Abstracts

Interstate Dynamics and Security Management on the Sino -India Border： A Game Theoretic Analysis By Sui Xinmin ABSTRACT： Interactions between China and India in their border region can be conceived of as a highly dynamic theoretical game. Seemingly identical or similar scenarios with respect to the border actually represent different strategic equilib- ria. These include a dove -hawk pure strategy equilibrium, a tit -for -tat mixed strategy equilibrium, and a coordination mechanism induced pure strategy relative equilibrium. A ＂spillover effect＂ is clearly evident in the China -India border game, which serves to contain tensions or prevent a crisis from escalating. Collec- tively, the major contrast in understanding between China and India vis - a - vis the border situation, trust deficit and the impact of domestic politics make it ex- tremely difficult for India and China to satisfactorily resolve the border dispute in the foreseeable future. With a militarized presence on both sides, peace can be managed China- India relations will continue to be characterized by competitive cooperation within the context of a non - cooperative game.