Best Practices to Reduce Migration Pressures

Are there best practices to foster economic development, reduce population growth, and protect the environment in source countries of unauthorized migration, in a manner that reduces emigration pressures and redirects migration towards legal channels? This paper outlines cooperative actions that can be undertaken by both source and receiving countries to better manage the movements of people over national borders. There are two broad approaches to foster wanted migration and to reduce unwanted migration. First, maximize migration’s payoffs by ensuring that the 3 Rs of recruitment, remittances, and returns foster economic and job growth in emigration areas. Second, make emigration unnecessary by adapting trade, investment and aid policies, and programmes that accelerate economic development and thus make it unnecessary for people to emigrate for jobs and wages. Most of the changes needed for stay–at–home development must occur in emigration areas, but immigration areas can cooperate in the management of immigration, guest workers, and students, as well as in promoting freer trade and investment, and in targeting aid funds. In a globalizing world, selective immigration policies may have important development impacts, as with immigration country policies toward students, and workers in particular occupations, such as nurses and computer programmers, as well as with mutual recognition of occupational licenses and professional credentials. Trade policies affecting migration are also important, such as trade in services and laws regulating contracts between firms in different countries that allow the entry of lower wage workers as part of the contract. opening channels for legal migration can deter irregular migration.     

Nigerians in China: A Second State of Immobility

China’s rapid economic development has been accompanied by new forms of immigration. Investors and professionals from developed countries are increasingly joined by a diverse group of immigrants from around the world. While there is a large body of academic literature on Chinese emigration, China’s new role as a country of immigration has received less scholarly attention. This paper addresses the dynamics of South–South migration to China through a study of Nigerians in Guangzhou, a major international trading hub. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews and participant observation among African traders and migrants in Guangzhou. The paper contends that Nigerian immigration to China epitomizes global migration trends towards a diversification of migration flows, commercialization of the migration process and increased policing of foreigners within national borders. China was rarely the preferred destination of this study’s Nigerian informants but, rather, a palatable alternative, as their aspirations to enter Europe and North America were curtailed by restrictive immigration regimes. They escaped a situation of involuntary immobility in Nigeria through short‐term visas obtained with the help of migration brokers. However, opportunities for visa renewals are scant under the current Chinese immigration policy. Undocumented migrants find their mobility severely inhibited: They must carefully assess how, when and with whom they move about in order to avoid police interception. This is a business impediment, as well as a source of personal distress for migrants who engage in trade and the provision of trade‐related services. The situation can be described as a “second state of immobility”: the migrants have succeeded in the difficult project of emigration, but find themselves spatially entrapped in new ways in their destination country.     

Can Migration Foster Development in Mexico? The Case of Poverty and Inequality

The impact of migration on development can be analysed from a number of perspectives. This article focuses on poverty and inequality. It assesses the relative contribution of migrants to Mexico′s economy through remittances, compared to other Latin American countries; analyses the distributional impact of remittances (with an emphasis on the poor), and compares this impact to the counterfactual impact of migrants’ stay‐at‐home income. It explains the processes leading to scant economic success rates among poor international migrants. Finally, it describes the nature and impact of current Mexican migrant‐oriented policies, and recommends a shift in focus, to lessen emigration, increase the income of migrants, promote returns, and bolster the economic impact of returning migrants.     

Social effects of migration in receiving countries

This paper examines the impact of post-1945 migration into Western, Middle, and Northern Europe from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, and migration to the traditional immigration countries by Asian and Latin American immigrants, on the social structures of receiving countries. Between 1955 and 1974, 1) traditional migration to the US and Australia became less important for European countries while traditional receiving countries accepted many immigrants from developing countries; and 2) rapid economic revival in Western and Northern Europe caused a considerable labor shortage which was filled by migrant workers especially from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, who stayed only until they reached their economic goals. Since 1974, job vacancies have declined and unemployment has soared. This employment crisis caused some migrants 1) to return to their countries of origin, 2) to bring the rest of their families to the receiving country, or 3) to lengthen their stay considerably. The number of refugees has also significantly increased since the mid-970s, as has the number of illegal migrants. After the mid-1970s, Europe began to experience integration problems. The different aspects of the impact of migration on social structures include 1) improvement of the housing situation for foreigners, 2) teaching migrants the language of the receiving country, 3) solving the unemployment problem of unskilled migrants, 4) improvement of educational and vocational qualifications of 2nd generation migrants, 5) development of programs to help unemployed wives of migrants to learn the language and meet indigenous women, 6) encouraging migrants to maintain their cultural identity and assisting them with reintegration if they return to their original country, 7) coping with the problems of refugees, and 8) solving the problems of illegal migration. Almost all receiving countries now severely restrict further immigration. [Those policies should result in improved development of aid policies towards sending countries. Immigration from other countries to those of the European Economic community should be limited to that for humanitarian reasons.     

Cherishing the Goose with the Golden Eggs: Trends in Migrant Remittances from Europe to Morocco 1970–20041

In contrast to earlier predictions, migrant remittances from Europe to Morocco have shown an increasing trend over the past decades. Remittances constitute a vital and relatively stable source of foreign capital. The so‐called “euro effect” and concomitant money laundering can only explain part of the recent, extreme surge in remittances. The structural solidity of remittances is explained by the unforeseen persistence of migration to northwestern Europe; new labor migration toward southern Europe; and the durability of transnational and transgenerational links between migrants and stay‐behinds. The stable economic‐political environment and new “enlightened” policies toward migrants explain why Morocco has been relatively successful in channeling remittances through official channels.     

Best Practice Options: Turkey

At the ninth Migration Dialogue seminar, held 29–31 March 2001 in Istanbul, Turkey, opinion leaders discussed the major immigration and integration issues facing emigration, transit, and immigration countries. Several major issues regarding Turkey were discussed. 1 This report was prepared after the seminar for participants and others interested in migration and development issues. It has not been approved by participants, and thus should not be considered a consensus document.
First, the effect of the Turkish Government’s modernization effort, which began in the 1920s. In the 1960s the government began to promote the export of surplus labour, with the hope that sending workers abroad from less– developed parts of the country would bring remittances and returned workers with skills needed for modernization. Among the governments of labour–exporting countries, Turkey’s has been unique in its high hopes for recruitment, remittances, and returns. They were expected to bring about a transformation of the country. These high expectations help explain the widespread frustration with migration’s actual effects. Second, the Turkish Government’s current goal of gaining full membership in the European Union (EU). Ankara stresses that the EU should embrace full Turkish membership for a variety of reasons, including the country’s strategic position between Europe and Asia, and to send a signal to other Muslim societies, such as those of North Africa, that the EU will include Muslim societies that are secular and democratic. Third, Turkey’s fear that EU membership would lead to another wave of migration. Many Europeans fear that Turkish EU membership would lead to another wave of migration. Turkey hopes that admission to the EU will bring EU assistance and foreign direct investment (FDI) that creates jobs and pushes up wages, thus making migration insignificant. Finally, Turkey’s position as an emigration, transit, and immigration country. There are 3 to 4 million Turks abroad, 3 to 4 million foreigners living in Turkey (perhaps half Iranians), and tens of thousands who move through Turkey to Europe. Turkey is revising its asylum law in a manner that will allow persons fleeing persecution outside Europe to be considered refugees in Turkey, to establish for the first time a support system for refugees.     

Recession and Migration: A New Era for Labor Migration?

The current recession, the worst in a half century, is likely to affect international migration differently than past recessions. In 1973–1974 and 1981–1982, rising oil prices led to recessions in oil‐importing countries and economic booms in oil‐exporting countries, enabling some migrants to shift from bust to boom areas, as from Europe to the Middle East. The 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis did not spread globally, and was followed by a relatively quick resumption of economic and job growth that attracted migrant workers. The 2008–2009 recession is most severe in countries that had the most severe debt excesses, including the U.S., Spain, and Eastern Europe, and in countries most dependent on trade, including many Asian countries. New deployments of migrants are likely to slow, but what is not yet clear is how many migrants who lose jobs will remain abroad.     

Thailand's responses to transnational migration during economic growth and economic downturn

This paper gives an historical overview of immigration to Thailand since the 1970s and emigration since the 1960s. It describes migration policies since the 1930s. Final discussion focuses on the impact of economic contraction on migration. Immigration to Thailand dates back to the 1760s when a huge wave of Chinese emigrated to Thailand. The flow continued until about 1850 and resumed during 1905-17. The next big waves of immigrants were after 1975, when refugees fled Indochina, and in the 1990s, when migrants flocked from neighboring countries drawn to the booming economy. Thai professionals left in the 1960s for the USA. During the 1980s, many left for work in the Middle East. During the 1990s, Thai migrants moved within the East and Southeastern Asian countries and the USA or Europe, and they included many women and illegal migrants. Emigrants leave as arranged by the government, by employers, by recruitment agencies, and as trainees. The first official act was in 1950 and revised in 1979. Many work permits were approved in the 1990s, especially for unskilled labor. There are supports for Thai migrants abroad, but little is offered to foreigners at home. By 1997, the country's recession led to nonrenewal of many work permits. The 1998 economic crisis led to a new labor policy that deported illegal and unskilled migrant workers in order to create jobs for Thais. Policy encouraged Thais to seek work overseas.     

Best Practices to Manage Migration: The Philippines

The Cooperative Efforts to Manage Emigration (CEME) project examines ways in which countries of origin, transit, and destination can cooperate to better manage migration. The project focuses on source countries of migration that are in transition to market economies and democratic systems of governance, developments that promise to reduce unwanted migration, and uses study visits to seek best practices for organizing the three Rs ‐ recruitment, remittances, and returns ‐ to protect migrants and to reduce emigration pressures and for promoting ongoing cooperation on migration matters between countries of origin, transit and destination.     

International migration in Western Europe since 1973: developments,mechanisms and controls

"This presentation describes the development of migration to and from Western Europe and seeks to determine to what extent such immigration and return migration movements are influenced by governmental action and regulation." It is observed that the basic factors determining immigration and return migration flows are the characteristics of the migrants themselves, policies of the receiving countries, and economic conditions in the sending and receiving countries. Data comparing alien populations and migration trends in selected European countries are provided     

Migration Movements from and into Poland in the Light of East‐West European Migration

This article investigates migratory movements from and into Poland before and after the collapse of communism. The character and scale of these movements are of considerable significance, not only for politicians and societies in the CEE region, but also for European integration. The Polish eastern border is likely to remain one of the few places in Europe where it will be possible to control mobility on the East‐West axis. One cannot discuss East‐West mobility without discussing the emigration of Poles. Because recent immigration into Poland from the East should also be assessed from the perspective of both Poland and the West, the article examines emigration trends from Poland and immigration into Poland as well as the demographic characteristics of migrants. Only official statistical data are considered. Migration pressure from the East induced by the collapse of the system, combined with the restricted migration policy of Western Europe towards former USSR countries, were conducive to the formation of the Central European buffer zone. Poland is probably the best example of a buffer zone country. From the Western perspective it is also the most important country because the future of East‐West migration depends on the extension of the visa regime by Poland. Irrespective of the introduction of new hurdles, there will be other ways of channelling the movement from the East via Poland to the West. Globalization of migration will inevitably increase flows from the East. It is argued that the key to future European migration lies also in the West, more specifically in the employment needs of western labour markets.     

Impact of Migration on Kerala's Economy and Society

This article reports results of the first migration study covering the entire State of Kerala. It encompasses both measurement as well as analysis of the various types and facets of migration. Migration has been the single most dynamic factor in an otherwise dreary development scenario in Kerala during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Kerala is approaching the end of the millennium with a little cheer in many people's homes as a result of migration which has contributed more to poverty alleviation than any other factor, including agrarian reforms, trade union activities and social welfare legislation. The study shows that nearly 1.5 million Keralites now live outside India. They send home more than Rs.4,000 million a year by way of remittances. Three‐quarters of a million former emigrants have come back. They live mostly on savings, work experience, and skills acquired while abroad. More than a million families depend on an internal migrant's earnings for subsistence, children's education and other economic requirements. Whereas the educationally backward Muslims from the Thrissur‐Malappuram region provide the backbone of emigration, it is the educationally forward Ezhawas, Nairs and Syrian Christians from the former Travancore‐Cochin State who form the core of internal migration. The article also analyses the determinants and consequences of internal and external migration. It offers suggestions for policy formulation directed at optimum utilization of remittances sent home by emigrants and the expertise brought back by the return migrants. Migration in Kerala began with demographic expansion, but it will not end up with demographic contraction. Kerala has still to develop into an internally self‐sustaining economy. The prevailing cultural milieu in which its people believe that anything can be achieved through agitation, and any rule can be circumvented with proper political connections, must change and be replaced by a liberalized open economy with strict and definite rules of the game.     

Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries

Official estimates of migrants’ remittances are around US$100 billion annually, with some 60 per cent going to developing countries. Any policy making use of migrants as a development resource must understand the size and allocation of remittances, and the roles played by migrants and their communities in the remittance process. This paper examines the flows of remittances in relation to other financial flows to developing countries. The examination is based on data available from official statistics. As discussed in the paper, remittances by unofficial channels are significant by all accounts so the remittance amounts reported here are quite conservative. The paper shows that annual remittances to developing countries have more than doubled between 1988 and 1999. Viewed over the last decade, remittances have been a much larger source of income for developing countries than official development assistance (ODA). The gap is increasing, since ODA has been falling while remittances have increased. Furthermore, remittances appear to be a much more stable source of income than private flows, both direct and portfolio, which tend to be more volatile and flow into a limited set of countries. Remittances to developing countries go first and foremost to lower middleincome and low–income countries. Lower middle–income countries receive the largest amounts, but remittances constitute a much higher share of total international flows to low–income countries. Of the ten countries receiving most remittances, two are low–income (India and Pakistan); six are lower middle–income (Philippines, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Thailand, and Jordan); and two are upper middle–income (Mexico and Brazil). Sub–Saharan Africa received some 8 per cent of remittances in 1980, but only some 4 per cent in 1999. South Asia’s share also declined from what was already a relatively high 34 to 24 per cent. Those who gained most were Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South and Central America, and the Caribbean, which increased their share of global remittances.     

To stay or to return? Return migration intentions of Moroccans in Italy

Using data from the Statistics on Income and living conditions of families with migrants carried out by ISTAT in 2009, we empirically examine the effect of micro level determinants on Moroccans’ return migration intentions. Although Moroccans living in Italy do not have a clear aspiration to return, the socio‐economic and work conditions in Italy determine their migration intentions. Furthermore, our research led us to argue that macro‐level determinants should also be considered. In particular, emigration, immigration and integration policies represent key elements in the analysis of the dilemma between to stay or to return. Therefore, the promotion of long‐term immigration policies, which allow the achievement of a permanent residence in the host country, combined with institutional reforms, which make the origin country socially, economically and politically more attractive for migrants are essential to complete the debate about to stay or to return.     

Arab Migration to Europe: Trends and Policies1

Growing Arab migration to Europe is a likely scenario for the coming years, poorly prepared for by current policies. The paper examines three reasons for this scenario: new patterns of family‐building in Arab countries; aging in Europe; and the emergence of a new demand for migrant labor. While the ongoing establishment of free trade may increase migratory pressures, government policies remain potentially conflicting – on the Arab side, optimizing the economic benefits drawn from emigrants and reviving their sense of belonging to their culture of origin; on the European side, restricting further immigration and integrating former migrants in the host society and culture.     

The Reshaping of Mexican Labor Exports under NAFTA: Paradoxes and Challenges

From the perspective of the political economy of development, this article analyzes the role played by Mexican labor in the U.S. productive restructuring process under the aegis of the North American Free Trade Agreement. By conceptualizing the labor export–led model it dissects three basic mechanisms of regional economic integration: maquiladoras, disguised maquilas, and labor migration. Not only does this analytical framework cast light on the contributions made by Mexican migrants to the economies of the United States and Mexico, it also reveals two paradoxes: the broadening of the socioeconomic asymmetries between the two countries, and increased socioeconomic dependence on remittances in Mexico.     

Best Practice Options: Albania

The Cooperative Efforts to Manage Emigration (CEME) site visit to Italy and Albania – organized in cooperation with the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), an Italian independent research institute – took place in June 2002. Albania is a country of 3.1 million people with a GDP of $4.1 billion that switched in the early 1990s, after 45 years of communism, from economic autarky to a peculiar form of market economy, and experienced some of the world’s highest emigration rates in the 1990s. Some 600,000 to 700,000 Albanians, or almost one–fourth of Albanians, and half of Albanian professionals, emigrated. As a result, the labour force is only 38 per cent of the population, versus 50 per cent in most industrial countries (UNDP, 1996, 2000). The major destinations of Albanian migrants in the 1990s were Greece, which had 400,000 to 600,000 Albanians in 2002, and Italy, which had 144,000 legal residents and probably some tens of thousands illegals at the end of 2001. 1 The Albanian Government estimates that about half of the Albanians in Greece are legal residents. There are also about 100,000 Albanians in Switzerland, the UK, Germany, and other Western European countries.
Many Albanians have become legal residents of Greece and Italy as a result of regularization–legalization programmes. Albania is also a transit point for third country nationals attempting to reach the rest of Europe via Albania. Of particular interest to the CEME members were efforts by the Italian and Albanian governments to cooperate in managing the flows of Albanian and transit migrants. When the CEME visit was made, Albania was experiencing rapid, yet unbalanced economic growth as a result of $615 million in remittances from Albanians abroad (estimates: Bank of Albania annual report, 2001), and aid from the European Union (EU) and other sources. The spending of remittances and aid has fuelled a building boom, but there was no clear sense of how Albania would use the window of opportunity opened by remittances and aid to develop a viable economy. The optimistic scenario is that remittances and investments from Albanians abroad will produce an economic take off based on value–added food production and tourism in the “Switzerland of the Balkans”. The pessimistic scenario is that corruption and divided government will prevent the development of a successful economic strategy, and that low wages, high unemployment, and inadequate services such as health care and education will prompt the continued emigration of young and educated Albanians. Potential best practices include: joint Italian–Albanian marine patrols to discourage smuggling and trafficking in small “fast boats”; Italy granting Albania at least 6,000 work visas a year to publicize that there is a legal way to work in Italy, helping to discourage illegal migration; and bilateral and international assistance to enable Albania to develop laws and institutions to deal with foreigners transiting Albania, and foreigners requesting asylum in Albania. Albania does not, on the other hand, appear to be a best practice in managing the use of remittances to aid economic development. Although remittances play an important role in basic subsistence and construction of housing, there have been fewer efforts to encourage investment of these funds in infrastructure or productive activities. The banking system needs substantial reform to become a venue for transfer of remittances and source of credit for enterprise development. Albania would benefit from a more systematic examination of the lessons learned in other countries about the investment of remittances for economic development.     

The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process

This analysis considers international migration remittances and their impact on development in migrant-sending areas. The new economics of labor migration (NELM) posit that remittances lessen production and market constraints faced by households in poor developing countries. The article states that remittances may be a positive factor in economic development, which should be nurtured by economic policies. The impact of remittances and migration on development varies across locales and is influenced by migrants' remittance behavior and by economic contexts. Criteria for measuring development gains may include assessments of income growth, inequity, and poverty alleviation. It is hard to gauge the level of remittances, especially when remittances may not flow through formal banking systems. The International Monetary Fund distinguishes between worker remittances sent home for over 1 year; employee compensation including the value of in-kind benefits for under 1 year; and the net worth of migrants who move between countries. This sum amounted to under $2 billion in 1970 and $70 billion in 1995. The cumulative sum of remittances, employee compensation, and transfers was almost $1 trillion, of which almost 66% was worker remittances, 25% was employee compensation, and almost 10% was transfers during 1980-95. Total world remittances surpass overseas development assistance. Remittances are unequally distributed across and between countries. Migration research does not adequately reveal the range and complexity of impacts. Push factors can limit options for use of remittances to stimulate development.     

Double emigration: geographical and cultural? The participation of Italian women in the German labour market

Already at the beginning of the fifties on the initiative of Italy, negotiations began between the Italian and German governments for the recruitment of migrant-workers, which ended in 1955 with a bilateral agreement between the two countries. Through this recruitment policy and because of the labour-market (Industry and Building) the Italian migration was composed prevalently of men. Female immigration happened in the setting of family reunification and less as an independent movement project. After years of stagnation of italian emigration in the eighties it may also be noted that, since the early nineties, there has been a revival of immigration to Germany. This and modernisation processes in Italy changed the gender composition of the Italian immigration flow to Germany: the distance between male and female immigration is decreasing. A peculiarity of the Italians in Germany is the low occupational participation of women in comparison with other women from EU countries. However, we could observe regional differences, which depend on the migration typologies and the dominating economic structure in the areas. The paper will analyse this different aspects (immigration-processes, migrant-typologies and labour-market participation) by female Italian migrants.