AGGREGATION AND THE STAGGERING OF PRICE CHANGES

Temporal distribution of individual price changes is of crucial importance for business cycle theory and for the microfoundations of price adjustment. While it is routinely assumed that price changes are staggered over time, both theory and evidence are ambiguous. We use a large Belgian data set to analyze whether price changes are staggered or synchronized. We find that the more aggregated are the data, the closer is the distribution to perfect staggering. The results hold both for aggregation across products, and across locations. They are consistent with an economy in which idiosyncratic shocks are the main cause of price changes. (JEL E30, E31, D40)     

ASSET DYNAMICS,LIQUIDITY, AND INEQUALITY IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS

The Kiyotaki and Wright model has exerted a considerable influence on the monetary search literature. We argue that the model also delivers important insights into a broader range of macroeconomic and development issues. The analysis studies how market frictions and the liquidity of assets affect the distribution of income. Experiments illustrate how the economy adjusts to shocks to asset returns and to the matching technology. They also deal with long‐run transition. An experiment interprets the reversal of fortune hypothesis as a situation in which an economy with a low‐return asset takes over a similar economy with a high‐return asset. (JEL C61, C63, E41, E27, D63)     

CAPITAL CONTROLS,MONETARY POLICY,AND BALANCE SHEETS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY

We develop a small open economy, New Keynesian model that incorporates a financial accelerator in combination with liability dollarization. Applying a Ramsey‐type analysis, we compare the welfare implications of an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates and an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates. In an economy without the financial accelerator, an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates is superior to an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates. In contrast, in an economy with the financial accelerator, an optimal capital control under fixed exchange rates yields higher welfare than an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates.(JEL E44, E52, F32, F38, F41)     

POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)     

AN OPEN‐ECONOMY MODEL WITH MONEY,ENDOGENOUS SEARCH,AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper describes a new monetary open‐economy model where firms have market power due to search frictions in the goods market, and endogenous search effort by consumers mitigates this market power. The optimal inflation rate generally depends positively on the cost of search effort, the cost of firm entry, and the cost of trade. Higher inflation always improves a country's terms‐of‐trade against its trading partners. I also characterize a general class of matching processes which offer a novel approach to modeling firm sales. (JEL D43, E40, F12)     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MONETARY POLICY,AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FAVAR MODEL

This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation to the U.S. economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression model using monthly data of 148 variables for the post–Bretton Woods period of 1973–2017. Exchange rate shock is identified to reflect exogenous disturbances to the foreign exchange market, and movements in exchange rate that are not accounted for by changes in the U.S. monetary policy. We find that depreciation is expansionary and inflationary to the broad U.S. economy, the current account improves over time conforming to the J‐curve theory, and monetary policy is leaning against the wind. (JEL E3, E5, F31, F32, F41)     

ON ENDOGENOUS BUSINESS CYCLES UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO VARIETY AND SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITY

We examine the theoretical as well as quantitative interrelations between endogenous business cycles, increasing returns to product variety and sector‐specific productive externalities within a two‐sector real business cycle model. In a calibrated version of our benchmark closed‐economy setting, the threshold level of investment externalities needed for equilibrium indeterminacy is found to be monotonically increasing in the degree of market competitiveness. We also study the model's local stability properties (i) when the parameters that govern the level of intermediate‐good producers' market power and the strength of variety effects are disentangled; and (ii) in the context of a small open economy. (JEL E30, E32, O41)     

CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

MONETARY POLICY AND ANTI‐CYCLICAL BANK CAPITAL REGULATION

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 revived attention given to booms and busts in bank credit, and their effects on real activity. This interest sparked two different strands of research in macro. The first one focuses on monetary policy in the context of financial frictions. The second studies capital regulation in banking. To the best of our knowledge, so far these two topics have mostly been studied in isolation from each other. Thus, we still lack an understanding of how monetary policy and bank capital regulation interact in the presence of financial fragility. This paper aims to contribute to furthering this understanding. Specifically, we ask how the monetary policy rule should look like in the presence of cyclical capital requirements. We extend the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with bank capital in Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero by introducing price rigidities in the spirit of the New‐Keynesian literature. We find that: First, anti‐cyclical requirements have important stabilization properties relative to the case of constant requirements. This is true for all types of fluctuations that we study, which include those caused by productivity, preference, fiscal, monetary, and financial shocks. Second, output and consumption volatilities present in the no regulation economy can be recovered with anti‐cyclical requirements as long as the policy rate responds only slightly to credit spreads. Third, monetary policy rules that respond to credit conditions also perform better in terms of welfare. (JEL E32, E44)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BITCOIN

The recent proliferation of bitcoin has been a boon for users but might pose problems for governments. Indeed, some governments have already taken steps to ban or discourage the use of bitcoin. In a model with endogenous matching and random consumption preferences, we find multiple monetary equilibria including one in which bitcoin coexists with official currency. We then identify the conditions under which government transactions policy might deter the use of bitcoin. We show that such a policy becomes more difficult if some users strictly prefer bitcoin because they can avoid other users holding the official currency in the matching process. (JEL C78, E41, E42, E50)     

LENDING RELATIONSHIPS AND MONETARY POLICY

Financial intermediation and bank spreads are the important elements in the analysis of business cycle transmission and monetary policy. We present a simple framework that introduces lending relationships, a relevant feature of financial intermediation that has been so far neglected in the monetary economics literature, into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with staggered prices and cost channels. Our main findings are (a) banking spreads move countercyclically generating amplified output responses, (b) spread movements are important for monetary policymaking even when a standard Taylor Rule is employed, (c) modifying the policy rule to include a banking spread adjustment improves stabilization of shocks and increases welfare when compared to rules that only respond to output gap and inflation, and finally (d) the presence of strong lending relationships in the banking sector can lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium forcing the Central Bank to react to spread movements. (JEL E44, E52, G21)     

FISCAL STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL EXCHANGE RATE PASS‐THROUGH

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)     

CONSUMER CREDIT,LIQUIDITY, AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY POLICY

That the lending channel is alive and well for consumer lending is at first glance a compelling notion given the growth in consumer credit. However, this paper demonstrates with disaggregated monthly consumer credit data that the consumer loan‐supply effect has diminished over time. Contrary to assumptions motivating the lending channel, after the mid‐1980s, households are not constrained in accessing nonrevolving or revolving bank loans in response to a monetary shock. The findings of this paper have important implications for research on the monetary transmission mechanism beyond the lending channel and for business cycle research in general. (JEL E44, E50, E60, C32)     

THE CYCLICALITY OF PRICE‐COST MARGINS IN BANKING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS DETERMINANTS

We study the determinants of the cyclical behavior of banks' price‐cost margins in the United States banking sector, using time series quarterly data for the period 1979–2005. We contribute to the literature by building an empirical model of the countercyclical behavior of these margins first documented by Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero (2010a) . Doing so we are able to explore potential explanations for this behavior, and to show that margins are consistently countercyclical, even after controlling for the effects of credit risk and monetary policy. As a mechanism for the propagation of aggregate shocks, the countercyclical nature of margins in banking can provide additional support to stabilization policy. (JEL E32, E44, G21)     

DELIBERATION AND LEARNING IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES

We use records from Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings to investigate the importance of deliberation and learning in monetary policy decision making in the period from 1970 to 1978 when Arthur Burns served as Chairman. We first propose a model of Bayesian learning in which FOMC members learn from each other as they sequentially reveal their policy preferences in a committee meeting. Then, as an alternative, we investigate a model in which members defer to an emerging consensus. Neither model is supported by the data, suggesting that within‐meeting deliberation might have had little effect on the quality of monetary policy decisions in the Burns era. (JEL E520, E580)     

MONEY AND PRODUCT QUALITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

This article examines the effects of money on product quality, as well as the price pattern of heterogeneous quality goods, in a search‐theoretical monetary model with divisible money and divisible commodities. We establish the existence and uniqueness/multiplicity of monetary equilibrium in several different cases. The steady‐state equilibrium of our model displays several properties that are absent or distinct from those of previous studies. In particular, we find that under egalitarian bargaining, the Friedman rule cannot achieve socially efficient allocation due to asymmetric information. We find that the price of informed high‐quality goods is higher than the price of uninformed quality goods. We also find that an increase in inflation can improve product quality. (JEL E40)     

IS THE PRICE ELASTICITY OF MONEY DEMAND ALWAYS UNITY?

Including both monetary gold and nonmonetary gold in a standard money‐in‐utility model, we establish a presumption that the price elasticity of money demand should be less than 1 under commodity standards. Applying cointegration methods to data of the world, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we find support for the new theory. (JEL E41, E42)     

GOVERNMENT DEBT‐THRESHOLD CONTRACTS

Politicians tend to push the amount of public debt beyond socially desirable levels in order to increase their reelection chances. We develop a model that provides a new explanation for this behavior: office holders undertake debt‐financed public projects, but postpone the timing of part of the output to the next term. This makes it difficult to replace them. As a consequence, the office holders' reelection chances rise—as does public debt. As a potential remedy for this inefficiency, we allow candidates for public office to offer government debt‐threshold contracts. Such a contract contains an upper limit for government debt and the sanction that an office holder violating this limit cannot stand for reelection. We show that such competitively offered contracts contain low debt levels that limit debt financing and improve the citizens' welfare. When negative macroeconomic events occur, government debt‐threshold contracts may be violated, and the economy is stabilized. (JEL: D7, D82, H4)     

TEMPTATION‐DRIVEN BEHAVIOR AND TAXATION: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN A LIFE‐CYCLE MODEL

This paper examines the impact of labor and capital income taxes in a stochastic overlapping generations (OLG) economy where agents face borrowing constraints and their behavior is temptation driven. We quantitatively establish that the existence of temptation in preferences may function as an opposing mechanism to modeling choices, such as liquidity constraints, life‐cycle structure, and idiosyncratic earnings risks, that are critical in delivering a positive capital income tax rate. We show that a sufficiently large measure of individuals having self‐control preferences, or alternatively, a sufficiently high cost of exercising self‐control, puts downward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. (JEL E21, E62, H55)     

Goal-oriented agents in a market

We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.