crisis has highlighted the transition costs that are associated with moving, even if only partially, to a system of pre‐funding. In 2010, the conservative government de facto “nationalized” the second pillar, and it is to use part of the accumulated pension capital to reduce Hungary's excessive public debt and annual budget deficit and to compensate for income tax reductions.     

Pension privatization in crisis: Death or rebirth of a global policy trend?

From 1981 to 2007, more than thirty countries worldwide fully or partially replaced their pre‐existing pay‐as‐you‐go pension systems with ones based on individual, private savings accounts in a process often labelled “pension privatization”. After the global financial crisis, this trend was put on hold for economic, ideational, and institutional reasons, despite a rise in critical indebtedness that has facilitated pension privatization in the past. Is the global trend towards pension privatization dead or in the process of being reborn, perhaps in a somewhat different form? Several recent trends point to rebirth as policy‐makers scale back public and private pension systems, attend to minimum pensions and “nudge” rather than mandate people to save for retirement.     

Inadequate Policy or Operational Failure? The Potential Crisis of the Korean National Pension Programme

The Korean National Pension Programme is one of the main pillars of the Korean welfare state. From its introduction in 1988, the Programme had come to include 26.8 per cent of the economically active population and had accumulated a pension fund equal to 24 per cent of government expenditure by 1994. Behind such a promising facade, the Korean National Pension Programme is likely to face financial crisis without a major reform. This paper seeks to answer the question as to whether the crisis will arise due to inadequate policy design or to operational failure. The latter cause may require privatizing the Pension Fund in order to operate more efficiently, while the former one would demand rectifying the defects of policy design. This study argues that the crisis is strongly related to inadequate policy design, which promises generous pensions and at the same time requires only a small amount in contributions; although there have also been operational inefficiencies in running the programme. It also argues that inadequacy in policy design stemmed from developmentalism embedded in the Korean welfare state, which regards the National Pension Programme mainly as a measure for mobilizing cheap capital. In conclusion, this paper argues that the Korean welfare state, created in the era of economic development, is transient in nature and that it needs a major reform not only to contain the cost but also to meet the growing demand for social welfare.     

Reforming pensions: Myths, truths, and policy choices

This paper discusses the building blocks of pension reform in the light of economic theory, and their application to different types of economy. The opening section sets out the simple economics of pensions. The second section discusses a series of myths which have proved remarkably persistent. Building on this analysis, the latter part of the paper sets out the foundations of effective pensions policy. The third section discusses the prerequisites which any pension reform must respect, i.e. those things which policy advisers can — and should — assert authoritatively. The fourth section turns to the range of choices facing policymakers, drawing on the very different arrangements in different countries. The main conclusions are threefold: (1) The key variable is effective government. (2) From an economic perspective, the difference between pay-as-you-go and funding is second order. (3) The range of potential choice over pension design is wide. One size does not fit all.     

Pensioners among Chinese elderly

The pension system is one type of social welfare system which provides support for elderly citizens after retirement. The system in the People's Republic of China was established in the 1950s, mainly for state employees and employees of privately owned enterprises, while peasants relied on their land to support them in their old age. Up to the 1970s, there was little change in this system. However, the system has since undergone dramatic reform. The implication of the new system for the future elderly in China will be significant. This paper discusses the current impact of the pension system on the elderly in China. According to our analysis, fewer than 25% of Chinese elderly receive a pension. The social and demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, residence, educational attainment, occupation) of pension recipients are partially a legacy of past policies. As new policies are implemented and the pension system improves, more elderly will be covered by the pension system. Nonetheless, we need to find ways to support those who do not receive a pension.     

Social Security at The Crossroads: Toward Effective Pension Reform in Latin America

Individual pension savings accounts in Latin America promised to improve compliance and raise benefits in a cost‐effective manner, while at the same time raising savings rates, which would in turn promote economic growth. A review of the evolution of pension reform in Latin America shows results to have been mixed. Analyses of the recent reforms generally fail to consider the extent to which the success or failure of pension systems is driven by exogenous factors, including macroeconomic and labour market conditions, and institutions. A number of recent studies have issued a reassessment of the region's reforms that stresses the importance of a basic guaranteed pension benefit and recognizes that a range of alternatives are viable in the region. Pension systems based on individual accounts are undergoing a thorough reevaluation.     

Reforming pensions: Principles, analytical errors and policy directions

This article, sets out a series of principles for pension design rooted in economic theory: pension systems have multiple objectives, analysis should consider the pension system as a whole, analysis should be framed in a second-best context, different systems share risks differently, and systems have different effects by generation and by gender. That discussion is reinforced by identification of a series of widespread analytical errors — errors that appear in World Bank work, but by no means only in World Bank work: tunnel vision, improper use of first-best analysis, improper use of steady-state analysis, incomplete analysis of implicit pension debt, incomplete analysis of the impact of funding (including excessive focus on financial flows, failure to consider how funding is generated, and improper focus on the type of asset in trust funds), and ignoring distributional effects. The second part of the article considers implications for policy: there is no single best pension design, earlier retirement does little or nothing to reduce unemployment, unsustainable pension promises need to be addressed directly, a move from pay-as-you-go towards funding in a mandatory system may or may not be welfare improving, and implementation matters — policy design that exceeds a country's capacity to implement it is bad policy design. We illustrate the ranges of designs of pension systems that fit the fiscal and institutional capacity constraints typical at different levels of economic development. The potential gains from simplicity imply that a country capable of implementing an administratively demanding plan does not necessarily gain from doing so. New Zealand has a simple pension system through choice, not constraint.     

The macroeconomic impact of reforming a PAYG system: The Portuguese case

Abstract   The article analyses the impact of various types of reform options on social security pension system financial sustainability and on a range of macroeconomic variables. The HERPOR model is used to consider the likely effects of parametric reforms of the existing pay-as-you-go system, as well as those of a systemic reform. The article concludes that the former are sufficient to ensure financial sustainability, although they should be accompanied by employment implementation measures. The article concludes that a fully pre-funded system does not seem to be a viable option for policy-makers in the redesigning of social security pension systems, due to the high transition costs involved.     

The retrenchment of second‐tier pensions in Hungary and Poland: A precautionary tale

In 1997, Hungary and Poland led Central Europe in partially privatizing their national pension systems, diverting a portion of public pension contributions to privately‐managed individual investment accounts. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, both governments retrenched these second‐tier schemes: Hungary (December 2010), by ceasing to fund the accounts and recouping most workers' existing balances; and Poland (April 2011), by reducing the diversion of contributions to the second tier. The factors that drove these retrenchments are traced to the original 1997 second‐tier designs, which omitted key specifications related to financing the accounts, private benefit design, and the regulation of private management fees. While both governments tried to compensate for the missing design specifications during implementation, the results were limited. By reducing investment returns and raising borrowing costs, the global economic crisis brought the problems to a head. The conclusion highlights some outstanding issues whose resolution will shape the retrenchments' long‐term impacts.     

Convergence or divergence? How the financial crisis affected European pensioners

The Member States of the European Union entered the financial crisis with very different pension systems. Although the use of standard adequacy measures suggest small impacts from the crisis, alternative measures based on pension wealth estimates indicate stronger effects. While the largest continental systems were left relatively unscathed by the crisis, Mediterranean systems were cut back significantly. This should lead to considerable convergence in system generosity across countries. Despite the cuts, state pensions in the stressed economies should still be generous enough to keep the majority of pensioners out of relative poverty, but this depends on a relatively quick turnaround in labour market performance in these countries.     

The Colombian pension system after the reform of 1994: An evaluation

The Colombian pension reform of 1994 introduced a privately administered defined–contribution programme, which coexists with a reformed public defined–benefit programme. This paper gives an overview of the Colombian pension system and evaluates its performance using four criteria: (1) effectiveness, (2) efficiency, (3) equity, and (4) sustainability, finding evidence of severe shortcomings. Both effective coverage and benefit levels are low, costs in the private programme are high, and there is evidence that insured persons are not fully informed about the actual system. The system is inequitable and the uninsured population bears part of the financial burden. The public programme is financially not sustainable. A current reform proposal from the Colombian government addresses only part of the problem.     

Extending pension coverage in Cambodia: The governance and investment challenges of the Social Security Investment Fund

Rapid economic growth, declining fertility and changes in family structures have encouraged the Kingdom of Cambodia to reform its old-age pension system. The Government of Cambodia reached an important milestone in 2019, when the Law on Social Security was promulgated. The Law includes provisions for a compulsory defined benefit pension scheme, establishing a sound framework for extending compulsory pension coverage beyond the public sector to formal private-sector workers. As a future step, the compulsory pension scheme should be extended to informal workers. To accompany the reform, the investment policy for the pension scheme’s reserve funds, including the supervisory regime and investment strategy, will be essential for the modernization of the Cambodian social security system. In this regard, Cambodia has successfully sought policy advice. However, the country should continue to seek further advice, and to act on this. Otherwise, the necessary and increasingly pressing policy ambitions of Cambodia to develop an adequate and sustainable social protection system may not be fully realized.