Population change in the former Soviet Republics

Demographic trends in the former Soviet Republics and Russia are summarized and discussed in this publication. The former Soviet Republics in Europe as well as Georgia and Armenia had completed or almost completed their demographic transition before October 1991. Other Central Asian republics experienced reduced mortality, but, despite rapid declines, fertility is still above replacement level (at 3-4 children per woman). The economic and social dislocation of the breakup of the republics has hastened fertility decline. The annual population growth rate of the USSR in the mid-1980s was 0.9%; this rate declined to 0.4% in 1991, and the decline has continued. The 1991 population of the USSR was 289.1 million. Between 1989 and 1991, the crude birth rate was 18/1000 population, and the crude death rate was 10/1000. The net migration rate of -4/1000 helped to reduce growth. Total fertility in the USSR was 2.3 children in 1990. In Russia, fertility declined from 1.9 in 1990 to 1.4 in 1993. The preferred family size in Russia was 1.9 in 1990 and 1.5 in 1993. This decline occurred due to lack of confidence in the economy and insufficient income. Only 19% of women used contraception in 1990. Marriages declined after 1990. Age pyramids were similar in the republics in that there was a narrowing in the proportion aged 45-49 years, and the male population aged over 65 years was diminished, due to the effect of World War II. The cohort of those aged 20-24 years in 1992 was very small due to the small parental birth cohort. The differences in the republics was characterized as broad-based in the younger ages because of high fertility. The number of childbearing women will remain large. Life expectancy has been 70 years since the 1950s and has declined in some republics due to substandard health care, lack of job safety measures, and alcoholism. Some republics experienced increased life expectancy, but, after 1991, mortality increased. Tajikistan had the highest infant mortality of 47/1000 live births in 1993. A demographic profile provided for each republic offers several population projection scenarios.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic ‘dividend’: extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985–2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

Asian and Pacific population targets

2 population targets for the Asian and Pacific regions were established in 1981-82: 1) by the Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development at Beijing, China to attain 1% population growth rate for the Asian region by the year 2000, and 2) by the 3rd Asian and Pacific Population Conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, to attain replacement level of fertility by the year 2000. In an attempt to ascertain whether these targets can be achieved and/or related, the Population Division of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) prepared population projections in which the 2 targets are achieved. These projections were prepared by aggregating the total population of member countries. When net reproduction rate (NRR) equals 1 (replacement level fertility) it will lead to a stable population with a growth rate of zero. In the short-term a population with replacement level fertility will continue to increase if it has a young age structure due to previous higher levels of fertility. Some projections for the period 1980-2005 are: 1) population growth rate will decrease from 1.78% to 1.05%, 2) total fertility rate will decrease from 3.63-2.11, 3) male life expectancy will increase from 59.8-67.3, and 4) infant mortality rate will decrease from 67.3-34.5. For the ESCAP region, a target of NRR of 1 would be easier to achieve than a growth rate of 1%. The UN projects the total population of the region to be 3,382,000,000 in the year 2000. If the NRR can be lowered to 1 by then, however, the total population would be 3,342,000,000 and if the growth rate can be reduced to 1% by the end of the century the resulting population would be 3,300,000,000. Major demographic benefits will be attained in terms of the age structure of the population if a 1% growth rate is achieved; the proportion under age 15 was 37.1% in 1980 but will be 27.2% in 2000 with a dependency ratio of 48.8 compared to 70.8 for 1980.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

The Future Composition of the Canadian Labor Force: A Microsimulation Projection

This article charts the future transformations of the Canadian labor force population using a microsimulation projection model. The model takes into account differentials in demographic behavior and labor force participation of individuals according to their ethnocultural and educational characteristics. As a result of a rapid fall in fertility, the Canadian population is expected to age rapidly as baby boomers start to retire from the labor market in large numbers. In response to declining fertility, Canada raised its immigration intake at the end of the 1980s, and immigration is now the main driver of Canadian population growth. At the same time, immigrants to Canada are becoming more culturally diversified. Over the last half century, the main source regions have shifted from Europe to Asia. Results of the microsimulation show that Canada's labor force population will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than in the recent past. By 2031, almost one third of the country's total labor force could be foreign‐born, and almost all its future increase is expected to be among university graduates, while the less‐educated labor force is projected to decline.     

Population growth trends in India: 1991 census

The decennial census counted the total population of India at 843.931 million as of the sunrise of March 1, 1991. The total is 160.6 million higher than that of a decade earlier in 1981. The actual census count exceeded by 45 million the official projections for 1991 based on the 1971 census. However, the official projections for the same year based on the 1981 census fell short by 7.6 million only. Most of the observed differences are explained by the slower decline in the fertility levels. The population growth ratepeaked during 1971–81, perhaps in 1972–73 (based on the Sample Registration Scheme data). The average annualexponential growth rate declined marginally to 2.11 per cent (4.5%) after having remained at a plateau for the previous two decades of 1961–71 and 1971–81. At this point in time, the fertility and mortality trends indicate that India will reach the replacement level fertility [Net Reproductive Rate of Unity] by the years 2010–2015. It can be said with a greater degree of certainty that the official target of reaching the replacement level fertility by the year 2000a.d. will not be reached. Based on the 1991 census results, it can be said that India will reach the billion mark by the turn of the century. The World Bank projects a population of 1,350 million by the year 2025a.d., and a stationary population of 1,862 million by the year 2150a.d., assuming that the replacement level fertility [Net Reproductive Rate = 1] in India is reached about the year 2015a.d.     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

The Philippines: country statement prepared for the International Conference on Population,Mexico City,August 1984

This statement, prepared for the 1984 International Conference on Population, summarizes the demographic situation in the Philippines, the Philippine position regarding implementation of the World Population Plan of Action, and current population policies. In 1980, the population of the Philippines stood at 48.1 million. The country's current population growth rate reflects the interplay between decreasing mortality and still high but declining fertility. The 1984-87 Philippine Development Plan aims to achieve sustainable economic growth, equitable distribution of the gains of development, and personal development. A net reproduction rate of unity by the year 2000 is sought, and preschool-age children, youth, premarriage-age groups, and married couples of reproductive age have been targeted for special outreach efforts. The national population program will concentrate on developing a network of public and private community-based organizations, strengthening the capacity of local government and community organizations to plan and manage the population program, developing community capacity to finance family planning services, upgrading the quality of natural family planning practice, continuing the promotion of effective contraceptive methods, developing a population data bank, and upgrading the technical and management capabilities of population program personnel. Increasing attention is being paid to regional development and spatial distribution. The average annual population growth rate is expected to decline from 2.8% in 1970-75 to 2.2% by 1987. The crude birth rate is expected to drop from 34/1000 in 1980 to 31/1000 in 1987. To help achieve this goal, the contraceptive prevalence rate should increase from 34% in 1983 to 41% in 1987 and 50% by 1993. In addition, attempts will be made to reduce the proportion of women marrying below the age of 20 years and to improve women's access to educational and employment opportunities.     

Chinese population prospects projection]

Production of population and goods are closely related, mutually restricted, and should be included in our economic plan. Population projection is important in implementation and study of population policy. It is also the foundation of population regulations. Assuming 2 children per couple the population growth rate will be 1% in 1985 and .6% in the year 2000. Therefore, we cannot realize our goal of .5% population growth rate by 1985 and 0% by 2000. A 9% annual growth rate of national production will be required to reach our goal of $1000 U.S. per capita income by the year 2000, a goal that history proves is difficult to achieve. 2 children per couple, therefore, cannot meet our urgent requirements of modernization and educational improvement. A 2nd assumption of 90% single child families after 1 year would yield an average annual population growth rate of .38% in 1985 and .012% in the year 2000. This assumption leads to a rapid population decrease, too rapid for most to accept the change. The 3rd assumption is a gradual increase in single child families to 50% in 1985 and 90% in the year 2000. The resulting growth rates will be .5% in 1983 and near 0% in the year 2000. The projected population boom from 1987 to 1996 will be decreased to an annual increase of .4-.5%. This assumption provides time for people to understand and recognize the importance of the policy. It meets the requirements of modernization and will help improve China's educational and living standards. All 3 assumptions were based on 3 children per couple for minorities.     

Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division’s current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country’s TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: how big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic 'dividend': extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985-2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

Family Benefits and Fertility: An Econometric Analysis

A population's growth potential is significantly underestimated by conventional calculations of population momentum which assume an immediate drop to replacement level fertility. Here we assume that the growth rate of births linearly declines to zero over a specified time interval, and find simple and intuitively meaningful expressions for the size of the ultimate birth cohort and the resultant population momentum. In particular, we find that the increase in the number of births over the transition is equal to growth at the initial rate for half the time needed to attain a constant birth level. Thus our formula readily calculates the growth potential of a population under a gradual approach to stationarity without the need for a numerical projection. Calculations for actual and hypothetical populations are presented to show the demographic impact of such gradual approaches to zero growth.     

A preliminary inquiry into the interrelationship between population growth and economic development in Hong Kong]

Hong Kong includes Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, New Territory, and more than 230 islands. During World War ii, the population of Hong Kong decreased sharply, and the total number decreased to less than 600,000. Since the war ended in 1945, the population of Hong Kong has been increasing rapidly at an annual rate of 20%. By the end of 1981, its total population had increased to 5.2 million, including 1.25 million newly arrived immigrants. The average age is 24.8. People above the age 65 constitute only 6% of the total population. This shows that there is a sufficient supply of labor for local economic development. Because of continued economic growth, there has been a constant demand for more labor. Low wages provide an excellent condition for high-speed industrial development. An improved quality of professional workers and management personnel also contributes much to Hong Kong's industrial modernization. Because of high employment among the labor population, the general population earns income and spends a great deal, and this has created a rather active economy. General population growth trends include: 1) continued population growth will bring the total population to 6.3 million by the end of 1981, and the housing problem will become more serious; 2) a stable decline in the natural population growth rate will gradually change the population pattern to a low birth, low death, and low natural growth situation; and 3) improvements in science and technology, health care, and living conditions will reduce the death rate, and the average age will lengthen, and with the increase in old people, the demand for social welfare will also increase; and 4) there will be a shortage in experienced labor (professional technicians and high management personnel) in the 1980s. Facing the new situation, Hong Kong's economic structure needs reform, moving from a labor intensive enterprise to a capital-technological intensive enterprise. The market will be expanded and Hong Kong will earn more profit in China's mode rnization process.     

A cohort analysis of the fertility of the July 1 People's Commune in Shanghai, County]

The survey was conducted in February-March 1981. The population of this commune at the end of 1980 was 18,608. The cultural and educational levels, economic condition, and work in family planning of this commune form a typical example among numerous similar communes in Shanghai County. The birthrate, natural growth rate, and average fertility rate began to decline in the later half of 1950s and reached the lowest level in 1974. The survey shows a delay in the marriage age. The fertility rate also dropped by 21.31% from 1963 to 1980. The average fertility rate dropped by 162.73% from 1963 to 1980. Among the women of childbearing age, 99% of them have a knowledge of birth control measures, 95% of them have used them before, and 78% are currently using them. All these figures show that the work in family planning in the commune has reached a high level by world standards. 3 factors which have a strong impact on fertility are: the economic and educational level, formation of population elements, and family planning work. A rise in the standard of living and improvement in education normally leads to late marriage and a decline in fertility. An increase in the number of women of childbearing age causes a rise in fertility. The population growth after 1974 is a reflection of this situation. The survey shows that the decline in fertility before 1973 was caused mainly by family planning work.     

生育率演变的生态学逻辑及人口增长的长期趋势

人口增长的长期过程一直是充满困惑与引发争论的话题,将人类复归到生态系统的普通成员,按照生态学逻辑构建一个由替代生育率内生引导、人口容量外生制约的人口增长新模型,以代替用具体社会经济因子解释短周期人口变动的传统思路,探讨生育率转变的一般模式及人口发展的长期趋势。工业革命以来,全球人口已经或正在经历着第一次、第二次生育率转变,全球生育率演变可以聚类为欧美、亚非拉、撒哈拉以南非洲和东亚四种区域模式;在计划生育政策的推动下,我国在短短的三十年内完整经历了两次生育率转变。极限替代生育率是生育率演变的长期目标,但当前已有一些国家跌破更替水平,这也许会成为各个国家的普遍经历,预示着人口容量约束的日益显性化;世界及主要国家的人口规模正在日益逼近其容量极限,并会在惯性驱动下突破容量限制,达到峰值后再以负增长方式趋近人口容量,同期的生育率也将向极限替代生育率递增复归。按趋势模拟世界和中国的可持续人口容量分别约为65亿人和12亿人。研究设计出测量人口增长惯性的新指标——人口增长惯性系数,它是生育率与实时替代生育率之比或出生率与死亡率之比,相比常用的人口惯性因子更为简便易行。     

Africa's expanding population: old problems,new policies

Sub-Saharan Africa faces an historic challenge: to achieve economic and social progress while experiencing extraordinary population growth. With an estimated 1989 population of 512 million, the 42 countries of sub-Saharan Africa have the highest birth and death rates of any major world region. While death rates have fallen since the 1960s, persistently high birth rates yield annual growth rates above 3% in many countries. The United Nations projects that the region's population will increase 2.7 times by 2025--to 1.4 billion. Throughout the region, population has outstripped economic growth since the mid-1970s. In addition, many African countries are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). The extent and demographic impact of the epidemic still are unknown, but disturbing social and political effects are already being felt. The region's population growth will slow only when African couples begin to have fewer children. The average number of children per woman ranges from 6 to 8 for most countries. The Africans' preference for large families is deeply rooted in the culture and fed by the perceived economic benefits they receive from their children. Economic stagnation during the 1980s prompted many national governments to recognize that rapid population growth was hindering their socioeconomic development. The political climate has shifted away from pronatalist or laissez-faire attitudes toward official policies to slow population growth. The policy formation process--detailed here for 4 countries (Zambia, Nigeria, Zaire, and Liberia)--is ponderous and beset with political and bureaucratic pitfalls, However, policy shifts in more and more countries combined with evidence of increased contraceptive use and fertility downturns in a few countries give some hope that the region's extraordinary population growth may have peaked and will start a descent. Whatever the case, the decade of the 1990s will be crucial for the future of sub-Saharan Africa.     

Population momentum for gradual demographic transitions

Population momentum is the ratio of a population's ultimate size after a demographic transition to its initial size before the transition. For an instantaneous drop to replacement fertility, Nathan Keyfitz found a simple expression M K for the momentum. However, as Keyfitz pointed out, `no one thinks that any country will drop immediately to stationary reproduction patterns'. We present results concerning the momentum of a population whose demographic transition is completed within a finite time. First, we provide an exact analytical formula for such a population's momentum. Second, for rapid fertility transitions, we obtain a simple exact expression for momentum that reduces to Keyfitz's M K if the transition is instantaneous. We show, by example, that our simpler formulae are accurate approximations to population momentum for transitions that take as long as 100 years. Finally, we show that the speed of fertility decline makes a substantial difference to population momentum.     

New Estimates and Projections of Population Growth in Pakistan

Pakistan's population growth rate rose steadily from about 2.6 percent per annum in the early 1960s to a high of about 3.5 percent during the late 1980s. Since then it has declined to an estimated 2.1 percent for 2003. Growth rates calculated from the population censuses, which show a very different picture, are distorted by differential accuracy of enumeration. During the period of rising growth rates, fertility was constant at just under 7 children per woman while life expectancy at birth rose by nearly 20 years. Fertility decline began in the late 1980s, bringing the population growth rate down with it. Remarkably, there appears to have been little change in life expectancy over the past 15 years.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

Europe's second demographic transition

By 1985, fertility rates in Europe were below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman in all but Albania, Ireland, Malta, Poland, and Turkey, following a steady decline from a 1965 postwar peak well above 2.5 in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe and an erratic trend from a lower level in Eastern Europe. Natural decrease (fewer births than deaths) had begun already in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and the Federal Republic of Germany and can be expected shortly in many other countries. According to current UN medium projections, Europe's population (minus the USSR) will grow only 6% between 1985 and 2025, from 492 to 524 million and 18.4% of the population in 2025 will be 65 and over. The decline to low fertility in the 1930s during Europe's 1st demographic transition was propelled by a concern for family and offspring. Behind the 2nd transition is a dramatic shift in norms toward progressiveness and individualism, which is moving Europeans away from marriage and parenthood. Cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility are increasingly acceptable; having a child is more and more a deliberate choice made to achieve greater self-fulfillment. Many Europeans view population decline and aging as threats to national influence and the welfare state. However, governments outside Eastern Europe, except for France, have hesitated to try politically risky and costly economic pronatalist incentives. As used in Eastern Europe, coupled with some restrictions on legal abortion, such incentives have not managed to boost fertility back up to replacement level. Immigration as a solution is unfeasible. All countries of immigration have now imposed strict controls, tried to stimulate return migration of guestworkers recruited during labor shortages of the 1960s and early 1970s, and now aim at rapid integration of minorities. Only measures compatible with the shift to individualism might slow or reverse the fertility decline, but a rebound to replacement level seems unlikely and long-term population decline appears inevitable for most of Europe.