Voting in an Officer Election: Testing a model in a multi-site local

We test a model based on social exchange theory to explain the patterns of membership voting in a local union officer election. Survey data from members and stewards aggregated by 55 voting units, when combined with the control variable, explained 46 percent of the variance in the incumbent president's re-election. A greater percentage of member votes for the incumbent president were related to higher union loyalty, higher confidence in the grievance procedure, better union-management relations, and more positive perceptions of the union contract, findings that support our model of membership voting.     

Challenges to professionalism and union voting intentions: The case of pharmacists

Using data from a national survey of pharmacists who are members of the American Pharmaceutical Association, we examine the union voting intentions of employee pharmacists. We find that union instrumentality regarding professionalism is a primary predictor of union voting intent among these employees. In addition, this predictor mediates the relationship between the level of professionalism at a pharmacist’s current employment situation and his or her expected union vote. Also important to union voting intent are respondent beliefs about union instrumentality regarding pecuniary issues, prior union experience, as well as overall job satisfaction. Implications for employers, unions, and researchers are drawn. We thank Mary Graham, Jann Skelton, Paul Swiercz, Terry Thomason, and participants at the Seventh Bar-gaining Group Conference at Michigan State University for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research was made possible by a grant from the American Pharmaceutical Association.     

An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences

In this article, we analyse the possibility of extending the Moulin theorem to Condorcet voting correspondences. Moulin (1988) established that every Condorcet voting function suffers from the No Show Paradox, or Abstention Paradox, which means that in some voting situations some voters would achieve a better result by abstaining (in other words, could manipulate the election by abstaining). This problem is similar to that of extending the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem on voting manipulation through casting an insincere ballot to voting correspondences. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet voting correspondence there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining. Another result states, by counterexample, that some Condorcet voting correspondences are free from the Abstention Paradox from the point of view of other types of voters.     

The American Sociological Association dues structure

In this article, we report on the extent of voluntary compliance by ASA members with the Association dues structure. Comparing our findings from a random survey of ASA members with the distribution of member payments by incomebased dues category, we find a fairly high degree of noncompliance in the highest dues category. This implies, and we observe, that higher fractions of ASA members pay dues in the lower income categories than is consistent with their self-reported income. David N. Laband, author of five books and many journal articles. Richard O. Beil, author of numerous articles in management and economics journals.     

Predictors of strike voting behavior: The case of university faculty

This study examines the impact of demographic characteristics, job variables, and attitudinal factors on the strike voting behavior of faculty members at a Canadian university. The results show that married faculty members and those from single-income households were more inclined to vote against the strike. Regarding the attitudinal factors, faculty members who were satisfied with existing research facilities and were loyal to the Faculty Association were likely to favor the strike, whereas faculty who were satisfied with working conditions and with the university administration were opposed to the strike. Beliefs about unions, however, did not appear to have an influence on voting behavior. The author thanks J. Dart, A. Dastmalchian, R. Long, D. Maki, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Soziale Konfliktlinien und Wahlverhalten: Eine Analyse der Determinanten der Wahlabsicht bei Bundestagswahlen von 1969 bis 2009

The aim of this study is to analyse whether the impact of cleavages on voting behaviour in Germany has decreased over time. Additionally, the study evaluates whether the belonging to a social group is still of relevance for voting behaviour after including further theoretically derived determinants. On the basis of a pooled dataset that covers all German national election studies between 1969 and 2009, the analysis reveal that the class cleavage and the religious cleavage are still of relevance for voting behaviour in Germany, even when controlling for the voter’s candidate preference and problem-solving capacity of a political party as perceived by the voters.     

Unionism and voter turnout

Conventional wisdom suggests that union members and their families are more politically active, and more likely to vote, than nonmembers. This study presents, to our knowledge, the first systematic empirical examination of that conventional wisdom. Results suggest that union members are more likely than nonmembers to vote in a general election, and that union campaign efforts increase voter turnout generally. There is no evidence, however, that union family members are more likely to vote than nonmembers, or that union status affects an individual’s likelihood of voting in a primary election. The authors wish to thank Robert Perloff, Donna Sockell, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This study was partially supported by a Columbia University Graduate School of Business Faculty Research Fellowship and a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Business.     

Majority voting rules and the union success rate in national labor relations board representation elections

This paper simulates how the union success rate in representation elections would be affected if the NLRB reverted from its current simple-majority voting rule to its original majority-in-unit voting rule. Such a rule change would have altered 21 percent of decertification and 16 percent of certification victories over the period 1977–81, resulting in the loss of 180,400 actual or potential bargaining unit members for the union movement. Abstentions play an important role in election outcomes. Under the present voting rule unions have no clear advantage to “get out the vote” in decertification elections, but a clear disadvantage in certification elections. Under a majority-in-unit rule unions hold an advantage when they “get out the vote” in all representation elections. I would like to thank Mike Bognanno, Jim Dworkin, Paul Schumann, two reviewers, and the editor for helpful comments and David Wilson for excellent research assistance. I would also like to thank the NLRB for providing the election data tape.     

Identifying the barriers and challenges to voting by residents in nursing homes and assisted living settings

To ascertain the need for and to inform development of guidelines for voting in long-term care settings, we conducted a telephone survey of Philadelphia nursing (n = 31) and assisted living (n = 20) settings following the 2003 election. Substantial variability existed in procedures used for registration and voting, in staff attitudes, and in the estimated proportion of residents who voted (29%+/-28, range 0-100%). Residents who wanted to vote were unable to do so at nearly one-third of sites, largely due to procedural problems. Nearly two-thirds of facilities indicated they assessed residents' voting capacity before the election. However, methods differed and may have disenfranchised residents who were actually competent to vote. Current procedures in many facilities fail to protect voting rights. These data suggest that rights might be better protected if election officials took charge of registration, filing absentee ballot requests, ballot completion, and trained LTC facility staff on voters' rights and reasonable accommodations.     

Elections in Post-Communist Ukraine, 1994–2004: An Overview

The paper attempts a comprehensive and theoretically grounded analysis of all parliamentary and presidential elections carried out in Ukraine in the decade 1994 to 2004. It is organized into four sections. The first deals with the electoral system, how it came into being and has been amended, how it translates votes into seats, the "effective number" of political parties in the electorate and the legislature, and the battle over the electoral system itself during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. In the second section, voting behaviour of the Ukrainian electorate is examined. Using voting data, along with the results of public opinion surveys and reports on the conduct of the various election campaigns, the paper sorts through the relevant determinants of voting choice to identify the most pertinent ones as they operate in the Ukrainian context. Generally speaking, such determinants are: (1) background social characteristics of the voters, including the regional and ethnic factors; (2) the public's assessments of the current political and economic conditions in the country; (3) individual voters' partisan identification and opinions on prominent issues; (4) their retrospective evaluations of the incumbents; (5) leadership qualities of the contenders; and (6) prospective evaluations of parties and candidates as to their expected performance in office. To determine which of these are consistently more important is an essential aim of the paper. The third section assesses the degree to which accountability has been achieved in any of these elections—those to the Verkhovna Rada of 1994, 1998, and 2002, and the presidential elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004. A penultimate section is devoted to evaluating the policy consequences of these elections: what difference have Ukraine's elections made to policies over the past decade? In the concluding portion, a characterization of the emerging party system is given along with a summing-up on the voting behaviour of Ukrainians in the post-communist era.     

Voting to belong: the inevitability of systemic Islamophobia

In this article, I connect Muslim American voting practices to the ‘good Muslim’ trope. Tracing participation of members of Islamic Representative Organizations (IRO’s) in election cycles from 2000 to 2016, I argue that elections have been a site for Muslim Americans to negotiate a sense of belonging in the U.S. My research reveals deep cynicism about the transformative potential of elections and a sense that systemic Islamophobia (i.e. militarism and surveillance) were perceived as inevitable. IRO members opted instead to vote as a way to articulate the presence of Muslims in the U.S.; for instance, Muslims ought to ‘make a statement’ by voting against Donald Trump or for the first woman candidate. In this way, voting can be understood as an articulation of a ‘good Muslim’ subjectivity through which IRO members seek legitimacy within, rather than a dismantling of, an Islamophobic milieu.     

Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference,relationship, examples

Approval voting is the voting method recently adopted by the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Positional voting methods include the famous plurality, antiplurality, and Borda methods. We extend the inference framework of Tsetlin and Regenwetter (2003) from majority rule to approval voting and all positional voting methods. We also establish a link between approval voting and positional voting methods whenever Falmagne et al.s (1996) size-independent model of approval voting holds: In all such cases, approval voting mimics some positional voting method. We illustrate our inference framework by analyzing approval voting and ranking data, with and without the assumption of the size-independent model. For many of the existing data, including the Society for Social Choice and Welfare election analyzed by Brams and Fishburn (2001) and Saari (2001), low turnout implies that inferences drawn from such elections carry low (statistical) confidence. Whenever solid inferences are possible, we find that, under certain statistical assumptions, approval voting tends to agree with positional voting methods, and with Borda, in particular.Michel Regenwetter thanks the National Science Foundation for funding this research through NSF grant SBR 97-30076. Both authors thank the Fuqua School of Business for financially supporting their collaboration. Most of this research was done while Regenwetter was a faculty member at Fuqua. We thank Prof. Steven Brams for his valuable comments as a discussant of a previous version of this paper, given at the 2002 Public Choice meeting, and Prof. Donald Saari for his helpful comments in conversations and on another draft. We also thank the editor in charge and a referee for their valuable comments. Tsetlin acknowledges the support of the Centre for Decision Making and Risk Analysis at INSEAD.     

Relationship admitting families of candidates

A central theme in social choice is to determine when must there be a relationship among a group's sincere election rankings of several different subsets of candidates. This issue is completely resolved here for positional voting methods. Namely, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a family of subsets of candidates to determine when there is a choice of positional voting methods so that there are relationships among the election rankings. The same issue is resolved for a related family of social choice mappings. Then, in part, these necessary and sufficient conditions are used i) to analyze sequential voting procedures, ii) to show how to create new classes of axiomatic representations for social choice mappings that uniquely characterize the Borda Count, and iii) to determine the limits of indeterminacy for positional voting election outcomes.This research was supported in part by NSF grant IRI-8803505 and a Fellowship from the Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.     

Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the “perfect” equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are “perfect” equilibria that are not “proper”. However, also some “proper” outcome is eliminated by sophisticated voting, while Mertens' stable set fully satisfies such criterium, for generic plurality games. Moreover, we highlight a weakness of the simple sophisticated voting principle. Finally, we find that, for some games, sophisticated voting (and strategic stability) does not elect the Condorcet winner, neither it respects Duverger's law, even with a large number of voters. Received: 16 March 1999/Accepted: 25 September 1999     

The Role of Corporations in the 1980 U.S. Congressional Elections*

The issues of whether and how corporate campaign donations affect the operation of American elections have recently become the focus of public and scholarly debate. Using Federal Election Commission campaign finance data, this analysis identifies a link betwren contributions from business PACs and candidate success in the 1980 U.S. congressional elections. Findings also confirm an association between corporate support and legislative voting for candidates re-elected in 1980. Candidates heavily supported by business PACs during the campaign did better at the polls and were more likely to vote conservatively if elected than those not so strongly endorsed by economic interests. Results are discussed in terms of various theories of the state as well as their relevance to potential election finance reforms.     

An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition

Spatial models of voting have dominated mathematical political theory since the seminal work of Downs. The Downsian model assumes that each elector votes on the basis of his utility function which depends only on the distance between his preferred policy platform and the ones proposed by candidates. A succession of papers introduces valence issues into the model, i.e., candidates’ characteristics which are independent of the platforms they propose. So far, little is known about which of the existing utility functions used in valence models is the most empirically founded. Using a large survey run prior to the 2007 French presidential election, we evaluate and compare several spatial voting models with valence. Existing models perform poorly in fitting the data. However, strong empirical regularities emerge. This leads us to a new model of valence that we call the intensity valence model. This new model makes sense theoretically and is grounded empirically.     

Symmetry extensions of “neutrality” I: Advantage to the condorcet loser

This is the first of three papers introducing a theory for positional voting methods that determines all possible election rankings and relationships that ever could occur with a profile over all possible subsets of candidates for any specified choices of positional voting methods. As such, these results extend to all positional voting systems what was previously possible only for the Borda Count and the plurality voting systems. In this first part certain mathematical symmetries based on neutrality are used 1) to generalize the basic properties that cause the desired features of the Borda Count and 2) to describe classes of positional voting methods with new types of election relationships among the election outcomes. Some of these relationships generalize the well-known results about the positioning of a Condorcet winner/loser within a Borda ranking, but now it is possible for the Condorcet loser, rather than the winner, to have the advantage to win certain positional elections. Included among the results are axiomatic characterizations of many positional voting methods.This research was supported in part by NSF Grant IRI-9103180.     

Voting rules and election outcomes: When does the true majority win?

Majority-in-unit (MIU) and method of majority decision (MMD) voting rules are investigated to determine their impact on the outcome of union elections. A theoretical foundation is established to explain why voters may rationally choose not to vote in these settings. Numerical simulations are employed to compute the probability that the population majority wins the election. The results for these two methods are compared to see which one is most likely to award the election to the true population majority.     

Rocking the Vote: Using Personalized Messages to Motivate Voting among Young Adults

We examined a nationwide effort to encourage young adults to vote in the 1996 U.S. presidential election. During the year before the election, individuals were given the chance to sign and self-address one of two kinds of postcards pledging to vote; these cards were mailed back to the individuals within 2 weeks prior to the election. It is important to note that some individuals completed pledge cards that prompted them to provide their own reason for voting by completing the sentence, "I will vote because ______," whereas other individuals completed pledge cards that did not contain this sentence prompt. We conducted a large-scale survey of individuals who filled out pledge cards and determined that receiving a pledge card with the sentence prompt had a positive influence on voting. Moreover, this effect was found above and beyond demographic and psychological predictors of voting. Implications of these findings are discussed.