The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

The lasting low fertility and ageing in Shanghai

This brief article discusses fertility decline and increased proportions of elderly in Shanghai, China. By 1996, Shanghai had 14.19 million permanent population and 13.05 million resident population. The natural population growth rate was 1.4/1000. The birth rate was 5.6/1000 and the death rate was 7/1000. 5.6084 million were engaged in urban employment by the end of 1996, which was 0.5% fewer employed people than in the preceding year. 3.8 million worked in state-owned or collectively owned enterprises. Unemployment was 2.8%. The gross domestic product per capita was 22,086 yuan (US$2661). The average annual wage was 10,572 yuan/year among urban workers. Rural and suburban households earned an average of 4846 yuan/year. The proportion of women of childbearing age continues to decline, while the proportion of elderly increases. 17.1% of total population were children aged 0-14 years in 1995 compared to 18.2% in 1990. The proportion of elderly increased from 9.4% in 1990 to 11.4% in 1995. The median age of population was 37.3 years. Life expectancy was 74.07 years for men and 78.21 years for women.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

The family planning work in Yiyang prefecture as suggested by part of the data of the sample fertility survey]

The National Committee on Family Planning conducted a sample survey of fertility in the Yi-yang area in September 1982. The survey was focused on the marriage and fertility status of women between the ages of 15 and 67. Results from this survey show that early marriage is still very popular. Only 40% of those surveyed delayed their marriage to a later age. There is a need to educate the people on the benefits of late marriage. In addition, statistics show that the average fertility rate for a woman was 6.8 children in 1970 and 2.35 children in 1982. This recent figure is still too high when compared with the under 1.2 figure suggested by the central government. Among the total number surveyed, only 77% have taken birth control measures, and the other 23% still have not taken any birth control measures. The phenomenon shows that popular education on late marriage and having children at a later age is still urgently needed in order to further reduce the fertility rate. Married couples of childbearing age should be taught effective birth control measures and knowledge of eugenics with better education for the next generation. In this way, the masses may participate actively and positively in the national family planning campaign.     

Variations in Natural Fertility: The Effect of Lactation and Other Determinants

The analysis focuses on average waiting times to a fertile conception, as derived from non-contraceptive exposure in second and higher-order birth intervals. Life-table estimates are derived from exposure in the two-year periods preceding the survey, for 20 surveys in Africa, Asia and Latin America undertaken as part of the WFS programme. Differences in the waiting time to conception are examined as a function of the duration of lactation and post partum abstinence. In addition, the extent to which variations in waiting times are produced by country and regional effects, and effects due to age, duration of marriage and parity are examined. The analysis points out the dangers of deriving estimates of natural fertility from the sub-group of women who never breastfed.     

Sex preference versus number preference: the case of Korea

The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.     

The fertility of teachers in England and Wales

Data on the fertility of teachers in grant earning schools in England and Wales were collected in 1955 as part of a general survey into the social characteristics of teachers. The survey was financed by the Nuffield Foundation with a contribution from the Population Investigation Committee. A subsequent article will discuss some possible determinants of fertility and in particular the interrelationship between social mobility and fertility. The present note describes changes in cohort fertility of teachers since 1915 and compares average family size with that of other sections of the population. The average number of children per married male teacher declined from 1.81 for the pre-1920 cohort to 1.47 for 1930–34. Segmental data after 1935 indicate a rise to approximately 2 children per family. Comparison with the Family Census suggests that the number of children of teachers is between 10% and 20% below that of all professions combined when the age at marriage of the wife is taken into account.     

A study on the effectiveness of sterilizations in reducing the birth rate

This study analyzed 1,081 women in Kerala State (India) who were either sterilized or were the wives of sterilized men, and by examining the fertility among a comparable group of 1,000 other women, estimated the number of prevented future births per 1,000 women in the sterilized group. The results of this estimation were then applied to project what the entire savings in births might be over a 3D-year period in the entire Kerala population if each year there were one, three, or five sterilizations performed per 1,000 of total population. The results failed to confirm the hope that the crude birth rate would be decreased by 12 per 1,000 in a decade merely by sterilization of five per 1,000 of the population per annum. The study also discusses various measures of reduction in the crude birth rate. By a reasonable measure, the reduction in the crude birth rate for Kerala from such a sterilization program is estimated as seven points after a decade or nine points after three decades, reflecting decreases of 21 and 36 per cent, respectively, in the number of births.     

The TFR and birth control]

Total fertility rate if (TFR) is a simple an straight forward measure of women's fertility. However, it is difficult to use the TFR as a target measure in FP programs. If TFR level is set as a target for a particular year, how can women's fertility be regulated to achieve this target? The following analysis suggests a simple model to control the proportion of birth parity. First, the TFR is decomposed into a parity- specific TFR. The parity-specific TFR can be worked out using coefficients of the regression models calculated from data of previous fertility surveys. Once the TFR is given, the parity-specific total fertility can be calculated using a model with coefficients from empirical data. Then the number of births of each parity may be calculated from the parity-specific TFR using the female age structure in a particular year, the survival probability, and the standard fertility model for each parity. When the number of surviving children of each women at child-bearing age is known, the desired proportion of births of each parity can be calculated using the standard birth probability during a years. From these models, it would be possible to calculate how many women can have their first child/year, and how many can have the second. Thus, family planning organizations would be in a position to formulate a birth quota on the basis of the above information.     

Age distribution and the stable equivalent

Some populations, like that of the United States in the 1950's, have a smaller proportion of women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with continuance of their age-specific birth and deaths rates, a continuance which produces the condition known in demography as stability. Others, like that of the United States in the 1930's, have relatively more women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with stability. A way of studying ages is to calculate how many women of stable age distribution would be equivalent from the viewpoint of reproduction to the women observed. This stable equivalent was 69,535,000 or 16 percent below the observed United States female population in 1955, and 12 percent above the observed in 1935. The stable equivalent is a measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher's reproductive value. Calculations for four countries illustrate how a fall of the birth rate, for example in demographic transition, occasions an age distribution in which the stable equivalent is greater than the observed number of women. The notion of stable equivalent is useful for comparison because changes in it are nearly invariant with respect to the age-pattern of fertility used. The statement that the United States stable equivalent increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1965 holds irrespective of whether the 1960 or the 1965 age-specific fertility and mortality rates are used as standard.     

Family planning in Taiwan, Republic of China: Progress and prospects

Abstract The family planning programme in Taiwan is considered to have been most successful and has been systematically evaluated. In the light of some expressed scepticism, however, its impact on fertility will have to be carefully reviewed. The present article discusses six specific problems : How many women have accepted the Lippes loops or pills offered in the programme ? How long will the loop stay in utero ? What proportion of married women is currently wearing the loops ? What changes have occurred in the knowledge-attitude-practice (KAP) of family planning among the target population ? How many births have been prevented by the IUD programme ? And finally, How much has fertility declined ? The fertility decline in Taiwan has been accelerating since the programme started in 1964. Approximately 40% of the decline in the birth rate, from 36.3 in 1963 to 27.7 in 1969, or 8.5 points per 1,000 in six years, however, was due to changes in age structure and delayed marriage. An increasing proportion of girls of marriageable age and a possible increase in the fecundability of the population will work against the programme's objective. Concerted efforts and heavier investment are essential for the final success of the programme.     

Models for the estimation of the probability of dying between birth and exact ages of early childhood

Abstract This paper develops two models, each of which is designed to estimate the probability of surviving from birth to selected exact ages of early childhood: namely ages two, three and five. The models are designed for use in areas with deficient registration systems. They require, as input, statistics which can be derived from retrospective data supplied by census or survey respondents. The first model, the age model, converts statistics on the proportion dead of children ever born to women in age groups 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34 into estimates of q2, q3 and q5. The second model, the marriage model, converts statistics on the proportion dead of children ever born to women of five-year marriage duration intervals into these estimates. The models can be used independently or simultaneously. These models were developed from data generated by a large number of empirical fertility and mortality schedules. Regression analysis was used to determine the parameter values of the relationships specified, and several sets of equations for estimating values of qa, for a = 2, 3 and 5 comprise the final product of the paper. It should be noted that the conceptual basis for the models was first derived by William Brass. The data generated for the regression analysis provided an opportunity to test the original Brass estimated model. We are able to report that the model performed well over the wide range of fertility and mortality conditions included in the test.     

Aboriginal fertility: Trends and prospects

Estimates of Aboriginal fertility compiled from an analysis of 1981 and 1986 Census data on children ever borne by Aboriginal women reveal age-specific fertility rates slightly higher than those of other Australian women at ages above 25, but very much higher rates for younger women. The result is a total fertility ratio more than 50 per cent higher than in the total Australian population, with no more than slight variation between States and Territories. A differential analysis using standardized indices shows considerable differences in levels of fertility of categories of young Aboriginal women classified by education, labour force status and income, and also differences between urban and rural areas. Analysis of prospects for Aboriginal fertility levels confirms the likelihood of continuation in the downward drift in levels of fertility that has been established during the past decade. Comparison of the estimates with another recent set of estimates obtained using the own-children method shows broad conformity in levels of total fertility ratios over time, except in the most recent period, the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the own-children estimates distort the recent trend and also the age distribution of Aboriginal fertility.     

Sweden faces zero population growth

In this discussion of Sweden as it approaches zero population growth, focus is on the following: population growth in perspective, fertility trends (childbearing concentrated and cohort versus period fertility), marital status (non-marital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and divorce), women's changing status (increasing education and increasing employment), constraints and supports for women's dual role (family allowances and housing), birth control (contraceptive methods and practice and abortion), mortality trends, changing age structure and the elderly (average population age and proportion of elderly and cost of elderly support), international migration (from emigration to immigration and demographic impact of immigration), immigration policy, recent population debate (immigration issues and facing zero population growth). Since 1900 the primary features of Sweden's demographic history are a continuing decline in the birth rate to very low levels -- relieved by some upward movement in the 1940s and 1960s -- and a marked shift in the migration balance from emigration to immigration. It is almost entirely because of immigration that Sweden's population growth rate has not yet turned negative. If Swedish women were to continue to bear children at the rate that all women in the reproductive ages actually did in 1978, each women would end up with an average well below the level necessary to exactly replace each adult in the population leaving migration out, an annual total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman would have to be sustained for births and deaths to be in balance under the low mortality conditions prevaling in Sweden.     

The construction of the fertility model of variable parity from family planning practice]

Understanding the changing patterns of age specific fertility under the planning system is essential for building a fertility model which reflects birth control policy implementation in China. In building a Parity Variable Fertility Model, 4 basic elements are to be considered: 1) psychosocial, and physiological variables, 2) patterns of the total fertility rate and age-specific fertility rate, 3) socioeconomic development, and 4) distribution of parity-specific fertility. THe natural fertility of women is 17, calculated from a 309-years childbearing period, with 17% of non-susceptible time. In China, about 86% of natural fertility is suppressed by various factors. In this model, the following variables are included: 1) The first marriage ratio, which is the proportion of women in each age group which enters into a first marriage. The range and spread of this ratio is closely associated with the first birth. 2) The first birth ratio, which is the proportion of a marriage cohort to have a first birth each year. 3) the birth interval, which determines the distribution of second births. 4) Regulation coefficient B, which represents birth control regulations which approximately determine the number of second-parity or higher order births. The difference between the fertility level generated from the Parity Variable Fertility Model and reality depends on the implementation of birth control program, the assumptions on regulation coefficients, and changes in social and cultural factors. The model is easy to use, especially for areas where the marriage and fertility records of women of child-bearing are well kept.     

Estimating marital fertility rates by educational attainment using a survey of new mothers

Marital fertility rates by educational attainment of mother are estimated for the United States for 1963. These calculations are based upon information collected in a probability sample survey of women having births in 1963 and are prepared by relating birth estimates for educational attainment groups to estimates of married women in corresponding groups.The rates do not display a negative association between educational attainment and the annual level of fertility, thus differing from the pattern observed in other measures of period fertility. Women who completed some high school but did not graduate and women with one or more years of college had higher annual fertility rates than women in other attainment classes.Alternative estimation procedures are discussed which illustrate difficulties in obtaining satisfactory correspondence between two independent surveys which are used to obtain the rate calculation components.     

Estimating infant mortality trends from child survivorship data

Summary Brass's procedure for estimating mortality from census or survey data on numbers of children born to women by age group and numbers of children surviving is generalized to allow the estimation of mortality trends. The new procedure is applied to data for Costa Rica and peninsular Malaysia. The resulting infant mortality rate estimates are compared with rates calculated from vital registration figures. The comparisons suggest, surprisingly, that the estimates derived from statistics for women aged 30-50 are not noticeably inferior to those derived from those for women aged 20-30. This suggests that the common practice of disregarding statistics for women aged over 30 or 35 years may be a mistake. Figures are presented which suggest that estimates based on women aged less than 20 are likely to be very seriously biased because of differential infant mortality by age of mother at birth.     

A cost benefit analysis of the barbados family planning programme

Abstract Of the Caribbean islands, Barbados has the lowest fertility level. The crude birth rate in 1970 was only 20·5 per 1,000, which is one of the lowest found in any country of similar economic development anywhere in the world. In 1960 the crude birth rate was much higher, at about 33·6 and for almost 40 years before that had fluctuated around a value of 33. Thus, a decline of about 40% has been achieved within the comparatively short period of a decade. The reasons for this rapid decline are of particular interest to all those concerned with population growth and economic development in the less developed areas. In Barbados, the importance of population control and the role of family planning was recognised early by the government and other civic agencies, and the Barbados Family Planning Association (BFPA), an autonomous national family planning agency, was established. Since its modest beginning in 1955 the BFPA has grown to be a major social institution, comprising 14 clinics situated in various localities throughout the island. In 1970, a full-time staff of 28 were providing services to an estimated 10,000 clients, about 20% of all women of reproductive age. Funds for the BFPA have come from local government with considerable assistance from international agencies.     

The change of fertility and factors impacting it in Shanghai City in the past thirty years]

In 1981 a 3% random sampling of women born between 1931-66 was taken in Shanghai to study their menstrual and marital histories, pregnancies, contraceptive use, education, and occupation. In the last 30 years the fertility rate and the rate of natural population increase began to decline beginning around 1957-58. The changes in fertility rate fall into 3 periods: 1) between 1958-61 the fertility rate fell from 238.6/1000 to 159.2/1000, averaging 26.5/1000 annually; there was a slight period of stability from 1961-63; 2) between 1963-67 it fell from 155.8/1000 to 56.3/000, averaging 24.9/1000 annually and between 1967-68 there was a slight increase; and 3) between 1968-74 it fell from 63.2/100 to 26.4/1000, averaging 6.1/1000 annually. The fertility rate of various age groups also declined during the last 30 years. The average number of children for married women was 1.92. Factors influencing the fertility rate include: 1) birth control policy: the changes in the fertility rates were dominated by the birth control policy; for instance, from 1956-60, after late marriages were officially advocated, the average age at 1st marriage for men was 1.64 years older than before; between 1962-64, those women with more than 3 children were sterilized. 2) Education: the higher the educational attainment, the later was the age at 1st marriage, the more effective was the use of contraceptives and the lower the standard was for fertility; 3) occupation: the type of job influenced the age at marriage, as well as the frequency of miscarriage and live births; 4) attitude towards children: the total number of children women reported they would like averaged out to be 1.7; 5) urban and rural differences: the fertility rate for Shanghai City was not only lower than for Shanghai County, it fell at a faster rate; 6) changes in the age structure of fertile women affected the fertility rate; and 7) others: nutrition, the ability to propagate, age at 1st marriage, plus economic and social factors all affected fertility.     

A decomposition of trends in the nonmarital fertility ratios of blacks and whites in the united states, 1960–1992*

We use a method of standardization and decomposition developed by Das Gupta to update Smith and Cutright’s analysis of demographic factors responsible for increases in the nonmarital fertility ratio (illegitimacy ratio) among blacks and whites in the United States. We create standardized rates for each year between 1960 and 1992, and consistent, exhaustive decompositions of the nonmarital fertility ratio for any interval during this period in terms of four components: (1) the age distribution of women of reproductive age, (2) the proportion of women unmarried at each age, (3) the age-specific birth rates of married women, and (4) the age-specific birth rates of unmarried women. Nonmarital fertility ratios are much higher among blacks than among whites, but both increased monotonically from 1960 to 1992. During the last 10 years, each increased by nearly 10 percentage points. Increases in the proportion of women not married, at all ages, account for the preponderance of the increase in black nonmarital fertility ratios. Increasing rates of unmarried childbearing, however, have played a role during the most recent decade (1983–1992). For whites, from 1960 until 1975, declines in marital fertility were most important in producing increases in the proportion of children born out of wedlock. Since then, these proportions have increased primarily because of increases in unmarried women s birth rates, and secondarily because of declines in the proportion of women who are married. These trends are consistent with arguments that emphasize declining economic incentives to marry and reduced access to, and acceptability of, abortion.