Population,resources, environment: an uncertain future

This issue analyzes the economic and environmental consequences of rapid population growth in developing countries (LDC), the population decline in developed countries, the limits that life on a finite planet impose on economic and demographic expansion and progress, and the proper governmental response to promote the welfare of its current and future citizens. The links between population growth, resource use, and environmental quality are too complex to permit straightforward generalizations about direct causal relationships. However, rapid population growth has increased the number of poor people in LDC, thus contributing to degradation of the environment and the renewable resources of land, water, and nonhuman species on which humans depend. Demands of the rich industrial countries have also generated environmental pressures and have been foremost in consumption of the nonrenewable resources of fossil fuels, metals, and nonmetallic minerals. On the other hand, population and economic growth have also stimulated technological and management changes that help supply and use resources more effectively. Wide variations in the possible ultimate size of world population and accelerating technological change make future interrelationships of population, resources, and the environment uncertain as well as complex. Those interrelationships are mediated largely by government policies. Responsible governments can bring about a sustainable balance in the population/resource/environment equation by adopting population and development policies that experience has shown could reduce future population numbers in LDC below the additional 5 billion indicated in current UN medium projections. This coupled with proven management programs in both LDC and developed countries could brake and reverse the depletion and degradation of natural resources.     

Land cover change and fertility in West-Central Africa: rural livelihoods and the vicious circle model

The vicious circle argument, rooted in a neo-Malthusian tradition, states that resource scarcity increases the demand for child labor and leads to higher fertility. The rural livelihood framework, on the other hand, contends that households employ multiple strategies, only one of which involves adjusting their fertility levels as a response to environmental pressures. This study provides a unique test of both theories by examining the relationship between land cover change and fertility across hundreds of rural communities in four West-Central African countries. The findings reveal a complex relationship between natural capital and fertility. In communities where natural capital was initially low, a further decline in that capital is associated with both higher fertility preferences and levels. However, we find that fertility preferences and behavior are often discordant, with notable within-community differences in response to decline in natural capital across levels of household wealth.     

Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Societies

The uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries of the world will lead to divergence between countries in ethnic and religious homogeneity. Developed‐country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants, primarily as a result of high recent levels of immigration. Many demographic patterns of the developed world, such as low death and birth rates, are becoming universal. It might be expected that less developed countries will also turn from emigration to experiencing immigration, as their populations age and their economies develop. This essay suggests, however, that future ethnic diversity arising from immigration may be less marked in many of those developing countries than in the West, especially among latecomers to the fertility transition. Five reasons are advanced as impediments to the globalization of ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration: demographic, economic, political, and factors related to resource constraints, and climate change. The essay considers what social, economic, and political consequences might arise if high levels of ethnic diversity, and possibly ethnic replacement, remained an idiosyncratic peculiarity of today's developed countries, which would therefore diverge in important ways from the rest of the world as the twenty‐first century unfolds.     

Renewable resources and population growth: Past experiences and future prospects

The links between population growth, resource use, and environmental quality are too complex to permit straightforward generalizations about direct causal relationships. Rapid population growth, however, has increased the number of poor people in developing countries, thus contributing to the degradation of the environment and the renewable resources of land, water, and nonhuman species on which humans depend. Demands of the rich industrial countries have also generated environmental pressures and have been foremost in the consumption of the so-called nonrenewable resources: fossil fuels, metals, and minerals. On the other hand, population and economic growth have also stimulated technological and management changes that help supply and use resources more effectively. Wide variations in the possible ultimate size of world population and technological change make future interrelationships of population, resources, and the environment uncertain as well as complex. But those interrelationships are mediated largely by government policies. Responsible governments can bring about a sustainable balance in the population/resource/environment equation by adopting population and development policies that experience has shown could reduce future population numbers in developing countries below the additional five billion indicated in current United Nations medium projections, coupled with proven management programs in both developing and developed countries that could brake and reverse the depletion and degradation of natural resources.This article is adapted from: Robert Repetto, "Population, Resources, Environment; An Uncertain Future,"Population Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1987).     

Natural resource collection and desired family size: a longitudinal test of environment-population theories

Theories relating the changing environment to human fertility predict that declining natural resources may actually increase the demand for children. Unfortunately, most previous empirical studies have been limited to cross-sectional designs that limit our ability to understand links between processes that change over time. We take advantage of longitudinal measurement spanning more than a decade of change in the natural environment, household agricultural behaviors, and individual fertility preferences to reexamine this question. Using fixed effect models, we find that women experiencing increasing time required to collect firewood to heat and cook or fodder to feed animals (the dominant needs for natural resources in this setting) increased their desired family size, even as many other macro-level changes have reduced desired family size. In contrast to previous, cross-sectional studies, we find no evidence of such a relationship for men. Our findings regarding time spent collecting firewood are also new. These results support the “vicious circle” perspective and economic theories of fertility pointing to the value of children for household labor. This feedback from natural resource constraint to increased fertility is an important mechanism for understanding long-term environmental change.     

Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty‐First Century

Over the second half of the twentieth century rapid population growth in the less developed countries has redrawn the global demographic map. Many once‐poor countries have also experienced strong economic growth, which in combination with the demographic change has yielded marked shifts in the world's economic balance, with far‐reaching geopolitical implications. At the same time, low fertility in much of the developed world presages a future of population shrinkage, accompanied by pronounced population aging. In per capita terms, the economic advantages of the developed countries will likely persist for many years, but their actual and potential falls in population may accentuate their loss of relative economic power and eventually lead to marginalization of their international standing and influence. Preventing population shrinkage will be an urgent task for them, requiring either large‐scale immigration (likely to be ruled out) or raising the birth rate. Existing pro‐family policies have had at best modest effects on fertility levels. Two novel approaches are described that would plausibly have greater impact. One would counteract the disproportionate influence of older voters in the electorate by granting voting rights to all citizens, allowing custodial parents to vote on behalf of their children. The second would reform the public pension system to reestablish the link between the financial security of retired persons and the number of children they have raised to productive adulthood.     

World fertility and the women's situation]

In 1981, total number of childbearing women in the world reached 9.8 hundred million. Their socioeconomic status and fertility level are very important data for the study of women's liberation and population control. Facing limited natural resources and a constant growing demand, many nations are studying how to control the population growth and achieve a "zero population growth." In nations with a high GNP, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and France, fertility is low. On the contrary, countries in central and south Asia and most parts of Africa are the poorest economically, and their fertility rate has remained very high. Another factor which is related to the fertility level is the degree of women's participation in the labor market. In Europe and North America, the percentage of women's participation in economic activities is high, and fertility is low. In Latin America and Africa, fertility is high, and the percentage of women's participation in economic labor is low. From the above, we may conclude that promotion of women's participation in the labor market and better employment conditions will reduce fertility. Another 2 factors related to fertility are marriage age and birth control rate. Late marriage and the extensive use of birth control measures are effective methods for reducing fertility. All the above mentioned factors are closely related to the woman's educational background. If women receive a better education and find better employment opportunities, delay their marriage age, and take birth control measures, fertility will be reduced and the population growth will be under control.     

Fertility changes in Latin America in periods of economic uncertainty

We explored the relation between fertility and the business cycle in Latin America. First, we used aggregate data on fertility rates and economic performance for 18 countries. We then studied these same associations in the transitions to first, second, and third births with DHS individual data for ten countries. The results show that in general, childbearing declined during economic downturns. The decline was mainly associated with increasing unemployment rather than slowdowns in the growth of gross domestic product, although there was a positive relationship between first-birth rates and growth. While periods of unemployment may be a good time to have children because opportunity costs are lower, in fact childbearing was reduced or postponed, especially among the most recent cohorts and among urban and more educated women. The finding is consistent with the contention that, during this particular period in Latin America, income effects were dominant.     

The Marxist outlook on population]

Marxist population theory and world population are discussed. From his study of capitalist population theory Marx concluded, "In capitalist reproduction, poverty produces population," thus rejecting Malthusian population determinism theory and developing economic determinism. According to UN statistics, world population has stabilized since the middle of this century after having doubled every hundred years for the last 300; population in the developed countries showed a positive decrease and average net population growth of the developing countries also decreased. The premise of this paper is that population grows according to social economy development. During the last several hundred years, world wealth increased much faster than population; in the last 200 years alone, the population has increased fivefold, but wealth fortyfold. In addition, world population analysis reveals an inverse relationship between wealth and population in the developed and developing countries: the poorer the country, the greater the population. From this perspective, the study of population must begin with surplus labor. Accumulation of surplus production is the foundation of continuous social development and the basis for population growth. The major difference in methods between capitalist countries and China is that the capitalist-planned fertility affects the individual family while Chinese-planned fertility has the whole nation in mind. Human fertility is determined by the economic system. Private ownership determines the private nature of fertility and public ownership determines the public nature of fertility. Thus population development is determined by the accumulation of social wealth.     

Economic development and fertility decline: lessons from Asia's newly industrialized countries

The general thesis that economic development and fertility decline are interrelated is substantiated in literature that discusses the successes of the newly industrialized countries of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. When countries are developing rapidly, family planning accelerates the rate of fertility change, particularly among the poor uneducated rural population. Relying on economic and social development is not enough. National policy in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan recognized that population growth drains resources and the family planning programs operating since the 1960s contributed to a drop from 5 children/woman to 2 by 1988, and 70% of married couples used contraception. Coupled with this, age at marriage rose, contraception became more available, and educational and employment opportunities increased. Economically, the growth rate in the 1980's was 6-10% annually, with growth in the manufacturing and service sectors and export trade. Close economic ties evolved between governments and private sectors. Social development programs had been fully funded and gains evident in education, living standards, health care and nutrition, and life expectancy. The success of family planning is attributed to encouraging contraceptive awareness and use. Fertility reduction may occur with social and economic development, but no developing countries have reduced fertility without family planning. The relative importance of family planning may change over time, and reducing the cost through government sponsored family planning programs and encouraging the acceptability of contraceptive usage.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: how big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic 'dividend': extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985-2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

New perspective in population assistance

The United States Agency for International Development (AID), in a proposal to Congress, has suggested that before assistance is extended to developing countries, its impact on the country's population growth should be considered and development projects accepted that contribute directly to fertility declines. Foreign development projects will be examined for their direct and indirect impact on population growth. Some projects related to education, employment and economic development may be found, by their very nature, to encourage fertility decline and emphasized as a result of the impact examinations. Other projects may be changed to stress the features that are conducive to slowing population growth. The population impact examination proposal has been included in this year's legislation to authorize the continuation of United States development assistance programs for the fiscal year 1978.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic ‘dividend’: extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985–2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

The formal dynamics of controlled populations and the echo,the boom and the bust

This paper analyzes the pattern of fluctuations of births in an age-structured population whose growth is subject to environmental or economic constraint. It synthesizes the traditional demographic analysis of age-structured renewal with constant vital rates and the economic analysis which treats population change endogenously. When cohort fertility depends on relative cohort size, or when period fertility depends on labor force size, fluctuations of forty or more years replace the traditional "echo" or generation-length cycle. Twentieth-century U. S. fertility change agrees well with the theory, as the "Easterlin Hypothesis" suggests; but the period model fits better than the cohort model.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

An Empirical Analysis of Social Capital and Economic Growth in Europe (1980–2000)

It is of paramount concern for economists to uncover the factors that determine economic growth and social development. In recent years a new field of investigation has come to the fore in which social capital is analysed in order to determine its effect on economic growth. Along these lines the work presented here examines the relationships that exist between human and social capital and economic growth. The applied part of the analysis is performed using a panel data model for 14 economically developed countries (OEDC) and by using a series of chronological periods that fall within the 1980–2000 time-frame. A revision of the social capital literature was first carried out and the potential links between social and human capital discussed. The study begins by assessing the way in which the two types of capital interact, how they should be measured and the best way of quantifying their importance within applied models. The econometric model uses panel data, and this enables the analysis to obtain robust results with respect to the role of different types of capital i.e. human physical and social.     

Why Is Fertility Lower in Wealthier Countries? The Role of Relaxed Fertility‐Selection

Lower fertility in wealthier countries can be explained in evolutionary terms by three key factors: (i) higher fertility in poorer countries—an evolutionary consequence of many generations of intense “fertility‐selection” favoring innate behaviors promoting high fertility, especially in males; (ii) the empowerment of women in wealthier countries that serves to reduce fertility directly—an evolutionary consequence of selection favoring an inherent preference for lower fertility in females, combined with release from the evolutionary effects of a long history of male control over female fertility; and (iii) offspring access in wealthy countries to public health care, welfare, and other social services, which combined with inherited wealth for offspring, virtually eliminates competition between families for the resource needs of offspring. The combined consequences of (ii) and (iii) mean that the fertility‐selection so prevalent in poor countries is relaxed in wealthy countries, thus allowing random genetic drift to produce an increased relative frequency of innate behaviors promoting low fertility and discontentment with high fertility.     

Instability,investment, disasters,and demography: natural disasters and fertility in Italy (1820–1962) and Japan (1671–1965)

This article examines whether natural disasters affect fertility—a topic little explored but of policy importance given relevance to policies regarding disaster insurance, foreign aid, and the environment. The identification strategy uses historic regional data to exploit natural variation within each of two countries: one European country—Italy (1820–1962), and one Asian country—Japan (1671–1965). The choice of study settings allows consideration of Jones’ (The European miracle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) theory that preindustrial differences in income and population between Asia and Europe resulted from the fertility response to different environmental risk profiles. According to the results, short-run instability, particularly that arising from the natural environment, appears to be associated with a decrease in fertility—thereby suggesting that environmental shocks and economic volatility are associated with a decrease in investment in the population size of future generations. The results also show that, contrary to Jones’ (The European miracle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) theory, differences in fertility between Italy and Japan cannot be explained away by disaster proneness alone. Research on the effects of natural disasters may enable social scientists and environmentalists alike to better predict the potential effects of the increase in natural disasters that may result from global climate change.     

A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.