A multiattribute decision time theory

In this study, we analyze choice in the presence of some conflict that affects the decision time (response time), a subject that has been documented in the literature. We axiomatize a multiattribute decision time (MDT) representation, which is a dynamic extension of the classic multiattribute expected utility theory that allows potentially incomplete preferences. Under this framework, one alternative is preferred to another in a certain period if and only if the weighted sum of the attribute-dependent expected utility induced by the former alternative is larger than that induced by the latter for all attribute weights in a closed and convex set. MDT uniquely determines the decision time as the earliest period at which the ranking between alternatives becomes decisive. The comparative statics result indicates that the decision time provides useful information to locate indifference curves in a specific setting. MDT also explains various empirical findings in economics and other relevant fields.     

Ensemble prospectism

Incomplete preferences displaying ‘mildly sweetened’ structure are common, yet theoretically problematic. This paper examines the properties of the rankings induced by the set of all coherent completions of the mildly sweetened partial preference structure. Building on these properties, I propose an ensemble-based refinement of Hare’s (Analysis 70:237–247, 2010) prospectism criterion for rational choice when preferences are incomplete. Importantly, this ensemble-based refinement is immune to Peterson’s (Theory and Decision 78:451–456, 2015) weak money pump argument. Hence, ensemble prospectism ensures outcome rationality. Furthermore, by recognizing the structural isomorphism between mildly sweetened preference structures and Cover’s splitting rule in Blackwell’s Pick the Largest Number problem (Ann Math Stat 22:393–399, 1951), ensemble prospectism can be shown to yield better-than-even odds of selecting the ex-post higher utility option—despite the absence of all-things-considered preferences ex ante.     

Resolute majority rules

We investigate resolute voting rules that always rank two alternatives strictly and avoid social indecision. Resolute majority rules differ from the standard majority rule in that whenever both alternatives win the same number of votes, a tie-breaking function is used to determine the outcome. We provide axiomatic characterizations of resolute majority rules or resolute majority rules with a quorum. Resoluteness axiom is used in all these results. The other axioms are weaker than those considered in the characterization of the majority rule by May (1952 Econometrica, 20:680–684). In particular, instead of May’s positive responsiveness, we consider a much weaker monotonicity axiom.     

When and how to satisfice: an experimental investigation

This paper is about satisficing behaviour. Rather tautologically, this is when decision-makers are satisfied with achieving some objective, rather than in obtaining the best outcome. The term was coined by Simon (Q J Econ 69:99–118, 1955), and has stimulated many discussions and theories. Prominent amongst these theories are models of incomplete preferences, models of behaviour under ambiguity, theories of rational inattention, and search theories. Most of these, however, seem to lack an answer to at least one of two key questions: when should the decision-maker (DM) satisfice; and how should the DM satisfice. In a sense, search models answer the latter question (in that the theory tells the DM when to stop searching), but not the former; moreover, usually the question as to whether any search at all is justified is left to a footnote. A recent paper by Manski (Theory Decis. doi: 10.1007/s11238-017-9592-1, 2017) fills the gaps in the literature and answers the questions: when and how to satisfice? He achieves this by setting the decision problem in an ambiguous situation (so that probabilities do not exist, and many preference functionals can therefore not be applied) and by using the Minimax Regret criterion as the preference functional. The results are simple and intuitive. This paper reports on an experimental test of his theory. The results show that some of his propositions (those relating to the ‘how’) appear to be empirically valid while others (those relating to the ‘when’) are less so.     

Modelling curiosity in decision-making

This paper develops a model of choice with an agent that is capable of experiencing curiosity using Loewenstein’s (Psychol Bull 116(1):75–98, 1994) information gap interpretation of curiosity. We then proceed to determine the restrictions on choice behaviour implied by the model in two choice environments: no discovery—where the Decision-Maker does not have the opportunity to learn—and discovery—where she is afforded such an opportunity. These restrictions can be applied by an observer to determine if a Decision-Maker’s choices align with the model.     

Loss aversion leading to advantageous selection

Some insurance markets are characterized by “advantageous selection”, that is, ex-post risk and coverage are negatively correlated. We show that expectation-based loss aversion as in K?szegi and Rabin (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1133–1165, 2006; The American Economic Review, 97(4), 1047–1073, 2007) provides a natural explanation for this phenomenon in environments in which risk aversion models do not, e.g., when agents face modest-scale risks and/or in absence of moral hazard. More exposure to risk has two competing effects on an agent’s willingness to pay for insurance: a positive effect, as in standard expected utility models; and a negative one, due to a reference effect. We determine conditions under which an insurance provider optimally sets a high price at which only low risk agents buy.     

Optimize,satisfice, or choose without deliberation? A simple minimax-regret assessment

Simon (Q J Econ 69:99–118, 1955) introduced satisficing, but he did not provide a precise definition or analysis. Other researchers have subsequently interpreted satisficing in various ways, but a consensus perspective still has not emerged. This paper interprets satisficing as a class of decision strategies that a person might use when seeking to optimize in a setting where deliberation is costly. Costly deliberation lies at the heart of Simon’s motivation of satisficing, but he did not formalize the idea. I do so here, studying decision making as a problem of minimax-regret planning in which costly deliberation enables a person to reduce ambiguity. I report simple specific findings on how the magnitude of deliberation costs may affect choice of a decision strategy.     

Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice

We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputations. We show that conspicuous conservatism results: agents of different qualities choose levels below those that would be chosen if quality were observable. This happens because bad agents must cloak their identity by choosing the same risk level as good agents, and good agents are more likely to distinguish themselves if they reduce the risk level. Our results contrast starkly with those for the case when risk choice cannot be observed.

Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products

Let \(\mathcal{X }\) be a set of outcomes, and let \(\mathcal{I }\) be an infinite indexing set. This paper shows that any separable, permutation-invariant preference order \((\succcurlyeq )\) on \(\mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }\) admits an additive representation. That is: there exists a linearly ordered abelian group \(\mathcal{R }\) and a ‘utility function’ \(u:\mathcal{X }{{\longrightarrow }}\mathcal{R }\) such that, for any \(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}\in \mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }\) which differ in only finitely many coordinates, we have \(\mathbf{x}\succcurlyeq \mathbf{y}\) if and only if \(\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} \left[u(x_i)-u(y_i)\right]\ge 0\) . Importantly, and unlike almost all previous work on additive representations, this result does not require any Archimedean or continuity condition. If \((\succcurlyeq )\) also satisfies a weak continuity condition, then the paper shows that, for any \(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}\in \mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }\) , we have \(\mathbf{x}\succcurlyeq \mathbf{y}\) if and only if \({}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} u(x_i)\ge {}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }}u(y_i)\) . Here, \({}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} u(x_i)\) represents a nonstandard sum, taking values in a linearly ordered abelian group \({}^*\!\mathcal{R }\) , which is an ultrapower extension of \(\mathcal{R }\) . The paper also discusses several applications of these results, including infinite-horizon intertemporal choice, choice under uncertainty, variable-population social choice and games with infinite strategy spaces.     

Harsanyi’s critical rule utilitarianism

In his recent book,Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium In Games and Social Situations, John C. Harsanyi devotes a chapter to his new theory of morality, which he calls ‘Critical Rule Utilitarianism’, and which contains his solution to the problem of the interpersonal comparison of utility. After a detailed exposition of his theory, arguments will be presented to show that:

1. there are certain formal difficulties in the solution that he offers which leads to a rejection of the axiom that there is to be agreement between an individualj’s personal preferences and individuali’s (i ≠j) extended utility function out of which the social welfare function is to be constructed; and
2. Harsanyi’s theory of critical rule utilitarianism cannot be accepted as a theory of morality because it presupposes a more fundamental theory in its actual construction.

     

A note on a recent paper by Dagsvik on IIA and random utilities

In a recent paper in this journal, Dagsvik derives the class of independent random utility representations that are “equivalent” to the independence-from-irrelevant-alternatives (IIA) assumption by Luce (Individual choice behavior: a theoretical analysis. Wiley, New York, 1959). In this short note, we clarify the relations between this paper by Dagsvik, and a paper in Lindberg’s 2012 thesis.     

The Nature of Work in the Future Communist Society

Editor's Note. The article by Academician N. M. Druzhinin, "Reminiscences and Thoughts of a Soviet Historian" [Vospominaniia i mysli sovetskogo istorika], published in the "Creative Experience of Soviet Historians" section of Istoriia SSSR. 1961, No. 6 [see The Soviet Review, Volume IV, No. 1], attracted the attention of Italian historians (Rivista storica italiana, 1962, No. 1). Druzhinin addressed an open letter (Istoriia SSSR, 1963, No. 4) in response to one of these reactions, that of the prominent Italian historian Franco Venturi.

The letters we are publishing by Venturi and Druzhinin are a continuation of the polemical exchange of opinions between Italian and Soviet historians. The important questions posed in this correspondence will doubtless excite the attention of participants in the Italo-Soviet symposium of historians soon to be held in Moscow. [Editor, Istoriia SSSR.]     

Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: a reply to Rabinowicz

Tiebreak rules are necessary for revealing indifference in non- sequential decisions. I focus on a preference relation that satisfies Ordering and fails Independence in the following way. Lotteries a and b are indifferent but the compound lottery 0.5f, 0.5b is strictly preferred to the compound lottery 0.5f, 0.5a. Using tiebreak rules the following is shown here: In sequential decisions when backward induction is applied, a preference like the one just described must alter the preference relation between a and b at certain choice nodes, i.e., indifference between a and b is not stable. Using this result, I answer a question posed by Rabinowicz (1997) concerning admissibility in sequential decisions when indifferent options are substituted at choice nodes.     

Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures

Two players, A and B, bargain to divide a perfectly divisible pie. In a bargaining model with constant discount factors, \(\delta _A\) and \(\delta _B\), we extend Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–110, 1982)’s alternating offers procedure to more general deterministic procedures, so that any player in any period can be the proposer. We show that each bargaining game with a deterministic procedure has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoff outcome, which is efficient. Conversely, each efficient division of the pie can be supported as an SPE outcome by some procedure if \(\delta _A+\delta _B\ge 1\), while almost no division can ever be supported in SPE if \(\delta _A+\delta _B < 1\).     

Conditional expected utility

Let \({\mathcal {E}}\) be a class of events. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences \(\succsim _{E}\), \(E\in {\mathcal {E}}\), satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory. We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We study a subclass of these preferences, namely those that satisfy dynamic consistency. We give a representation theorem, and show that these preferences are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al. (Journal of Economic Theory 118:133–173, 2004). We also show that these preferences have only a trivial overlap with the class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences, but there are plenty of preferences of the \(\alpha \)-Maxmin Expected Utility type that satisfy our assumptions. We identify several concrete settings where our results could be applied. Finally, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn (Econometrica 41:1–25, 1973).     

Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized version of the heuristic which generalizes the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories such as cumulative prospect theory.     

Exploitation of a crisp relation in a ranking problem

The outranking methods usually contain two main steps: determination of a (sometimes valued) relation which aggregates the preferences and exploitation of this relation in order to choose, sort or rank the actions. In a ranking problem, the second step is the construction of a (complete or partial) preorder from a (valued) relation. We have considered it was interesting to list the good properties such a construction should verify and to analyze some procedures in this context. We present here the first results of this study, which concern the construction of a complete preorder from a non valued relation.     

The influence of fear in decisions: Experimental evidence

This article studies decisions made under conditions of fear, when a catastrophic outcome is introduced in a lottery. It reports on experimental results and seeks to compare the predictions of the expected utility (EU) framework with those of a new axiomatic treatment of choice under uncertainty that takes explicit account of emotions such as fear (Chichilnisky 1996, 2000, 2002, 2009). Results provide evidence that fear influences the cognitive process of decision-making by leading some subjects to focus excessively on catastrophic events. Such heterogeneity in subjects’ behavior, while not consistent with EU-based functions, is fully consistent with the new type of utility function implied by the new axioms.     

A note on identification in discrete choice models with partial observability

This note establishes a new identification result for additive random utility discrete choice models. A decision-maker associates a random utility \(U_{j}+m_{j}\) to each alternative in a finite set \(j\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,J\right\} \), where \(\mathbf {U}=\left\{ U_{1},\ldots ,U_{J}\right\} \) is unobserved by the researcher and random with an unknown joint distribution, while the perturbation \(\mathbf {m}=\left( m_{1},\ldots ,m_{J}\right) \) is observed. The decision-maker chooses the alternative that yields the maximum random utility, which leads to a choice probability system \(\mathbf { m\rightarrow }\left( \Pr \left( 1|\mathbf {m}\right) ,\ldots ,\Pr \left( J| \mathbf {m}\right) \right) \). Previous research has shown that the choice probability system is identified from the observation of the relationship \( \mathbf {m}\rightarrow \Pr \left( 1|\mathbf {m}\right) \). We show that the complete choice probability system is identified from observation of a relationship \(\mathbf {m}\rightarrow \sum _{j=1}^{s}\Pr \left( j|\mathbf {m} \right) \), for any \(s<J\). That is, it is sufficient to observe the aggregate probability of a group of alternatives as it depends on \(\mathbf {m}\). This is relevant for applications where choices are observed aggregated into groups while prices and attributes vary at the level of individual alternatives.     

Enhancing Forgiveness: A Group Intervention for the Elderly

This article describes a therapeutic model of forgiveness (Enright, 2001 Enright, R. D. 2001. Forgiveness is a choice: A step-by-step process for resolving anger and restoring hope, Washington, D.C: American Psychological Association.  [Google Scholar]) and discusses its applicability to social work intervention with older adults. A total of 20 men and women, aged 57–82, participated in 2 different forgiveness groups, each of which met weekly for 8 sessions with a 4-month follow-up session. Measures of forgiveness, as well as biopsychosocial functioning, were collected before and after the group intervention. Results indicated that participants experienced long-term improvement with respect to forgiveness and depression, short-term improvement of physical health, and no change in relation to anxiety or social support. Clinical issues that emerged during the forgiveness group are discussed, and suggestions for gerontological social workers are offered.