Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia

The general decline in fertility levels in Pacific Asia has in its vanguard countries where fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. A related trend is toward delayed marriage and nonmarriage. When prevalence of cohabitation in European countries is allowed for, levels of “effective singlehood” in many countries of Pacific Asia have run ahead of those in northern and western Europe. This raises questions about the extent to which delayed marriage has been implicated in fertility declines, and whether the same factors are leading both to delayed marriage and to lowered fertility within marriage. The article argues that involuntary nonmarriage is likely to be more common in Pacific Asia than in Western countries, and that resultant involuntary childlessness plays a substantial role in the low fertility rates currently observed.     

Eleanor Rathbone on the Remuneration of Women's Services

Humans are dependent on others for their livelihood for many years before they become economically productive and self-supporting. In modern industrial societies productivity and the capacity to be self-supporting also require costly investments in human capital. What is the proper division of responsibilities between parents and other members of society for rearing children and thus, collectively, reproducing the population? And how equitable is the sharing between husband and wife of the burdens that fall on the immediate family? To what extent should social responsibilities for childrearing be formalized in explicit institutional arrangements? While certainly long-standing, these questions acquired a special urgency in industrial countries beginning with the second decade of the twentieth century as a result of the convulsive experience of the world war. (In subsequent decades, below-replacement-level fertility amplified such concerns.) Total mobilization for war resulted in the massive influx of female workers into industry, thus undercutting prevailing assumptions about the logic and equity of an industrial system characterized by sharp divisions of labor by sex, discrimination in hiring and remuneration in the job market, and routine reliance on unpaid female labor in childrearing. In the March 1917 issue of The Economic Journal, Eleanor F. Rathbone addressed these issues in an article titled “The remuneration of women's services.” This article is reproduced below in full. “Perhaps the most important function which any State has to perform—more important even than guarding against its enemies—is to secure its own periodic renewal by providing for the rearing of fresh generations,” asserted Rathbone. How is this burden paid for? She saw the existing system as iniquitous and haphazard—requiring a disproportionate and unremunerated contribution from the adult female population, a contribution supplemented only in a “hesitating and half-hearted way” by the state. The modern state gradually accepted responsibilities to cover some of the costs of formal education and started to make minor provisions for child nurture and medical expenses. Still, she noted, “the great bulk of the main cost of [population] renewal [the state] still pays for… by the indirect and extraordinarily clumsy method of financing the male parent”—thus accomplishing the task “in a very defective and blundering way.” Rathbone argued for a radical rethinking and revision of the existing system. She further elaborated her proposals in a book, The Disinherited Family, published in 1924. This book was republished posthumously in 1949 under the title Family Allowances. Lord Beveridge, father of the post–World War II British welfare state, in an Epilogue written for that book, attributes the intellectual preparation of the 1945 Family Allowances Act “first and foremost” to the author of The Disinherited Family. Eleanor Rathbone was born in 1872 to a prominent Liverpool family. Educated at Oxford in classics and philosophy, she played an active public role as a suffragist, feminist, and advocate of social reforms. She was a member of the British Parliament, as an Independent, from 1929 to her death in 1946.     

The Limits to Low Fertility: A Biosocial Approach

In light of 30 years of below‐replacement fertility in many industrialized societies, demographers are asking whether fertility could drop even further, or whether there is a “floor” below which it will not fall. A key unanswered question is whether there may be a variable biological component to fertility motivation which ensures that we continue to reproduce. Drawing on evidence from evolutionary biology, ethology, quantitative genetics, developmental psychobiology, and psychology, the article argues that our evolved biological predisposition is toward nurturing behaviors, rather than having children per se. Humans have the unique ability to be aware of such biological predispositions and translate them into conscious, but nevertheless biologically based, fertility motivation. It is likely that we have already reached the limits to low fertility since this “need to nurture,” in conjunction with normative pressures, ensures that the majority of women will want to bear at least one child. A sketch for a biosocial model of fertility motivation is outlined.     

Parity-specific fertility intentions and uncertainty: the United States, 1970 to 1976

A theoretical and analytic model of fertility intentions is proposed which treats “don’t know” responses and other uncertain responses as distinct from more firm intentions. Methodologically, these analyses show that “don’t know” responses need not be treated as missing data, but instead are both valid and meaningful responses. Furthermore, eliminating these uncertain respondents would have the negative effects of distorting across survey comparisons in intentions due to shifts in aggregate uncertainty, reducing the likelihood of accurately detecting shifts in fertility intentions, and lessening the representatives of the sample analyzed. Substantively, in conjunction with Morgan (1981), these results show that the sharp 1965–76 decline in the likelihood of intending more births at parities 2 through 5 occurred as women halted childbearing at minimal acceptable levels and postponed further childbearing. With time (or age), this delayed fertility became fertility about which the respondent was uncertain and, finally, fertility foregone. Since 1970, similar shifts are observed at parities 0 and 1, perhaps foreshadowing an increase in voluntary childlessness and one-child families.     

Electile Dysfunction

This essay combines Burke's burlesque frame and Jamieson's double binds to create a hybrid gendered theory for rhetorically analyzing the aggressive sexualization of 2008 United States vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin. The essay develops our theory titled the “burlesque binds” and explicates a specific form of a burlesque bind: the “MILF frame.” Palin's aggressively sexualized representation was united under the crass acronym MILF, which stands for “Mom I'd Like to Fuck.” The MILF frame emphasized Palin's feminine qualities, positioning her as a “trophy vice” with no political acumen, and highlighted her masculine behaviors, but deflated them through sexual objectification. The unification of the binds and burlesque theories reveals how Palin's role as a social actor was not simply circumscribed but shut down: she was deemed unfit by both masculine and feminine standards, by both public and private sphere conventions. Although Sarah Palin has arguably been the most prevalent subject of the political MILF frame, our essay catalogues other instances of female political leaders experiencing this type of symbolic degradation, suggesting the MILF frame's vast influence.     

On the Modernity of Traditional Contraception: Time and the Social Context of Fertility

Many studies of fertility implicitly equate temporal management, biomedical contraception, and “modernity” on the one hand, and “tradition,” the lack of intentional timing, and uncontrolled fertility on the other. This article questions that equation, focusing on the widespread use of periodic abstinence in southern Cameroon. Drawing on field data and the Cameroon Demographic and Health Survey, the article investigates how local concepts of timing shape both contraceptive choice and the evaluation of methods as “modern” or “traditional.” Cameroonian women prefer periodic abstinence because they perceive it as “modern,” a modernity tied both to the social context in which it is taught and to its unique temporal form. By contrast, Depo‐Provera, pills, and the IUD are seen as less‐than‐modern, because they are less exigent of temporal control. The reliance on a behavioral, rather than technological, contraceptive method parallels the experience of the European fertility transition. Cameroonian women draw on a complex social repertoire in making contraceptive choices; methods are preferred or rejected not only on the basis of their efficacy in averting pregnancy, but also because of their correspondence to models of legitimate social action. Reproductive practices may have social motivations that are unrelated to fertility per se.     

From first daughter to first lady to first woman president: Park Geun-Hye’s path to the South Korean presidency

This paper examines the role of gender and familial ties in Park Geun-Hye’s political trajectory to become the first female president of South Korea. Even though her entry into politics was heavily indebted to her kinship ties to her father Park Jung-Hee, an authoritarian leader who led South Korea from 1963 to 1979, she has consolidated her position within the party and among Korean voters as a viable, competent politician over the last fifteen years. Analyzing Korean news reports, campaign pamphlets, and her autobiography, this study reveals that Park used stereotypes of women as problem solvers in difficult times to open doors for her political entry. During the presidential campaign in 2012, Park was adept at stressing her positive “feminine” traits, overcoming the perceived weaknesses of female politicians by emphasizing her long political credentials and strengths in diplomacy and national security issues. Park presented herself as the embodiment of both change and experience through her campaign slogan “the well-prepared female president” and the public reacted favorably to the appeal.     

Which women stop at one child in Australia?

The decline in fertility in Australia in the 1990s reflected both decreased first-order birth rates and decreased second-order birth rates (Kippen 2004). Whilst childlessness has been studied extensively, little attention has been paid to the progression from one to two children. This study analyses which women stop at one child using data from 1,809 parous 40–54 year olds from Wave 1 of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. Important early lifecourse predictors of whether a woman stops her childbearing at one child are shown to be a woman s country of birth, highest level and type of schooling, and her father s occupation. A woman s marital status and her age at the time of the first birth are also shown to be significant predictors of her likelihood of not progressing to a second birth. The causes of trends over time are discussed.     

Kübra Gümüşay,Muslim digital feminism and the politics of visuality in Germany

abstract

Muslim women’s digital activism exists in complexly racialized visual contexts. This is exemplified in the journalism and activism of Kübra Gümü?ay, who first gained public attention as the purportedly first “hijabi columnist” in Germany. This essay draws on her series “50 Thoughts” as an entry point into her digital activism. I suggest that Gümü?ay uses this series to reveal the larger visual dilemmas with which she engages. Her digital activism functions by taking the risk to both expose and reconfigure the very conditions under which she is visible and comprehensible to her publics. In particular, I consider her activism as using digital spaces for self-poiesis (an imaginative remaking of self) as well as teleopoiesis (an imaginative reaching out to the other). This latter move functions both to gesture to an anti-racist community as well as to alliances among multiple feminisms.     

Low Fertility,Socioeconomic Development,and Gender Equity

While new empirical findings and theoretical frameworks provide insight into the interrelations between socioeconomic development, gender equity, and low fertility, puzzling exceptions and outliers in these findings call for a more all‐encompassing framework to understand the interplay between these processes. We argue that the pace and onset of development are two important factors to be considered when analyzing gender equity and fertility. Within the developed world, “first‐wave developers”—or countries that began socioeconomic development in the nineteenth/early twentieth century—currently have much higher fertility levels than “late developers.” We lay out a novel theoretical approach to explain why this is the case and provide empirical evidence to support our argument. Our approach not only explains historical periods of low fertility but also sheds light on why there exists such large variance in fertility rates among today's developed countries.     

Xena Rules

This paper analyzes and discusses “Antony and Cleopatra,” an episode from the popular and highly intertextual action-fantasy television series, Xena: Warrior Princess, in the context of the Roman story arc in the series and more particularly as a “feminized” appropriation of Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra. Although Xena's version of this tragedy copies the voluptuous atmosphere of Shakespeare's play, it radically changes its characterization. The Roman triumvirate exemplifies rigid and corrupted power play: Octavius is (as yet) a peaceful idealist, but Brutus (who replaces Lepidus) has murdered Cleopatra, and Antony, although brave and intelligent, is depicted as a ruthless and over-ambitious power politician, who is only taken in by a woman much cleverer than himself. Cleopatra is the victim of the struggle between these oppressive masculine forces, and, unlike Shakespeare's Queen of Egypt, Xena, who replaces her, does not allow her feelings for Antony to divide her from her sensibilities. She never loses sight of the desirable outcome: a mutual weakening of the combative (masculine) forces of empire and colonial expansion through war, and the survival of the traditionally feminine values of peace and justice. She eliminates both Antony and Brutus, and to a much larger extent than Shakespeare's fickle and understandably insecure lover-queen, Xena, a focused and confident female superhero, acts as an empowered and pragmatic ruler, who sacrifices her own love for the greater cause of Egypt's freedom.     

Policies Addressing the Tempo Effect in Low‐Fertility Countries

The possible negative consequences of current low fertility levels are causing increasing concern, particularly in countries where the total fertility rate is below 1.5. Social inertia and self‐reinforcing processes may make it difficult to return to higher levels once fertility has been very low for some time, creating a possible “low‐fertility trap.” Policies explicitly addressing the fertility‐depressing effect of increases in the mean age at child‐bearing (the tempo effect) may be a way to raise period fertility to somewhat higher levels and help escape the “low‐fertility trap” before it closes. Reforms in the school system may affect the timing of childbearing by lowering the age at completion of education. A more efficient school system, which provides the same qualifications with a younger school‐leaving age, is potentially capable of increasing period fertility and hence exerting a rejuvenating effect on the age composition, even if the levels of cohort fertility remain unchanged. Such policies may also have a positive effect on completed cohort fertility.     

Increases in childlessness in New Zealand

New Zealand’s fertility fell below the theoretical replacement level (2.1 births per woman) for the first time in recorded history in 1978. It has hovered at or below replacement level ever since. The result, an impression of relative stability, belies changes taking place. Data from the 1981, 1996 and 2006 censuses show a pattern of delayed childbearing and increased childlessness. In a little over 30 years, childlessness has shifted from being almost entirely a consequence of a couple’s infecundity to being as frequently a result of a woman’s life choices. The steady rises in childlessness recorded by successive cohorts suggest that childlessness is already having a significant effect on New Zealand fertility. Patterns in characteristics of those women choosing not to start families, as well as subtle differences in these patterns between New Zealand and other developed nations, suggest that there is a significant potential for childlessness to cause a more dramatic shift in New Zealand’s total fertility rate. This analysis examines growth in childlessness in relation to marital status, country of birth, ethnicity, regional and urban differentials, religion, and educational attainment of women who were childless at the 1981, 1996 and 2006 censuses.

A model of voluntary childlessness

Demographers and sociologists have studied why women remain childless for more than two decades; however, this specific choice of zero fertility has not interested economists. Permanent childlessness, in developed countries, can concern up to 30 % of the women in a cohort. Childlessness rates can be positively related to average fertility for some cohorts of women. This paper provides an explanation for this using an endogenous fertility model where individuals have different preferences for children. The main mechanism considered goes through the intergenerational evolution of preferences: I show that a reduction in the gender wage gap, or an increase in the fixed cost of becoming a parent, has a negative effect on both fertility and childlessness. The reduction of childlessness is due to a composition effect: small families shrink more than larger families, and this reduces childlessness.     

Involuntary childlessness and voluntary fertility control during the fertility transition: Evidence from men who graduated from an American college

Abstract. Influences on the fertility of men during the American fertility decline are examined using a sample of about 1700 married men born between 1830 and 1880, all of whom attended Amherst College, Massachusetts. We consider two types of reduced fertility: involuntary childlessness as a function of health in early adulthood, and voluntary fertility control as a function of access to contraceptive technology. The relation between health, as measured by body mass index, and childlessness was nonlinear, with average sized men significantly more likely ever to father children than thin or bulky men. Among men who ever fathered a child, physicians fathered significantly fewer children while having probabilities of childlessness that were statistically indistinguishable from those of other men. Physicians may have had greater access to relatively new contraceptive technologies, which suggests a role for voluntary fertility control.     

Immigration to the UK from High‐Fertility Countries: Intergenerational Adaptation and Fertility Convergence

The fertility of immigrants' children increasingly shapes the ethnic diversity of the population in Western Europe. However, few data are available on the fertility patterns of immigrants and their offspring. This article provides new fertility estimates of immigrants and immigrants' children by ethnic group in the United Kingdom that may provide better‐informed fertility assumptions for future population projection models. The impact of migration‐specific tempo effects on the period TFR of immigrants is analyzed. Among the results, intergenerational fertility transitions strongly contribute both to fertility convergence between ethnic groups and to fertility “assimilation” or “intergenerational adaptation” to the UK mainstream childbearing behavior. Ethnic fertility convergence, particularly marked for populations originating from high‐fertility countries, reflects in part decreasing fertility in sending countries and in part intergenerational adaptation to the UK mainstream. Higher educational enrollment of the daughters of immigrants may partly explain their relatively lower fertility.     

On Net Intergenerational Wealth Flows: An Update

Almost 30 years have passed since I introduced the concept of “net intergenerational wealth flows” in a PDR essay, “Toward a restatement of demographic transition theory.” A great deal of research has been published since then, and accordingly an update is needed. That research suggests the following propositions. Immediately before fertility transition, children's farm labor may not quite offset their consumption, although much depends on how far into adulthood they continue to perform at least some work for their parents. In premodern times children may have paid their way because of lower consumption. Research on the pre‐transitional value of children's work produced contradictory results because it examined both hunter‐gatherer societies, in which both adults and children worked comparatively few hours, and farming societies, in which both worked longer hours. In pre‐transitional societies, the insurance value of children was almost unlimited. For most people in most societies, alternative ways of maintaining savings from the earlier to the later stage of the life cycle first became available only when large‐scale investment in children's education was possible. The costs and gains from that investment played a major role in the onset of the fertility transition.     

Edward Alsworth Ross on Western Civilization and the Birth Rate

A declining trend in fertility had taken hold in Western Europe, North America, and Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, attracting much social scientific interest and public policy concern. Explanations advanced at the time—for example, in the writings of John S. Billings, Lujo Brentano, Arsène Dumont, Adolphe Landry, and F.W. Taussig—mostly posited multiple causes and in many respects anticipated the arguments subsequently made by the theorists of “demographic transition” in the 1940s and 1950s. A prominent figure who should be added to the names just mentioned is the American sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross (1866–1951). Ross's account of fertility decline is best captured in his article, “Western civilization and the birth‐rate,” American Journal of Sociology, volume 12, no. 5 (March 1907), pp. 607–632, which is excerpted below. Writing in a vigorous and fluid style, he gives weight to the lessening of class divisions offered by democracy, the “newly awakened wants” that crowd out children, the emancipation of women, the decay of religious authority, and the numerous elements of modern life that “enthrone reason over impulse” and hence make for enlightened foresight. In the parts of the article not reprinted, Ross discusses the then widespread worries about the implications of differential fertility—the possible dysgenic effects within nations and the prospective demographic marginalization of the West as a whole (requiring “the bristling frontiers between peoples and races” to remain in place until the economic gaps are narrowed). In an acute and prescient comment on Ross's article, published in the same issue of AJS, the demographer Walter F. Willcox (1861–1964) remarked on the prospect of the fertility decline going too far, with individual interests diverging from the interests of society:

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