Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

Fertility of the jews

The objectives of this paper were to review and summarize the existing literature on Jewish fertility and to discuss the highlights of data on fertility trends and differentials based on survey data obtained on the Jewish population of the metropolitan area of Providence, Rhode Island. The literature consistently confirmed the finding of lower fertility among Jews since the 1880's in the United States and for the last seventy-five years in a variety of European countries.A review of available data on fertility trends and differentials within the Jewish population indicated contradictory and inconsistent findings. The Providence survey data pointed to changing patterns of fertility among Jews and clarified a number of seeming inconsistencies. These data suggested (1) the pre-World War II decline and postwar recovery of Jewish fertility; (2) the change from an inverse relationship of social class and Jewish fertility among first-generation Jews to a direct relationship among second- and third-generation Jews; (3) the changing relationship of religiosity and Jewish fertility, which reflects social class changes.Finally, an attempt is made to clarify the interpretation of these and related findings by placing the analysis of Jewish fertility in the context of assimilation and acculturation.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

An analysis of the fertility of Chinese women]

The 1982 census provided detailed information on fertility in China. It recorded 20,689,704 births in 1981, producing a birth rate of 2.1%, a decrease, respectively, of 43% and more than 50% in comparison with 1952 and 1963. The birth rate has varied widely over the last 30 years, from 3.6% in the early 1950's, to 1.8% in 1961, after a planned birth program was begun, to a record high of 3.7% in 1962 following the economic recovery, to 3.3% in 1970, after a gradual decline through the 1960's. By 1981 the birth rate had declined to 2.1%, clearly resulting from the intense planned fertility promotion begun in the early 1970's. In the mid- and late 50's, urban birth rate was consistently higher than rural, with the mass move to the cities at the beginning of the People's Republic. General economic development after 1957 brought simultaneous declines of both urban and rural rates, both reaching a low point in 1961. Age structure of the population also has an influence, depending on the proportion of childbearing women in the population. In 1981, the fertility of China's childbearing women was 8.3%, lower than that of the developing countries, but higher than the developed countries. By age group, the fertility rates reached 14.7% and 23.9% respectively in women between 20-24 and 25-29 years of age; the legal marriage age is 20. The fertility rate in large cities is generally lower than that of provinces. Higher educational and socio-economic level also exert an inverse influence on fertility rates; in low socio-economic areas the rate reached 3.5%, and in more advanced areas it was held to 2.2%. In all professions with the exception of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the percentage of families with 1 child was 81.8%. Since planned fertility was implemented, the overall fertility rate has dropped from 3% to 2%. China's fertility mode has changed to that of developed countries, with high intensity between 20 and 29 years of age. Appropriate measures should be taken to lower the fertility rate in different regions.     

文化力对中国生育率下降的重要影响

中国在经济不发达的情况下 ,仅用 30年的时间实现了人口再生产类型从高出生、低死亡、高增长到低出生、低死亡、低增长的历史性转变。中国生育率迅速下降是政策力、经济力、文化力综合作用的结果。其中文化力对生育率的下降起着推动力、导向力、凝聚力和鼓舞力的作用。在文化力日积月累、潜移默化的影响下 ,中国城乡育龄夫妇生育观念正在发生巨大变化 ,且这种变化还远没有完成。     

Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

Persistence of high fertility in tropical Africa: the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The article explores how geography, history, and society have shaped childbearing behaviors over the last half-century, and how they are now being reshaped by modernity and the exigencies of urban life, in the democratic Republic of the Congo. The decline of prolonged postpartum abstinence and involuntary childlessness initially raised fertility to high levels (6–7 children per woman). More recently, socioeconomic differentials in fertility have emerged, suggesting that the country may be entering a phase of fertility decline. A full-blown transition, however, seems still a remote prospect. Supported both by cultural traditions and by economic rationality, Congo's people remain largely convinced of the benefits of many children for their own and their kin's security. While an eventual fertility transition may be taken for granted, the article examines the many hurdles, contradictions, and tensions that will have to be overcome to achieve that outcome.     

The decline of non-marital fertility in Europe, 1880-1940

Abstract Between 1880 and 1940, to take approximate dates, illegitimate fertility rates in Europe dropped precipitously, falling in most countries by 50% or more. The rates used throughout this paper relate extra-marital births to the number of unmarried (i.e. single, widowed and divorced) women; we use a standardized index, I ({ih}) to be discussed later. In Fig. 1 we present most of the European series of I ( h )'s that can be computed from existing census and vital registration data. Although there are interesting exceptions the general picture is clear: a decline in illegitimate fertility commenced in most countries in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and was arrested in the 1920's and 1930's. Once it had begun in a country, the downward course was swift and uninterrupted, until non-marital fertility had been cut in half.     

From natural fertility to family limitation: The onset of fertility transition in a sample of German villages

Utilizing data from a sample of German village genealogies, it is possible to document the changes in reproductive patterns on the family level that started to take place in Germany during the nineteenth century and formed the basis for the secular decline in fertility which eventually encompassed the entire country. One striking finding from this study was the substantial diversity among the small sample of villages in terms of the timing of the emergence of family limitation. While couples in all villages who married during the last half of the eighteenth century appeared to be characterized predominantly by natural fertility the emergence of family limitation began as early as the turn of the nineteenth century in some places and as late as the end of the nineteenth century in others. Occupational differentials with respect to family limitation were also examined. There is little evidence that changes in birth spacing played an important part in the initial phase of the fertility trnsition. Rather, the underlying process appears to involve a change from fertility patterns that were characterized by the absence of parity-dependent control to one in which attempts to terminate childbearing in response to the number of children already born becomes widespread.     

A look at Asia's changing youth population

This report summarizes findings from a recent East-West Center study on demographic and social changes among young people aged 15-24 years in 17 countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Nearly every country in Asia has experienced fertility decline. Decline began in Japan and Singapore during the 1950s, followed by declines in Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China during the 1960s. Declines occurred during the 1970s in Indonesia, India, and Myanmar. A "youth bulge" occurred about 20 years later due to declines in infant and child mortality. This bulge varies by country with the timing and magnitude of population growth and subsequent fertility decline. The proportion of youth population rises from 16% to 18% about 20 years after the beginning of fertility decline and declines to a much lower stable level after several decades. The bulge is large in countries with rapid fertility decline, such as China. Governments can minimize the effects of bulge on population growth by raising the legal age at marriage, lengthening the interval between first marriage and first birth, and increasing birth intervals. School enrollments among adolescents are rising. In South Korea, the population aged 15-24 years increased from 3.8 to 8.8 million during 1950-90, a rise of 132% compared to a rise of 653% among school enrollments. It is expected that the number of out-of-school youths will decline from 5.1 to 3.6 million during 1990-2025. Youth employment varies by gender. Policies/programs in family planning and reproductive health will need to address the changing needs of youth population.     

Fertility and development in Brazil

In the past, one of the concomitants of development has been a sustained reduction in fertility. As a result of this experience, demographers hypothesize that in a society in which fertility is lower in urban areas, among the upper socioeconomic status groups and the better-educated, fertility will decline to a moderate level as the country changes from a rural, agricultural socioeconomic structure, with low levels of living and education, to an urban, industrial structure, with rising levels of living and education.The data analyzed in this study indicate, however, that though substantial social and economic development (as measured by changes in industrial structure, per capita income, urbanization, and education) occurred in Brazil from at least 1920-40 to 1960, during which time fertility differentials of the kind indicated above existed, fertility has shown little or no tendency to decline. Between 1940 and 1960, in fact, the birth rate appears to have remained fairly constant around 43. With the death rate steadily dropping, the rate of natural increase and population growth (given a small net in-migration) has been accelerating. p ]From a theoretical point of view, these facts reinforce a growing realization, based on similar findings in some other developing countries, that the prevailing theoretical ideas concerning the relationship between development and fertility require modification, particularly in the direction of greater specificity. On the practical side, the question is raised whether Brazil's rate of economic development during the postwar period up to 1960 can be maintained, let alone increased, in the face of a population growth rate which will probably average 3.2-3.5 percent for the period 1960-70 and which, in the absence of a decline in fertility, is likely to accelerate further.     

Spatial Patterns of Fertility Transition in Indian Districts

The article explores the dynamics of Indian fertility at the district level using a child‐woman index developed from the four Indian censuses, 1961 to 1991. It employs statistical and geostatistical techniques to assess fertility change across districts and periods. Fertility decline is evident in every region, but sizable regional differentials exist. A cluster analysis of fertility profiles indicates that a clear spatial pattern of fertility in India has emerged and the pattern intensified because of the process of fertility decline.     

Are there crisis-led fertility declines? Evidence from central Cameroon

Past demographic transitions have beenobserved with and without economic progress, but thereis little empirical record of crisis-driven fertilitytransitions. In recent years, several authors haveargued that conditions for such transitions are met inAfrican countries under economic crisis and structuraladjustment. Using retrospective family histories,this study examines fertility responses to crisis inCameroon, a country with a particularly abrupteconomic reversal. The thesis of a crisis-led declineis tested on the basis of five criteria includingtiming of the decline, statistical and substantivesignificance, rural-urban response differentials andsocial salience. Findings are consistent with acrisis-led effect.     

Views and concepts relating to population problems in the Netherlands 1918–1939

The problem of the possibility of overpopulation in the Netherlands has never been a subject of debate. The tempo of decline of fertility in this densely populated country was, however, much slower than elsewhere. Discussion started only after 1919, when economic problems relating to a rapidly expanding population were studied. The object of this article is to trace the development of such discussion in the Netherlands between the two world wars. The article is intended to make a contribution to explaining the exceptional situation of the Netherlands during the last hundred years in respect of population.     

Economic motives for family limitation

Abstract Taiwan can boast one of the most rapid rates of economic development in the world over the past 20 years. Taiwan is also in the midst of the demographic transition. The nature of the connection between economic development and the onset and progress of the fertility decline is far from clear, however. Rather than explore the relation between income and fertility change, this paper will be concerned with some of the economic motivations which may be responsible for fertility decline during the demographic transition. Inquiries in this area have been handicapped by having to rely on aggregative or on household data which included only a very limited set of economic variables (other than income) along with demographic data. In order to re-examine the linkages between economic change and fertility change at the family level, a special survey was conducted in Taiwan in 1969. While recognizing that economic factors are not wholly, perhaps not even primarily, responsible for the lowering of the birth rate, the central interest of this paper is the complex of cost and benefit considerations which may contribute to a decline of the rate, using the new data for Taiwan.     

The Bangladesh fertility decline: an interpretation

The claim has been made, notably in a 1994 World Bank report, that the Bangladesh fertility decline shows that efficient national family planning programs can achieve major fertility declines even in countries that are very poor, and even if females have a low status and significant socioeconomic change has not occurred. This article challenges this claim on the grounds that Bangladesh did experience major social and economic change, real and perceived, over the last two decades. This proposition is supported by official data and by findings of the authors' 1997 field study in rural southeast Bangladesh. That study demonstrates that most Bangladeshis believe that conditions are very different from the situation a generation ago and that on balance there has been improvement. Most also believe that more decisions must now be made by individuals, and these include decisions to have fewer children. In helping to achieve these new fertility aims, however, the services provided by the family planning program constituted an important input.     

Womens education and diffusion of the fertility transition: The case of Egypt 1960–1996 in 4905 administrative subdivisions

Egypt comprises thousands of small geographic units. Total fertility rates are reconstructed for the 4905qism, qarya, medina, markaz andshiyakhat covering non-desert Egypt at the 1960, 1976, 1986 and 1996 censuses. This fine spatial scale reveals that heterogeneity across subdivisions increased during the fertility transition, illustrating the rapidity of change. Spatial patterns appear in the fertility upsurge of 1974–85, which is accompanied by a large but temporary reduction in heterogeneity. Fertility varies greatly between subdivisions and geographic differentials underlie the expected and observed association between fertility, literacy, family transfers and industrialization. Cairo led the decline of fertility, but that decline is counterbalanced by rapid economic growth and persistently high levels of illiteracy. A similar pattern of fertility change is observed for the chief city of the Muhafaza and its surrounding area. Egypt presents an archetype of demographic transition as improved economic and educational status diffuses across the country, moderated by its specific geography.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

Population growth,economic development and family planning

This report discusses research conducted to determine whether reduction in population growth rates contributed to the rapid economic growth of Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The 5-year research projects, jointly sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities, the Nihon University Population Research Institute, and the East-West Population Institute, concluded that development and family planning programs contributed substantially to fertility decline in these countries. The project examined 3 factors that influence the long-term productive capacity and growth of the 4 Asian economies: savings, the size of the labor force, and the quality of labor (measured by educational attainment). Available evidence indicates a strong positive contribution of population decline toward growth of savings, a growth in labor force concurrent with a decline in fertility rates which enables per capita income to rise, and an increase in 2ndary education enrollment ratios as fertility is lowered. Development factors by themselves explain no more than 1/2 of the decline in fertility observed, suggesting that family planning programs particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia since 1976 have had an important impact on fertility and economic development.     

Japan's fertility: effects of contraception and induced abortion after World War II

This report studies the effects of contraception and abortion on crude birth rate (CBR) and total fertility rate (TFR) in Japan from 1947-1980. The CBR declined from 34.3 in 1947 to 17.3 in 1957, and the TFR from 4.5 to 2.0 in the same period. Both stabilized (CBR in the range of 17.0 to 19.0 and TFR at 2.0 to 2.1) between 1957 and 1973. This dramatic decline in fertility was initiated under the serious socioeconomic difficulties of post-World War II Japan. At the onset of the postwar fertility decline, fertility within marriage was controlled most strongly by induced abortion, and to a lesser extent, lactation and contraception. During the period of stable low fertility (1960-1980) the effect of abortion decreased and the effect of contraception increased. KAP surveys show that in the late 1970's more than 75% of contraceptive users in Japan employed the condom, while condom use in other Asian countries is generally very low. A shift from traditional to modern methods of contraception is unlikely to alter the already low level of fertility in Japan but would have considerable social, medical, and economic impact.