Comparative Evaluation of the Local Police

Gallup data indicating presidential popularity from 1950 to1974 are analyzed in a distributed lag model which tests theimportance of key economic influences. Results indicate thatinflation and military expenditures are statistically significantand politically important influences on presidential popularity.The success of this model in revealing hitherto undetected economicinfluence calls into question the nonfindings of previous simplelinear analyses and suggests the need for more sophisticatedmodels which provide, through the use of time lags and cumulativeimpacts, a more complex pattern of economic influence on presidentialpopularity.     

Question-Order Effects on Presidential Popularity

A methodological experiment is conducted on the same questionthat is used virtually every month in the Gallup Poll to measurepresidential popularity. The point of the experiment is to determinewhether presidential popularity is affected by the placementof the question within the survey, in response to a recent chargethat alternations in the order in which this question has beenasked invalidate time-series analyses of presidential popularity.The primary finding is that the order in which the questionis presented does not significantly affect the direction ofresponse (the balance between approval and disapproval), butit does affect opinionation (the willingness to make a directionalresponse, whether positive or negative). This effect is foundto be particularly pronounced for less educated respondents.The implications of these findings for time series analysisof presidential popularity are spelled out.     

Economic class and popular support for franklin roosevelt in war and peace.

History has judged FDR as one of America's greatest leaders in part because he maintained the public's confidence in seeing the nation through the travails of the Depression and World War II. During this era, the two most widely employed explanatory variables in contemporary presidential popularity scholarship-the economy and war-assumed their most extreme values of the twentieth century. Hence, not only is understanding Roosevelt's public support historically important, but it represents a valuable case for filling in our understanding of the opinion dynamics of presidential support more generally. Yet, surprisingly, Roosevelt's approval ratings have attracted little systematic scrutiny. Compiling time-series data from 1937 to 1943, partially disaggregated by economic class, we investigate FDR's popular support among different classes during both national crises. We find that Roosevelt's peacetime support divided along class lines, while during the war class divisions blurred. Roosevelt's support was indeed conditioned by external events, refracted through the interests of different societal groups. We conclude that public support for modern presidents should be similarly studied as the sum of opinions among heterogeneous constituencies.     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

Why Does Presidential Popularity Decline? A Test of the Expectation/Disillusion Theory

According to the "expectation/disillusion" interpretation ofthe decline of presidential popularity over time, popularitydeclines as unrealistically high expectations of presidentialperformance inevitably give way to more realistic assessments.This paper puts that interpretation and several specific aspectsof it to the test through analysis of data from a series ofnationwide polls conducted between 1977 and 1979.     

Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections: An Update and Extension

The popularity of the president as ascertained months priorto a presidential election permits an accurate prediction ofthe election outcome, even when the incumbent president is notrunning for reelection.     

The Presidents and the Polls

Since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, presidents have used opinionpolls to aid them in being elected and as input to policy formulation.Several examples of such effective use are presented. Pollsmay also be misused by presidents simply to enhance presidentialpopularity. Such actions are generally ineffective either forincreasing presidential popularity or for making wise policydecisions.     

Expectation/Disillusion and Presidential Popularity: The Reagan Experience

The Sigelman-Knight analysis of the "expectation/disillusion"interpretation of recurring declines in presidential popularityis replicated with data on the Reagan presidency. There is aconnection between Reagan's popularity and expectations aboutwhat he would be able to accomplish, but (just as was the caseduring the Carter presidency, and directly counter to predictions)it was the more highly educated whose expectations of presidentialperformance were initially highest. Moreover, as time passedthe size of the education-based gap in expectations of Reaganincreased over time. These findings leave the expectation/disillusioninterpretation in considerable doubt.     

Testing the Permanence of the Permanent Campaign: An Analysis of Presidential Polling Expenditures, 1977 2002

Many presidential observers argue that the modern White Houseis the site of more-or-less permanent campaigning. In a recentPOQ piece, Murray and Howard (2002) [Public Opinion Quarterly66:527–558] explore one indicator of the "permanent campaign,"the extent to which Presidents Carter, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush,and Clinton commissioned independent opinion polls and focusgroups to assist in policymaking and political maneuvering.Murray and Howard suggest that while a sophisticated pollingoperation has been institutionalized in the White House, thereis substantial variation in how much a president uses this operation.In this article, we model presidential polling expendituresover time using monthly figures. We find that presidents donot vary significantly in the average amount spent per monthon polls. There are, however, two recurring patterns of variationwithin presidential administrations: Presidents tend to spendsignificantly more on internal polling during the most intensemonths of a presidential reelection campaign; and polling expendituresincrease over the course of each presidential term. These findingssuggest that there are common forces (e.g., elections, naturaldecline in support) that have driven all presidents since Fordto poll.     

THE CALCULUS OF VOTING RECONSIDERED

A rational economic hypothesis of the citizen's decision tovote or not vote in U. S. presidential elections has been citedas an example of the replacement of social-psychologically oriented"empirical generalizations" by axiomatically based deductivepropositions in political science. However, close scrutiny showsthat the rational (or political) economic paradigm is no moreaccurate a theory than previously popular systems analysis orfunctional paradigms. The claimed verification of the originalhypothesis was based on an apparently imprecise, adhoc, ordinalprocedure that could not distinguish between the intimatelyrelated rational economic and social-psychological hypotheses.A more powerful technique resolves the issue in favor of thelatter model for the data used by the original authors.     

Economic Partisan Advantages in Congressional Contests: 1938-1978

Two broad categories of variables have been used to explainthe dynamics of national forces on congressional elections:presidential and party-related forces. Present research hasemphasized presidential forces in analyzing congressional electionoutcomes, especially with respect to the impact of economicconditions, but this emphasis has resulted in a lack of attentionto other variables that are linked to the major parties ratherthan incumbent presidents. Meaningful empirical relationshipsmay have been inadvertently disregarded because they contradictexpectations derived from an "incumbency hypothesis." This articlesuggests that there are party-related forces operating on congressionalelections, aside from party affiliation, that provide consistentand long-term electoral advantages to candidates of the parties,irrespective of which party controls the presidency. We arguethat the economic policy emphases and historical records ofthe major parties interact with economic conditions such asunemployment and inflation to yield advantages that accrue tothe candidates at election time; these effects are termed economicpartisan advantages.     

The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments

We find that presidential and congressional influences affect the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation of FEMA disaster expenditures across states. States politically important to the president have a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster expenditures are higher in states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees. Election year impacts are also found. Our models predict that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically rather than by need. The findings reject a purely altruistic model of FEMA assistance and question the relative effectiveness of government versus private disaster relief.     

Public Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model

The approval accorded to Presidents by the American public isfound to follow a cyclical pattern over time. All Presidentsbegin their terms with great popularity, experience parabolicdeclines, steadily lose popular support for about three years,and then recover some at the ends of their terms. These distinctivecycles, it is argued, reflect regular expectation/disillusionmentcycles among the less well-informed segments of the public andare tied to the four-year election calendar. The extraordinaryfit of parabolic curves to actual presidential approval leadsto the suspicion that presidential approval may be almost whollyindependent of the President's behavior in office, a functionlargely of inevitable forces associated with time.     

Change and Stability in Presidential Popularity at the Individual Level

This article employs a three-wave panel to examine change andstability in the popularity of the president. By survey standards,the item is found to be quite reliable, approaching the reliabilityof party identification. Change in the item can be predictedusing measures of political interest and sophistication, partisanship,and strength of presidential approval or disapproval.     

Economic Satisfaction vs. Moral Conservatism in the 1988 Presidential Election

Abstract

Residents from “Middletown” who were going to vote in the 1988 presidential election were interviewed concerning their various economic and moral positions. The results showed that satisfaction with the economic situation in the fall of 1988 was much more important than moral conservatism in Bush's election win. An extended analysis on how economic satisfaction could influence vote was presented.     

PRIME MINISTERS, PARTIES, AND THE PUBLIC: THE DYNAMICS OF GOVERNMENT POPULARITY IN GREAT BRITAIN

This article proposes and tests a model of British party supportbetween 1953 and 1987, including prime minister's popularity,economic fluctuations, and short-term noneconomic factors. Weargue that public evaluations of the prime minister (PM) havehad an increasingly important effect on relative party popularity("government lead"). We demonstrate that this enhanced linkbetween PM popularity and government lead began in the 1960s,well before the Thatcher era. We also attempt to demonstratethat noneconomic factors (wars, scandals, etc.) exert indirecteffects on government lead through voters' evaluations of theprime minister. The results of this test, however, are inconclusive.We discuss the implications of these findings for our understandingof British politics.     

The inflation-unemployment trade-offs of union members

Social preference functions between inflation and unemployment are estimated for individuals classified by union status using Gallup Poll presidential popularity data. We expected union members to assign higher weights to unemployment and lower weights to inflation than those who are not union members, but we found the reverse. Union members weight unemployment relative to inflation less than nonunion members because they weight unemployment less. Given the emphasis that trade union leaders place on reducing unemployment rather than inflation, this suggests a divergence in views between union leaders and the rank and file. The authors are indebted to Jeff Moore and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are our own. Smyth’s research was aided by the LSU Foundation.     

DIRECT AND INDIRECT ROUTES TO POLITICIZING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE DOES KNOWLEDGE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

This study examines the effects of issue-specific knowledgeon the extent to which personal unemployment experiences influencepresidential approval. The well informed are found to be morelikely to connect personal experiences directly to politicalpreferences, yet less likely to generalize from their own personalexperiences in assessing the state of the nation as a whole.Since perceptions of the state of national conditions have awell-documented influence on presidential approval, Simultaneouslyconsidering direct and indirect paths helps to resolve contradictoryimplications in past findings on the role of information inconditioning the politicization of personal economic experience.     

The Making of a President: How Presidential Candidates Become Who They Are in Biographical Campaign Materials

This article examines how presidential campaigns claim that candidates became who they are by looking at biographical campaign materials through the lens of biographical reasoning. Biographical reasoning is the process of connecting the experiences in someone’s life to his or her identity, often by treating those experiences as either a cause or an illustration of characteristics. An analysis of biographical reasoning in presidential campaign materials from 1952 to 2016 reveals three key themes in how campaigns portray candidates’ development: (a) Early in life, candidates mostly acquire, rather than illustrate, positive characteristics; (b) candidates mostly improve as people without major characterological setbacks, going from good to better; and (c) candidates benefit very little from economic advantages. The consistency of these themes suggests that the conventions of biographical campaign materials include specific assumptions about how presidents should become who they are, some of which help campaigns connect candidates to important American myths.     

Inefficiency of democratic decision making in an unstable society

The political power is said to be efficient if good results in decision making are achieved by moderate means. For example, if a large parliament makes the same decisions as a given president, the power efficiency of the president is better than that of the parliament. We study the efficiency of three forms of political power, president, cabinet of ministers, and the parliament, using the model from the author's earlier publications on the mathematical theory of democracy. We define an indicator of power quality, referring to the weight of the coalition whose preference is satisfied by each decision. We prove that a presidential power can be absolutely efficient when the society is divided by preferences into (almost) equal coalitions, which is interpreted as social instability, because a small change in preferences breaks the equilibrium. When the society is stable, i.e. there are predominant coalitions, the cabinet and the parliament provide a better power quality. For a model with a large number of independent individuals we derive approximation formulas of the indicator of the power quality which imply a geometric interpretation of optimal president, cabinet, and parliament as providing the greatest projections of their characteristic vectors on the characteristic vector of the society. We draw an analogy to the geometric interpretation of forces in physics. From our standpoint, democratic (collective) forms of power are efficient in a stable society. In an unstable society, a parliament and a cabinet are less efficient than personal power. Linking social stability to economic development, we conclude that a democratic political system is not the cause but rather a result of economic development which makes the society stable. We comment on the political development in the ex-Soviet Union. In particular, we justify the separation of the Soviet Union into independent states as a measure to make the power more powerful when its potential has been exhausted. However, we doubt that democratic transformations can contribute to solving economic problems and that real democratic systems will be established in the ex-Soviet republics before at least major economic difficulties have been overcome. We also outline some applications of our results to Gallup polls of public opinion and to multicriteria decision making.First version of the article is published as Discussion paper No. 185 at the Universität Hagen, Germany