The structure of random utility models

I am grateful to Joseph B. Kadane for numerous constructive suggestions offered during discussions of this research. The financial sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation through grant DOT-OS-4006 is also acknowledged. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author.Assistant Professor of Economics, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University.     

The arguments of utility: Preference reversals in expected utility of income models

There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas others argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the unified treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference reversals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final wealth alone.     

Ordinal utility models of decision making under uncertainty

This paper studies two models of rational behavior under uncertainty whose predictions are invariant under ordinal transformations of utility. The quantile utility model assumes that the agent maximizes some quantile of the distribution of utility. The utility mass model assumes maximization of the probability of obtaining an outcome whose utility is higher than some fixed critical value. Both models satisfy weak stochastic dominance. Lexicographic refinements satisfy strong dominance.The study of these utility models suggests a significant generalization of traditional ideas of riskiness and risk preference. We define one action to be riskier than another if the utility distribution of the latter crosses that of the former from below. The single crossing property is equivalent to a minmax spread of a random variable. With relative risk defined by the single crossing criterion, the risk preference of a quantile utility maximizer increases with the utility distribution quantile that he maximizes. The risk preference of a utility mass maximizer increases with his critical utility value.     

用经济学的方法解读道德终极标准

道德终极标准是各种道德规范和道德行为的根本准则。用经济学的方法分析、解读道德终极标准,道德的根本目的就是通过调整利益关系,达到利益最大化。这种道德终极标准体现了义利统一的道德价值观,它不仅是评价一切道德行为善恶的根本标准,也是评价一切道德规范优劣的根本标准。道德终极标准具有三种形态:一是在利益冲突时,增加边际效用大的利益;二是在利益不冲突时,不损害一人地增加利益总量;三是无论利益是否冲突,“自我牺牲”的利他行为一般都是善的、道德的。     

Which Congregations Will Take Advantage of Charitable Choice? Explaining the Pursuit of Public Funding by Congregations*

Objective. To determine the effects of clergy attitudes on the willingness of congregations to seek public funding to provide social welfare. Methods. Survey data are drawn from a probability sample of clergy leading congregations in metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia. A logistic regression model examines the effects of clergy attitudes on the potential pursuit of public funding by congregations. Results. Controlling for a set of congregation attributes, a positive attitude toward partnerships between congregations and secular groups and a fear of government entanglement with religion are the strongest attitudinal predictors of congregation willingness to pursue public funding. However, attributes, particularly the racial composition of members and denominational affiliation, also predict congregation willingness to seek public funding. Conclusions. Congregation willingness to pursue public funding is a function of clergy attitudes and congregation attributes, which has implications for politics and public policy.     

Excerpts from a report by the U.S.-GAO survey of models used by executive agencies in the policy-making process

The General Accounting Office of the U.S. was asked to provide evidence concerning the nature and number of major models used by U.S. Federal Executive Agencies in the policy- making process. A report was issued with a complete listing of the 357 models identified and related agencies. The report is preceded by a statement by Mr. Morton A. Myers, Director of the Program Analysis Division, U.S. General Accounting Office. What follows are excerpts from the statement by Mr. Myers, which the editors of JPM thought to be rather informative. The list of the models identified in this exercise and related agencies follows the statement by Mr. Myers.—Editor